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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political career of Marie de Guise in Scotland during the period 
1548-1560. Challenging the conventional interpretation of Guise as the defender of 
Catholicism whose regime climaxed with the Reformation Rebellion, this study shows 
that she was, on the contraty, a shrewd and effective politique, whose own dynastic 
interests and those of her daughter took precedence over her personal and religious 
convictions. Dynasticism, not Catholicism, was the prime motivational force behind her 
policy and it is from this perspective that her regime is considered. 
The eight chapters of the thesis focus on two main themes. Firstly, that Marie de 
Guise's dynasticism, and political career as a whole, were inextricably associated with 
those of Mary, Queen of Scots, whose Scottish sovereignty, Catholic claim to the 
English throne and betrothal to the Dauphin of France carried with it notions of Franco-
British Imperialism. And secondly, that Marie de Guise's policy in Scotland was 
dictated by European dynastic politics and, specifically, by the Franco-Scottish alliance 
of 1548-1560. Significantly more than a betrothal contract, the treaty of Haddington 
established a 'protectoral' relationship between the 'auld allies' whereby Henri II was 
able to assume control over Scottish militaty affairs, diplomacy and foreign policy as 
the 'protector' of Scotland. Guise's assumption of the regency in 1554 completed the 
process of establishing French power in Scotland, which was later consolidated, albeit 
briefly, by the marriage of Mary Stewart to Franyois Valois in 1558. The overall 
success of Guise's dynastic and domestic policies, however, was limited. International 
considerations undermined her policies and weakened her administration. Yet the 
collapse of her regime came not with the outbreak of the Reformation Rebellion or her 
alleged defeat at the hands of the Congregation. Only with her death, did Marie de 
Guise's regime and French power in Scotland truly collapse. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
List of Abbreviations 
Introduction 
Mary Stewart and the Treaty of Haddington: the Foundations of 
a Franco-British Empire 
Henri II's Protectorate of Scotland and the Establishment of 
French Power (1550-1552) 
The Final Building Block: Marie de Guise's Ascent to Power in 
Scotland 
Mary Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial Threat: Anglo-Scottish 
Relations (1553-1556) 
Marie de Guise's Administration and Policy in Scotland 
The Borders, Highlands and Western Isles 
War and Marriage 
8 The Reformation Rebellion: the Collapse of Marie de Guise 
Regime in Scotland? 
Conclusion 
Appendix 
I 
11 
IV 
1 
36 
80 
127 
166 
198 
230 
284 
335 
362 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis would not have been possible without the financial support of the School of 
History and International Relations and the Department of Scottish History, or the 
assistance given to me by the staff of the Scottish Record Office, National Library of 
Scotland, Archives de Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres and Special Collections 
Department at the University Library, St. Andrews. Recognition must also be given to 
the many individuals who assisted me in numerous capacities throughout my 
postgraduate career. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Nonnan Macdougall, Dr. 
Hamish Scott, Professor Keith Brown, Professor John Guy, Marjory Bruce and, 
especially, Dr. Helen MacDonald and Dr. Jane Dawson for their invaluable help and 
endless stream of encouragement and support. The same is also true of my colleagues 
in the University Library. The patience and flexibility of the 'triumvirate' in Special 
Collections (also known as Christine Gascoigne, Dr. Nonnan Reid and CilIa Jackson) 
added considerable ease to a long and, at times, arduous journey, while the friendship of 
my fellow postgraduates made it all the more pleasurable. In this, special mention must 
be made to Roland Tanner, Michael Penman, Linda Dunbar, Triona Logan, Ben 
Sanders, Augustine Kelly, Stuart Foster, Philip Conner, Natalie Mears, Alan Bryson and 
Margaret Beckett. But my deepest and most heartfelt thanks must go to my supervisor, 
Dr. Roger Mason. His patience, understanding, honesty and wry sense of humour made 
this whole experience worthwhile, not least to say bearable. As a scholar, he was an 
immeasurable source of inspiration and, without him, the thesis would be all the poorer. 
But it is to my family that lowe the greatest debt of gratitude. First thanks must go to 
Elizabeth and Graeme Ritchie for their generosity, hospitality and tolerance. Words 
cannot express how truly appreciative I am for all they have done. I am similarly 
indebted to Ronald and Robert Mitchell and, especially, to my sisters, Fiona and Alison, 
for their much needed support and encouragement across the miles. Above all, though, 
I would like to thank my parents, Robert and Doreen. They have been a constant source 
of inspiration and a font of much needed love and moral and financial support - and it is 
to them, that I dedicate this thesis. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Apart from those listed below, all abbreviations and contractions in the text have been 
taken from 'List of Abbreviated Titles of the Printed Sources of Scottish History to 
1560', Scottish Historical Review, supplement (October 1963), pp.vi-xxix. 
Adv.MSS 
AE 
APC 
BL 
Ch. 
Cor. Pol. 
CSP Foreign 
CSP Ireland 
CSP Rome 
CSP Spain 
Advocates' Manuscripts 
Archives de Ministere des Affairs Etrangeres, Paris. 
Acts of the Privy Council of England, ed. J.R. Dasent 
et aI, New Series, 46 vols. (London, 1890-1964). 
British Library, London. 
Charter 
Correspondence Politique 
Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, eds. W.B. 
Tumball and l Stevenson et al (London, 1861-
1950. 
Calendar of State Papers relating to Ireland of the 
reigns of Henry IIL Edward VL Mary, and 
Elizabeth, 1509-1573, ed. H. C. Hamilton 
(London, 1860). 
Calendar of State Papers, relating to English Affairs 
preserved principally at Rome in the Vatican 
Archives and Library, ed. lM. Rigg (London, 
1916). 
Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers, 
relating to the negotiations between England 
Spain, ed. lM. Thomson et al (London, 1862-
1954). 
ii 
CSP Venice 
DNB 
E 
HER 
fo(s). 
GD 
LPL 
L & P of Henry VIII 
MS(S) 
NLS 
Papal Negotiations 
PRO 
SP 
SRO 
Statutes of the Realm 
Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating 
to English affairs, existing in the Archives and 
Collections of Venice, ed. R. Brown et al 
(London, 1867-97). 
Dictionary o/National Biography, ed. L. Stephen et 
al (London, 1885-1903). 
Exchequer 
English Historical Review 
folio(s) 
Gift and Deposit 
Lambeth Palace Library, London. 
Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the 
reign of Henry VIII, ed. lS. Brewer et al 
(London, 1862-1932). 
Manuscript( s) 
National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh. 
Papal Negotiations with Mary Queen of Scots 
during her reign in Scotland, 1561-1567, ed. lH. 
Pollen (Scottish History Society, Edinburgh, 
1901). 
Public Record Office, London. 
State Papers 
Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh. 
The Statutes of the Realm, ed. A. Luders et al 
(London, 1810-28). 
iii 
INTRODUCTION 
On 21 October 1559, the Reformation Rebellion ceased to be a Protestant revolt against 
Catholicism that was exclusively concerned, at least publicly, with the establishment of 
the reformed kirk in Scotland. The Lords of the Congregation's 'Act of Suspension' 
added a nationalist dimension to the rebellion that was now directed specifically against 
the Queen Regent, Marie de Guise, and the establishment of French power in Scotland. I 
In their act deposing Marie de Guise from the regency, the Congregation charged the 
Queen Regent with the 'interprysed destructioun of thair said commoun-weall, and 
overthrow of the libertie of thair native cuntree'. 2 She had revealed her true intentions 
by such acts as building and fortifying strongholds, appointing Frenchmen to key 
offices of state and, most obviously, by bringing in French troops in August and 
September 1559. What the Congregation failed to mention, of course, was that these 
French reinforcements had been sent to quell their armed rebellion against duly 
constituted temporal authority. Nevertheless, the fact that these troops had arrived in 
Scotland with their 'wyves and barnes' so soon after Mary, Queen of Scots' husband, 
Fran90is, had succeeded his father to become the King of France, was used by the 
Congregation to infer that Scotland's future as an independent kingdom would be short-
lived in the union of the French and Scottish crowns. 'Enormities' such as these clearly 
showed that Marie de Guise's true political objective was the 'manifest conqueast of our 
1 Knox, Works, I, pp. 444-9 and History, I, pp. 251-5; R.A. Mason (ed.), Knox: On Rebellion 
(Cambridge, 1994), pp. 171-4. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.444 and History, I, p.251; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.17l. 
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native rowmes and countree ... to suppress the commoun-weall, and libertie of our 
native countree, [and] to mak us and our posteritie slaves to strangearis for ever' .1 
Rhetoric such as this typified the propaganda disseminated by the Congregation 
during the Reformation Rebellion. Its emphasis on conquest and French domination 
was designed to play on the xenophobia of the Scots and establish the Congregation as a 
party of patriots, being the 'borne Counsallouris' of the realm and the 'swome 
protectouris and defendaris' of the commonweal. 2 By identifying themselves with 
freedom, liberty and patriotism, the Congregation not only hoped to secure widespread 
political support for their rebellion, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the public 
and military support of Elizabeth I. 
Although it is widely recognised by historians that the Congregation engaged in 
a war of words against Marie de Guise, very little has been done to explore the extent to 
which their propaganda bore any relation to the facts. The reason for this is 
symptomatic of a larger problem - neither Marie de Guise nor her political career in 
Scotland has been the subject of in-depth study or historical analysis. Only two works 
have been completely devoted to Marie de Guise. Rosalind Marshall's biography,3 
however, is an overly romanticised literary work, full of sweeping generalisations and 
oversimplifications, while Marianne McKerlie's4 is similarly devoid of any 
sophisticated analysis, if not more so. Any attention Marie de Guise does receive in 
I Knox, Works, I, p.445 and History, I, p.252; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.l72. 
2 ~ox, Works, I, p.448 and His t01Y , I, p.254; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.174. 
3 R.K. Marshall, Mmy 0/ Guise (London, 1977). 
4 E.M.H. McKerlie, Mary o/Guise-Lorraine, Queen o/Scotland (London, 1931). 
v 
Introduction 
modem scholarship tends to be in relation to her family in France, 'les Guises',! her 
daughter, Mary, Queen of Scots,2 andlor the Scottish Reformation.3 As a result, her 
political career in Scotland from 1548 to 1560 has not only been the victim of selective 
examination, but also gross misunderstanding - primarily because it is conventionally 
used to establish the context of, and pretext for, the Reformation Rebellion of 1559-60. 
The tendency of historians, such as Gordon Donaldson, to read history 
backwards and examine Marie de Guise's regime within a religious framework has been 
a convenient way to justify the Congregation's rebellion and to account for their 
ostensible victory. This is largely due to the fact that modem scholarship concerning 
the Reformation Rebellion is still heavily reliant on John Knox's version of events (and 
perception of Guise) contained within his History of the Reformation in Scotland, and 
other partisan sources such as the English State Papers. As a result, the negative 
imagery surrounding Marie de Guise and her regency has, on the whole, been reinforced 
and perpetuated over time. While Jenny Wormald and Michael Lynch have gone some 
way to free Guise of her historiographical stereotype as the defender of Catholicism 
I S. Carroll, Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause 
in Normandy (Cambridge, 1998); r.- M. Constant, Les Guises (Paris, 1984); H. Noel Williams, The Brood 
of False Lorraine: The House of Guise (London, 1914); H. Fomeron, Les Dues de Guise et Leur Epoque 
(Paris, 1877); R. de Bouille, Histoire des Dues de Guise (Paris, 1849); G. de Pimodan, La Mere des 
Guises: Antoinette de Bourbon 1494-1583 (Paris, 1925); F.r. Baumgartner, Hemy II: King of France, 
1547-1559 (Durham and London, 1988); 1. Cloulas, Henri II (Paris, 1985). 
2 J. Wormald, Mary, Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure (London, 1988); G. Donaldson, All the Queen's 
Men: Power and Politics in Mary Stewart's Scotland (London, 1983); A. Fraser, Mary, Queen of Scots 
(London, 1971 edn.); D. Hay Fleming, Mmy, Queen of Scots (London, 1898 edn.); M. Lee, James 
Stewart, Earl of Moray (New York, 1953). 
3 Donaldson, The Scottish Reformation (Cambridge, 1960); I.B. Cowan, The Scottish Reformation: 
Church and SOCiety in sixteenth century Scotland (London, 1982) M. Lynch, Edinburgh and the 
Reformation (Edinburgh, 1981); F. Bardgett, Scotland Reformed: The Reformation in Angus and the 
Mearns (Edinburgh, 1989); M.H.E. Sanderson, Ayrshire and the Reformation: People and Change, 
1490-1600 (Edinburgh, 1997). 
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whose political career climaxed with the Reformation Rebellion,! Donaldson's 
assessment still remains largely unchallenged. 2 
By reading history forwards from the perspective of Marie de Guise herself, 
however, an entirely new picture develops. A reassessment of the sources traditionally 
used for this period of Scottish history reveals that Guise's political career in Scotland 
post-1548 must be examined within the wider context of European dynastic politics and, 
specifically, within the context of the Franco-Scottish alliance of 1548-1560. 
Consequently, this thesis has expanded the source base to include French and English 
archival material, largely in the form of diplomatic and state papers held in the French 
Archives de Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, the English Public Record Office and 
various manuscript collections in the Briti'sh Library. 3 The sheer volume of pertinent 
material in these depositories, however, has not only highlighted the truly extensive 
nature of this topic, which exceeds the confines of a single thesis, but also made it 
necessary to limit the number of sources consulted. Despite these constraints, these 
sources nevertheless reveal that the conventional religious interpretation of Marie de 
Guise's regime is overblown - dynasticism, not Catholicism, was the over-riding 
characteristic of her political career in Scotland. As such, Marie de Guise emerges as an 
extremely shrewd and effective politique whose own dynastic interests and those of her 
I Wormald, Mmy, Queen of Scots, pp. 76-101 and Court, Kirk, and Community: Scotland 1470-1625 
(Edinburgh, 1981), pp. 109-21; Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, pp. 68-89. 
2 Donaldson, All the Queen's Men, pp. 25, 27-9, 33-4 and Scotland: James V-James VII (Edinburgh, 
1994 edn.), pp. 63-106. 
3 Some of the material contained within the Correspondence Politique and Mbnoires et Documents 
Angleterre series has been printed in Alexandre Teulet (ed.), Relations Politiques de la France et de 
I'Espagne avec l'Ecosse au XVI" Siecle (Paris, 1862) and Papiers d'etat, pieces et documents in edits ou 
peu connus relatifs a I 'histoire de I 'Ecosse au XVIeme Siecle (Paris, 1852). 
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daughter took precedence over her personal and religious convictions. It also becomes 
clear that, contrary to the attestations of the Congregation, Marie de Guise was not 
solely responsible for the establishment of French power in Scotland. Rather, this 
process began in 1548 with the signing of the treaty of Haddington and came as a direct 
result of Henri II's 'protectorate' of Scotland. More importantly, it was a process that 
was sanctioned and endorsed by the Scottish political elite itself. 
This thesis, therefore, is the first full-scale study of Marie de Guise and her 
political career in Scotland. While it is in no way definitive or exhaustive, it 
nevertheless raises and examines some fundamental points that modem scholarship has 
failed to consider. The first and foremost point is the nature of the Franco-Scottish 
alliance during the minority of Mary, Queen of Scots. While the treaty of Haddington 
provided for the dynastic union of the French and Scottish crowns with the betrothal of 
Mary Stewart and Franyois Valois, its significance lay in two other areas. As is 
discussed in Chapter I, the treaty of Haddington also laid the foundations for a Franco-
British Empire. Mary Stewart's Catholic claim to the English throne, strengthened by 
Henry VIII's break from Rome and the repeated failure of Tudor monarchs to secure the 
line of succession by producing heirs to the throne, made it a very real possibility that 
she alone could unite the crowns of Scotland, England and Ireland under one Catholic 
crown. The imperial opportunities with which Mary Stewart's dynastic position 
provided Henri II through marriage to his son, therefore, were impressive and a prime 
motivating factor behind his Scottish policy as a whole. 
The possible realisation of Valois notions of Franco-British Empire was not the 
only advantage the treaty of Haddington afforded Henri. On a more immediate and 
Vlll 
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practical level, it created a 'protectoral' relationship between the 'auld allies' whereby 
Henri became the 'protector' of Scotland and Scotland a 'protectorate' of France. 
Henri's protection of Scotland and her queen justified and facilitated the establishment 
of French power in Scotland prior to the union of the crowns. As a result, the French 
King was able to maintain a permanent military foothold in a kingdom that served as the 
backdoor to England and, as we shall see in Chapter II, assume control over Scottish 
diplomacy and foreign policy. But it was Marie de Guise's control of the Scottish 
governrnent in April 1554 that was the final and, arguably, most important part of the 
process establishing French power in Scotland. 
Chapter III charts Marie de Guise's ascent to power, which was in no way 
certain after Mary Stewart left Scotland to become an absentee monarch in 1548. 
Indeed, it was commonly presumed that Guise would accompany her daughter to France 
now that her future seemed so secure. Having been committed to seeing the Anglo-
Scottish conflict resolved, Guise stayed on but there is some evidence to suggest that her 
return to France in 1550 was originally intended to be a permanent homecoming. The 
Scots who accompanied the Queen Dowager to France to celebrate Henri's triumphant 
entry into Rouen, however, seem to have been intent on seeing Guise return to Scotland 
for the 'executioun of justice and [the] ordouring of the cuntre' as opposed to some 
French gentleman acting as a viceroy.' Although the Scots may have had a say in who 
they wanted to govern during Mary, Queen of Scots' majority, it was Henri, in his 
capacity as 'protector', who ultimately decided when his future daughter-in-law reached 
1 RPC, I, p.90; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,225, p.61. 
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her perfect age and who would govern her kingdom during her majority rule. In 
December 1553, Henri officially informed the Duc de Chatelherault that his tenure as 
regent was over and that the Queen Dowager would be replacing him.! Like Marie de 
Guise's regency as a whole, the timing of Henri's decision was influenced by the 
international situation. 
Chapters IV to VIII relate specifically to Marie de Guise's regime in Scotland, 
which, for the first time, is set within the wider context of Euro-British dynastic politics. 
The Anglo-Imperial dynastic alliance that was forged with Mary Tudor's marriage to 
Philip of Spain brought the Habsburg-Valois conflict to the Anglo-Scottish Border. As 
a result, Guise's administration was overwhelmingly concerned with matters of defence 
and national security. The Tudor-Habsburg threat also highlighted the need for 
domestic stability and, in particular, law and order. While this was particularly true of 
the Borders and Highlands, the general aims of Guise's policy sought to effect a strong, 
yet personal monarchy by advancing the interests of the crown at the expense of local 
jurisdictions throughout all of Scotland. Like her Stewart predecessors, Guise's policy 
came in direct response to the events that had destabilised Scottish society and which 
the Anglo-Imperial threat served only to exacerbate. International considerations, 
however, coupled with the relatively short duration of her regency prevented the 
successful execution of Marie de Guise's domestic policy as a whole. 
For many members of the Scottish political community, the international 
situation also highlighted the need for their queen to be married. As we shall see in 
1 NLS, Adv.MSS, 33.1.9, fYv. 
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Chapter VII, the Scots were increasingly reluctant to finance the Queen Regent's 
defensive policies simply on account of Henri's foreign policy or, for that matter, on the 
strength of a protectoral alliance. England's declaration of war against France and entry 
into the Habsburg-Valois conflict in June 1557 was the catalyst that resulted in the 
marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots to the Dauphin of France in April 1558. The Franco-
Scottish dynastic alliance marked the fulfilment of Marie de Guise's dynastic policies, 
while the Three Estates' consent to grant the crown matrimonial to the Dauphin brought 
Henri one step closer to realising his imperial ambitions. The death of Mary Tudor in 
November 1558 and the dubious legality of the accession of her Protestant half-sister, 
Elizabeth, saw the launch of a vigorous campaign on the part of the French King to 
advance the Catholic claim of Mary Stewart to the English throne, which by virtue of 
the crown matrimonial was also that of her husband, Franyois. 
Finally, this thesis challenges the predominant view that Marie de Guise needed 
to buy off and/or conciliate her Protestant subjects in order to achieve her dynastic 
objectives. This challenge is comprised of three main arguments. Firstly, that from 
1548 to 1551, French patronage was distributed by Guise to Scots of all religious and 
political persuasions - not just those with pro-English and/or pro-reform sympathies. 
Secondly, that Protestants enjoyed key offices of state alongside their Catholic peers in 
Marie de Guise's administration - an administration which, contrary to the 
Congregation's assertions, was still dominated by the Scots. Of greater significance still 
is the final argument that shows how leading Protestants, such as the Earl of Argyll, 
Lord James Stewart and John, Erskine of Dun, were extensively involved in every 
aspect of Mary, Queen of Scots' marriage to the Dauphin. By adopting an inclusive and 
xi 
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accommodating position in matters of religion, Guise assured her Protestant subjects 
that they would not be excluded or persecuted on account of their faith as a result of the 
union of the French and Scottish Catholic crowns, nor that the reform movement was 
incompatible with her dynastic policies. It would be wrong, however, to presume that 
Protestantism was a major preoccupation for Guise during her administration. Religion 
played a decidedly secondary role to her dynastic interests and to the more pressing and 
immediate concerns of defence and national security. But, as a pragmatic politique, 
Guise was not above altering her religious policy if international considerations made 
such a change necessary for the protection and/or advancement of her dynastic interests 
- as was the case in 1558-9, when the dubious legality of Elizabeth Tudor's accession 
launched a vigorous campaign to advance Mary Stewart's Catholic claim to the English 
succeSSIOn. 
It is because of Marie de Guise's politique position in matters of religion and of 
the support Scotland's reformers gave to the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance that the 
Queen Regent viewed the professed motives of the Congregation's rebellion in 1559-60 
with great suspicion. Chapter VIII outlines the course of events up to and including the 
outbreak of the Reformation Rebellion and, for the first time, charts the various 
reactions and responses of the French and Scottish governments to the civil unrest in 
Scotland. For her part, Marie de Guise consistently maintained that the Congregation's 
rebellion was not a revolt of conscience, but rather a rebellion against the established 
authority. Throughout 1559, Guise's suspicions were confirmed by the Congregation's 
actions - most notably, by the defection of Chate1herault to assume the nominal 
leadership of the Congregation with his son, James, 3rd earl of Arran, and their 
xii 
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subsequent' Act of Suspension', deposing Marie de Guise from the regency. While the 
Queen Regent had the ideological, constitutional and legal edge over the Congregation 
throughout most of 1559, the formal intervention of England into the conflict in 1559/60 
and, more decisively, the failure of France to respond to this intervention with adequate 
military reinforcements, irrevocably weakened the foundations of Marie de Guise's 
administration. Only with her death in June 1560, however, would its collapse be 
complete. 
xiii 
CHAPTER I 
Mary Stewart and the Treaty of Haddington: the Foundations of a Franco-British 
Empire 
Like her daughter, Marie de Guise-Lorraine's importance in sixteenth-century Europe 
lay not so much in what she did as in who she was. In her forty-five years, she was no 
less than a Regent, a Queen Consort, a Duchess and, most famously of all perhaps, a 
Queen Mother. Yet, none of these public personae accurately captures the essence of 
Marie de Guise or, for that matter, identifies the driving force behind all her actions. In 
a life of ever-changing roles and circumstances, the only constant in Marie's life was the 
fact that, above all else, she was a 'Guise'. Born on 20 November 1515 to Claude de 
Guise and Antoinette de Bourbon, Marie was the eldest member of the first generation 
of the House of Guise, a scion of the princely House of Lorraine and, arguably, the most 
powerful dynasty in sixteenth-century France. I This prestigious lineage not only served 
as the foundation for Marie de Guise's own dynastic importance, but also as the pretext 
for her family's over-riding dynastic ambition and for her career in Scotland as a 
dynastic politique. 
Dynasticism was central to the prestige of 'les Guises' in France and throughout 
Europe as a whole. The Princes of Lorraine, an independent duchy on the Franco-
Imperial border, boasted Charlemagne and the Carolingian Kings of France as 
ancestors. The arms of a host of royal houses also bore the alerions of Lorraine. Those 
I For the ancestry of the House of Guise and their establishment in France, see Bouille, Histoire des Dues 
de Guise, I, pp. 1-72; Fomeron, Les Dues de Guise, I, pp. 1-37; Constant, Les Guises, pp. 20-2; Pimodan, 
La mere des Guises, pp. 1-98; Carroll, Noble Power' during the French Wars of Religion, pp. 14-25; 
Marshall, Mmy a/Guise, pp. 15-39. 
Chapter I: Mary Stewart and the Treaty 0/ Haddington. 
of Hungary, Naples, Jerusalem, Aragon, Anjou, Gueldres, Flanders and Bar were all 
represented, while the Princes themselves preferred to be styled as the 'Kings of Sicily'. 
When, in 1506, Marie's grandfather, Rene II of Lorraine, stipulated that his second son, 
Claude, was to become a naturalised Frenchman and take possession of Lorraine's 
extensive landholdings in France, of which Guise, Aumale, Mayenne, Joinville, Elboeuf 
and Harcourt were just a few, the prestige of the newly created House of Guise was 
virtually instantaneous. l The fact that 'les Guises' also happened to excel on the battle 
field and proved themselves to be exceptional ecclesiastics and statesmen served only to 
enhance and consolidate their position at the French Court - despite their status as 
foreigners. 2 For Marie de Guise, this prestige secured her a marriage, firstly, to Louis 
d'Orleans, duc de Longueville, and, secondly, to James V of Scotland. The significance 
of these marriages lay not only in their obvious stature, but also in the fact that, having 
been originally destined for a cloistered life, Marie's religious convictions were to take a 
back seat to Guise dynastic ambition. 
Up until the age of fourteen, Marie received an intense Christian education from 
her paternal and exceptionally devout grandmother, Philippa de Gueldres (James Ill's 
first cousin).3 Following the death of Rene II in 1508, Philippa was drawn into a life of 
holy simplicity and entered the Convent of Pont-au-Mousson on 15 December 1519. 
For twenty-seven years she lived an austere life as a Poor Clare against the objections of 
I Bouille, Des Ducs de Guise, I, pp. 45-9. 
2 For more on the Guise ecclesiastics, see J. Baker, 'The House of Guise and the church, c. 1550-1558' 
(unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1995); RO. Evennett, The Cardinal of Lorraine and the 
Council of Trent: A Study in the Counter-Reformation (Cambridge, 1930); J. Bergin, 'The decline and 
fall of the House of Guise as an ecclesiastical dynasty' , Historical Journal, 5 (1982), pp. 782-803. 
3 See Marshall, Mmy o/Guise, pp. 19-32 for a discussion of Marie's childhood and education. 
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her family, and despite a papal dispensation excusing her from such austerities on 
account of her noble standing. 1 Under the tutelage of her grandmother, therefore, Marie 
became fully immersed into the ascetic life of a Poor Clare - attending all religious 
ceremonies and partaking in domestic chores such as gardening, cooking and cleaning. 
Although it is not known when Marie entered the Convent to begin her education, her 
experience at Pont-au-Mousson during her formative years must have had a profound 
influence on her personal faith. But, as we shall see in Chapters VII and VIII, it is 
impossible to determine the extent of these convictions based solely on her religious 
policy in Scotland - throughout her regency, Marie would display extraordinary 
tolerance towards the reform movement and implement a policy of accommodation 
towards her Protestant SUbjects. 
Antoine I's decision to withdraw his niece from the Convent at Pont-au-
Mousson in order to prepare her for a life at Court set an important precedent for 
Marie's future political career in Scotland - and for her brothers', Franyois (the future 
Duc de Guise) and Charles (the future Cardinal de Lorraine), during the reigns of Henri 
II and Franyois II. Through the actions of their father, Claude, 'les Guises' had become 
established as the 'protectors of Catholicism'. Claude's success in suppressing the 
Lutheran inspired peasant revolts of 1525 in Lorraine, earned him title 'defenseur du 
catholicism et de l'ordre social' by the Parlement of Paris and Pope Clement VII.2 For 
I Marshall, Mmy de Guise, pp. 21-2; McKerlie, Mmy of Guise Lorraine, p.22. 
2 In 1525, the socio-political effects of Lutheranism in Germany took the form of peasant revolts against 
the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V. Lorraine was also invaded and Antoine I appealed to his brother 
for French military intervention. The Regency Council in France, however, forbade Claude to use a 
national army to defend an independent duchy. But, on the advice of his staunchly Catholic mother, 
Philippa de Gueldres, Claude ignored the Regency Council's order and led an expeditionary force into 
Lorraine. Successful in his mission, Claude 'fut felicite par Ie pape [Clement VII] et Ie Parlement de 
Paris. II appamt alors aureole du titre de dUenseur du catholicism et de l'ordre social, ce qui plaisait au 
peuple parisien don't la sensibilite religieuse etait vive'. From this point on, Claude de Guise was 
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both Marie de Guise and her brothers, however, this was a role they were ultimately 
willing to forego when it came to the defence and advancement of their dynastic 
interests.! 
Marie's intelligence, charm, wit and stature made her a very popular figure at 
Court and, more importantly, with the French King. Because of this, Franyois I took a 
direct hand in instigating and arranging Marie's first marriage to one of the most 
important members of the French nobility, Louis, duc de Longueville, the Grand 
Chamberlain of France.2 Solemnised in the presence of the entire royal court at the 
Royal Palace of the Louvre on 4 August 1534, this union produced two sons, Franyois, 
born at Amiens on 30 October 1535, and Louis, at Chateaudun on 4 August 1537.3 
While pregnant with her second son, however, Marie would suffer the first of many 
tragic deaths that would mar her personal happiness - that of her husband on 9 June 
1537,4 Marie's sorrow was compounded soon after by the death of his namesake, who 
did not survive his first year. But it was only a matter of months before Franyois was 
regarded by Catholics as a Christian hero and was dubbed the 'protector of the faith' - to the Protestants, 
he was known simply as the 'Grand Boucher'. Constant, Les Guise, p.21; Cloulas, Henri II, p.62; Bouille, 
Histoire des Ducs de Guise, I, pp. 62-5,79-84; Marshall, Mmy a/Guise, pp. 28-9. 
1 Franyois and Charles de Guise are conventionally associated with ultra-orthodox Catholicism and 
religious persecution during the reign of Franyois II. As Stuart Carroll has shown, however, the negative 
imagery surrounding their administration is largely due to unfavourable Protestant sources, when, in fact, 
there was little difference in policy between the reigns of Henri and his son. 'The Guise', he argues, 
'were conventional in pursuing family interests rather than devoting themselves to a simple religious 
ideology. '" Far from altering the designs of the dead king, the Guise showed themselves to be highly 
conservative. Their policies did not herald the dawn of a new era. They implemented the policies of 
Henri and his most trusted and faithful friend Anne de Montmorency in maintaining a viable peace with 
Spain while at the same time pursuing French dynastic claims in Scotland. At home religious persecution 
was to be intensified, as Henri II had intended'. Carroll, Noble Power during the French Wars 0/ 
Religion, p.91 and especially his chapter 'Faction, religious schism and dynastic strategy, 1558-1562', 
pp.89-115. 
2 Marshall, Mmy a/Guise, pp. 35. 
3 Ibid, pp. 32-6; Pimodan, La mere des Guises, pp. 56-60. 
4 Ibid, p.65. 
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playing matchmaker again with Marie - a young, wealthy and extremely attractive 
marital prospect. 1 This time, the proposed match was with his recently widowed son-in-
law, James V, who was in the market for a new French bride following the death of 
Franyois' eldest daughter, Madeleine. 2 Needless to say, the Dowager Duchess of 
Longueville found such a prospect less than appealing - most notably because her son, 
Franyois, would be obliged to stay in France as the new Duc de Longueville and Grand 
Chamberlain. Marriage to the King of Scots also implied separation from the rest of her 
family and abandoning a life of luxury in her beloved France. The only other prospect 
in the offing, however, was even less appealing - Marie had no intention of becoming 
Henry VIII's next 'victim'. But, after much persuasion from both Franyois and James, 
who wrote a personal letter pleading for her hand and counsel, Marie eventually relented 
and agreed to marry the Stewart monarch.3 
Negotiated by David Beaton (the future Cardinal and Archbishop of St. 
Andrews), Franyois and Marie's father, Claude, the royal marriage was contracted in 
January 1538 and signed at Lyon before the French Court.4 The terms of the contract 
were favourable to both James and Marie. The King of Scots would receive a dowry of 
150,000 livres, 70,000 livres of which was generously gifted by Franyois himself.s For 
I See Pimondan, La mere des Guises, p.60; James V Letters, pp. 340-1; and Marshall, Mary a/Guise, p.36 
for the terms of Marie's marriage contract to the Duc de Longueville and the provisions of her jointure, 
which inlcuded the Castle of Chiiteaudun. 
2 James and Madeleine's marriage lasted only seven months. Falling ill while still in France, Madeleine 
died on 7 July 1538, just six weeks after arriving in Scotland. James V Letters, pp. 333-4, 340-1; TA, 
VII, p.181; J. Cameron, James V: The Personal Rule 1528-1542, edited by N. Macdougall (Edinburgh, 
1998), p.133. 
3 Marshall, Mmy a/Guise, pp. 51-3; S. Zweig, The Queen a/Scots, translated by C. & E. Paul (London, 
1935), pp. 1-2. 
4 Teulet, Relations, I, pp. 115-8. 
5 Cameron, James V, p.261 n.47. 
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her part, Marie's portion was equally lucrative. She was gifted Falkland Palace, 
Stirling, Dingwall and Threave Castles, the earldoms of Strathearn, Ross, Orkney and 
Fife, and the lordships of Galloway, Ardmannach and the Isles. In the event of James' 
death with issue, Marie was entitled to a third of her dowry - one half if there was no 
surviving heir. She was also granted financial immunity for all James' debts and, in 
return for waiving any claim to those of her husband, she was allowed to keep all her 
possessions. More importantly, these terms also applied if Marie wished to return to 
France. She was entitled to take the allocated portion of her dowry, her possessions, and 
retain the revenues from her jointures in Scotland.! Clearly, this treaty was designed to 
satisfy two main objectives - to augment James' revenue and to protect the interests of 
Marie and her family in Scotland. 
These terms having been agreed, James V and Marie de Guise were married on 9 
May 1538 at the Castle of Chfiteaudun with Robert, lord Maxwell acting as proxy for 
the absent Scottish monarch.2 Scotland's new Queen arrived at St. Andrews in June 
1538 and was formally crowned at Holyrood on 22 February 1539/40.3 The marriage 
produced three children in quick succession: J ames, born at St. Andrews on 22 May 
1540, Robert, at Stirling on 24 April 1541, and Mary, at Linlithgow on 8 December 
1542. One week after their second son was born, however, tragedy dealt the King and 
Queen a double blow - the deaths of Prince James and Prince Robert within hours of 
each other. When James himself died at Falkland on 14 December 1542, therefore, his 
I Teulet, Relations, I, pp. 115-8. 
2 BN, f. fro 5467, f.66; Marshall, Mary of Guise, p.53. 
3 Cameron, James V, pp. 263-4; DiumaZ ofOccurents, p.23. See Marshall, Mmy of Guise, pp. 55-64, 79-
80 for a more detailed account of Marie's arrival, reception and coronation in Scotland. 
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only surviving heir was his infant daughter, Mary, who became the Queen of Scotland at 
the tender age of six days old. l 
Mary Stewart was what one historian aptly described as a 'dynastic entity,.2 Her 
accession to the Scottish throne rendered her a figure of extraordinary dynastic 
importance in sixteenth-century Europe. But this importance lay not entirely in her 
Scottish sovereignty and Guisean lineage. Of even greater significance, perhaps, was 
Mary Stewart's Catholic claim to the English throne. The dynastic problems caused by 
Henry VIII's break from Rome, coupled with the repeated failure of successive Tudor 
monarchs to secure the line of succession by producing heirs to the throne, made it a 
very real possibility that Mary Stewart alone could unite the kingdoms of Scotland, 
England and Ireland under one Catholic crown. Mary Stewart's dynastic importance 
was further enhanced by her gender as notions of 'British imperialism' could be realised 
through marriage to the Scottish Queen. She was from the outset a highly prized 
marriage partner and it is no surprise that the question of marriage dominated her reign. 
At no time was this more true than during the first eight years of her minority when the 
Kings of England and France literally fought for her hand and control of her kingdom. 
As an extension of her own dynasticism, Marie de Guise was naturally keen to 
protect and advance the dynastic interests of her daughter. These interests not only 
served as the pretext for Guise's formal entry into factional high politics during Mary's 
minority in the 1540s, but also for her official political career in Scotland as Queen 
I Marshall, Mary of Guise, pp. 86-7. Mary's coronation was on 9 September 1543. 
2 M.H. Merriman, 'Mary, Queen of France', in M. Lynch (ed.), Mmy Stewart: Queen of Three Kingdoms 
(Oxford, 1988), p.31. 
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Regent from 1554 to 1560.' The traditional struggle for power and factionalism that 
accompanied any minority government did not escape Mary's, but these problems were 
exacerbated by additional conflicts over foreign, dynastic and ecclesiastical policy. 
The factions that emerged fell loosely into two categories - those that supported 
an Anglo-Scottish dynastic alliance and sought the reform of the church along more 
radical lines than from within, and those that favoured an alliance with France and 
sought to maintain the authority of the established Church in Scotland. While this thesis 
is primarily concerned with the elite politics of post-1548 Scotland, this overly-
simplified summation of the divisions within the political community during the first 
five years of Mary Stewart's minority is nevertheless enough to place Marie de Guise 
firmly in the camp opposed to the pro-reform and pro-English faction led by the Earls of 
Angus and Lennox.2 Along with Cardinal Beaton, Guise played a leading role in the 
campaign to promote the interests of France in Scotland and, in doing so, proved to be a 
shrewd and effective dynastic politician -:- especially when compared to the Earl of 
Arran, whose policies as Governor were as inconsistent as his allegiances. Indeed, 
Guise had made such an impact that, as early as June 1544, a convention at Stirling 
1 James Hamilton, 2nd earl of Arran and Governor of the reahn, initially led this faction and was 
responsible for contracting the treaties of Greenwich. After his 'godly fit' had passed, he altered his 
position and was reconciled, albeit tenuously, with Marie de Guise and Cardinal Beaton. Archibald 
Douglas, 6th earl of Angus and Matthew Stewart, 4th earl of Lennox were more steadfast in their 
commitment and carried on as the leaders of the pro-Englishlpro-reforrn faction. The national and 
international politics surrounding the minority and marriage of Mary Stewart during the 1540s is a 
complex and involved subject that Marcus Merriman has already studied in great detail. It is not the 
purpose of this thesis to repeat his work, only to highlight certain events in order to establish the context 
of the treaty of Haddington and the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance as a whole. In addition to 
Merriman's, 'The Struggle for the Marriage of Mary Queen of Scots: England and French Intervention 
in Scotland, 1543-1550' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1974), see also Marshall, Mmy 
of Guise, pp. 108-76; Wormald, Mary, Queen of Scots, pp. 43-75; Donaldson, James V-James VII, pp. 
63-84 and All the Queen's Men, pp. 15-26; Sanderson, Ayrshire and the Reformation, pp. 48-63; Cowan, 
The Scottish Reformation, pp. 89-104; Scottish Correspondence, pp. 1-252. 
2 Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage', pp. 27-87. 
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called on her to supersede Arran as regent. Although Arran and the Queen Dowager 
were reconciled soon after, Guise nevertheless retained a position of authority as head of 
a sixteen strong council set up to 'advise' the Governor.l This episode was an early, yet 
clear indication as to whom the Scottish political elite ultimately deemed most able 
when it came to governing the realm.2 
In the end, Marie de Guise was successful in her primary objective to protect her 
daughter's dynastic interests in Scotland. The treaties contracting the marriage of Mary, 
Queen of Scots, to Prince Edward of England had been revoked and, largely on account 
of England's harsh Scottish policy, a treaty was then contracted between the 'auld allies' 
at Haddington on 7 July 1548. This treaty not only provided for the future union of the 
French and Scottish crowns, but also tied Scotland irrevocably to the interests of France 
by establishing what was, essentially, a protectoral alliance. As we shall see, Marie de 
Guise played a key role in securing this treaty, and advancing the dynastic interests of 
'les Guises' as a whole. But before we look in detail at the treaty of Haddington itself, 
it is necessary to examine the broader significance of Mary Stewart's dynastic 
inheritance. 
*** 
In 1503, the marriage of James IV to Margaret Tudor, eldest daughter of Henry VII, 
established the Stewarts as heirs apparent to the English throne upon the failure of the 
main Tudor line. During the reign of Mary, Queen of Scots, the Stewart claim to the 
English succession was particularly strong for two reasons. Firstly, the infecundity of 
I Lynch, Scotland: A New History (Edinburgh, 1992 edn), p.208. 
2 Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.70. 
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the Tudors gave credence to the contemporary perception of England as a kingdom 
ruled by an infertile and weak dynasty. This belief was exemplified by the collective 
failure of Edward VI, Mary I and Elizabeth I to fulfil their fundamental duty as 
sovereigns by producing heirs to the throne and securing the line of succession. 
Significant as it was in its own right, the problem of infertility also served to exacerbate 
a larger problem that undermined the strength of England's royal house - the 
controversies surrounding the order of succession as a result of Henry VIII's break from 
Rome, assertion of royal supremacy and divorce from Catherine of Aragon. As we shall 
see, the dynastic and political ramifications of Henry's ecclesiastical schism not only 
generated dissent and opposition to the crown within England, but also cast doubt 
internationally on the legality of Elizabeth Tudor's accession in November 1558. 
Henry VIII's primary motivation for divorce was to secure the Tudor line of 
succession with a legitimate male heir. After the birth of Princess Mary in 1516, 
Henry's confident prediction that 'the sons will follow' became increasingly unlikely 
with every miscarriage and stillbirth Catherine of Aragon suffered in later years. I In 
1527, after almost twenty years of marriage and only a daughter to show for it, Henry 
took steps to obtain a dispensation from Pope Clement VII to annul his marriage on the 
grounds that it was 'against God's law and His precept'? It was argued that according 
to two texts in Leviticus, Henry's marriage to Catherine (the widow of his brother 
I CSP Venice, II, p.691. 
2 According to Edward Hall, this speech constituted Henry 's formal announcement that the validity of his 
marriage was to be the subject of a papal investigation - the reason for which was only 'to settle my 
conscience and for no other cause'. Delivered at Bridlewood on 8 November 1528, the English King also 
took the opportunity to remind his audience of the dynastic controversies surrounding the War of the 
Roses and warn of a similar danger 'if our true heir be not known at the time of our death'. Hall, 
Chronicle, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1809), pp. 754-6. 
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Arthur) was sinful and, therefore, invalid.! By consequence, Pope Julius II's 
dispensation enabling Henry to wed his brother's widow in 1509 was similarly null and 
void.2 The success of Henry's supplication to Rome, however, was influenced and 
ultimately hindered by events on the Continent. As long as Rome was in Imperial 
control and subject to the will of Catherine of Aragon's nephew, Charles V, Clement 
was extremely reluctant to dissolve a marriage that would blatantly antagonise his 
oppressor. As a result, the Anglo-Papal deliberations dragged on for years. 
Impatient at these setbacks, Henry decided to break the deadlock through anti-
Papal legislation. Between the years 1532 and 1536, a plethora of statutes were enacted 
that severed England's ecclesiastical and financial ties to Rome and established Henry 
as the 'Supreme Head' of an autonomous Church in England.3 The 'Act in Restraints of 
Appeals' (1533), in particular, facilitated the dissolution of Henry's marriage to 
Catherine completely independent from the Court of Rome. 4 The preamble to this 
statute contained Henry's famous declaration that, 'Englond is an Impire, ... governed 
by oon Supreme heede and King ... with plenarie hoole and inti ere power premynence 
auctoritie prerogatyve and jurisdiccion ... without restraynt or provocacion to any foreyn 
1 Leviticus 18:16, 'Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife; it is thy brother's 
nakedness', and 20:21, 'And if a man shall take his brother's wife, it is an unclean thing: he hath 
uncovered his brother's nakedness; they shall be childless'. In direct contradiction to Leviticus, however, 
were the words of Deuteronomy 25:5: 'If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, and have no 
child, the wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a stranger: her husband's brother shall go in 
unto her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of an husband's brother unto her'. 
2 See lJ. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (Berkley, 1968), pp. 163-240 for a detailed discussion on canon law and 
Henry's struggle for divorce, as well as A.G. Dickens, The English Reformation (New York, 1968), pp. 
104-8; J. Guy, Tudor England (Oxford, 1988), pp. 116-53; and M. Levine, Tudor Dynastic Problems, 
1460-1571 (London, 1973), pp. 54-61, 148-50. 
3 1534: 26 Henry VIII, c.1, Statutes of the Realm, III, pA92. 
4 1533: 24 Henry VIII, c.12, ibid, III, pp. 427-9. 
11 
Chapter I: Mary Stewart and the Treaty of Haddington. 
Princes or Potentates of the World'. 1 This assertion of royal supremacy enabled 
Archbishop Thomas Cranmer to dissolve Henry's marriage on 23 May 1533. Five days 
later, Henry's marriage to Anne Boleyn, whom he had wed secretly in January 1532/3, 
was legitimised and in the following September, Henry's second daughter was born. 
Far from settling the succession unequivocally, however, the birth of Princess Elizabeth 
served only to complicate an already complex dynastic situation. 
In order to clarify matters Henry turned to Parliament and, in 1534, obtained 
what would be the first of three' Acts of Succession'. Intended 'to forsee and provyde 
for the perfite suertie of both you [Henry] and of your moste lawfull succession and 
heires', these statutes actually had the opposite effect and fostered internal dissension.2 
By omission, the first 'Acte for the estalishement of the Kynges succession' excluded 
Princess Mary from the succession in favour of Princess Elizabeth and any other 
offspring Henry might have with Anne Boleyn.3 Although Mary Tudor's legitimacy 
had not been affected, her exclusion from the succession was yet another source of 
discontent for Henry's pro-Aragonese subjects. His second 'Act of Succession' would 
do little to placate this growing opposition to the crown. 
The execution of Anne Boleyn and Henry's marriage to Jane Seymour in May 
1536, necessitated that the order of succession be altered once again. Whilst Queen 
Jane was pregnant with the future Edward VI, Henry obtained from Parliament a second 
'Acte for the establisshement of the succession of the Imperyall Crowne' of England.4 
11533: 24 ReillY VIII, c.12, Statutes of the Realm, III, p.427. 
2 1534: 25 Remy VIII, c.22, ibid, III, p.471. 
3 1534: 25 Remy VIII, c.22, ibid, III, pp. 471-4. 
4 1536: 28 Remy VIII, c.7, ibid, III, pp. 655-62. 
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At the time of its enactment, however, this statute provided for a less than secure 
succession. In this unprecedented piece of legislation, both the Tudor Princesses were 
bastardised and excluded from the succession in favour of an unborn child.! Moreover, 
Henry was invested with 'full and plenar power and auctority to geve despose appoynte 
assigne declare and lymytt, by your letters patentes under your great seale or ells by 
your laste Will made in wrtynge and signed with you moste gracious hand '" the 
imperiall Crowne of this Realme', irrespective of whether he had legitimate heirs or 
not. 2 Needless to say, these provisions were controversial. Henry's bastardisation of 
Princess Mary and his unfettered statutory power to determine the succession were 
contributing factors to the widespread discontent that culminated in the rebellions of the 
Pilgrimage of Grace (1536-7).3 The fact that each' Act of Succession' was accompanied 
with increasingly stringent definitions of treason, further indicates the extent to which 
Henry's assertion of royal supremacy caused internal dissension and, consequently, 
undermined the strength and stability of the Tudor dynasty.4 Fortunately for Henry, a 
son was borne by Queen Jane and, to all intents and purposes, the succession seemed 
secure with a legitimate male heir. 
Prince Edward, however, proved to be a sickly child and Henry's subsequent 
marriages to Anne of Cleves (1539/40), Catherine Howard (1540) and Catherine Parr 
(1543) were all childless. As the succession stood, Henry would have no other heirs if 
I 1536: 28 Henry VIII, c.7, Statutes of the Realm, III, v, vi, viii, ix, pp. 655-62. 
21536: 28 Henry VIII, c.7, ibid, III, ix, x, xvii, pp. 659, 660, 662. 
3 See M. Bateson (ed.), 'Aske's Examination', EHR, v (1890), pp. 652-4, for the demands of Robert 
Aske, leader of the rebellion. 
4 See, for example, 1534: 25 Henry VIII, c.22, v-ix and 28 Henry VIII, c.7, Statutes of the Realm, III, xi-
xvi, pp. 473-4, 659-72. 
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Edward should die prematurely. The seriousness of this situation was brought to the 
fore in 1544, when Henry was making preparations to launch and lead a military 
campaign against Franyois I on the Continent. As a precautionary measure, he obtained 
a third act from Parliament restoring both his daughters to the succession. 1 But the 
restoration of Mary and Elizabeth was far from complete - they retained their 
illegitimate status in the eyes of the law and were further required to fulfil any 
conditions Henry chose to impose on their succession by letters patent or in his will. 2 In 
this stipulation lay the painful reminder that another heir could still be appointed by the 
same means. These precautionary measures, however, proved to be in vain. Henry's 
health was deteriorating rapidly and it soon became apparent that Edward would not 
predecease his father, but succeed him as a minor. 
Even on his deathbed Henry tinkered with the succession and, in December 
1546, made some last minute revisions to his will to provide for his son's minority.3 
Appointing the members of the Regency Council to govern the kingdom, Henry also 
added a clause excluding Mary and Elizabeth from the succession if they married 
without the consent of the aforesaid councillors. Finally, and of greater significance 
from a Scottish perspective, Henry deliberately snubbed the Stewarts. In what can only 
be seen as an expression of the English King's displeasure at the Scots' continued 
refusal to recognise the renounced treaties of Greenwich, a clause was inserted 
excluding the Stewarts from the succession in favour of the Suffolk line - the 
descendants of Henry's younger sister, Mary, and her daughters, Frances and Eleanor 
1 1544: 35 Henry VIII, c.1, Statutes of the Realm, III, pp. 955-8. 
21544: 35 Henry VIII, c.1, ibid, III, i, ii, iii, vi, pp. 955-6. 
3 Foedera, XV, pp. 112-4. 
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Brandon. Yet, despite these provisions, controversy surrounding the succession still 
managed to follow Henry to the grave. Immediately following his death on 23 January 
154617, the authenticity of his will was brought into question. According to the second 
'Act of Succession', Henry had been empowered to appoint his successor arbitrarily in 
either his letters patent or in his will which had been authenticated by the king's hand.! 
The fact that the will had not been signed by his 'gracious hand' but with a dry stamp, 
technically rendered it invalid. As a result, the amendments contained within his last 
will and testament were inapplicable and the succession was to follow as stipulated in 
the third 'Act of Succession'. Mary Stewart's claim to the English throne was secure. 
Immediately following her accession in 1553, Mary Tudor repealed the articles 
in the second 'Act of Succession' that bastardised her and renounced Archbishop 
Cranmer's declaration that Henry's marriage to Catherine of Aragon was invalid, 'as if 
the same hadd never been geven or pronounced'.2 No attempt was made to reverse 
Elizabeth's illegitimate status. In fact, Mary would have preferred to exclude Elizabeth 
from the succession altogether on account of her 'heretical opinions, illegitimacy and 
characteristics in which she resembled her mother', had it not been necessary to appease 
the body politic into accepting her decision to marry Philip of Spain.3 Of all the 
candidates she considered to be her successor, Mary I acknowledged that the Queen of 
Scots not only had the 'real right by descent', but also the 'best right ". for it came 
I 1536: 28 Henry VIII c.7, Statutes of the Realm, III, ix-x, pp. 659-60. 
2 'An Acte declaring the Quenes Hyghnes to have bene borne in a most just and lawfull Matrimonie, and 
also repealing all Actes of Parliament and Sentences of Divorce hadd and made to the contrarie'. 1553: 
1 Mary st.2 c.1, ibid, IV, pp. 200-1. 
3 CSP Spain, XI, p.393. 
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through Margaret, elder sister of King Henry'. 1 The simple desire to avoid trouble, 
however, prevented both Mary, Queen of Scots' and Mary I's preferred choice, 
Margaret Douglas, the Countess of Lennox/ from being named heir apparent -
'Parliament had accepted the Lady Elizabeth as proper to succeed'.3 But, in the eyes of 
the Papacy and Catholic princes of Europe, the invalidity of Henry's marriage to Anne 
Boleyn in canon law rendered Elizabeth illegitimate and, thus, ineligible to succeed her 
Catholic half-sister. The next legitimate Catholic claimant in line was Mary Stewart. 
Upon Mary Tudor's death in November 1558, England consequently found herself 
subj ect to yet another succession crisis, but this time on an international level. 
The effect of the Reformation on dynastic and political issues was uncharted 
territory and destined to become the source of controversy. Yet, irrespective of all the 
internal turmoil and uncertainty surrounding the succession as a result of Henry VIII's 
ecclesiastical schism, Mary Stewart's Catholic claim to the English throne remained 
intact and increased in strength with every Tudor sovereign who failed to produce an 
heir to the throne. As a female sovereign of such extraordinary dynastic importance, it 
comes as no surprise that she was highly sought after on the marriage market - for only 
in the person of Mary, Queen of Scots could notions of British imperialism be 
entertained and potentially realised. Given the correct set of circumstances, such as 
1 CSP Spain, XI, pp. 393,395. 
2 Apmt from being the Queen's principal favourite, Lady Margaret Douglas also had a claim to the 
English throne as a direct descendant of Henry VII. She was the daughter of Margaret Tudor, Henry 
VIII's elder sister and Queen Dowager of Scotland, and Archibald Douglas, 6th earl of Angus. In an 
interesting twist of fate, Lady Margaret's son, Henry Stewart, Lord Darnley, became Mary, Queen of 
Scots second husband in 1565. See ibid, XI, pp. 393-5, for Simon Renard's report to Charles V dated 28 
November 1553, of the discussion he had with Mary Tudor concerning the succession and her thoughts 
on the various rival claimants to the throne. 
3 Ibid, XI, p.395. 
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those that presented themselves in November 1558, it was possible that she alone could 
unite the kingdoms of Scotland, England and Ireland under one Catholic crown. 1 Mary 
Stewart's marriage, therefore, had weighty dynastic and imperial implications. During 
the 1540s, two separate treaties contracted her marriage: the collective treaties of 
Greenwich in 1543 and the treaty of Haddington in 1548. Both laid the foundations for 
a British empire, Anglo-centric and Franco-centric respectively, and both were centred 
on the dynastic claims of Mary Stewart. 
*** 
Notions of Anglo-British imperialism did not originate with Mary, Queen of Scots. 
England had a long tradition of claiming suzerainty over Scotland and the extension of 
English sovereignty to include Scotland had been a political objective of many an 
English king, most notably Edward 1.2 The birth of Mary Stewart merely provided the 
means through which this imperial vision could be peacefully realised - the union of the 
English and Scottish crowns through her marriage to Prince Edward Tudor, the future 
Edward VI. Even the scenario of a Scottish queen regnant marrying the heir to the 
English throne was not unprecedented. In 1290, the betrothal of Margaret 'Maid of 
Norway' to Edward Plantagenet (the future Edward II) was contracted and ratified in the 
treaty of Birgham. Significantly, neither the treaties of Birgham nor Greenwich 
succeeded in their objective of uniting the kingdoms of Scotland and England 
dynastically. 
1 In 1553, Hemi II commented that, on account of the English Parliament's declaration that Catherine of 
Aragon's marriage to Henry VIII was 'bon & vallable', Elizabeth's Tudor's illegitimacy meant that 'rna 
fille la Royne d'Escosse approche en degree', and his vision of a Franco-British Empire came one step 
closer to becomir1g a reality. AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.182. 
2 For more on Edward 1's Scottish policy, see FJ. Watson, Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 
1286-1306 (Edirlburgh, 1998). 
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However enticing the idea of a united Britain was to the English, the tumultuous 
history of Anglo-Scottish relations rendered this prospect less so to the Scots. Their 
struggle to maintain and defend the independence of their kingdom from the seemingly 
incessant threat of English invasion andlor domination made them acutely sensitive 
about matters of sovereignty. There were some Scots, such as James Henri son, to 
whom the idea of Britain was appealing, and even providentia1.1 The wave of reformist 
ideologies sweeping across sixteenth-century Europe had not failed to reach the shores 
of Scotland, and Henry VIII's break from Rome added a Protestant dimension to the 
already existing geographical, linguistic and cultural arguments in favour of Anglo-
Scottish union which culminated in the treaties of Greenwich.2 Yet only months after 
its ratification, the treaty contracting the marriage of Mary Stewart to Edward Tudor 
was renounced by the Scottish Parliament.3 Given the Scots' reluctance to enter into a 
dynastic alliance with England, the question must then be asked why they were so eager 
to enter into a similar, if not more intimate alliance with France in July 1548? As we 
shall see, the answer lies in the English response to the Scots' refusal to recognise the 
treaties of Greenwich, which had the adverse affect of driving the Scots into the 
I See, for example, James Hemison's An Exhortation to the Scotts in lA.H. Murray (ed.), The Complaynt 
ofScotlande (Early English Text Society, 1872-3), pp. 208-36. 
2 J.E.A. Dawson, 'Anglo-Scottish protestant culture-and integration in sixteenth-century Britain' in S.G. 
Ellis & S. Barber (eds.), Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State, 1485-1725 (London, 1995), 
pp. 87-114; B.P. Levack, Theformation of the British state: England, Scotland and the union of 1603-
1707 (Oxford, 1987); Mason, 'The Scottish Reformation and the origins of Anglo-British imperialism', 
in Mason (ed.), Scots and Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603 (Cambridge, 1994), 
pp. 161-86, and 'Kingship, nobility and Anglo-Scottish union: John Mair's History of Greater Britain 
(1521)" Innes Review, 41 (1990), pp. 182-222; Merriman, 'James Hemisoun and 'Great Britain': British 
Union and the Scottish Commonweal' in Scotland and England, 1286-1815 (Edinburgh, 1987); and A.H. 
Williamson, 'Scotland, Antichrist and the invention of Great Britain' in l Dwyer et al (eds.), New 
Perspectives on the politics and culture of early modern Scotland (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 34-58. 
3 11 December 1543, APS, II, pp. 431-2. 
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welcoming arms of France and, ultimately, provided for the dynastic union of the 
French and Scottish crowns. 
The volte-face of the Scottish government regarding the treaties of Greenwich 
sparked a reactionary English policy in Scotland. Initially placatory in nature with the 
use of 'assured Scots', Henry VIII soon changed tactics and, in 1544-5, embarked on an 
aggressive campaign of 'rough wooing' Scotland into recognition of the treaties that 
contracted his son and heir's marriage to Mary Stewart. l After his death, Henry's 
Scottish policy was vehemently continued by Edward Seymour, duke of Somerset and 
Lord Protector of England during Edward VI's minority. Believing it to be his 'godly 
purpose'to 'enjoin the Queen [Marie de Guise] and Council to deliver the young Queen 
[Mary Stewart] ... to be suitably nourished and brought up with her husband, as a Queen 
of England', Somerset launched his military campaign against the Scots in August 
1547.2 The ideological justification for his invasion and subsequent occupation of 
Scotland was deeply rooted in terms of Anglo-British imperialism. In his Epistle 
Exhortatorie to the Scots (1548), for example, Somerset reasoned that, 'as you and wee 
be annexed an ioyned in one Islande, so no people so like in maner, forme, language, 
and all condicions ... should bee, like as twoo brethren of one Islande of greate Britayn', 
I Merriman, 'The assured Scots: Scottish Collaborators with England during the 'Rough Wooing", SHR, 
xlvii (1968), pp. 10-34. For more on England's Scottish policy during the 1540s see R.B. Wernham, 
Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1588 (London, 1966), pp. 149-78; M.L. 
Bush, The Government Policy of Protector Somerset (London, 1975), pp. 7-39; S. Doran, England and 
Europe, 1485-1603 (London, 1986), pp. 23-50; Scarisbrick, Hemy VIII, pp. 355-83,424-57; Donaldson, 
James V-James VII, pp. 27-9, 63-94; D.M. Head, 'Henry VIII's Scottish Policy: a Reassessment', Innes 
Review, lxi (1982), pp. 14-24; J.B. Paul, 'Edinburgh in 1544 and Hertford's Invasion', SHR, viii (1911), 
pp. 113-31; and especially, Merriman 'The Struggle For the Marriage', pp. 88-116, 145-74,202-57; 'The 
assured Scots', pp. 10-34; 'The Forts of Eye mouth: Anvils of British Union?', SHR, lxvii (1988), pp. 
142-55 and 'War and Propaganda during the "Rough Wooing''', Scottish Tradition, ix/x (1979-80), pp. 
20-30. 
2 CSP Scot., 1,50, p.22; P.G.B. McNeill & H.L. MacQueen, Atlas of Scottish History to 1707 (Edinburgh, 
1996), p.127. 
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and 'if it wer possible one kyngdome be made in rule ... and not to be divided in rulers'. 1 
Recognising that 'twoo successions cannot concurre and fal into one, by no maner of 
other meanes, then by mariage, whereby one bloude, one lignage and parentage, is made 
of twoo, and an indefecible right geuen of bothe to one, without the destruccion and 
abolishing of either', Somerset stressed that his military objective in Scotland was not to 
conquer, but simply to 'join in marriage from high to low both the realms, to make of 
one isle one realm in love, amity, concord, peace, and charity'.2 The great majority of 
the Scots, however, found Somerset's declarations of love and amity hard to swallow 
and perceived the purpose of the English occupation, conversely, as one of conquest. 
Central to Somerset's policy was the construction of strategically placed trace 
italienne fortresses. The first phase of construction, beginning in September 1547 and 
lasting until January 1547/8, resulted in the creation of an English Pale in south-east 
Scotland. 3 The strongholds erected at Eyemouth, Roxburgh, Home, Inchcolm and 
Broughty, and later at Lauder, Haddington, Dunglass and Inchkeith, enabled the English 
to attack Scotland from within and led to the great devastation of the surrounding areas. 
As Marcus Merriman argues, it was Somerset's military foothold in Scotland and not 
necessarily the crushing defeat of the Scots at Pinkie Cleugh on 10 September 1547 that 
'convinced the Scottish government of the day that England might successfully conquer 
the realm'.4 For many, however, the battle of Pinkie, or 'Black Saturday' as it was later 
I The Complaynt ofScotlande, pp. 239-43. 
2 Ibid, pp. 239, 241. 
3 Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth' , pp. 146-7; H.M. Colvin, History of the King's Works (London, 
1975), IV, pp. 694-726; Atlas of Scottish Hist01Y to 1707, p.l28. 
4 Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth' ,p.148. This sentiment was also expressed by M. de la Chapelle de 
Biron, treasurer of the French troops in Scotland, who reported on 23 March 154718 that, ' ... les gens de 
ce pays [Scotland] se ressenttent tant de la perte de la bataille et de la crainte qu'ilz ont des fortz que les 
ennemys tinnent, qu'ilz ne peuvent reprandre sans l'ayde du Roy, au moyen de ce qu'ilz ont peu 
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dubbed, was a decisive event that epitomised England's aggressive policy and revealed 
Somerset's true objective for Scotland. The comments of one contemporary observer, 
Alexander Gordon,l reveal that Pinkie did little to win favour for the English cause 
amongst the Scots: 
... we be swa cruelly owrthrawin in this matter we will randyr to the 
Twrk rathyr nor to be onrewangit ... thocht the wysdome offIngland 
be extremit greitt, thay gane nocht the rycht way to mak unuon off thyr 
twa realmis. Gyf thay thynk to hawe hartlynes, thay suld traist ws moir 
tendyrly.2 
More importantly, Pinkie was a catalytic event in terms of the renewal of the Franco-
Scottish alliance and, indirectly, the future political career of Marie de Guise in 
Scotland. In its immediate aftermath, both the Queen Dowager and the Scottish 
political elite made urgent requests to the French King for financial and military 
assistance. Guise wrote a personal letter to Henri II, while the Scots decided to make a 
formal appeal to the French King for men, money and munition at a convention at 
Edinburgh on 16 October 1547.3 Although the news of Pinkie was the source of 'plus 
grand deplaisir' at the French Court, the Scots were well aware that sympathy alone 
would not induce Henri to intervene formally on their behalf in their conflict with 
England.4 So, on 23 November 1547, the French ambassador resident in Scotland, 
d'artillerie et munition, que, sans l'assureance que l'on leur donne du secours du Roy, ilz seroient en 
dangier de bientost prandre l' autre party', Teulet, Relations, I, p.160. 
1 Brother to George Gordon, 4th earl of Huntly, and postulate of Caithness. 
2 Scottish Correspondence, eli, pp. 213-4. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 78, 88, pp. 37, 41. According to these reports, Sir Walter Ogilvy seems to have been 
selected as the ambassador to France, whom Lesley writes was 'to desyre in moist freindlie and hartlie 
maner from the king, as thair auncient and maist speciall considerat and allya, sum convenient support 
alswill of men as of money and munitione, and that the same suld be send in Scotland with all possibill 
diligence in the next spring tyme'. Lesley, History, p.200. 
4 Balcarres Papers, I, cxxx, p.172; CSP Spain, IX, pp. 523-5. 
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Henri Cleutin, seigneur d'Oisel et de Villeparisis, was sent on a diplomatic mission to 
France armed with a proposal from the Scots. In return for French military and financial 
assistance, the Scots were prepared to grant Henri possession of certain Scottish 
strongholds, such as Dunbar Castle, and more importantly, their Queen who, it was 
proposed, 'mycht be send in France, thair to be keped, quhill sho shuld be mareid at the 
Kingis pleasour ... with the Dophine of France'.1 This offer signalled the complete 
failure of Somerset's Scottish policy that aimed to coerce the Scots into recognition of 
the treaties of Greenwich and provide for the union of the English and Scottish crowns. 
Rather, Somerset's 'rough wooing' had the opposite effect of reducing the Scots to such 
a state of desperation that they had no choice but to tum to their 'auld ally' for help. In 
doing so, they gave Henri the opportunity to pursue his own dynastic and imperial 
ambitions within the archipelago. 
Whilst the decision to entrust Henri with the military security of Scotland and 
her queen may have come easily to the likes of Marie de Guise, whose dynasticism and 
daughter's personal safety were directly threatened by the occupying English forces, the 
Regent of Scotland needed persuading. As the Governor, second person of the realm 
and heir apparent to the Scottish throne on the failure of the Stewart line, Arran was 
extremely reluctant to support any alliance that would thwart his own dynastic 
ambitions and undermine his political position in Scotland. Initially, he had been intent 
on resolving the conflict with Somerset in order that Mary might then marry his own 
son and heir, James.2 The proposal that she become an absentee monarch affianced to 
I CSP Scot., I, 81, 86,92, pp. 38,40,42-3; TA, IX, pp. 127, 15,4; Lesley, HiSt01Y, pp. 203-4. See also 
Ninian Cockburn's report in CSP Scot., I, 73, pp. 34-5, for a similar discussion. 
2 CSP Scot., I, 218, p.107; R.K. Hannay, 'The Earl of Arran and Queen Mary', SHR, xviii (1921), p.260. 
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the Dauphin of France directly contravened his plans. Moreover, there was also the 
possibility that such an arrangement would undermine his position as regent, an office 
which had served him well in 'providing' for his kinsman and strengthening the power 
of the house of Hamilton through the nepotistic distribution of patronage and the forging 
of dynastic alliances. 1 The power and influence wielded by Arran made his support 
crucial for the success of the proposed alliance. His over-riding dynastic and personal 
ambition, however, rendered him an unreliable political ally whose backing would not 
be forthcoming unless he felt it was advantageous to provide it. Indeed, it took 
considerably more than 'a French gentleman with fair words' to acquire his support.2 
During November 1547 Marie de Guise and d'Oisel entered into negotiations 
with Arran. The terms of his support, presented to Henri along with the other proposals 
from the Scots by d'Oise1, were eventually accepted and contracted in a formal 
agreement on 27 January 1547/8.3 With so much to lose personally, the price of Arran's 
support was predictably high. It was agreed that he would retain his governorship until 
Mary Stewart reached her age of majority, which for a female sovereign was 
traditionally considered to be on completion of her twelfth year,4 and was granted 
financial immunity for all expenses incurred during that time. s This provision, however, 
I Hannay, 'The Earl of Arran', pp. 258-76 and 'Some Papal Bulls among the Hamilton Papers', SHR, xxii 
(1924), pp. 25-41; E. Finnie, 'The House of Hamilton: Patronage, Politics and the Church in the 
Reformation Period', Innes Review, xxxvi (1985), pp. 3-28; M. Mahoney, 'The Scottish Hierarchy, 1513-
1565' in D. MacRoberts (ed.), Essays on the Scottish Reformation, 1513-1625 (Glasgow, 1962), pp. 51-3; 
Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage', pp. 27-39; Donaldson, All the Queen's Men, pp. 15-7. 
2 CSP Scot., I, 67, pp. 30-1. 
3 Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.78. 
4 As we shall see in Chapter III, Hemi brought this into question and asked the Parlement of Paris to 
determine whether Mary, Queen of Scots' reached her age of majority during or upon completion of her 
twelfth year. Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 261-6 and Relations, I, pp. 274-8. 
5 Balcal'res Papers, II, xxxvii, pp. 52-3. 
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left open the question of Scotland's government during Mary Stewart's majority. As 
she was destined to be an absent monarch residing in her future husband's kingdom, this 
question assumed great significance, especially, as it would tum out, for Marie de 
Guise. Arran's support was also secured by the offer an annual pension of 12,000 livres 
and the promise of a French duchy.! This promise was fulfilled on 17 June 1549, when 
Arran officially became the Duc de Chatelherault and was invested in the Order of St. 
Michael. 2 Finally, in an agreement that was concluded on 28 April 1548, Arran was 
offered the Duc de Montpensier's eldest daughter as a bride for his son, James, 
presumably to compensate for the latter's apparent loss of Mary, Queen of Scots.3 With 
offers and assurances such as these, Henri not only received Arran's backing for the 
proposed Franco-Scottish alliance, but also his son, James, who was sent to France as a 
hostage to ensure the Regent's continued and loyal support.4 Arran's endorsement of 
the alliance and public declaration of support at a convention of the Scottish nobility at 
Stirling in February 1547/8 proved to be effective. On 7 July 1548, the treaty of 
Haddington was ratified by the Three Estates who, as Marie de Guise wrote, were 
content 'pour mettre toutes choses entre les mains du Roy,.5 
I CSP Scot., I, 73, p.34; E. Bonner, 'French Naturalization of the Scots in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth 
Centuries', The Historical Journal, xl/4 (1997), Appendix No.5, pp. 1109-11. See also 'Double de la 
charge, Instruction et memo ire pour Ie Controlleur Astier concernant les affaires d'Escosse' contained in 
AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.663, for additional references to Arran's French pension. 
2 APS, II, pp. 508-10; Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage', p.266. 
3 This marriage never materialised as Mlle. de Montpensier was promised to another. Balcarres Papers, 
II, eli, elxiii, elxviii, pp. 197-8,245-8,256-8. 
4 Ibid, I, elix-xi, pp. 205-7; TA, IX, p.83; CSP Scot., I, 238, pp. 116-7. See also J. Durkan, 'James, Third 
Earl of Arran: The Hidden Years', SHR lxv (1986), pp. 154-66, for a discussion on James' life in France. 
S Teulet, Papiers, I, p.680 and Relations, I, p.179. 
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At its most basic level, the treaty of Haddington was contracted as an immediate 
response to 'the mortall weiris crudelties depredatiounis and intollerabill iniuris done be 
our auld enimeis of Ingland aganis our Souerane Lady [Mary, Queen of Scots] '" hir 
realme and lieges' ,I Using the 'auld alliance' as a historical precedent to justify French 
intervention against England, Henri II pledged to 'reccouer all strenthis Castellis and 
Fortalices' out of English hands and restore Scotland 'to the auld libertie priuilegeand 
freedome'? Although the treaty was an expression of Henri's regard for the 'ancient lig 
confederatioun and amitie standard betuix the Realme of France' and Scotland, his offer 
to assume responsibility for its military security was not a selfless gesture of goodwill in 
the name of the 'auld alliance',3 In return for French succour, the Scottish political elite 
had consented to the betrothal of Mary Stewart to Franyois Valois, which was intended 
to provide for the 'mair perfyte vnion' of Scotland and France,4 More importantly, this 
dynastic alliance was also the basis for Henri's vision of a Franco-British empire. The 
strength of this dynastic and, quite possibly, imperial alliance was further enhanced by 
the simple fact that, as a direct result of the treaty, Henri not only took the kingdom of 
Scotland into his personal protection, but also its young queen. 
The declared intention of Somerset's invasion, that Mary Stewart 'be suitably 
nourished and brought up with her husband, as a Queen of England', placed the personal 
safety of the young queen in jeopardy,5 The Scots responded by taking precautionary 
I APS, II, pA8l. 
2 Bonner, 'Scotland's 'Auld Alliance' with France, 1295-1560', SHR, lxxxiv/273 (1999), pp. 5-30; APS, 
II, pA81. 
3 Ibid, II, pA81. 
4 Ibid, II, pA81. 
S CSP Scot., I, 50, p.22. 
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measures to deprive Somerset of his prize. Mary was taken into the protective custody 
of her guardians, Lords Erskine and Livingstone, and was sheltered first at Stirling 
Castle, then at a secluded priory on the island of Inchmahome in the Lake of Menteith 
and, finally at Dumbarton Castle in February 1547/8.1 The devastation caused by the 
occupying English troops, however, brutally demonstrated the extent to which Somerset 
was determined to fulfil his dynastic objective. It soon became apparent that Mary, 
Queen of Scots' safety could not be guaranteed in her own kingdom. To provide for her 
safety, therefore, it was decided that she would leave Scotland to reside in France where 
she would remain in the personal protection of the French King until her marriage to the 
Dauphin? Within weeks of the treaty of Haddington's ratification, Mary embarked for 
France3 on the galleys that had arrived at Leith on 16 June 1548, with the military 
reinforcements that Henri had, for so long, promised to Marie de Guise.4 Despite 
Somerset's best efforts, Mary was to 'be suitably nourished and brought up with her 
husband' , not as a Queen of England, but as a Queen of France. 
*** 
The treaty of Haddington's significance is most commonly identified as its betrothal of 
Mary Stewart to Franc;ois Valois and, ori a more immediate and practical level, its 
1 Mary would remain at Dumbarton Castle, which was placed at the disposal of Marie de Guise, until her 
conveyance to France. Arran retained control of Edinburgh Castle, whilst Henri was entrusted with 
Dunbar. CSP Scot., I, 147, p.71. 
2 APS, II, pA81. 
3 Lesley, HistOlY, p.200; CSP Scot., I, 270, 274, 290,306,310, pp. 134, 136, 147, 154-5, 157; APS, II, 
p.543; TA, IX, pp. 107, 122, 177,207,209; Balcarres Papers, I, cliv, elv, pp. 200-2. See also W.M. 
Bryce 'Mary Stuart's Voyage to France in 1548', EHR, xxii (1907), pp. 43-50, for a detailed account of 
the voyage itself. 
4 See' Letters from Henry II King of France to His Cousin Mary Queen Dowager of Scotland' , Maitland 
Misc., I, 4-7, pp. 214-8 and Balcarres Papers, I, cxlv, cxlvi, cxlix, clii, c1iv, lxxii, lxiii, pp. 188-90, 195-6, 
198-9,242 for similar assurances of French aid and details of the planned intervention. 
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furnishing of men, money and munitions to the Scots. But the treaty of Haddington is 
also significant in that it established a protectoral relationship between the 'auld allies'. 
The Three Estates' acceptance of Henri's offer to defend Scotland against England 'and 
all vthers in libertie and fredome', now and 'at all necessar tymes to cum', and to 'keip 
maintain and defend this Realme liegis of the samin liberteis and Lawis thereof, 
effectively made Henri the 'Protector' of Scotland - and Scotland, a protectorate of 
France.! In this context, the terms 'protector' and 'protectorate' are used not so much in 
the sense implied by Somerset's title of Lord Protector of England, but more in the 
modem sense of a less powerful state or territory being protected and largely controlled 
by a more powerful one. While Henri did not formally assume the title of 'protector' in 
relation to Scotland, his extensive use of the language of 'protection' in his 
correspondence, for example, clearly conveyed his perceived role in the Franco-Scottish 
alliance. This exceedingly important, yet largely overlooked, aspect of the treaty 
justified and facilitated the immediate establishment of French power in Scotland well 
before the Franco-Scottish union of the crowns in 1558.2 Given that the treaty of 
Haddington was significantly more than a betrothal contract for Mary Stewart, its failure 
to contain specific provisions stipulating how Scotland's ancient laws and liberties were 
to be safeguarded in this newly created protectoral alliance and absentee monarchy is all 
the more striking, especially when compared to the treaties of Birgham and Greenwich, 
and ultimately serves to demonstrate the problems exclusively associated with 
queenship. 
I APS, II, pA81. 
2 The establishment of French power in Scotland, most notably between the years 1550 and 1552, is the 
subject of Chapter II. 
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The question of marriage for any female sovereign was inevitably a source of 
controversy and contention. The opinions expressed by some political and religious 
figures such as John Knox are, of course, well known. In 1558, with reference to female 
sovereignty in general and Mary Tudor in particular, he asserted that 'to promote a 
woman to beare rule, superioritie, dominion, or empire above any Realme, Nation, or 
Citie, is repugnant to Nature; comtumelie to God, a thing most contrarious to his reveled 
will and approved ordinance; and finallie, it is the subversion of good Order, of all 
equitiie and justice'.1 Yet the right of queenship was an accepted and established 
tradition in Scotland.2 What was controversial was the choice of husband and the 
possible repercussions thereof. To what extent would marriage affect the authority of a 
female sovereign given that her husband would be, as Constance Jordan argues, her 
social and political superior?3 And in reference to Mary, Queen of Scots, how would 
the cultural and institutional independence of Scotland be affected by a matrimonial 
union of crowns with France? Would such a union, for example, be nominal in nature, 
would the two kingdoms be integrated, and if so, to what degree, or would Scotland be 
reduced to a satellite state under the dominion of her consort, and more than likely, 
king?4 Unlike the treaties of Birgham and Greenwich, the treaty of Haddington made no 
I J. Knox, The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women, in Knox, Works, 
IV, p.373 and Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.8. 
2 N.H. Reid 'Margaret, 'Maid of Norway' and Scottish Queenship', Reading Medieval Studies, iii (1982), 
pp. 75-96. For more on the rights of queenship see Dawson, 'The Two John Knoxes, England, Scotland 
and the 1558 Tracts', Journal of Ecclesiastical History, xliiJ4 (1991), pp. 555-76; R.L. Greaves, 'The 
Gynaecocracy Controversy', in his Theology and Revolution in the Scottish Reformation: Studies in the 
Thought of John Knox (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1980), pp. 157-68; C. Jordan, 'Woman's Rule in 
Sixteenth-Century British Political Thought', Renaissance Quarterly, xl (1987), pp. 421-51; P.L. 
Scaligni, 'The sceptre and the distaff: the question offemale sovereignty, 1516-1607', The Historian, xli 
(1978), pp. 59-75; and A. Shephard, Gender and Authority in Sixteenth-CentUlY England, (Keele, 1994). 
3 Jordan, 'Woman's Rule', p.426. 
4 See M. Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe 
(London, 1991), pp. 1-24, for a general discussion of these questions, and lH. Elliot's 'The Spanish 
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attempt to address these questions specifically, but rather contained one general clause 
guaranteeing Scottish laws and liberties - a clause whose generality left room for 
interpretation. 
Both the treaties of Birgham and Greenwich are characterised by their numerous 
provisions designed, in theory, to safeguard the authority of a Scottish queen regnant 
and the independence of her kingdom in a matrimonial union of the crowns with 
England. l These provisions are noticeably absent from the treaty of Haddington. 
Admittedly, Henri pledged to observe and keep 'this Realme and liegis thairof in the 
samin fredome liberteis and Lawis as bene in all kingis of Scotlandis tymes bypast'.2 
But no other details were given as to how Scotland's independence was to be 
maintained after the union of the crowns, or in the interim as a protectorate state of 
France. The treaties of Birgham and Greenwich, by contrast, specify exactly how 
Scotland was to retain its political, legal, financial and ecclesiastical autonomy. 
Scotland, for example, was to retain its own name, laws and government; all matters of 
state were to be dealt with in a Scottish parliament; and no Scottish subj ect was to be 
answerable to an English court of law for crimes committed in Scotland. Moreover, in 
the event of her husband's death without issue, Scotland's queen regnant was to return 
to her native kingdom freely and without impediment. If the marriage did produce 
offspring, all heirs were to succeed to a united Scotland and England. In comparison to 
the treaties ofBirgham and Greenwich, the treaty of Haddington is noticeably reticent in 
Monarchy and the Kingdom of Portugal, 1580-1640', ibid, pp. 48-67; C. Desplot, 'Louis XIII and the 
Union of Beam to France', ibid, pp. 68-83; and H.H. Rowen, The King's State: Proprietary Dynasticism 
in Early Modern France (New Brunswick, 1985), for more specific case studies. 
I Stevenson, Documents, I, cviii, pp. 162-73; Foedera, XIV, pp. 786-96. See also APS, II, pp. 411-3, for 
the instructions issued to the Scottish negotiating commissioners for the treaties of Greenwich. 
2 Ibid, II, pA81. 
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these subject areas and neglects to address the problems that arise with the question of 
marriage in a gynaecocracy.' 
The vulnerable situation in which Scotland found itself in 1547 may offer some 
explanation as to why this was so. Scotland's desperation was France's opportunity. 
The Scots were in no position to dictate the terms of the treaty as their need for financial 
and military aid against England was too great. Ironically, the only thing the Scots 
could offer was the hand of their queen in marriage. The physical threat that the 
occupying English troops posed to national security and the person of Mary Stewart also 
explains why the Scottish political elite consented to send their queen to France, where 
she was to be raised during her minority until the time of her marriage. Again, the 
treaty of Haddington's lack of detail regarding such an unusual and intimate 
arrangement is striking when compared to the treaty of Greenwich. The Scots were 
adamant in their negotiations with the English that Mary stay in Scotland and in the care 
of her mother and four Scottish lords until she reached what they considered to be her 
perfect age of 10 years. 2 Contrary to the wishes of Henry VIII, who wanted Mary 
'deliuirit to him or In Ingland to be kepit quhill the completing of the said mariage,'3 the 
Scottish political community were adamant in their belief that Scotland's ancient 
liberties and freedoms were best safeguarded by keeping the queen's person in Scotland 
until she reached her age of majority. This fact alone makes Mary, Queen of Scots' 
conveyance to France, on the strength of a betrothal contract alone, extraordinary and all 
I As we shall see in Chapter VII, similar provisions were contained in Mary Stewart's 'public' marriage 
contract of 19 April 1558, but by this time, the Scottish Queen had been residing in France as an absentee 
monarch for close to ten years. 
2 APS, II, p.412. 
3 Ibid, II, pA12. 
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the more significant. France's possession of Scotland's queen regnant not only 
improved the chances of the marriage actually occurring, but also tied Scotland 
irrevocably to the interests of France. In addition to his protection of Scotland as a 
whole, this readily provided Henri with access to, and influence in, a strategically placed 
kingdom that served as the back-door to England, where French power could be 
established and Franco-centric policies implemented to his advantage. But before he 
could fully exploit his advantageous position in Scotland, Henri's immediate 
responsibility in 1548 was the expulsion of the English occupying troops. 
*** 
French military intervention began in earnest on 16 June 1548 with the arrival of a 
French fleet at Leith carrying 6,000 French and foreign troops and munitions. I The 
military objective, as stated in the treaty of Haddington, was to recover all the 
strongholds in English possession and restore Scotland to 'the auld libertie priuilege and 
fredome'.2 It is of interest to note as testimony to the dynastic importance of Mary 
Stewart that, although aid had arrived in mid-June, the French refused to engage in 
combat and besiege Haddington until the marriage treaty had been successfully 
contracted. 3 Central to the French military campaign was the strengthening of existing 
Scottish strongholds and the construction of new ones, in an attempt to counter the 
effects of Somerset's own fort-building policy.4 As promised, Dunbar passed into 
1 Merriman's 'Struggle for the Marriage' is the best account of France's military intervention in Scotland. 
Once again, it is not the purpose of this chapter to repeat Merriman by delving into the logistics of the 
military campaign, but rather to outline briefly what happened and highlight a few points that are of 
particular significance to Franco-Scottish relations during the 1550s. See also Merriman, 'The Forts of 
Eyemouth', pp. 142-55; Teu1et, Papiers, I, pp. 185-204 and Relations, I, pp. 159-236. 
2 APS, II, p.481. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 281, 283, 284, pp. 139-40; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.189 and Relations, I, p.22l. 
4 Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage', p.303. 
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French hands,l and work immediately began to fortify the castle under the direction of 
Migliorino Ubaldini, despite financial difficulties.2 The French also set about fortifying 
and modernising existing strongholds at Leith, Millhaven, Inchgarvie and the castles at 
Blackness and Stirling, and constructing new ones at Inveresk, Inchkeith and Luffness. 3 
This policy of fort modernisation and construction did not end with the cessation of 
hostilities with England, but continued throughout the 1550s and became a defining 
characteristic of the establishment of French power in Scotland.4 By assuming 
responsibility for Scotland's military security, Henri was able to establish a military 
foothold in a strategically placed kingdom ostensibly for the purpose of defence. But 
this also provided him with an ideal opportunity to engage in offensive military 
campaigns against the English. As Henri was simultaneously trying to recapture 
Boulogne from the English, his military position in Scotland was effective in diverting 
English attention from the Continent and depleting resources that otherwise would have 
been used to fortify and victual the English held strongholds at Boulogne and Calais. 
The main target in Scotland, however, was the principal English stronghold at 
Haddington. Through the strengthening and construction of their own strongholds in 
Scotland, France's military objective was to over-extend and financially exhaust the 
15 February 1547/8, CSP Scot., I, 147, p.7l. 
2 Dunbar was handed over to the French captain and treasurer of the troops in Scotland, M. de Chapelle, 
on 18 June 1548. NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.3, f.144 and MSS, 2991, f.71; TA., IX, p,445; CSP Scot., I, 147, 
228,257,265, pp. 71, 111, 125, 131; CSP Spain, IX, p.246. In his letter to Marie de Guise from Dunbar 
on 3 September 1548, Ubaldini reported that the fortification of the castle began on the first day of his 
arrival, but due to the difficulty in finding sufficient labour, he was unable to commence the fortification 
of the town itself. 
3 Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage', pp. 305, 312 and 'The Forts of Eyemouth', pp. 151-2; Colvin, 
King's Works, IV, p.609 n.4. 
4 As we shall see in Chapters II, IV, V, VII and VIII; between 1548 and 1559, improvements were made 
at Stirling, Blackness, Edinburgh and Dunbar, while new fortresses were erected at Leith, Inchkeith and 
Langholm. Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth', pp. 51-2. 
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English in order to 'isolate the important garrisons and reduce them by either siege or 
starvation' .1 Initially, this proved to be a more difficult task than anticipated. 
Somerset's strategically placed network of English fortresses enabled strongholds, like 
Haddington, to be revictualled without hindrance.2 But in 1549, the delivery of 
proVIsIOns was hindered and England's position in Scotland irreparably weakened. 
Ironically, this had nothing to do with France's military intervention, but was rather due 
to a series of domestic crises in England. Troops and victuals destined for Scotland 
were retained in England in order to deal with the various uprisings that constituted the 
'western rebellion' of 1549. It was because of England's weakened position on a 
national and international level that Henri felt that the time was ripe to refocus his 
attention on the Continent and intensify his efforts to recapture Boulogne. On 8 August 
1549, France officially declared war on England. The combined effects of internal 
dissension and France's assault on two fronts proved too much for the English. 
Haddington was abandoned in September 1549 and, in October, Somerset was removed 
from the Protectorate. Somerset's successor, John Dudley, earl of Warwick and future 
duke of Northumberland, inherited a financially exhausted and weak administration.3 
Eager to consolidate his position and re-establish order, Warwick moved to end 
England's conflict with France at Boulogne and in Scotland.4 
I Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage', pp. 304-5. This was also Somerset's strategy against the French. 
2 Ibid, p.310. 
3 For more on Dudley see D. Loades, John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, 1504-1553 (Oxford, 1996) 
and B.L. Beer, Northumberland: The Political Career of John Dudley, Earl of Warwick and Duke of 
Northumberland (Kent, Ohio, 1973). 
4 CSP Spain, X, pp. 47, 92-3. 
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On 18 February 1549/50, therefore, negotiations for an Anglo-French peace 
accord began and culminated in the treaty of Boulogne (24 March 1549/50) - a treaty in 
which Scotland was comprehended as an ally of France. 1 As the 'Protector' of Scotland, 
Henri assumed control over Scottish diplomacy and all matters pertaining to Scotland 
were represented by the French commissioners at the peace talks. The English still held 
the strongholds at Roxburgh, Eyemouth, Dunglass, Lauder and Broughty, and while this 
was the subject of great debate, the treaty. of Boulogne was fundamentally an Anglo-
French accord. As such, it was not expected to settle all differences between England 
and Scotland. The major issue was Boulogne and the terms under which it would revert 
to French possession. Indirectly, however, it did provide for the cessation of Scotland's 
hostilities with England and pave the way for an exclusively Anglo-Scottish treaty 
which was eventually contracted at Norham in June 1551. But it was France's 
representation of Scotland during the negotiations of the treaty of Boulogne that marked 
the beginning of Henri II's control over Scottish diplomacy - another defining feature of 
the establishment of French power in Scotland prior to the union ofthe crowns. 
The treaty of Haddington's significance, therefore, is multi-faceted. On an 
immediate and practical level, it provided the Scots with French financial and military 
assistance and a safe haven for their queen, both of which prevented Somerset from 
conquering Scotland and capturing Mary, Queen of Scots as a bride for Edward VI. 
Dynastically, the treaty provided for the union of the French and Scottish crowns and, 
on account of Mary's Catholic claim to the English throne, also laid the foundations for 
a Franco-British empire. Finally, the treaty of Haddington established a permanent 
iPoedera, XV, pp. 212-5. 
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protectoral relationship between France and Scotland that enabled Henri to assume 
control over Scottish foreign policy and diplomacy while maintaining a military 
presence in Scotland after the cessation of hostilities with England. It would also be 
responsible for Marie de Guise's future political career in Scotland as Queen Regent. 
With the removal of the English threat, however, the question remained as to whether 
the Scots would remain favourable to such an intimate Franco-Scottish alliance that 
involved the marriage of their absent queen regnant and gave the French King an 
extraordinary amount of power over their affairs and kingdom. As we shall see, it 
would appear that the Scots had no such qualms. 
35 
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Henri II's Protectorate of Scotland and the Establishment of French Power 
(1550-1552) 
The establislunent of French power in Scotland came as a direct result of the treaty of 
Haddington and the protectoral relationship it established between the 'auld allies'. 
Henri II's military intervention in Scotland was not intended to be a short-term 
arrangement that would end with the cessation of hostilities with England. Rather, he 
was commissioned by the Three Estates- in Parliament to defend Scotland against 
England and all others, in liberty and freedom 'at all necessar tymes to cum'. 1 
Essentially, Scotland became a protectorate of France and, as its 'Protector', Henri was 
able to assume control over Scotland's military security, diplomatic affairs and foreign 
policy. While the betrothal of Mary Stewart to Franyois Valois was an important aspect 
of the treaty of Haddington, the structure and wording of the accord clearly indicates 
that it was the protectoral relationship that the proposed Franco-Scottish dynastic 
alliance was designed to secure in perpetuity.2 
This is not to say, however, that Henri's protectorate of Scotland superseded the 
proposed dynastic alliance in importance. On the contrary, Mary Stewart's dynasticism 
and betrothal were central to Henri's VISIOn of a Franco-British empire and he 
considered his protection of Mary to be synonymous with his protection of her kingdom 
1 APS, II, pA81. 
2'Thairfoir hauand consideratioun of the premissis and how that the said maist Christin King hes set his 
haill hart and minde for defence of this Realme desyrit in his said maisters name for the mair perfyte 
vnion and indissolubill band of perpetuall amitie lig and confederatioun The mariage of our Souerane 
Lady to the effect that the said maist Christin Kingis eldest sone and Dolphin of France may be coniunit 
in matrimonie with grace' _ Ibid, II, pA81. 
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and vice versa. Writing to inform the Estates of Scotland that the young Queen, 'rna 
fille', had arrived safely in France and was with 'Ie Dauphin son Mary', Henri declared 
that 'par consequence, son Royaume, ses affaires & Sujets estre auec nostre vne mesme 
choses, sans en faire iamais separation'. 1 Indeed, the Estates' consent to the proposed 
marital alliance and the solemnity of the ceremony in which it was given, was also used 
to demonstrate how the Scots already recognised the Dauphin as the King of Scotland.2 
Dynastic arguments such as these were fortified by the residency of Scotland's queen 
regnant in France. Both the Queen Dowager's brother, Franyois, duc de Guise, and the 
Constable of France, Anne de Montmorency, for example, wrote of the French King's 
desire not to differentiate between his own kingdom and that of Scotland as he regarded 
'la petite Roine sa fille comme la siene propre'.3 Because Mary Stewart was in his 
protection and affianced to his son and heir, Henri considered it his duty and personal 
obligation to protect and defend her kingdom as he would his own, for now there was no 
difference between the two.4 During the period 1550-1552, however, it was Henri's 
protection of the actual kingdom of Scotland that emerged as the principal reason 
behind the establishment of French power· in Scotland. His contention that Scotland, 
1 30 July 1548, M. Belot (ed.), Lettres et mbnoires d'estat des roys, princes, ambassadeurs et autres 
ministres sous les regnes de Franr;ois 1", Henri II et Franr;ois II par G. Ribier (Paris, 1666), II, pp. 150-1. 
2 Henri wrote to his ambassador resident in England, Odet de Se1ve, that 'Ie contract de mariage d'entre 
... passe solennellement en Escosse, auant Ie partement de ladite Reyne, & l'inuestiture & possession des 
Royaumes, Sceptre & Couronne, baillee & delaissee en la presence, & du consentrnent des Estats du 
pays, ames deputez au profit de mondit Fils, lequel a este en ce faisant reconnu pour Roy d'Escosse'. 
Ibid, II, p.152. The Imperial ambassador, St. Mauris, also reported that Henri had declared that the 
'Parliament of Scotland had agreed to the marriage of the Queen of Scots to his son, and for that reason 
he had already taken possession of the kingdom, which he intended to keep and govern as his own 
kingdom'. CSP Spain, IX, pp. 336-7. 
3 NLS, MSS.2991, fos. 14v-5', 9v_lOr; Fourquevaux Mission, pp. 12,9. They also wrote of how 'Ie Roy a 
acueur Ie bien des affaires d 'Escosse qui sont les siens propres'. 
4 On 30 July 1548, Henri wrote to de Se1ve that, 'la protection, & conseruation dudict Royaume d'Ecosse, 
comme du mien propre, n'estant a present tous deux qu'vne mesme chose l'vn auec l'autre'. Ribier, 
Lettres et lIuhn 0 ires , II, p.152. 
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'comme Royaume qui est a ma protection. et que j'estime comme mien', was used to 
justify this process and, more importantly, was accepted on a national and international 
leve1.! 
As the 'Protector' of Scotland, therefore, Henri was not only able to justify his 
intervention in Scotland in 1548, but also maintain a legitimate military position within 
the archipelago after the cessation of hostilities in 1550, assume control over Scotland's 
diplomatic affairs and, by implication, her foreign policy. These defining characteristics 
of French power/ and the 'protectoral' arguments used to justify its establishment, are 
effectively demonstrated in three areas which are dealt with in this chapter: the 
negotiations over, and Scotland's comprehension within, the terms of the treaty of 
Boulogne; the rapprochement between the Scots and Charles V; and the extensive 
involvement of France in Anglo-Scottish relations, particularly during the negotiations 
that culminated in the treaty of Nor ham. 
*** 
Dynastic and imperial considerations unquestionably motivated Henri II to intervene in 
Scotland in 1548. But these considerations were only potential returns on his military 
and financial investment that ultimately depended on the marriage of Mary Stewart to 
Franyois Valois. To suggest that Henri was motivated by dynastic and imperial 
I AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, VIII, f.l03 v; D.L. Potter (ed.), 'Documents concerning the negotiation of the 
Anglo-French treaty of March 1550', Camden Miscellany, xxviiil29 (1984), 47, p.134. 
2 Another feature was the introduction and circulation of French currency in Scotland. This, however, 
seems to have been a less popular aspect of the establishment of French power owing to the refusal of 
some Scots to accept French coins as legal tender. Having been examined by the auditors of the 
Exchequer in July 1550 and authorised as legal currency on 7 August, increasingly harsh penalties were 
prescribed by the Privy Council for those who refused to accept French coins - including escheat and 
death. In the end, the obstinacy of the Scots prevailed and the Privy Council was forced to issue a 
prohibition on the importation of certain French cdins on 16 November 155l. RPC, I, pp. 104-5, 106, 
108-9, 109-1l. 
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ambitions alone is a narrow interpretation of events - especially since it was a very real 
possibility that these prospects would not materialise. The incentive for Henri's 
intervention in Scotland must be seen in the wider European context as part of his 
territorial quest to recover Boulogne, neutralise England, and redress the balance of 
power that was then in Charles V's favour. 
Captured by Henry VIII in 1544, the 'loss of Boulogne had dominated French 
policy towards England in the last years of Franyois I and the first of Henri II'.! Henry 
VIII's determination to hold on to Boulogne prompted Franyois I to launch an attack on 
the Isle of Wight and Seaford in July 1545 in the hope of forcibly weakening the 
English King's resolve. Stalemate rather than surrender led to negotiations for an 
Anglo-French peace, and the resulting treaty of Ardres (7 June 1546) provided for the 
return of Boulogne in 1554, but only upon receipt of two million crowns. Less than 
satisfactory from a French perspective, it comes as no surprise that the reconquest of 
Boulogne continued to be a military objective upon the accession of Henri II in 1547. 
The traditional Habsburg-Valois rivalry, however, constrained Henri from taking any 
overt military action against the English for fear of recriminations by Charles V. But 
the Scots' timely appeal for French aid and the ensuing treaty of Haddington presented 
Henri with the ideal opportunity to confront England directly and legitimately as the 
'Protector' of Scotland. French military intervention in Scotland would not only serve 
to divert English attention from the Continent and deplete resources that otherwise 
would have been used to maintain and fortify Boulogne, but also provided Henri with 
I Potter, 'The Treaty of Boulogne and European Diplomacy, 1549-50', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research, Iv (1982), pp. 50-1. 
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the opportunity to cash in on the long-H~nn dynastic and imperial rewards that an 
alliance with Scotland had to offer. 
By July 1549, it was clear that Charles V was not prepared to assist the English 
in their defence of Boulogne.! The door had effectively been left open for Henri to 
declare war against England in August and commence his military campaign. Despite 
having taken many of the forts surrounding Boulogne, such as Ambleteuse, Henri's 
military campaign to take Boulogne itself had ultimately failed. 2 French forces were 
impeded by adverse weather conditions and what D.L. Potter describes as, 'a certain 
improvisation in the late planning of the campaign'.3 For England, a series of domestic 
crises culminating in the collapse of Somerset's protectorate in October 1549, and the 
debilitating effects of a confrontation with France on two fronts, made the overtures for 
peace as welcome to the war weary and financially exhausted English as they were to 
the French.4 Just six months after war had been declared, therefore, negotiations for an 
Anglo-French peace accord began in earnest on 18 February 1549/50.5 
Although the treaty of Boulogne was fundamentally concerned to engmeer a 
rapprochement between England and France, Scotland nevertheless figured prominently 
in the negotiations and was represented by Henri and his negotiating commissioners: 
1 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 160, p.36; Potter, 'Treaty of Boulogne', p.5l. Paget was despatched to the 
Imperial Court at Brussels in order to ask for assistance against the French in June 1549. See also 
Charles' letter to Van der Delft on 26 July 1549 in CSP Spain, IX, pp. 411-2. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 196, p.46. See also, for example, W.K. Jordan (ed.), The Chronicle and 
Political Papers of King Edward VI (London, 1966), p.13; Cloulas, Henri II, pp. 268-9; Baumgartner, 
Hemy II, pp. 141-3. 
3 Potter, 'Documents', p.59. 
4 Between 1545 and 1550, England's war expenses totaled £3,491,472, approximately £603,900 of which 
was for their military campaign in Scotland alone. BL, Harley MSS, 353.28, fos. 90-102; PRO, 
SP10/15/11; Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage',·p.323. 
5 Potter, 'Treaty of Boulogne', pp. 51-65 and 'Documents', pp. 58-180. 
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Francois de Montmorency, Seigneur de Rochepot, Gaspard de Coligny, Seigneur de 
Chatillon, Andre Guillart, Seigneur du Mortier, and Guillaume Bochetel, Seigneur de 
Sassy.! The French King's primary aim was to settle the financial terms under which 
the English would relinquish Boulogne. By 2 March 1549/50, he was 
'merveilleusement aise' that his offer of 400,000 ecus d'or solei! and the reservation of 
England's pension rights were considered reasonable by the English.2 In order to 
consolidate the resumption of friendly relations with England and at the strong urging of 
Antonio Guidotti,3 mediator of the negotiations, Henri also proposed the marriage of his 
eldest daughter, Elisabeth, to Edward VI.4 Seen by the French commissioners as 'Ie 
plus grand et honnorable qui soit en nostre instruction', the acceptance of this proposal 
would bring to an end England's persistent, albeit futile, demand for the recognition of 
the treaties of Greenwich and facilitate the promotion of French interests at the English 
Court. 5 On a more immediate and practical level, rapprochement with England, with or 
without a dynastic alliance, would ensure England's neutrality in the seemingly 
inevitable renewal of the Habsburg-Valois conflict for European supremacy. In this 
respect, the Franco-Scottish alliance of 1548 and the subsequent establishment of 
French military power in Scotland placed Henri in a strong position within the 
archipelago to enforce England's neutrality or, if need be, to check English involvement 
1 Potter, 'Documents', 1, pp. 74-5. 
2 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, VIII, f.l0l'; Potter, 'Documents', 47, p.129. 
3 A Florentine merchant, Antonio Guidotti was a naturalised Englishman with influential contacts at the 
French court. Ibid, p.85 n.l and 'Treaty of Boulogne' , pp. 57-8. 
4 AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, II, f.287 V and VIII, f.l07; Potter, 'Documents', 2, 27, pp. 81, 103. For more 
on the Tudor-Valois marriage negotiations see CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,347,351,387,411, pp. 107-8, 
109, 133, 150; BL, Harley MSS, 353.33, fos. 110-1 and 353.34, fos. 112-3. 
5 AE, Cor. Pol. Angleterre, VIII, f.107; Potter, 'Documents', 27, p.103. 
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andlor ambitions on the Continent. But as long as England had a military foothold in 
Scotland, France's strategic position was undermined and Scotland's national security 
threatened. Henri's secondary objective during the negotiations, therefore, was the 
relinquishment of all strongholds held by the English in Scotland. 
England's military position in Scotland was a very contentious issue during the 
negotiations, but could not be, and was not, effectively dealt with in the treaty of 
Boulogne itself. This was primarily due to the fact that it brought into question specific 
Anglo-Scottish boundary disputes. The contentious issue at hand was the fate of the 
English strongholds located at Roxburgh, Eyemouth, Broughty, Lauder and Dunglass. 
Henri's position on the matter was clear and unwavering from the outset: all those 
places and fortifications that had been conquered and occupied by the English since 
Henry VIII's invasion were to be relinquished and returned to the Scots. 1 The English 
commIssIOners, conversely, were explicitly instructed to hold on to all English 
strongholds in Scotland and, only as a last resort, to surrender the lesser forts at Lauder, 
Dunglass and Broughty.2 By late February, the English had done just that,3 but they 
were determined to reserve the English King's title to Scotland and retain Roxburgh and 
Eyemouth, claiming that they constituted 'leurs anciennes limites et frontieres'. 4 This 
1 AB, Cor. Pol. Angleterre, II, f. 287'; Potter, 'Documents', 2, p.80. 
2 BL, Cotton MSS, Caligula E.iv, fos. 285', 278', Harley MSS, 36.12, fos. 54-5, 55-6 and Lansdowne 
MSS, 2.33, fos. 81-3; Potter, 'Documents', p.129 n.2. 
3 AB, Cor. Pol. Angleterre, VIII, f.101'; Potter, 'Documents', 47, p.129. Henri wrote to his 
commissioners that, 'vous ont accorde de me rendre Boulogne et tous les fortz Escosse, scavoir est: 
Donglas, Bourtierac et Ladres, retenans a eulx Roxbourg et Aymond [Eyemouth]'. 
4 BL, Harley MSS, 36.11, fos. 52-3 and Cotton MSS, Caligula E.iv, f.282'; Potter, 'Documents', p.138 
n.l. 
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proved to be as unacceptable to Henri as it was to Marie de Guise, who wrote of the 
'grand mal que ce ne seroit s'illeur demeroit un seul fort dans ce royaume'.1 
In response to these claims, Henri was quick to establish and assert his position as 
'Protector' of Scotland. Because Scotland was in his protection and, therefore, a 
kingdom of his own, 'il ne seroit raisonnable que je leur laissasse riens de ce qu'ilz ont 
prins depuis les dernieres guerres'. 2 As Eyemouth and Roxburgh had been taken since 
the last war, Henri flatly rejected the claims that they constituted England's ancient 
borders and similarly declined the offer of Broughty on the grounds that there was 
nothing there but the worst ensigns even the English did not wane For these reasons, 
Henri could not accept England's terms and ordered his commissioners back to the 
negotiating table to demand the return of Eyemouth and Roxburgh and, while they were 
at it, to try for a reduction in the price of Boulogne.4 The English, however, were 
equally determined to retain Roxburgh and Eyemouth, even to the point of temporarily 
suspending the negotiations, as their position in Scotland was the only leverage they had 
against the French.s Consequently, Scotland was reduced to nothing more than a 
bargaining tool with which both sides haggled over the price of Boulogne, leaving the 
fate of Scotland's strongholds still to be determined when peace between England and 
France was finally contracted on 24 March 1549/50.6 In order to address this question 
I Marie de Guise to Franc;:ois, duc de Guise, 26 February 1550, J.-P. Micharde et J.-P.-P. Poujolat (eds)., 
Memoires-lournaux de Franr;ois de Lorraine, due d'Aumale et de Guise, 1547 a 1563 (Paris, 1854), p.8. 
2 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, VIII, f.102r; Potter, 'Documents', 47, p.131. 
3 AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, VIII, f.102r; Potter, 'Documents', 47, pp. 131-2. 
4 AE, Cor. Pol., Ang1eterre, VIII, fos. 103r-4r; Potter, 'Documents', 47, pp. 133-4. 
5 BL, Cotton MSS, Ca1igula E.iv, f.282r; Potter, 'Documents', p.138 11.1. 
6 Foedera, XV, pp. 211-7; SRO, SP7/40. 
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and other issues pertaining to Scotland's military security and diplomatic affairs, Henri 
despatched Francois de Seguenville-Fumel, sieur de Thor, to Scotland. l 
As the Scottish political community would soon hear from Fumel, the treaty of 
Boulogne provided for a less than conclusive and rather confusing settlement on the 
question of the English held fortifications in Scotland.2 Much to the displeasure of 
Marie de Guise, England retained possession of Eyemouth and Roxburgh, in return for 
which they agreed to evacuate and surrender the lesser forts of Lauder and Dunglass. 3 
England's retention of Eyemouth and Roxburgh, however, was conditional. If the Scots 
retook Lauder and Dunglass before the publication of the peace, or officially expressed 
a desire for their demolition, the English would not only have to comply, but would also 
be constrained to demolish Roxburgh and Eyemouth.4 The fate of all four strongholds, 
therefore, needed to be determined by the Scots - but not before Henri took steps to 
ensure that their decision was in accordance with his own.5 
At the time of Fumel's mission to Scotland, Henri had already made up his mind 
on the course of action that should be taken. In his opinion, all four forts should be 
demolished as Dunglass and Lauder could always be rebuilt to 'faire la une barriere aux 
angloys pour ne rentrer J amais dedans ledit pays [Scotland]'. 6 In order to ensure that he 
got his own way, or at least a decision that was in accordance with the interests of 
I M. Wood (ed.), 'Instructions to the French Ambassador, 30 March 1550', SHR, xxvi (1947), pp. 154-
67. 
2 Fumel arrived in Scotland in mid-April and addressed the Privy Council on 22 April 1550. TA, IX, pp. 
393,397; RPC, I, p.86. 
3 Micharde et Poujolat, Mbnoires-Journaux, pp. 8, 31. 
4 Wood, 'Instructions', p.160; AE, Cor. Pol. Angleterre, II, fos. 293 v_4r, 366v-7'; Potter, 'Documents', 51, 
p.142. 
5 Ibid, 52, pp. 144-6. 
6 Wood, 'Instructions', pp. 160-1. 
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France, Henri instructed Fume1 to discuss the matter with Marie de Guise, d'Oisel and 
Paul de Termes, lieutenant-general of the French forces in Scotland, before informing 
Chatelherault of the terms of the treaty and consulting him on the matter. If it was 
deemed appropriate that the Regent and his council should be consulted, i. e. if it was 
felt that they would reach a similar decision, only then was Fumel to discuss it with 
them following the advice of the Queen Dowager and her French advisers. 1 The same 
procedure also applied to Henri's inquiry as to the number of French troops that were 
needed in Scotland now that Anglo-Scottish hostilities had ceased. 
Wanting to reduce his expenditure in this new reign of peace, Henri asked d'Oisel, 
de Termes and Marie de Guise to determine how many French garrisons were still 
required for the security of Scotland, and whether it was possible to withdraw the 
lansquenets (for service in Denmark) and light horse, while leaving the gens d'armes. 2 
This clearly reveals Henri's intention to maintain his military position in Scotland. 
Surely, the most expedient way of reducing his expenditure would have been the 
complete withdrawal of all French troops. But it is the way in which Henri discreetly 
assumed control over Scotland's military affairs that is of greater significance. His 
insistence that matters of military security be discussed with Marie de Guise and her 
French advisers in advance of any discussion with Chatelherault demonstrates how the 
latter's position as Regent was being subtly undermined. Chatelherault was being 
consulted as a formality - the real decisions were being made by Henri and his French 
agents in Scotland. To all intents and purposes, though, it appeared as if Chatelherault 
I Wood, 'Instructions', p.161. 
2 Ibid, p.165. 
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was making the decisions with respect to Scotland's military security. This was a 
shrewd piece of manipulation by Henri. Whilst reassuring Chatelherault of his position 
and authority as Regent, Henri was able simultaneously to exert his will in order to 
ensure that the interests of France were being served in Scotland. 
In the end, it was deemed appropriate that Chatelherault be 'consulted' on these 
matters of national security and, on 22 April 1550, the Scottish Privy Council issued a 
formal reply to Henri. 1 With respect to the English held fortifications in Scotland, it 
was the opinion of Marie de Guise, Chatelherault and his Council, 'that the fortis of 
Lauder, Dunglas, Roxburgh, and Aymouth, be all cassin doun', finally putting an end to 
the matter.2 After England's consent to surrender these strongholds had been received,3 
preparations were soon made for 'the essegeing of forttis within Scotland presentlie in 
the handis of oure auld inemeis of Ingland'.4 With oxen, 'pikis, schulis and mattokis', 
the Scots descended on Lauder and Dunglass to cast down their walls and transfer their 
artillery and munition respectively to Home Castle and Dunbar. 5 Even though their 
demolition had been completed by July 1550, the English nominally retained Eyemouth 
and Roxburgh until all the boundary disputes were settled in the treaty of Nor ham (June 
1551).6 
1 RPC, I, pp. 86-93. 
2 Ibid, I, p.90. 
3 APC, II, p.429. 
4 TA, IX, p.396. 
5 Ibid, IX, pp. 421, 423-4. 
6 RPC, I, p.99; APC, III, pp. 47, 97,171; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,215,221, pp. 48, 50; CSP Scot, I, 
371, p.185; Foedera, XV, pp. 265-71. 
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While many of Scotland's strongholds had been allocated for demolition in 1550, 
France continued to invest in their programme of fortress modernisation that began in 
1548.1 Engineers, such as Camillo Marini, were sent to plan and repair Scotland's 
border and coastal fortifications.2 On 8 November 1550, for example, orders were 
issued to build a fort 'about the toun and castell of Dunbar for strenthing and 
fortificatioun of the same and resisting . of sik danger and inconvenientis as may 
hereafter follow,' 3 and in the following March, d'Oisel, Chatelherault and Marini 
recommended that a fort at Jedburgh would be ideal for the defence of the frontier and 
for enforcing the peace.4 Despite the complaints of a lack of money sent from France to 
carry out the desired renovations,S work on Scotland's strongholds was conducted at 
such a pace that the English ambassador resident in France, Sir John Mason, felt 
compelled to report that this was distasteful to the Scots, who thought they were meant 
for the keeping of them as opposed to the safety of the country.6 In the light of the 
Scots' reaction to Henri's expressed desire to reduce his expenditure in Scotland, 
however, the accuracy of Mason's statement is questionable and was more than likely 
intended to reassure his English audience. 
1 Merriman, 'The Forts of Eyemouth', p.151; Colvin, King's Works, IV, p.609 n.4. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,248, p.59; Balcarres Papers, II, lxvi, pp. 92-3. 
3 ADCP, p.606. 
4 15 March 155011, Balcarres Papers, II, lxvi, pp. 92-3. 
5 In his letter to Marie de Guise, Camillo Marini complained that the 3,000 livres Hemi sent for the repair 
of Scotland's border fortifications was insufficient. Ibid, II, lxvi, pp. 92-3. 
618 March 1550/1, CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,305, p.79. See also Balcarres Papers, II, cxxvii, pp. 185-6, 
for the work that was to begin diligently at Dunbar in December 1553 - no doubt as a response to Mary 
Tudor's accession, the arrival of her consort, Philip of Spain, and the work being done on the English 
side of the Border, most notably at Berwick. 
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With a view to 'sparing the Kingis expense in tyme of pece', the Privy Council 
proposed that the forts at Inchcolm, Inchgarvie, Broughty (Balgillo), Montrose and 
Luffness (Aberlady) also be demolished.! While the Scots' proposed certain cost-
cutting measures, they also requested that the strongholds at Dunbar, Blackness, 
Inveresk, Inchkeith and Broughty Castle be fortified and garrisoned with French troops. 
The strategic positions of Inchkeith and Broughty at the entrances to the Firths of Forth 
and Tay, 'our Soveranis maist speciale revaris', made this request a particular necessity, 
as was the maintenance of Home Castle, because of its close proximity to the Borders.2 
England, therefore, was still regarded as a threat to national security, and the stipulation 
that 1,000 footmen remain in Scotland to garrison the strongholds of the realm, is 
testament to the Scots' predominant concern with matters of defence at this time.3 By 
December 1550, it has been estimated that d'Oisel commanded a force of 1,100 French 
soldiers in Scotland.4 The continuation of French military intervention at the explicit 
request of the Scottish government, and the latter's formal recognition of Henri as 'the 
sure and onlie defendar and releiff, under God, of all this realme', not only provided for 
the establishment of French military power in Scotland during 1550-1552, but also 
confirmed and reinforced the protectoral relationship that existed between France and 
Scotland.S Needless to say, this voluntary recognition and subsequent legitimation of 
1 RPC, I, pp. 90, 119. 
2 Ibid, I, p. 90. 
3 Ibid, I, p.90. 
4 Merriman, 'Struggle for the Marriage', p.324. See also R.S. Rait (ed.), 'Muster-Roll of the French 
Garrison at Dunbar', SHS Misc., II, pp. 105-13. At this point in time, Henri felt that Dunbar should be 
garrisoned with 93 French soldiers. 
5 RPC, I, p.87. 
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Henri's protectorate was a point conveniently forgotten by the Lords of the 
Congregation in their proclamations of French domination and conquest a decade later. 
The fate of the English held fortifications in Scotland and other matters of military 
security having thus been determined, Thomas, Master of Erskine, was despatched to 
England on 24 April 1550 with a commission to 'ratifie, afferme, and appreve ... the 
comprehensioun of Hir Grace and hir realme of Scotland' in the treaty of Boulogne. 1 
The ratification of Scotland's comprehension was formalised on 15 May 1550.z From 
England, Erskine then proceeded to France to present the Scots' reply to Henri's 
memorial and to pledge their continued support for the Franco-Scottish dynastic 
alliance. 3 Echoing the French King's wish 'veoir ung Jour son fils mary dune des plus 
vertueuses princesses que Ion scauroit desirer,' the Scots also expressed their hope that 
'be hir [Mary Stewart's] birth, mak his Hienes to be callit the gudschir of ane of the 
maist victorious princes in the warld and Kyng to ryng lang prosperouslie abufe baith 
the realmes'.4 By placing the military security of Scotland in the hands of Henri, 
recognising him as the 'Protector' of Scotland and asking for continued intervention 
after the cessation of hostilities with England, the Scottish political elite willingly 
abetted the establishment of French military power in Scotland prior to a projected 
union ofthe crowns. More importantly, this was neither forced nor the result of military 
conquest. But were the Scots in any position to refuse? 
I TA, IX, pp. 393, 394, 397; RPC, I, p.87; Wood, 'Instructions', pp. 159-60. 
2 SRO, SP6/49; BL, Cotton MSS,Caligua B.vii, fos. 405, 406, 414, 418-20 and B.viii, fos. 279-80; CSP 
Spain, X, pp. 91, 98, 168. 
3 RPC, I, pp. 86-93. 
4 Wood, 'Instructions', p.163; RPC, I, p.88. 
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The very fact that Henri asked the Scots to determine what, if any, French forces 
were needed in Scotland is noteworthy. Having expressed the wish to reduce his 
expenditure, he could have stopped providing French military and financial aid 
completely. Likewise, the Scottish political community could have requested the 
immediate removal of all foreign troops and the complete cessation of French military 
and financial intervention. Instead, the Privy Council issued Henri with certain criteria 
that would take a considerable amount of time to satisfy, if at all. Firstly, it was 
stipulated that, 'gif it be the Kingis pleasour to tak away his army here', enough troops 
were to remain until a final and perfect peace was concluded with England and sure 
knowledge was had of peace with Charles V. l If these objectives were not attainable, 
Henri's 'imperial dewite ... oblisit [him] to defend pupillis, that he will grant support of 
men, munitioun, and sic thair reasonabill help as he may spair'.2 As we shall see, 
securing an enduring Scoto-Imperial peace and 'ane honorabill peax of the King of 
Ingland', was no mean feat - nor, for that matter, was the Scots' second demand.3 The 
Privy Council also looked to the French and Marie de Guise, in particular, for help in 
pacifying their country internally. Once peace had been established on an international 
level, it was requested that 'sik ordour sall be takyn for executioun of justice and 
ordouring of the cuntre be the avise of the Quenis Grace [Marie de Guise], ... 
quharewith the King sall have caus to be contentit, and sall be advertist thairof in dew 
tyme. ,4 As we shall see in Chapters V and VI, years of warfare had reduced Scotland to 
1 RPC, I, p.93. 
2 Ibid, I, p.93. 
3 Ibid, I, pp. 90, 93. 
4 Ibid, I, p.90. 
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near lawlessness, especially on the Borders and in the Highlands, and the restoration of 
law and order in those areas and throughout the kingdom in general, would neither be a 
short-term nor an easy endeavour for Guise. Given the nature of these demands, 
therefore, it would seem that the Scottish political elite was in no hurry to see the back 
of the French. Indeed, it was not Regent Chatelherault to whom they appealed for the 
'ordouring of the cuntre' or for international peace, but Marie de Guise and, once again, 
Henri II. 
*** 
Diplomatic control was another feature of France's establishment of power in Scotland 
during the period 1550-1552. As in matters of military security, control over Scotland's 
diplomatic affairs and, by implication, her foreign policy, was considered by Henri to 
fall within the jurisdiction of the 'Protector' of Scotland. Using what was fast becoming 
his catch-phrase, that 'comme Royaume qui est rna protection '" j' estime comme 
mien', Henri was able to justify his eclipse of Chatelherault's authority in the realm of 
diplomacy.! More importantly, the Scottish political community's acceptance of this 
justification not only sanctioned the French King's assumption of power, but was also 
an act of recognition that their kingdom was a protectorate of France. Two occasions in 
particular, demonstrate Henri's assumption of control over Scotland's diplomatic 
affairs: the negotiations that culminated in the treaties of Binche (1550) and Norham 
(1551). 
The volatile and particularly hostile nature of Scoto-Imperial relations in 1550 
provided Henri with the ideal opportunity to assert and exercise his diplomatic 
I Wood, 'Instructions', p.163; AE, Cor. Pol., AngletelTe, VIII, f.103 v; Potter, 'Documents', 47, p.l3l. 
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authority. In his memorial, Henri instructed Fumel to rebuke Chatelherault for making 
overtures of peace with Charles V without his knowledge or consent.! Indeed, Henri 
found it 'very strange' that the Governor should dare to take such an independent course 
of action given that Scotland was in his protection, and when negotiations should have 
been conducted by one of his ambassadors resident with the Emperor. 2 In order to 
persuade Chatelherault to accept the French King's assumption of diplomatic control 
and, of course, to further bind him to the interests of France, Fumel was to disclose that 
steps had been taken at the Court of Rome, via the Cardinal de Guise, to grant legatine 
powers to his brother, John Hamilton, the archbishop of St Andrews, as a gesture of 
Henri's contentment with the Regent in his retaking of the strongholds held by the 
English.3 Undoubtedly fuelled by dynastic ambition, and the prospect of a Hamilton 
controlling the dispensation of all ecclesiastical benefices and offices in Scotland, save 
bishoprics, Chatelherault relented and beseeched Henri to 'send his ambassadouris 
towart the Empriour to procurer ane peax ... always referring the tyme to his Maj esteis 
discretion', while not forgetting to thank and implore the king to continue the efforts 
made on behalf of his brother at the Papal Court.4 
Any peace negotiations between the Scots and Charles V, however, were destined 
to be fraught with difficulty whoever was at the helm. Reminding the Scots that they 
could not afford to have an enemy in the person of Charles V, Henri's first task was to 
I NLS, MSS.2991, fos. 72V_3; FOllrqllevallx Mission, pp. 27-8. 
2 Originally, Fumel was instructed to state that Henri found Chatelherault's actions 'assez mauvais', but 
this was later modified to 'estrange'. Wood, 'Instructions', p.163 n.c; RPC, I, p.89. 
3 Wood, 'Instructions', pp. 163-4; RPC, I, p.89; Micharde et Poujolat, Mbnoires-Journallx, p.7; Ribier, 
Lettres et mbnoires, II, p.272; Balcarres Papers, II, Ii, pp. 67-70. 
4 RPC, I, pp. 89,91-2; Finnie, 'The House of Hamilton' , pp. 8-9; Mahoney, 'The Scottish Hierarchy', pp. 
51-3. 
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admonish Marie de Guise and Chatelherault for 'Ie grans dommaiges que aucuns leurs 
subgectz continuent a faire par mer a ceulx de lempereur,' and to order the cessation of 
these maritime molestations.! The Scottish political elite's immediate response to this 
demand was, at best, half-hearted. Thomas Erskine was commissioned 'to putt 
inhibitioun to the capitanis, maisteris, and awnaris '" that nane of thame tak upon hand 
to mak were upon the Empouris subjectis', but only if he happened to come across any 
Scottish warships while in France.2 The Scots' apprehension was justified. Previous 
peace treaties contracted at Antwerp in 1545 and Edinburgh in 1546, for example, had 
failed to calm the waters and served only to inaugurate a period of rampant piracy that 
was unprecedented in its hostility.3 While the Privy Council desired the 'maist Christine 
King to trete ane peax betuis the Empriour and us, be his ambassadour presentlie being 
with the Empriour,' Erskine was to make it-clear to Henri that their conditions for peace 
must be satisfied on account of the continual violation of the peace by the Emperor and 
his Flemish subjects, who, in the taking of a great number of Scottish ships 'at the 
desyre of Ingland,' caused 'grete hurt and dampnages of the liegis of this realme'.4 
By 6 July 1550, the Scots' misgivings seemed to be vindicated by the 'gret 
enormiteis dalie done' within Scotland's 'awin watteris and firthis ... be the schippis of 
Holand, Flussing, and uthiris the Lawlandis of Flandaris, subjectis to the Empriour,.5 
An order issued by the Privy Council licensing the launch of Scottish warships for the 
I Wood, 'Instructions', p.162. 
2 RPC, I, p.87. 
3 M.P. Rooseboom, The Scottish Staple in the Netherlands (The Hague, 1910), pp. 68-9. 
4 RPC, I, pp. 89, 91-3. 
5 Ibid, I, p.l04. Specifically, d'Oisel had alleged that from 4 July to 24 July 1550, the Emperor's 'ships 
had committed several outrages on the Scots at sea, and behaved with inhuman cruelty'. CSP Spain, X, 
p.157. 
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'stanching thairof, effectively disregarded Henri's command to cease all 
confrontational activity against the Emperor's subj ects. 1 This hiccup in the resumption 
of friendly relations was further exacerbated by the confusion and distrust caused by 
France's involvement in the negotiations and, ultimately, its alliance with Scotland. 
The confusion surrounded a letter issued by Marie de Guise and Chatelherault to 
Sebastian de l' Aubespine, Abbe of Bassefontaine, the French ambassador at Brussels, to 
Mary, Queen Dowager of Hungary, sister of Charles V and Regent of the Netherlands, 
empowering him to conclude a treaty on the Scots' behalf. 2 Having scrutinised the 
letter, the Queen Dowager of Hungary and her Council conveniently found some 
discrepancies that would forestall the negotiations. Firstly, it was argued that de 
l' Aubespine did not have the power to conclude a truce because he was the ambassador 
resident to the Queen Dowager of Hungary and not, as the letter clearly stipulated, the 
King of France's ambassador resident with Charles V (M. de Marillac). Secondly, the 
proposed duration of the truce until May 1551 was denounced as being 'so long a term 
that one can only take it the real object of the truce is to put off a peace, and make sure 
that all your [Charles V's] warships shall be disarmed in the meantime, in order to make 
war again in the spring if the French feel like it,.3 Indeed, these fears seemed to be 
vindicated only weeks after the Scoto-Imperial peace had actually been concluded at 
Binche in December 1550, when Sir John Mason reported that great warlike 
1 RPC, I, p.104; CSP Spain, X, p.157. 
2 See ibid, X, pp. 157-61, for the Queen Dowager of Hungary's discussion of this letter and analysis of its 
contents. 
3 Ibid, X, p.158. 
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preparations on land and sea were being made in France for use against the Emperor.' 
Although nothing immediately came of these preparations, Mary of Hungary's 
perception of her Valois rival was remarkably acute. Thirdly, and perhaps more 
importantly, the clause expressing the Queen of Scotland's wish to comprehend her 
'abettors, confederates and friends' immediately raised alarm bells as to Henri's true 
intentions. The Queen Dowager of Hungary astutely remarked that: 
It looks very much as if they [the Scots] wished to include the King of 
France, so that if we were hereafter to break with the Scots, they might 
claim that we were also breaking with the King of France. This point is of 
importance, and we must be careful to have it cleared up if we really treat 
with the Scots: namely, whether or no war with one country would mean 
war with the other.2 
Although de l' Aubespine stressed that Henri was merely 'anxious to have the truce 
concluded in order to stop hostilities', the doubts raised by the Queen Dowager of 
Hungary do merit some consideration as to the implications of Henri's protectorate of 
Scotland.3 
The comprehension of France in any treaty contracted between Scotland and 
Charles V had serious repercussions in the wider context of the Habsburg-Valois 
struggle for European supremacy. Something as slight as a shipping infraction, for 
instance, would constitute a violation of the peace and justify French retributory action 
against the Emperor, thus legitimately renewing the conflict. As an ally of France, 
Scotland would automatically be drawn into the conflict and vice versa. Moreover, 
France's alliance with, and military position in, Scotland could be used to divert 
1 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 270, 282, pp. 65, 69. The target of these warlike preparations, such as the 
hasty completion of ships, was originally thought to be England because of the internal dissension it was 
then experiencing. 
2 CSP Spain, X, p.158. 
3 Ibid, X, p.159. 
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Imperial attention and resources from the focus of the Habsburg-Valois conflict in Italy 
- most notably, through intrigues at sea. As in matters of military security, Henri's 
assumed control of Scottish diplomacy, while ostensibly for the purpose of defence and, 
therefore, within his jurisdiction as 'Protector' of Scotland, also provided him with the 
means to manipulate events and pursue his ambitions offensively on the Continent. The 
concerns raised by the Queen Dowager of Hungary are indicative of the advantageous 
position Henri found himself in as a result of his protectorate of Scotland - a position 
that could be exploited equally for defensive and offensive purposes. 
On 23 August 1550, the potential problems that arose with France's involvement 
were simply avoided by Mary of Hungary, who empowered her commissioners to 
negotiate the terms of a peace settlement only with the envoys of Scotland, making no 
reference to the French King's Imperial ambassador.! Marie de Guise and Chatelherault 
duly responded on 8 September 1550 by commissioning Thomas Erskine to proceed to 
Flanders in order to negotiate the accord.2 Left to their own devices, however, nothing 
more than a truce could be agreed upon - only when France intervened were the 
differences between Scotland and the Low Countries resolved in a treaty signed at 
Binche on 15 December 1550.3 
Comprehending Henri II and Edward VI, the treaty of Binche sought to put an end 
to all the hostility and enmity, past and present, between Scotland and the Low 
123 August 1550, CSP Spain, X, p.167. The Imperial commissioners were Count de Reuil, M. de Praet, 
Charles, Count de Lalaing, Charles, Seigneur de Berlaymont, Jehan de st. Mauris, Seigneur de 
Montbarey, and Viglius de Zwichem. 
28 September 1550, ibid, X, p.174; CSP Scot., I, 370, p.184. 
3 Foedera, XV, p.265; CSP Spain, X, pp. 197-201; CSP Scot., 1,374, p.186; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 229 
237 and Relations, I, p.250; Rooseboom, The Scottish Staple, pp. 69-71. Thomas Erskine arrived in 
France with the conclusion of the peace on 30 December 1550. CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,270, p.65. 
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Countries and usher in a new era of amicable Scoto-Imperial relations. 1 This was to be 
achieved specifically through the abolition of piracy and the promise to help each other 
in times of war. The treaty also provided for the free passage and entry into each other's 
territories (eradicating the need for safe-conducts), the alleviation of trade restrictions 
for merchants who paid the appropriate customs and duties, and full and immediate 
compensation for crimes committed by the subjects of one party to the other. The 
offenders, or anyone who tried to inflict harm, were to be branded as robbers and 
pirates. Finally, in what must be seen as a victory for the Queen Dowager of Hungary 
in the negotiations, it was stipulated that any action perceived to be contrary to the basic 
tenor of the treaty was not to be considered a breach of the peace and, therefore, a 
pretext for war.2 
Although the terms of the treaty had been concluded, 'certan small differens' 
arose over its ratification by the ScotS.3 Charles V wanted two ratified versions of the 
peace: one in the Queen's name, to which her great seal alone should be affixed, and 
the other with the Queen's seals followed by the Regent's and those of the Council and 
Estates.4 The reasoning behind this unusual and seemingly pedantic request was the 
ratification of the treaty of Binche by the Estates of Scotland who, it was claimed, had 
no written power to do so. The Three Estates' lack of authority could, technically 
speaking, be used to repudiate the treaty by rendering it invalid, although it was thought 
1 The treaty also comprehended the King of Denmark and Norway, the King of the Romans, Hungary and 
Bohemia, and the Estates of the Roman Empire. Foedera, XV, p.265; Rooseboom, The Scottish Staple, 
p.71. 
2 Foedera, XV, p.265; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 239-48; Rooseboom, The Scottish Staple, pp. 70-1. 
3 Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxix, p.354. 
4 CSP Spain, X, p.337; Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxix, p.354. 
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highly unlikely that the Scots themselves would think to use this as a reason. There 
was, however, the possibility that the Scots could be 'influenced and egged on by their 
neighbours', no doubt a reference to France, who knew that the absence of power was a 
point taken very seriously by the Imperialists.! In June 1550, Matthew Strick was sent 
to Scotland as the Imperial envoy to receive the two ratifications that Henri's 
'imbassadour now in Flanderis [de I' Aubespine] hes grantit tharto' .2 Once again, France 
had assumed control and directed Scottish diplomacy. Although the Scottish nobility 
complied and granted the two ratifications, they nevertheless felt it necessary to respond 
to the inference that their authority was deemed insufficient. 3 Proclaiming that 'they did 
not treat separately, and will not ratify separately', the Scots insisted that both 
ratifications were to be identical in wording and begin with the words Maria Regina 
Scotorum.4 
While the treaty ofBinche is significant in itself as a peace treaty, the predominant 
role played by Henri in the resumption of friendly Scoto-Imperial relations is of greater 
significance. Fumel's instructions, and the answers given by the Privy Council in 
response to Henri's memorial, clearly indicate that peace with Charles V was an 
objective for both Chatelherault and the French King. Why, then, was Henri so adamant 
that he should control the negotiations when the Regent had already made overtures of 
peace? To ensure that the terms of the treaty were compatible with French interests is 
one obvious answer. The insistence that France be comprehended in the treaty, as an 
1 CSP Spain, X, p.338. 
2 Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxix, p.354. 
3 A meeting of the Scottish nobility was scheduled for 22 June 1550 to mend the 'certan small differens' 
that existed over the ratification of the treaty of Binche. Ibid, ccxxxix, p.354. 
4 CSP Spain, X, p.337. 
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abettor, confederate and friend of Scotland, was also a means by which Henri could 
prevent Chatelherault from pursuing independent policies on the Continent that might 
conflict with or undermine those of France. Control over Scotland's diplomatic 
relations ensured that her foreign policy was aligned with that of France. Unity in 
policy symbolised and conveyed strength. Yet, France was more than an ally of 
Scotland and Henri was not merely employing strong-arm tactics as a display of French 
domination or to coerce the Scots into submission. As the defender and protector of 
Scotland, her rights and liberties against England and all others, Henri's protectorate 
naturally extended to include diplomacy. Moreover, his belief that Scotland was a 
kingdom of his own because it was in his protection facilitated the establishment of 
French power in Scotland prior to the union of the crowns, of which diplomatic control 
was a major feature. Henri's involvement in Scoto-Imperial relations, however, is but 
one example demonstrating how his protectorate of Scotland included control over 
Scottish diplomacy. Another and more revealing example is his extensive and multi-
faceted involvement in Scotland's relations with England. This is especially true of the 
negotiations that culminated in the treaty of Nor ham. 1 
*** 
As an Anglo-French accord, the treaty of Boulogne did not settle the disputes that 
pertained specifically to England and Scotland, nor was it expected to. Although 
progress had been made regarding the English held fortifications in Scotland, of which 
Roxburgh and Eyemouth had been fully dismantled under the supervision of Sir Robert 
I For an overview of the negotiations for the treaty of Norham from an English perspective, see P.G. 
Boscher, 'English provincial government and its relationship with central government, 1550-70' 
(unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Durham, 1985), pp. 117-33. 
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Bowes by 11 July 1550, there were still remnants of the Anglo-Scottish war that needed 
to be settled in order for the peace finally to be concluded.! As the preamble to the 
treaty of Norham states, certain questions and controversies needed to be handled in a 
friendly manner, ordered and ended, lest great jeopardy ensue.2 Such questions and 
controversies included the boundaries between England and Scotland and, in particular, 
the Debatable Land, the detention and delivery of captives and pledges, the 
administration and execution of justice for the piracies, spoils and 'attemptates' done to 
the subjects of both kingdoms, and the hospitable and friendly reception of merchant 
ships and subjects into each kingdom.3 Exclusive as these matters were to England and 
Scotland, Henri nevertheless took an active and predominant role through his 
ambassador resident in England, Sieur de Chemault and, more significantly, through his 
diplomatic envoy, Louis de Saint Gelais, Sieur de Lansac. 
It became apparent almost immediately after the ratification of the treaty of 
Boulogne that these problems were in urgent need of resolution. In response to the 
daily and continual incursions made against the Scots by the English troops still 
garrisoned at Roxburgh and Eyemouth, the Scottish Privy Council ordered 'all and 
sindry' to apprehend and imprison anyone who emerged from these fortifications 
without licence and/or who, it was thought, intended to inflict harm on Scotland or the 
lieges thereof.4 The release of captives and pledges was brought to the fore with the 
detention of Alexander Gordon, archbishop of Glasgow, who was caught travelling 
1 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,215,220,224, pp. 48, 50, 51; RPC, I, p.99; APC, III, pp. 47, 97,171. 
2 Foedera, XV, p.265; W. Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum: Or, The Border-Laws (London, 1714), pp. 56-
7. 
3 Foedera, XV, p.265; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, p.57. 
422 May 1550, RPC, I, pp. 99-100. 
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through England without a safe-conduct. 1 The English considered the Archbishop of 
Glasgow to be a legitimate prisoner because England 'had no peace with Scotland such 
that they [the Scots] might pass [through] our country'. 2 Although the archbishop was 
deemed a 'prisoner of good price', his ransom being set at 20,000 crowns, Edward VI 
nevertheless consented to Henri's demand that the Scottish prelate be liberated in view 
of the Anglo-French peace that had lately been concluded.3 Yet, despite the English 
King's concession, there still existed a mutual distrust between the 'auld enemies' 
largely because boundary disputes continued to exacerbate tensions on the Border. 
In July 1550, the English Council received word from William, Lord Dacre, 
Warden of the West March, that his opposite number in Scotland, Robert, Lord 
Maxwell had assembled a considerable Franco-Scottish force and was planning to 
invade the Debatable Land in order to pursue certain fugitives there.4 The fugitives in 
question were the Grahams, a family whom Edward VI confessed to be 'yielded to me'.s 
The Council immediately warned the French Ambassador that if Maxwell carried out 
I CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,221, p.50; APC, III, p.62; Jordan, Chronicle, p.38. 
2 Ibid, p.38; APC, III, p.62. 
3 Teulet, Pap iers , I, pp. 218, 220-1 and Relations, I, pp. 242-3; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,235, p.54. 
Hemi's diplomatic intervention is interesting given that it was reported by Sir John Mason on 20 July 
that, 'the King refused to interfere for the Archbishop of Glasgow, who must "stand to folly"'. Hemi 
later thanked Edward for the 'enlargement of the Archbishop of Glasgow'. Ibid, 224, 238, pp. 51, 55. 
4 Sir John Mason reported '2,000 Scots and 400 or 500 Frenchmen', while M. de Chemault wrote to 
Hemi on 15 August 1550, that 'la Reine, mon cousin Ie Gouverneur d'Ecosse et Ie sieur de Termes 
faisoient marcher vers la terre debatable quatre ensignes de gens de pied'. Ibid, 232, p.53; Teulet, 
Papiers, I, p.217, and Relations, I, p.239. 
5 APC, III, pp. 104-5, 108-9; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 230, 232, pp. 52-3; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 222-3, 
Relations, I, p.244; Jordan, Chronicle, p.44. Banished from Scotland c.1516, the Grahams eventually 
settled in the Debatable Land on the English side of the Esk. However, through a string of advantageous 
marriages with other Scottish Border families, such as the Armstrongs, their occupation of evacuated 
properites and the extensive tracts of land granted to them by the English crown, the Graham network 
spread and eventually crossed over into the Scottish side of the Debatable Land at Canonbie. As we shall 
see, the subversive activity of the Grahams against the Scots was the source of much contention in Anglo-
Scottish relations. W. Mackay Mackenzie, 'The Debatable Land', SHR, xxx (1951), pp. 109-25. 
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his invasion, it would be considered to be a breach of the treaty of Boulogne. 1 Chemault 
flatly rejected this line of argument. The Debatable Land was not English held territory 
and the Scottish Privy Council had expressly prohibited any Borderer from taking it 
'upoun hand to ryde in Ingland or to make ony pertubatioun thairintill ... under the pane 
of tresoun'.2 A raid into the Debatable Land was not an invasion of England and, 
therefore, would not be a contravention of the peace. 
Clearly this boundary dispute was not going be settled without formal 
negotiation, but the English Council still took steps to defend the Debatable Land as if it 
was their own. If the Scots forcibly entered the Debatable Land, Dacre was instructed to 
fight back and then to 'reason the matter with the Scottes, why they shulde entre upon 
the Debatable Grounde, knowing it to have been in the Kinges possession these many 
yeres,.3 Dacre was also directed to entreat 'the Graymes, enhabitauntes there, as 
amyablie as he might, to kepe them still the Kinges Majesties good subjectes as they 
have been before.,4 This was of particular importance as the Grahams had threatened to 
switch allegiances if England failed to protect them against Maxwell. The prospect of 
having the Grahams as hostile neighbours and being the target of their criminal activity 
was something the English knew they did not want - as the Scots could well testify.s To 
prevent such an undesirable situation from even developing, therefore, the English 
1 Teulet, Relations, I, pp. 246-7; J. Nicolson and R. Bum, The History and Antiquities of the Counties of 
Westmorland and Cumberland (London, 1777), I, pp. lxxv, lxxvii, lxxix-xxx. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,230, pp. 52-3; RPC, I, p.86. 
3 14 & 21 August 1550, APC, III, pp. 104, 108-9. On 3 September, the Warden of the East March for 
England, Sir Robert Bowes, had been ordered to supply 'ccc hacquebutiers ... to the Lord Dacres if he 
write for theim'. Ibid, III, p.119. 
4 Ibid, III, p.1 05. 
5 Nicolson and Bum, Hist01Y and Antiquities, I, p.1xxv. 
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Council demanded that the French King send an envoy to Scotland to deal with the 
situation and stay the said enterprise. 1 
Henri had already been informed of the events on the Scottish Border by his 
ambassador resident in England, and personally by Lansac, who delivered Chemault's 
report.2 The French King's response reveals that Maxwell had not embarked on an 
independent course of action, but that 'la Reine [Marie de Guise], mon cousin Ie 
Gouverneur d'Ecosse et Ie sieur de Termes faisoient marcher vers la terre debateable 
quatre ensiegnes de gens de pied'.3 In an attempt to ease the escalating tensions, Henri 
issued a formal statement explaining Maxwell's movements on the Border. The 
purpose of the Scoto-French march was· not to invade England, but to pursue the 
troublemakers who were threatening the neutrality of the Debatable Land. Refusing to 
recognise England's claims to the disputed territory, Henri asserted that the Debatable 
Land had always been neutral and Chemault was to remind the English Council of this 
point and of the treaty of Boulogne's stipulation that all things were to return status quo 
ante bellum. But, recognising the signs of a potentially explosive situation, Henri also 
instructed Chatelherault and d'Oisel to re-establish order on the Border, if that was 
possible, and to leave the settling of border disputes to the appointed Scottish and 
English commissioners.4 On 26 August, Sir John Mason confirmed Henri's wish to 
I 18 August 1550, CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 230, pp. 52-3; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.222 and Relations, I, 
p.244. 
2 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.222 and Relations, I, p.244. 
3 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.217 and Relations, I, p.239. 
4 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.218 and Relations, I, p.239. 
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resolve this affair amicably and reported that the French King 'would issue immediate 
orders for the prevention of such in future'. 1 
It soon became apparent that Scotland's comprehension in the treaty of Boulogne 
was riddled with ambiguity. Although the potentially damaging situation of Maxwell's 
assembly on the Scottish frontier had, for the time being, dissipated, diplomatic tensions 
soon flared up during Thomas, Master of Erskine's visit to England in September 1550. 
After presenting various letters to Edward VI, Erskine raised what was fast becoming 
the main concern for the Scots; namely, that 'syns the realme of Scotlande was 
comprehended in the Treatie, the Quene and Counsaill there desired to knowe wheather 
the Kinges Highnes and Counsaill ment thei shulde enjoie their olde lymites in like 
maner as thei did before the last warres' ,2 Specifically, 'their olde lymites' referred to 
Edrington, also known as Cawe Mill, which was occupied by the English, and the 
fishing rights to half of the River Tweed.3 The English Counci1's reply was less than 
amenable. Although they declared that their primary concern was the 'continewance of 
thamytie withe Fraunce' and of Scotland's comprehension therein, the English Council 
claimed that the Scots had 'required divers thinges more than resonable, which wee 
oughte not to satisfie, and therfore if thei seeke redresse of any thinge (as we thinke thei 
have no cause), than lett the French Kinge by his Ministers declare it, and we shall 
accordinglie make him aunswere whith [sic] whom the Treatie hathe been concluded, 
1 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,232, p.53. 
2 28 September 1550, APC, III, p.132. 
3 The land and house at Edrington was located six miles north-west of Berwick. 
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and not with them'. 1 As Erskine was en route to France, the Council referred him to the 
French King for an explanation of the treaty.2 Ironically, the English Council's 
insistence that France represent Scotland's interests served only to strengthen Henri's 
position as 'Protector' by legitimising his control over Scotland's diplomatic affairs and, 
inadvertently, contributing to the establishment of French power in Scotland. 
While diplomatic tensions could be masked by polite words at the English Court, 
the same was not as easily done on the Borders themselves. The threat of vigilante 
retribution and physical confrontation loomed heavily over the meetings between the 
Wardens of the West Marches. In October .1550, for instance, Dacre's refusal to provide 
restitution for the crimes committed by the English against the Scots led to a riotous 
outbreak, largely at the instigation of the Scottish Warden. Upon hearing of Maxwell's 
role in the disturbance, d'Oisel strongly advised him to conduct himself in a friendly 
manner towards the English, so as not to give them occasion to cause intrigue and 
enable Henri and Edward to resolve the differences between England and Scotland. 
Specifically, he was ordered not to let the hounds loose, so to speak, if the English 
should irritate him or his own, but to do everything by the book and inform Dacre of 
any problems.3 Henri was similarly displeased with news of this incident. The source 
of his displeasure, however, was not Maxwell, but England's Border officials. 'Les 
ministres du Roi d' Angleterre etant sur la frontiere dudict pays d'Ecosse', he wrote, 'ne 
suivent pas la douce voie que I' on vous assure ordinairement par dela vouloir tenir en 
I APC, III, pp. 132, 134; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,242, p.56. In addition to Edrington, the fishing of the 
Tweed and the Debatable ground between the Esk and Sark in the West March, the Scots also laid claim 
to Thriepland in the Middle March. 
2 Ibid, 242, p.56. 
3 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.226 and Relations, I, p.247. See also BL, Harley MSS, 34.14, fos. 57-9. 
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toutes choses; car ils se veulent faire croire en ce different de la terre debateable, et 
cependant en retenir une possession que malaisement l'on leur voudroit laisser, s'ils en 
usent de telles sortes,' and subsequently ordered Chemault to demand that they behave 
graciously and reasonably.! 
Despite these apparent setbacks, Henri was nevertheless pleased with the overall 
progress being made on Scotland's diplomatic front by December 1550. Under his 
direction, a Scoto-Imperial peace had just been concluded at Binche, and a settlement 
with England seemed imminent. Expressing his optimism to Chemault with respect to 
the latter, Henri made the very revealin'g and confident statement that, 'il y sera 
incontinant pourvu et donne si bonne provision ames sujets qu'ils auront occasion de 
demeurer contens'.2 The realisation of such a sentiment, however, greatly depended on 
the success of his envoy, Sr. de Lansac, on his mission to Scotland. 
*** 
In January 1550/1, Henri complied with the English demands for French diplomatic 
intervention and sent Lansac to the English Court to present the French King's demands 
on behalf of the Scots. Feeling it necessary to dispel any English fears of possible 
ulterior motives, Henri informed his ambassador that, 'l'occasion pourquoi je l'envoye 
par del a, qui tend seullement a pacifier les differends qui sont entre les Angloys et les 
Escossoys, dont je desire bien veoir la fin et que la Royne d'Escosse puisse avoir net ce 
qui luy appartiens,.3 Chemault then proceeded to the English Court to request that the 
1 26 November 1550, Teulet, Papiers, I, p.227 and Relations, I, p.248. 
221 December 1550, Teulet, Papiers, I, p.228 and Relations, I, p.249. 
3 Henri II to M. de Chemault, 23 January 1550/1, Teulet, Papiers, I, p.207 and Relations, I, p.25l. See 
also CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,282, pp. 68-9. 
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'gentleman whom the French King hathe sent hither may see and speake withe the 
Kingis Majestie', and to continue the diplomatic pressure being placed on the English to 
respond to the main questions of the Anglo-Scottish debate concerning the restoration of 
Scotland's ancient limits and the neutrality of the Debatable Land - questions which 
'had been divers tymes asked and never fullie aunswered'.' Chemault was feebly 
informed that Dacre had already been sent north where he was to make a full answer on 
the neutrality of the Debatable Land upon his arriva1.2 With respect to Lansac's 
audience, the entry in the register giving the Council's response is incomplete, but 
presumably favourable, as Henri's demands were formally presented on 1 February 
1550/1.3 
The French King's demands were, to say the least, predictable. They had 
already been voiced many times by Erskine and Chemault on behalf of Marie de Guise 
and Chatelherault. Henri's primary objective was the full restoration of what he termed 
'Ie propre patrimoine d'Escosse'; namely, that Edrington, the fishing rights of the 
Tweed and the Debatable Land be returned to the status quo ante bellum. As in the 
negotiations for the treaty of Boulogne over the fate of Roxburgh and Eyemouth, Henri 
thought it unreasonable that the English should claim these things as their own, 
considering that they had only been held since the war, and appealed to Edward VI on a 
personal level to see their restitution. He used Scotland's comprehension in the treaty as 
a confederate of France to justify his diplomatic intervention and, of greater interest, 
informed Edward that, because Scotland was in his protection, he would be constrained 
129 January 155011, APC, III, p.203. 
2 Ibid, III, p.203. 
3 Ibid, III, pp. 204-5. 
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to assist and defend the Scots in this quarrel, which he considered to be just.' This point 
was not lost on the English. They reported that: 
... forasmuche as he [Henri] had taken the protection of the Scottish Quene, 
considering that Scotlande was comprehended, he coulde no lesse do then 
to desire the King his goode brother to restore Edrington, fyssheng in Twede 
and other like limites, with the newtrall estate of the Debateable Grounde, 
in like maner as every thing was before the beginneng of the last warres. 2 
In addition to the restoration of Scotland's ancient limits and frontiers, the French King 
also demanded the immediate payment of ransoms for English prisoners who had 
already been released, the restitution of the five Scottish ships taken since the peace, full 
and free traffic at sea and on land, open intercourse between the two kingdoms and, 
finally, the release of the Scottish hostages who had been taken at Solway Moss. The 
latter was particularly important since the English prisoners taken at St. Andrews had 
already been liberated. 3 
On the whole, the English Council's response to Henri's demands was 
conciliatory. They agreed, for example, to the liberation of all Scottish ships not 
belonging to pirates and the immediate payment of ransoms due.4 But once again, the 
Council claimed that the Scots had solicited the French King to demand far too much, 
and had it not been for Henri's desire to maintain amicable relations with England, 
Henri would have refused to do SO.5 This was particularly true with respect to his 
I Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 208-9 and Relations, I, pp. 251-3. 
2 APC, III, p.204. 
3 Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 210-1 and Relations, I, pp. 253-4; APC, III, p.205; Jordan, Chronicle, pp. 51-2. 
See Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 211-2 and Relations, I, pp. 255-6, for a list of Scots taken prisoner at Solway 
Moss, which included two of Glencairn's sons, and of English prisoners released since the peace. The 
payment of ransoms, the return of prisoners, hostages and Scottish ships had been topics of great debate 
since June 1550. CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,215,221,224, pp. 48, 50, 51; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 221-4 
and Relations, I, pp. 241-5; APC, III, pp. 114, 116-7. 
4 Ibid, III, p.212; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 214-5 and Relations, I, pp. 257-8; Balcarres Papers, II, lxiv, pp. 
88-91. 
5 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.213 and Relations, I, p.256. 
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demands for the restoration of Scotland's old limits and frontiers and the full liberty of 
traffic through England, which met with some, albeit superficial, resistance. They 
argued, for example, that Edrington, the fishing rights of the Tweed and the Debatable 
Land had all originally belonged to Henry VIII and, having been inherited by his son 
upon his death, were, consequently, not subject to restitution. It was thus deemed 
'laufull for the Kinges Majestie to enyoie and keepe not only Edrington, with other 
thinges that he keepeth not within that realme, having had the same in his possession 
long before the last Treatie'.1 As a gesture of England's commitment to the peace, 
however, the Council declared that an envoy would be sent to Henri to give a fuller 
answer on this matter, with which Henri 'oughte to be contented'.2 
Sir William Pickering was the chosen envoy who, in the words of Edward VI, was 
'to declare that, although I had [the] right in the aforesaid places yet I was content to 
forbear them under conditions to be agreed on by commISSIOners on both sides'.3 
Pickering was also to give Henri a fuller answer regarding the full liberty of traffic 
through England. While the Council had declared that 'all Scottishe shippes which arr 
driven in by tempest or that come by necessitie, shall have libertie to goo agayne', they 
felt that they could not conveniently consent to the 'further libertie of trafficque,.4 The 
detention of the Archbishop of Glasgow for not having the proper travel documentation 
in July 1550 was but one telling example of the underlying distrust the English had for 
the Franco-Scottish alliance. Another and more revealing example was the Council's 
II APC, III, p.2l1. 
2 Ibid, III, pp. 211-2; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,290, p.73. 
3 Jordan, Chronicle, p.53. 
4 APC, III, p.2l2. 
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refusal to allow Lord Maxwell to pass through England on his return journey from 
France in February 1550/1. The free passage of the French and Scots through England 
was a matter of great concern to the Council now that Scotland had been 'made Frenche, 
and bicause it appeareth the libertie therof shulde muche advaunce the French affaires 
and hinder our owne'. 1 Maxwell's safe-conduct was denied on the pretence that 'the 
realme had been so chargded withe the furnyssheng of those that syns the Peace 
concluded had thus passed to and from, that wee could not convenyently and lenger 
supporte it'.2 The great influx of applications for safe-conducts from Scots who had 
travelled to France with Marie de Guise and now wished to return, no doubt added an 
element of truth to the Council's refusa1.3 But their refusal was more than likely due to 
the timing of Maxwell's application. It directly coincided with the great invasion scare 
of Ireland by France, and the receipt of a related report from Sir Robert Bowes and the 
Captain of Berwick that Chatelherault, with all the French troops in Scotland and a 
complement of Scottish ships, was planning to attack Berwick while ostensibly 
punishing thieves in Liddesdale.4 Henri's reaction to the English Council's refusal left 
him 'highly irritated' which, according to Sir John Mason, was further 'fomented by the 
Queen of Scots [Marie de Guise] and her house ... who desireth as much our subversion, 
if it lay in her power, as she desireth the preservation of herself.s Ironically, the 
Council's attempt to hinder the return of Maxwell backfired. Forced to travel by sea, 
1 3 February 1550/1, APC, III, p.205. 
2 Ibid, III, p.206. 
3 Among the applicants wishing to return to Scotland in February 155011 were Sir Hugh Campbell of 
Loudon, his son Matthew, and both their wives, Hugh Kennedy, Ninian Cranston and Sir James Douglas 
of Drumlanrig. CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,280,281,283, pp. 68-9. 
417 February 1550/1, ibid, 291, p.73. 
523 February 1550/1, ibid, 295, p.75. 
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Maxwell returned to Scotland in just three days and was able to join Chatelherault and 
d'Oise1 at the justice ayre at Jedburgh in accordance with the Queen Dowager's 
instructions. 1 The intimacy of the Franco-Scottish alliance, which the English 
themselves recognised and feared, made French intrigues in Ireland at this time a matter 
of great concern.2 
*** 
Tudor Irish policy, particularly Henry VIII's Kingship Act of 1541 and the creation of 
an English Pale in Ireland, left in its wake many disaffected Irish chieftains. One such 
individual was Cahir O'Connor who, in 1548, mounted an unsuccessful revolt against 
the English that ended with the confiscation of the O'Connor and O'More lands and 
many executions. 3 These events led some disaffected Irishry to appeal for French aid. 
Henri was not unaware of the Irish antagonism towards England and recognised that 
intervention, or political intrigues at the very least, would serve to distract the English 
from the Continent whilst also depleting their resources. 
In 1548, Henri sent Beccarie de Paiv'e, Baron de Fourquevaux, on an exploratory 
mission to Ireland whilst the latter was delivering men and munitions to the ScotS.4 
I Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxiv, pp. 344-5; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,305, pp. 78-9; TA, IX, pp. 473-
4; RSS, IV, 1145-58, pp. 185-6. Two musters had been called for this justice ayre (24 February and 4 
March 1550/1) and were supported by a French military force under d'Oisel. A bond was also signed on 
26 March 1551 by Chatelherault and other Border nobles, pledging to keep good rule within their bounds 
and to bring offenders to justice despite the remission of many crimes against their households, tenants 
and servants. CSP Scot., I, 369, p.184. 
2 Potter, 'French Intrigue in Ireland during the Reign of Henri II, 1547-1559', International HistOlY 
Review, v (1983), pp. 159-80; Fourquevaux Mission, pp. 1-36; Dawson, 'Two Kingdoms or Three?: 
Ireland in Anglo-Scottish Relations in the Middle of the Sixteenth Century' in Mason (ed.), Scotland and 
England, pp. 113-38; W. Palmer, The Problem 0/ Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy, 1485-1603 
(Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), pp. 15-88; C. Brady, 'The Decline of the Irish Kingdom' in Greengrass 
(ed.), Conquest and Coalescence, pp. 94-115. 
3 Potter, 'French Intrigue in Ireland', p.161. 
4 NLS, MSS.2991, fos. 7, 29, 43, 49. 
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Fourquevaux's visit to Ireland began in October 1549 and lasted approximately three 
months.' Accompanied by Robert Wauchop, 'the blind bishop', and Jean de Monluc, 
Fourquevaux met with the Irish princes and noblemen who were 'willing to cast aff the 
yok of England and becom subiect to the King of France, provyding that he wald 
procure the Paipes gift of Yreland, and then send to ther help 2000 hacbuters 200 leicht 
horse men and four canons'.2 Intervention in Ireland was also favoured by the Earl of 
Argyll, who offered to lead a subsidised military expedition there, and d'Oisel, who not 
only provided a military strategy for Argyll's proposed campaign, but also the 
justification: England received Ireland only on condition that they maintain the rights 
and authority of the Apostolic Church, and if there was any violation thereof, Ireland 
would automatically revert to Papal suzerainty.3 
When Monluc and Fourquevaux returned to Scotland in January 1549/50, they 
immediately proceeded to France in order to present Henri with the various propositions 
concerning Ireland, the basic tenor of which was that, in return for French military and 
financial aid, a number of the Irish gentry were prepared to accept French sovereignty.4 
Should he agree, Henri would then be provided with a loyal and obedient following in 
yet another strategic position within the archipelago. But would such an investment 
yield the French King the same short and long-term returns as it did in Scotland? Henri 
clearly did not think so, but in order to exploit his advantageous position in Ireland at 
the time, he conveniently took his time to decline the offers of the Irish. 
I Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 707, 711. 
2 NLS, MSS.2991, f.49; James Melville, Memoirs of His Own Life by Sir James Melville of Halhill 
(Edinburgh, 1827), pp. 9-12; CSP Ireland, 1509-1573, p.107; Maitland Miscellany, I, 11, pp. 220-1. 
3 NLS, MSS.2991, fos. 74v_6v; Fourquevaux Mission, pp. 30-4. 
4 Melville, Memoirs, p.12; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 716-8. 
72 
Chapter II: Henri II's Protectorate of Scotland. 
Henri secretly put an end to his intrigues in Ireland in April 1550. One of Fumel's 
tasks in Scotland was to order Fourquevaux and Monluc to stop their dealings in 
Ireland. 1 But it would not be until April 1551 that the Irish envoy, George Paris, was 
officially told that the French King would not be providing military aid to the Irish 
malcontents.2 Paris, an Anglo-Irish gentleman who had links with the O'Connors and 
represented other disaffected Irishry such as McWilliam, visited France in 1550 and 
1551 to try and persuade Henri to intervene on their behalf against the English.3 
Needless to say, these meetings were of great concern to the English ambassador, Sir 
John Mason. He filed alarming reports of 'this' Paris, who sought to annoy the King 
and his realm by serving as 'a common post between the wild Irish and the French,.4 
Mason also informed the Council that the letters presented by Paris bragged that the 
'whole nobility of Ireland from the highest to the lowest, had conspired to rid 
themselves from the yoke of England'. In light of this discovery, Mason felt obliged to 
voice his opinion that, 'We have, these many years past, wasted there [in Ireland] great 
sums of money by piecemeal, which, if it had been spent together, might have bred 
more quietness than we have at this Present', adding that, 'These Wildbeasts would be 
hunted aforce, and at the beginning should so be bearded, before the whole herd run 
together,.5 The perceived gravity of the situation was brought home when Mason 
1 Wood, 'Instructions', pp. 166-7. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 320, 324, 327, pp. 89-90, 92, 95; P.F. Tytler, England under the reigns of 
Edward VI and Mmy (London, 1839), I, pp. 351-3. 
3 Paris' mission to France in June 1550, for instance, was to present Hemi with letters of credence from 
McWilliam. CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,217, pA8; Tytler, Edward VI and Mmy, I, pp. 291-2; Potter, 
'French Intrigues in Ireland', pp. 169-70. 
4 Tytler, Edward VI and Mary, I, pp. 292, 301; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,217,218, pp. 48, 49. 
529 June 1550, Tytler, Edward VI and Mmy, I, pp. 301-3. 
73 
Chapter II: Henri II's Protectorate of Sea tlall d. 
reported in October that there had been much talk at the French Court, especially since 
the coming of the Scots, that Ireland was theirs whenever the King wished. A similar 
report was sent in December and stated that Paris himself 'doubteth not to see the 
French King shortly to bear the crown ofIreland'.1 
Reports such as these, together with those informing the Council of the great 
warlike preparations being made in France, led to the invasion scare of January and 
February 1550/1.2 It is of significance to note that this coincided with Lord Maxwell's 
application for a safe-conduct which, as has already been demonstrated, was received 
with a tremendous amount of suspicion. Because 'the Frenchmen did go about practice 
in Ireland', major preparations were promptly made by the English Council. Admiral 
Winter was to command a small fleet of four ships, Lord Cobham was appointed to take 
charge of the military preparations, St. Leger was ordered to repair to the southern parts 
of Ireland with force, Sir James Croft was despatched to Ireland with John Roberts to 
begin fortifications, John Parker was commanded to victual his forts at Knockfergus and 
Olderfleet to resist the Scots who planned to attack from the Western Isles, and Osbert 
Mountford, a dealer in bread grains, was commanded to provide victuals for the ships 
embarking for Ireland.3 Interestingly, preparations were also made for Berwick and the 
northern parts of England, where it was feared a simultaneous attack would be launched 
by Cha.telherault, his French military entourage and its naval complement that had been 
I In December 1550, George Paris returned to Ireland with the French King's replies to the letters he 
presented from McWilliam and other Irish malcontents. CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,247,264, pp. 58, 63. 
230 December 1550, ibid, 270, p.65. 
3 Jordan, Chronicle, pp. 51-2; APC, III, pp. 195,204-5; CSP Ireland, 1509-1573, pp. 110-2. 
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assembled ostensibly for a justice ayre at Jedburgh.! The crisis peaked when it was 
reported that sixteen ships of a large French fleet destined for Scotland, and laden with 
victuals and munitions, had perished on the Irish coast.2 Given this course of events, it 
comes as no surprise that the English were anxious to appease the French regarding 
Scotland - despite their pretences to the contrary. In reality, England was in no position 
to press their claims in Scotland and had no choice but to capitulate to the French. This 
was the real reason why Sir William Pickering was sent to France. 
Pickering's primary objective in France was to reach an amicable settlement with 
Henri of all the differences still extant between England and Scotland.3 In this, he was 
successful, but only because Edward was willing to relinquish what he considered to be 
his rightful claims to Edrington, the fishing of the Tweed and his private use of 
Debatable land in the West Marches, Roxburgh and Eyemouth - despite being taking 
through conquest.4 Edward's 'kind gesture', however, was only an attempt to retain 
some degree of English prestige during the negotiations with France. In a private letter 
to Sir Richard Morsine (England's ambassador to Charles V) the Council admitted that 
none of these things were really worth keeping and, more importantly, that since the last 
wars, English soldiers had held Edrington, the Scots had been forbidden from fishing on 
the Tweed, and wasteland common to both realms in the Debatable Land had been 
I Jordan, Chronicle, p.52; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 291, 295, 305, pp. 73, 75, 78-9; Scottish 
Correspolldnce, ccxxxiv, p.344; TA, IX, pp. 473-4; RSS, IV, 1145-58, pp. 185-6. 
2 Jordan, Chronicle, pp. 54-5; CSP Ireland, 1509-1573, p.l12; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,305, pp. 78-9. 
3 BL, Harley MSS, 297.5, fos. 31-5 and 353.27, fos. 86-9; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,290,292, p.73. In 
this, Sir William Pickering was to work with Sir John Mason, whom he succeeded as ambassador in April 
1551. Ibid, 318, p.87; Jordan, Chronicle, p.156. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,314, p.83; CSP Scot., I, 371, p.185. 
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privately held by the English.! Finally, the French King was told that Edward was 
willing to liberate the Scottish prisoners taken at Solway Moss and that the use of 
English ports by Scottish merchants and ships would revert to customary practices.2 
These proposals ultimately proved acceptable to Henri, who summoned Marie de 
Guise, then at Chateaudun, for consultation before replying to the English King on 17 
March 1550/l.3 Henri simultaneously despatched Lansac and Thomas, Master of 
Erskine, back to England as his commissioners to discuss these proposals and other 
Anglo-Scottish Border disputes, and to work with the French ambassador, Chemault, in 
getting the official negotiations underway.4 The involvement and influence of the 
French in Anglo-Scottish affairs did not wane once these negotiations began. As 
Henri's representative, Lansac played a prominent role during the formal negotiations 
and was supported by other loyal supporters of the French cause, Thomas Erskine, 
Maxwell, Sir Robert Camegy of Kinnaird and Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney.s To 
counter this Franco-Scottish delegation were Edward's representatives: Sir Robert 
Bowes, Sir Leonard Beckwith, Sir Thomas Challoner and Richard Sampson, bishop of 
Lichfield and Coventry.6 Despite some initial communication problems on the part of 
the English commissioners, who allegedly lacked the proper instructions to accord what 
16 Apri11551, CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,314, p.83. 
2 Ibid, 314, p.83. 
3 Ibid, 301, 305, pp. 77-8. 
4 Ibid, 303-5, pp. 78-9. On 5 Apri11551, for example, Lansac and Chemault presented the names of the 
Scottish commissioners who were to take part in the discussions preceding the formal negotiations. They 
were named as either Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney, or David Paniter, bishop of Ross, and Patrick, 
Master of Ruthven. Teulet, Papiers, I, p.215 and Relations, I, p.258; APC, III, pp. 250-1; Jordan, 
Chronicle, p.57. 
5 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.215 and Relations, I, p.258; APC, III, pp. 252-3; Foedera, XV, pp. 263-4. 
6 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.215 and Relations, I, p.258; Jordan, Chronicle, pp. 57-8; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 
318, p.87. 
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Pickering and Mason had agreed with Henri, the negotiations eventually began on 
Monday, 1 June 1551 and ended nine days later with the formal conclusion of the treaty 
ofNorham.! 
The articles of the treaty of Nor ham did not contain any surprises.2 It was agreed 
that the English would relinquish all their holdings and 'claims' in Scotland. The limits, 
bounds and borders of both kingdoms were to revert to their original state as they were 
prior to the war; the Debatable ground between the West Marches was to revert to its 
accustomed state and use by subjects of both realms; Edrington was to be restored to the 
Queen of Scots, the English garrison there being evacuated, in addition to the fishing 
rights of the Tweed, from Berwick to Ryding-burne.3 The treaty also provided for the 
expedient delivery of all captives and pledges, and laid out explicit regulations for 
merchant traffic and the issuing of safe-conducts.4 Years of war had clearly had 
devastating effects on the Borders, and the considerable amount of attention devoted to 
Border Law and the administration and execution of justice in the treaty reflects the 
urgent need felt by both parties to impose law and order.s The treaty called for the 
delivery and punishment of murderers, thieves, rebels and other evil-doers by the 
Wardens of the Marches and their Deputies at the Days of Truce according to Border 
Law. Malefactors who had sought refuge in the other kingdom were to be returned to 
I CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,356, p.l1l; BL, Harley MSS, 297.5, fos. 36-9; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.230 and 
Relations, I, p.271; Foedera, XV, pp. 265-72; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 56-71; CSP Scot., I, 375, 
p.186. The treaty of Norham was ratified by Edward VI and Mary, Queen of Scots on 30 June and 14 
August 1551 respectively. Ibid, I, 367-7, 379, pp. 186-7; Foedera, XV, p.273. 
2 Ibid, XV, pp. 265-72; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 56-71. 
3 Foedera, XV, pp. 265-6; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 58-60. 
4 Foedera, XV, pp. 266, 268-70; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 60, 65-70. 
5 Foedera, XV, pp. 266-8; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 60-5. 
77 
Chapter II: Henri II's Protectorate of Scotland. 
the appropriate Warden and tried in the place of the crime. Acts of revenge or 
retribution by an injured party were also discouraged through the annulment of the 
injured party's cause. 
The treaty of Norham, however, was far from conclusive. The exact division of 
the Debatable Land still needed to be determined and was deferred to a later date due to 
the sensitivity of the subject. Lawlessness, violence and disorder on both sides, and 
across the Anglo-Scottish border continued to rage on, as did the almost incessant 
assembly of Border commissions attempting to resolve these problems. Indeed, Border 
disputes were the most prominent and consistent feature of Anglo-Scottish relations 
during the 1550s and, arguably, the bane of Marie de Guise's relations with England. 
As we shall see in Chapters IV and V, these disputes assumed great significance with 
the accession of Mary Tudor and, in particular, her marriage to Philip of Spain. The 
Borders became the loci not only of political intrigue and heightened tensions, but also 
where Valois and Habsburg power met tete a tete. The immediate task at hand, 
however, was to restore amicable relations between the 'auld enemies' in an exclusive 
Anglo-Scottish peace accord. In this, the treaty of Norham succeeded - albeit 
precariously. 
The prominent role played by Henri in achieving this is beyond question. 
Archbishop Hamilton commented that 'be the kyngis mageste lawboris all the boundis 
of Scotland is als fre as thai war in ony of ouris days ... and gud redres and justice on the 
bordouris'.1 The participation of Henri in these proceedings, as in the treaties of 
Boulogne and Binche, not only served to strengthen and consolidate his own position as 
114 June 1551, Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxix, p.353. 
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the 'Protector' of Scotland and her queen, but also facilitated the establishment of 
French power in Scotland. Having eradicated all effects of the English occupation, and 
established peaceful relations with Charles V and Edward VI on the Scots behalf, Henri 
was now free to devote all his attention to his struggle with Charles V on the Continent. 
The year 1552 witnessed the rekindling- of the Habsburg-Valois conflict and the 
simultaneous reduction of the French King's personal intervention in Scottish affairs. 
Henri did ensure, however, that French intervention continued in the person of Marie de 
Guise. Having declared Mary, Queen of Scots, of age on 12 December 1553, Henri then 
informed Chatelherault that his tenure as regent was over and that his successor would 
be the Queen Dowager.! Guise's formal assumption of the regency and government on 
12 April 1554 marked the completion of the process establishing French power in 
Scotland. Although Guise was intent on securing the marriage of her daughter to the 
Dauphin and irrevocably binding Scotland to the interests of France, her ascendancy 
should not be seen as a foregone conclusion. After the cessation of hostilities with 
England in 1550, Guise returned to France for what many thought would be a 
permanent homecoming. It was only when she made her somewhat surprising return to 
Scotland a little over a year later that Marie de Guise's political destiny became clear, 
and it is to her ascent to power that we now tum. 
I NLS, Adv.MSS, 33.1.9, f.1r-v. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Final Building Block: Marie de Guise's Ascent to Power in Scotland 
While Henri II's protection justified and facilitated the establishment of French power in 
Scotland, the realisation of the dynastic provisions contained within the treaty of 
Haddington was nevertheless crucial to its ultimate and long-term success. This, in 
tum, depended on the Scottish political elite remaining favourable to the proposed 
dynastic alliance and to the idea of Franco-Scottish union. The Three Estates' 
renunciation of the treaties of Greenwich, however, demonstrated all too clearly that a 
ratified betrothal contract was in no way a guarantee that the marriage itself would 
actually occur. The question facing Henri, therefore, was how to ensure that it did - for 
only in the person of Mary Stewart could his vision of a Franco-British empire become 
a reality. It is within this wider context of European dynastic politics that Marie de 
Guise emerged as a leading figure intent on securing the marriage of her daughter to the 
Dauphin Franyois and irrevocably binding Scotland to the interests of France. On 19 
September 1550, Guise touched foot on her native soil and returned to France after an 
absence of twelve years. 1 The year she spent there constituted the watershed in her 
political career? Her return to Scotland in 1551 marked the beginning of her campaign 
to assume control of her daughter's kingdom, supplant Chatelherault as Regent upon his 
stipulated resignation, and fulfil the dynastic and imperial objectives common to the 
houses of Guise and Valois. 
I CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,244, p.57. 
2 Marie de Guise arrived at Portsmouth on 22 October 1551. Ibid, 477, p.l90; APC, III, p.364. 
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Marie de Guise's return to France is, perhaps, the most misunderstood event of 
her political career. This is largely due to the tendency of historians to presume that, 
because Guise eventually returned to Scotland to assume the regency in 1554, the main 
purpose of her trip was to promote her own political ambitions. But the failure of 
historians to explain adequately why Guise should wish to return to Scotland, given her 
daughter's situation in 1550, has resulted in weak and unconvincing analyses. In his 
Historie and Cronicles of Scotland, for example, Robert Lindsay of Pitscottie contends 
that Guise 'passit haistalie to France, and tuik certane of the nobillis of Scottland witht 
hir and thair procurit at the king of France and hir dochteris hand that scho might have 
the governance in the realme of Scotland thair to be as regent thairof.l Similarly, John 
Lesley wrote in his History of Scotland that the principal purpose of Guise's visit was 
'to prepair and fynd all moyens, be the quhilkis sho mycht obtane the governement of 
the realme of Scotlande and be regent thairof.2 But according to this exponent of the 
Catholic and Marian cause, this was not the only reason for her journey. Guise also 
went to visit 'the Quene hir dochter' and to 'congratulat and rejoise' with Henri of the 
fact that, as Mary was now living in France, Scotland was 'moir subject and bound ... as 
a prvnce joynit unto France be mariage',3 At the other end of the political and religious 
spectrum, John Knox focused on 'diverse of the nobilitie ... baronis and gentillmen of 
I Pitscottie, Historie, II, p.112. Although he was a contemporary of Guise, Pitscottie's Historie should 
not be taken as an example of historical accuracy. Citing his kinsman and noted reformer, Patrick, 6th 
lord Lindsay of Byres as one of his influences, it comes as no surprise that his Historie unabashedly 
reflects his Protestant bias. 
2 Lesley, Hist01Y, pp. 234-5. An apologist for Mary, Queen of Scots, the Bishop of Ross wrote this work 
in 1573 and clearly conveys his pro-Catholic inclinations. 
3 Ibid, p.234. 
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ecc1esiasticall estait' who accompanied Guise to France and her 'promisses that thei 
should be richely rewarded for thare good service'. 1 What Knox implies is that she did 
so for political purposes, ' ... for schortly after hir returnyng, was the Governour deposed 
of the governement, ... and she maid Regent'.2 
For their part, modem historians diverge only slightly as to the perceived 
'political' objective of Marie de Guise's trip.3 Marshall, Fraser, Tytler and Hay Fleming 
all contend that the primary purpose was to gain Henri's approval for her designs to 
supplant Chate1herault as regent,4 while McKerlie is somewhat ambiguous in her 
statement that in order to conciliate the Scots, the French King 'did all in his power to 
promote the assumption of the Regency by the Queen Dowager on her return to 
Scotland,.5 Financial exigencies have also been cited as a motivating factor. Marshall 
argues that Guise needed to augment her revenue and replenish her empty coffers to 
restore Scotland's prosperity, while Fraser asserts that she needed the money to buy the 
political support of her Scottish travel companions.6 But it is Gordon Donaldson's 
contention that Marie de Guise's trip was fundamentally 'a brain-washing expedition', 
1 Knox, Works, I, pp. 241-2 and HistOlY, I, p.116. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.242 and HistOlY, I, p.116. Considering the author and the subject of his work, the 
history of the Scottish Reformation, it comes as no surprise that John Knox paints Guise in a less than 
favourable light. 
3 It should be noted that there is a general consensus of opinion amongst modem historians that familial 
considerations played a large part in Guise's decision to return to France. It had been two years since 
Guise waved her daughter off at Dumbarton, and twelve years since she last saw her son and other 
members of her immediate family. She did, however, receive a visit from her younger brother, Claude, 
duc d' Aumale, who had been sent to England as a pledge for the treaty of Boulogne in April 1550. 
4 Tytler, HistOlY of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1842), VI, pp. 50-1; Fleming, Mmy, Queen of Scots, p.16; 
Fraser, Mmy, Queen of Scots, p.77; Marshall, Mmy of Guise, p.182. 
5 McKerlie, Mary of Guise-Lorraine, p.147. 
6 Marshall, Mmy of Guise, p.182; Fraser, Mmy, Queen of Scots, pp. 76-7. 
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whereby Henri bought the fonner pillars of the English and refonning cause with 
French pensions, that has been commonly accepted and adopted by historians such as 
Merriman and Lynch. I By inference, Donaldson also presumes that Guise had every 
intention of returning to Scotland to serve as Henri's principal agent and promoter of the 
French cause. 
There thus appears to be a general consensus that Marie de Guise went to France 
with political designs to oust Chatelherault from his regency, thereby explaining her 
return in 1551. But are these interpretations accurate? Is it not possible that hindsight 
has provided historians with a convenient explanation as to the purpose of Guise's trip 
and, more importantly, why she returned at all? In fact, as we shall see, the evidence 
suggests that Guise returned to France with no political agenda for Scotland and with no 
intention of returning to her daughter's kingdom. 
When news spread that Mary, Queen of Scots was leaving Scotland to become 
an absentee monarch, it was commonly assumed that Marie de Guise would accompany 
her daughter to France.2 Contrary to the public's expectations, however, the Queen 
Dowager remained in Scotland to see the Anglo-Scottish hostilities brought to an end. 
In a revealing letter to her brothers infonning them that the French anny had arrived and 
the galleys were ready to transport 'la Royne votre niesse', Guise wrote that, 'Le Roy ne 
I It is unclear as to whether Donaldson has coined this phrase himself, or is using a contemporary 
description of Guise's trip in All the Queen's Men, pp. 25-7, 106 and James V-James VII, p.80. Marcus 
Merriman agrees with Donaldson in that Marie de Guise went to France not only 'to see her daughter, but 
also to expose to a band of accompanying Scotsmen both their young queen and the power and the glory 
that was the France of her future husband. Merriman, 'Mary, Queen of France', p.36; Lynch, Scotland: 
A New Hist01Y, p.208. 
2 See, for example, CSP Spain, IX, pp. 290, 571; CSP Venice, V, 544, p.230; and CSP Scot., I, 274, 306, 
336, pp. 136, 155, 169, for reports that Guise was to accompany, or had accompanied Mary to France. 
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me trouverajames manteuze, combien qu'y me sanble qu'a mon particulier l'on ne m'a 
pas for bien tretee [traitee], mes je ne lere [laisserai] a fair tout se quy sera an rna 
peuisanse [puissance]'.1 Similarly in 1549/50, when asked if she intended to stay in 
Scotland much longer, Guise responded in reference to the war that, 'Jai ne suis 
envcouer prester dicy partir du long temper'.2 Marie de Guise's commitment to the war 
effort is not entirely surprising. She had been instrumental in gaining Arran's support 
for the proposed dynastic alliance,3 and her constant pleas for financial and military aid 
were largely responsible for France's intervention as a whole.4 After the arrival of 
French reinforcements on 16 June 1548, Guise's interest in the war effort intensified. 
She took an active role in military affairs and, during her tour of the various military 
camps, roused the allied troops with words of inspiration. 5 
Yet, despite this extensive and personal involvement in Scotland's military 
affairs, Marie de Guise seems to have been intent on returning to France for good after 
the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, there is no plausible explanation as to why she 
would want to stay in Scotland after 1550, especially to pursue her own political 
ambitions, when her daughter's future seemed so secure. Mary, Queen of Scots was 
already living in her future husband's kingdom as an absentee monarch and destined to 
1 Marie de Guise to the Due d'Aumale and Cardinal de Guise, 25 June 1548, Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 674-6 
and Relations, I, pp. 173-5. 
2 Marie de Guise to Mlle. de Fourquevaux, 14 February 1549/50, NLS, MSS.2991, f.27. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 73, 92, pp. 34-5,42-3; TA, IX, pp. 127, 15,4. 
4 See, for example, Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 674-6, 680-1, 694-7 and Relations, I, pp. 173-5, 179-80, 192-5; 
Balcarres Papers, I, exlv, exlvi, exlix, lxxii, pp. 188-9, 189-90, 195-6,242; Maitland Miscellany, I, 5-7, 
pp.215-8. 
5 Histoire de la guerre d'Ecosse, pendant les campagnes 1548 et 1549 par Jean de Beaugue (Maitland 
Club, 1830), pp. 37-8, 126-33; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.188 and Relations, I, pp. 220-1; Lesley, Hist01Y, pp. 
212,228. 
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become the Queen of France. Guise's prior involvement in Scottish politics, 
particularly in her struggle for power during the 1540s, was inextricably associated with 
the future welfare and authority of her daughter who, at that time, was still in Scotland. 1 
If, like the treaties of Greenwich, the treaty of Haddington had stipulated that Mary was 
to remain in Scotland until she reached marriageable age, the argument that Guise had 
political designs in Scotland at the time of her trip to France would acquire some degree 
of credibility. Even less convincing is Marshall's romanticised notion that Guise 
returned to Scotland out of a genuine concern for the welfare of her late husband's 
subjects or her argument that Guise was on a mission from God to transform Scotland 
into 'a civilized, sophisticated, well-organized and modem state'.2 There are too many 
discrepancies and unanswered questions found in these arguments that cast doubt over 
the perceived 'political' objective of Guise's trip to France and, more importantly, the 
reason for her return to Scotland. What is certain is that Marie de Guise's sojourn 
requires more investigation before any attempt to understand the reason for her return to 
Scotland in 1551, or her quest for power immediately thereafter, can begin. 
*** 
In his letter to Edward VI requesting a safe-conduct for Marie de Guise, Henri stressed 
that the purpose of the Queen Dowager's voyage was 'pour nous visiter et la Reine 
d'Escosse notre petite fille,.3 The timing of Guise's arrival to coincide with Henri's 
1 See, for example, Marshall, Mmy of Guise, pp. 89-153; Donaldson, James V-James VII, pp. 63-71; 
Scottish Correspondence, pp. 1-252. 
2 Marshall, Mmy of Guise, pp. 187-8. 
3 23 July 1550, Teulet, Papiers, I, p.234 and Relations, I, pp. 237-8. See also Teulet, Papiers, I, p.235 
and Relations, I, pp. 238-9; ADCP, pp. 605-6; APC, III, pp. 95-6, 101-2; and Jordan, Chronicle, p.43, for 
the letters authorising Guise's safe-conduct and the French galleys sent to transport her, and for details of 
Mary's proposed passage through England. 
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triumphant entry in Rouen also suggests that the purpose of her trip was largely 
celebratory in nature. The grandeur afforded to Guise upon her arrival at Dieppe and at 
Rouen, moreover, demonstrates the extent to which her own 'homecoming' was 
considered to be a cause for celebration in itself. 
At the behest of Henri, great preparations were made for Marie de Guise's 
arrival in France. Montmorency informed the Queen Dowager that, because of Henri's 
'grant contentment' with her management of Scottish affairs, 'vous serez la tres bien 
venue et trouverez une compaignye qui vous recevra et verra avecque tout l'honneur et 
contantement que I' on scauroyt penser'. 1 Indeed, it was later reported by the English 
ambassador in France that Guise's 'service in Scotland is so highly taken here, '" she is 
in this Court made a goddess'.2 In August 1550, and just as Montmorency had 
promised, Franyois, duc de Guise, and 'the flower of the nobility' congregated at Dieppe 
to await the arrival of Henri's esteemed guest. 3 So highly was she regarded that Henri 
not only desired her to be the godmother of his son, but even deferred the day of his 
christening to allow for her late arrival, which had become a source of great concern at 
the French court, 'lest recent storms should have driven her to the coast of Flanders'.4 
Unbeknownst to her welcoming committee, the reason for Guise's non-appearance was 
not adverse weather conditions, but the fact that she had not yet left Scotland. A dispute 
I Balcarres Papers, II, Ii, p.71. See also SRO, SP13170 for Henri's letter to Guise dated 4 September 
1550, in which he writes how eagerly he awaits her arrival in France, and NLS, MSS, 3112, f.1, for the 
lodging arrangements he made for Guise and her daughter for his entry into Rouen on 1 October 1550. 
2 The words of Sir John Mason in a letter dated at Blois, 23 February 1550/1, CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 
295, p.75. 
3 Ibid, 232, p.53; NLS, Adv.MSS, 19.1.25, f.6. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,232-3,237, pp. 53, 57. Mary did not arrive in time to attend the christening 
ceremony for Louis. 
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between several of those who were to accompany her to France had delayed her 
departure. 1 
The altercation surrounded Huntly's arrest of William Mackintosh of 
Dunnachtane, a Highland chief whom he had charged with conspiracy against his life. 
According to Lesley, Huntly's subsequent forfeiture of Mackintosh's lands, in which he 
acted as the judge of his own cause being the lieutenant-general of the north, sparked a 
bitter reaction from Gilbert, 3rd earl of Cassillis, Maxwell, Sir George Douglas of 
Pittendreich and Sir James Douglas of Drumlanrig. Given the high profile nature of the 
dispute, Guise could not proceed to France until the feud between many of her travelling 
companions was settled. It was because of this that Marie de Guise decided to step in. 
As a result of the Queen Dowager's intervention, a truce was arranged whereby both 
sides agreed to a reduction in the process of forfeiture and the restoration of 
Mackintosh's lands to his son and heir. 2 As a mark of their truce, which was to last for 
the duration of their trip to France, each one 'uthalden his hand to the Quenis Grace, 
moder to our Soverane Lady, quhais Grace tuk every manis hand thair upoun,.3 Having 
achieved an albeit fragile state of accord between her travelling companions on 5 
1 RPC, I, p.107; Lesley, History, p.235; Scottish Correspondence, ccliv, p.381 n.1; Marshall, Mmy of 
Guise, p.185. 
2 Lesley, HisfO/y, p.235. 
3 RPC, I, p.1 07. For Huntly, however, the issue was not closed. Lesley reports that after he departed for 
France, the Countess of Huntly ordered the execution of Mackintosh on her husband's orders. This, in 
tum, led to retributory action and the murder of Huntly's agent and sheriff-deputy, Lachlan Mackintosh 
on 30 September 155l. Attempts were also made on Huntly's life. After his return to Scotland, he 
complained to Guise 'off the greit tresone and dyssait devyssit for my slayng'. Although Huntly does not 
identify those who were planning to assassinate him specifically, he was more than likely alluding to 
associates of the Clan Mackintosh. Scottish Correspondence, ccliv, p.381 n.1; Lesley, RistO/y, p.381; 
A.M. Mackintosh, The Mackintoshes and Clan Chattan (Edinburgh, 1903), pp. 128-40. 
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September, Marie de Guise was finally ready to depart for France and set sail the next 
day. 1 
After much anticipation, Marie de Guise finally arrived at Dieppe on 19 
September 1550. There, 'sho was honorable receaved' by her brother and his noble 
entourage, which included her 15 year old son, Franyois, duc de Longueville.2 From 
Dieppe, Guise then made her way to Rouen, where she was 'received with much 
honour,3 at the French court six days later. Henri, in particular, welcomed Guise 'with 
gret effectione and fawour, shawin alswell to all the nobill men that was with hir and to 
hir self.4 More importantly, she was reunited with her daughter, Mary, Queen of Scots. 
Whilst her delayed departure from Scotland had caused her to miss the baptismal 
ceremony for the Valois prince,s she did arrive in time to participate in what was 
ostensibly the main purpose her journey - Henri's triumphant entry into Rouen on 1 
October 1550.6 
Unlike his previous entries at Lyons (1548) and Paris (1549), for example, 
Henri's entry into the Norman capital was more than a typical Renaissance rete 
I If Sir John Mason's report of 10 September is accurate, Guise embarked for France from the port of 
Leith on Saturday, 6 September 1550. CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 237, pp. 54-5; C.R. Cheney (ed.), 
Handbook of Dates (London, 1991), Table 16, pp. 114-5. 
2 NLS, Adv.MSS, 19.1.25, f.6. 
3 Guise arrived at Rouen on 25 September 1550. Tytler, Edward VI and Mmy, I, p.327; CSP Foreign, 
1547-1553,244, p.56. 
4 Lesley, HistOlY, p.236. 
5 On 28 August 1550, Mason reported that 'The christening is to be on Sunday next'. CSP Foreign, 
1547-1553,233, p.53. 
6 Tytler, Edward VI and Mmy, I, pp. 325-6; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,244, p.56; CSP Spain, X, pp. 181-
2. For more on Henri's entry into Rouen, see Cloulas, Henri II, pp. 271-94; Merriman, 'Mary, Queen of 
France', pp. 35-41; M.B. McGowan, 'Form and themes in Henri II's entry in Rouen', Renaissance 
Drama, i (1968), pp. 199-252; and M. Wintroub, 'Civilizing the Savage and Making a King: The Royal 
Entry Festival of Henri II (Rouen, 1550)" Sixteenth Centwy Journal, xxixl2 (1998), pp. 465-94. 
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celebrating his accession and sovereignty.! It was also a vainglorious display of his 
accomplishments and a confident expression of things yet to come. Unsurprisingly, his 
recent recovery of Boulogne and emancipation of Scotland from the English were 
flaunted unabashedly as great 'military' victories. Following the ceremonious 
procession of Rouen' s townspeople and local officials, a military parade with elaborate 
floats depicted Henri's apparent 'conquest' of Boulogne.2 This ostentatious and rather 
pretentious display included replicas of the forts of Boulogne and the spoils, such as 
ammunition and prisoners of war, taken from the English during Henri's military 
campaign of August 1549.3 This pretence of military victory did not escape comment 
from the English ambassador, Sir John Mason, who was overheard as saying that 'if it 
[Boulogne] had cost them nothing they might have had a triumph with good reason,.4 
But the recovery of Boulogne was not the only cause for celebration; so, too, was 
France's successful intervention in Scotland. Another military procession saw soldiers 
in Roman costume carrying banners signifying the Scottish strongholds defended and 
'recouvert par la force francoise', followed by a chariot on which a winged Fortune held 
I See, for example, I.D. MacFarlane (ed.), The Ently of Henri II into Paris, 16 June 1549 (Binghampton, 
New York, 1982). 
2 The Imperial ambassador, Simon Renard, reported that, 'The townspeople made a good show; some 
were on horseback, and three ensigns of foot-soldiers equipped at their expense were present and took 
part in it. The clergy came fIrst, then the burgesses, followed by the judges and the admiralty. The 
Rouen bailiffs and their offIcers, the tax collectors for the province, the officials of the parliament, ". 
followed in the succession'. CSP Spain, X, p.181; Cloulas, Henri II, pp. 276-8. 
3 Simon Renard also reported that, 'The last triumph were the forts of Boulogne; and with it the spoils 
taken from the English, ammunition and similar things, as a sign and symbol of the conquest of 
Boulogne. CSP Spain, X, pp. 181-2; Cloulas, Henri II, pp. 278-83; Merriman, 'Mary, Queen of France', 
pp.36-9. 
4 CSP Spain, X, pp. 182-3. 
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an Imperial crown over a laurelled figure clad in armour representing Henri. 1 Directly 
behind this symbolic chariot rode the two figures who were destined to playa large part 
in the realisation of Henri's imperial ambitions: the Dauphin of France and Mary, 
Queen of Scots.2 
Henri's entry into Rouen, therefore, was also a celebration of the treaty of 
Haddington and a bold statement of his imperial objective for a Franco-British empire. 
Just days before his entry, Henri wrote: 
... j'ai pacife Ie Royaume d'Ecosse que ie tiens & possede auec tel 
commandement & obeissance que j' ai en France, ausquels deux 
Royaumes, j' en ay joint & vny vn autre, qui est Angleterre, dont 
par vne perpetuelle vnion, alliance & confederation, ie puis disposer, 
comme de moy-mesme, du Roy, de ses Subjets, & de ses facultez; 
de sorte que lesdits trois Royaumes ensemble se peuuent maintenant 
estimer vne mesme Monarchie. 3 
The success ofthe French King's plan for 'vne mesme Monarchie', however, ultimately 
depended on the marriage of Mary Stewart to Franyois Valois and, in the interim, on a 
Scottish government favourable to an intimate Franco-Scottish alliance brought about 
by the proposed union of the crowns. In 1550, the question remained as to how this was 
to be achieved most effectively. Although the Scottish political elite had expressed their 
desire for the continued protection of the French King in April, this did not guard 
I McGowan, 'Forms and themes in Henri II's entry into Rouen', pp. 213-4; Merriman, 'Mary, Queen of 
France', p.38. 
2 It should be noted that Henri's imperial ambitions extended beyond his vision of a Franco-British 
empire. At the entry, an elaborate performance was staged depicting France's projected victory over 
Portugal in Brazil. CSP Spain, X, p.182; Tytler, Edward VI and Mmy, I, p.326; Williamson, 'Scots, 
Indians and the Empire: the Scottish Politics of Civilization, 1519-1609', Past and Present, 150 (1996), 
pp. 46-83; Wintroub, 'Civilizing the Savage', pp. 465-71; Cloulas, Henri II, pp. 283-8; Merriman, 'Mary, 
Queen of France', pp. 38-9. 
3 Henri II to the Grand Sultan of Constantinople, 27 September 1550, Ribier, Lettres et memoires, II, 
p.288. See also the Cardinal of Ferrare's letter concerning Henri's alleged designs against the English, in 
which he writes that, 'estimant que quand vour seriz joints & vnis ensemble; qu'il vour seroit plus aise 
d'obtenir l'vn de l'autre que1que grace qu'autrement'. Ibid, II, p.250. 
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against the possibility that they could renege on the betrothal contract if, at a later date 
perhaps, they no longer felt the need for French protection. 1 In this respect, the Rouen 
entry may also be seen as an elaborate exercise in public relations directed at the Scots 
who were in attendance with Marie de Guise. The lavishness of Henri's entry into 
Rouen exposed them to the grandeurs of France and, by inference, to the benefits of a 
dynastic alliance. This message was accentuated by the prominence of Mary, Queen of 
Scots in the procession. Her position alongside the Dauphin, her future husband, was a 
recognition of her own sovereignty and projected an image of equality in the union of 
the crowns. The Scots could not fail to be impressed. Even the English and Imperial 
ambassadors were compelled to report that Henri's entry was so imposing, 'brave and so 
rich, ... the like ... hath not been seen'.2 
But can such imagery and exposure to lavish ostentation be seen as an attempt to 
'brainwash' the Scots? More to the point, was Marie de Guise's trip to France with a 
large retinue of Scottish notables intended to be 'a brainwashing expedition' whereby 
Henri could buy their support with French pensions? It is in answer to these questions 
that historians have used the composition of Marie de Guise's retinue to suggest that it 
was. Closer examination, however, reveals that there are serious flaws in this line of 
argument. 
Issue must first be taken with the term 'brainwashing'. Implying a forced 
mental and physical imposition, if not complete control over, passive victims, one 
1 RPC, I, pp. 86-93. 
2 Tytler, Edward VI and Mmy, I, pp. 325-6; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,244, p.56; CSP Spain, X, pp. 181-
3. 
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would be hard pushed to describe the Scots as either passive or victims (especially in 
light of the activities of the 'assured Scots' during the 1540s), or Henri as one who was 
in a position to exercise complete control. Some credit must also be given to Henri and 
Marie de Guise. They needed only to refer to the inability of the English to keep these 
Scots 'assured' to realise that it would take significantly more than a one off trip to 
France to secure their long-term and unwavering support to the French cause. The 
prevalent use of the term 'brainwashing', moreover, implies that all the Scots who 
accompanied Marie de Guise to France, or were recipients of French patronage, were 
opposed to the Franco-Scottish alliance. Surely, Guise wished to be surrounded by 
friends and loyal supporters at an event that celebrated the failure of England's Scottish 
policy. Gordon Donaldson, in particular, has further exaggerated these misconceptions 
by placing undue emphasis on those Scots in Guise's retinue with reforming and/or 
anglophile sympathies. As will become apparent, Donaldson's analysis is as inaccurate 
as his interpretation is misleading. 
The biggest hole in Donaldson's argument is that by relying on an extremely 
limited source base, he has failed to consider all the Scots who were in, or travelled to, 
France during Guise's visit. In All the Queen's Men, he presents as a complete list only 
those who are mentioned in the Register of the Privy Seal, as being the 'persons who 
accompanied Marie de Guise to France on her 'brainwashing expedition' in 1550'.1 
I RSS, IV, 879, 880, 882, 883, 887, 893, pp. 146-9; Donaldson, All the Queen's Men, Appendix C, p.160. 
In James V - James VII, p.80, Donaldson also makes reference to those Scots listed in Knox's Works, I, 
pp. 241-2 and History, I, p.116. By examining a wider range of sources, however, it soon becomes 
obvious how many more Scots accompanied Guise to France or joined her later - not to mention the large 
number of Scots who were already there. Safe-conducts, correspondence, ambassadorial reports and 
receipts contained in CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, CSP Scot., I, APC, Scottish Correspondence, Balcarres 
Papers, II, RPC, RMS, RSS, and NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.5 all contain references to these individuals which 
have been compiled in Appendix A. 
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Secondly, he has made no attempt to consider the political and religious loyalties of 
those who did not go to France, or whether these individuals were also the recipients of 
French patronage. And finally, Donaldson has completely disregarded the fact that 
French patronage had been distributed to the Scots since 1548. Needless to say, these 
oversights have resulted in an inaccurate and misguided analysis of the motivating 
factors behind Marie de Guise's return to France. By taking into account these 
oversights, it soon becomes apparent that the argument highlighting the positive 
correlation between those Scots with anglophile or reformist inclinations and those who 
received French patronage is a grossly simplified account based on incomplete 
evidence, preconceived notions and sweeping generalisations. 
There is no doubt that Marie de Guise's retinue was as grand in its composition 
as it was diverse. As Appendix A shows, those Scots who travelled to France included 
great nobles, such as the Earls of Cassillis, Glencairn, Huntly, Marischal, Sutherland, 
and Lords Erskine, Fleming, Home, Maxwell and Somerville, as well as men of lesser 
status, such as Master John Douglas, parson of Newlands, Master David Henderson, 
vicar of Rossie, and the monks of Pittenweem priory. There were also many lairds in 
attendance, such as Sir Hugh Campbell of Loudon, Sir George Douglas of Pittendreich, 
Sir James Douglas ofDrumlanrig and Sir William Murray of Tullibardine, in addition to 
James V's illegitimate sons, Lords James, John and Robert. Other visitors to France 
included John Spottiswoode, William Lauder of Haltoun, and representatives of the 
ecclesiastical estate, such as Robert Stewart, bishop elect of Caithness, Andrew Durie, 
bishop of Galloway, and John Roull, prior of Pittenweem and Blantyre. But one must 
not forget the countless other Scots in France, such as students, merchants, soldiers and 
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servants, who may have also joined in the celebrations at Rouen or attended the same 
pageants and fetes as Marie de Guise and Mary, Queen of Scots throughout their French 
progress. 1 What is certain, and what Appendix A only begins to demonstrate, is that 
there were far more Scots in France during Marie de Guise's trip than we have been led 
to believe. 
Just as the composition of those Scots in France was diverse in terms of social 
status, so too were their religious and political sympathies. Representatives from all 
across the religious and political divide seem to have been present. Marie de Guise's 
entourage included committed reformers, such as the Earls of Glencaim and Marischal; 
faithful adherents to the established Church, such as the earls of Huntly and Sutherland; 
and those who may be described as reforming Catholics, the most notable of whom 
were John Wimam, subprior of st. Andrews, and Henry Sinclair, dean of Glasgow.2 
The religious sympathies of others are less certain. While many were ostensibly still 
Catholics, it is difficult to gauge the effects of the reform movement on particular 
individuals in 1550, let alone prove the sincerity of their religious convictions. Future 
membership in the Lords of the Congregation is, similarly, an ume1iab1e indicator of 
Protestant inclinations in 1550 - widespread support for their rebellion came only when 
I See Lesley, History, pp. 236-7, for an itinerary of Guise's movements after Rouen. 
2 As will be discussed in Chapters VII and VIII, the inclusion of reformers in Guise's entourage typifies 
her policy of accommodation towards the Protestants of her realm. By including them in what was 
essentially a celebration of the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance, she was inadvertently assuring them that 
the union of the French and Scottish Catholic crowns was not incompatible with the reform movement. I 
am extremely grateful to Linda Dunbar, whose research on John Winram reveals that, in 1550, he was 
fundamentally concerned about reforming the Church from within. LJ. Dunbar, 'John Winram c.l492-
1582: A Study of his life and his role in the pre and post-Reformation Scottish Church' (unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 26-55. 
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France failed to respond adequately to England's military intervention on the side of the 
Congregation in February 1559/60. 
Using political activities as a gauge of religious sympathies is equally 
problematic. Due to the ever-changing political scene in Scotland during the 1540s, 
political allegiances were not always consistent with religious convictions. Glencaim, 
Cassillis, Marischal, Sir Hugh Campbell of Loudon, Sir George Douglas of Pittendreich 
and Lord Maxwell, for example, had all been 'assured' Scots and/or were noted as 
having secret dealings with the English· during their 'rough wooing' of Scotland. 
Publicly, though, these Protestant anglophiles opposed Somerset on political grounds, 
while others resented the aggression of Somerset's campaign and defended their 
kingdom against the English occupying forces. But, once again, it is necessary to point 
out the loyal supporters of the crown and friends of Marie de Guise who were also in 
France - the most notable of which was the Gordon contingency, including Huntly, 
Sutherland and James Ogilvy of Deskford and Findlater. There was also Sir Robert 
Camegy of Kinnaird, John Beaton of Creich, John Sempill of Fowlwod and the Lords 
Erskine, Fleming, Home and Somerville, all of whom were either ardent supporters of 
the French and Catholic cause or just decidedly anti-English. From this brief analysis, it 
becomes clear that a considerable proportion of Scots who were in France during Marie 
de Guise's visit were neither anglophiles nor zealous reformers in need of 
'brainwashing'. While it is true that, as an exercise in public relations, Guise's trip 
promoted the Franco-Scottish alliance by exposing the Scots to the grandeurs of France, 
particularly at Henri's entry into Rouen, Marie de Guise had been actively and 
effectively securing the support of the Scots since 1548. 
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In fact, it was Marie de Guise's shrewd and effective distribution of patronage 
that procured the greatest support for the Franco-Scottish alliance. Guise had seen first 
hand how offers of French gold and titles were instrumental in securing the political 
support of Arran for an alliance that directly contravened his own dynastic and personal 
ambitions in 1548. Henry, lord Methven, confirmed the important role patronage 
played in gaining the support of the Scottish nobility as a whole: 
The lordis that is greit men and uther lordis and barronis to be cherisit 
fawvorable wyth your graic and wyth all the prynsipall men of gud 
quhay that cummis out of France heyr, for the nater of this pepill is 
of this realm; first to be gentillie don to, and that tha persaif luf and 
gudnes in the kingis graice of France. And als this realm is pwyr and 
the greit men can na way beyr greit exspens of thar awn leving. All 
greit men in this realm has, and utheris efter thair greis has, folkis to 
sarve tham in thair awn bowndis but ony mone bot allanerly gud tretyng 
and greit houss to be haldin of daly exspens ordynar of meyt and drynk; 
bot to remayn lang out of thair awn boundis apon thair awn exspenssis 
thai rna na way do the samyn wythout tha be suppleyit and helpit be 
substance. I 
The accuracy of Methven's description of the Scottish nobility, and how best to treat 
them, is effectively demonstrated by Patrick, earl Bothwell, whose loyalties during 
Somerset's occupation were highly suspect. 2 In a letter to the Queen Dowager, 
Bothwell reminded her of the 2,000 crowns promised to him, but as of yet not received. 
Knowing that Guise wanted him and Huntly to embark on a northern expedition, he 
I Scottish Correspondence, clxxii, p.242. 
2 During the early 1540's, Bothwell was an ardent supporter of Marie de Guise and the French cause, 
staunchly opposing the English alliance and reformed doctrines. But a year after he apprehended the 
reformed preacher, George Wishart, in 1546, Bothwell's name appeared on the list of Scots who had 
bound themselves to Henri VIII and, in 1549, he signed a bond of fealty to Edward VI. Charged with 
treason in 1550, Bothwell fled Scotland and did not return until Marie de Guise allowed him to return in 
1553. She subsequently granted him a remission for his treasonous activities and appointed him Lord 
High Admiral and Lieutenant of the Borders during her regency. Ibid, cxlv, cxlvii, ccxxiv, pp. 205-6, 
207,320,321; CSP Scot., I, 92, 353-5, pp. 42, 178; APC, II, p.318 and III, p.92; TA, IX, pp. 414, 430; 
AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.31r; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.269 and Reiations, I, p.279. 
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shrewdly pointed out that he had 'nocht at this tym money to mak my furnessingis as 
afferis me to do', and humbly requested that she 'support me with this said money 
quhilk my servand suld have ressavit in Frans, that I may ordour me tweching my 
passage according to your grace will'. I In other words, no money - no service. 
Although Bothwell had a valid point in that money was desperately needed to finance 
military campaigns, his comments nevertheless reflect the advantageous position the 
Scots found themselves in as pawns in the game of European dynastic politics. Money 
was being thrown at the Scots by both England and France in the hope of procuring 
support for their respective causes. As the objects of an international bidding war, the 
allegiance of the Scots ultimately came at a price. 
The years 1548-1549, therefore, witnessed an active campaign by Marie de 
Guise and Henri to consolidate existing support and secure new support for the Franco-
Scottish alliance through the distribution of patronage.2 Methven's advice seems to 
have been well heeded by Guise, who was undoubtedly already aware of the important 
role patronage had to play for the success of France's military and dynastic objectives in 
Scotland. She was quite forthright in reminding Henri of his financial obligations and, 
in particular, of the necessity to ' ... entretienne les seigneurs de ce pays et leur donner 
des penssions pour les attirer de plus en plus a Iuy faire service'.3 As a result, Scots of 
I Scottish Correspondence, CXCV, p.284. See also Kerr and Macdowall's letter beseeching Guise to 'fynd 
sum lywing for ws in Scotland' in return, it is implied, for their loyal support and service. Ibid, ccviii, 
p.299. 
2 This policy was reported on extensively by the Imperial ambassador, st. Mauris, who informed Charles 
V of Henri's intent to bestow pensions and titles 'on the Scots in order to 'nourish their affection for 
France and tum them from friendship or understanding with the English'. CSP Spain, IX, pp. 302-4, 
312,361,573. 
325 February 1548/9, NLS, MSS.2991, f.67v; Fourquevaux Mission, p.18. 
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all religious and political persuasions who were thought to give the best service received 
the 'luf and all gudnes in the kingis graice of France', predominantly in the form of 
annual pensions and/or cash gifts.! The Earl of Angus and his anglophile brother, Sir 
George Douglas of Pittendreich, for example, received pensions of 2,500 francs and 
1,000 crowns/ while the decidedly anti-English Border laird, Sir Walter Scott of 
Buccleuch and Branxholme, was granted a pension of 400 crowns.3 The Homes were 
also beneficiaries. John Home of Coldenknowes and Patrick Home of Broomhouse 
each received 500 ecus,4 and in return for relinquishing Home Castle to the French for 
the duration of the war, pensions of 2,000 francs and 500 ecus were dispensed to Lord 
Home and his son, Alexander, who, as a calvary captain, also received 100 light horse.s 
I NLS, MSS.2991, f.67 V ; Fourquevaux Mission, p.18. Due to the nature and lack of sources, tracing the 
annual payments of these French pensions has, on the whole, been a fruitless task. Similarly, the receipts 
for payments that are available, such as those contained in NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.5, tend not to specify 
whether the cash received was an annual payment of a pension or a one off cash gift. 
2 SRO, E34/14/5-6. In 1514, Archibald, 6th earl of Angus, famously married his second wife, Margaret 
Tudor, elder sister of Henry VIII and relict of James IV. Although his allegiances often wavered, Angus 
was consistent in his animosity for Arran. He led the pro-English/reform faction with Lennox in the early 
1540s, but fought for Scotland against Somerset, commanding the defeated army at Pinkie. His younger 
brother, conversely, was a staunch anglophile and was regarded as the leader of the English party in 
Scotland during the 1540s. Sir George's refusal to take part physically in Henry VIII's 'rough wooing' 
of Scotland, however, was not looked kindly upon by the English. They laid waste to his lands and took 
many members of his family captive, including his wife. He subsequently became a loyal servant to 
Marie de Guise. 
3 Ibid, SP13/14/12. A prominent Border laird, Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch strongly opposed the Tudor-
Stewart marriage and actively defended his kingdom against Somerset, despite suffering badly at the 
hands of the English. Scott was murdered in 1552 by partisans of his traditional enemies, the Kerrs of 
Cessford. 
41 July 1549, NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.5, f.121. 
5 Ibid, MSS.2991, fos. 61'-8r and Adv.MSS, 29.2.5, f.123; Fourquevaux Mission, p.18. Guise's memo 
regarding the relinquishment of Home Castle and its furniture is dated 29 February 1548/9; Alexander's 
receipt for 500 ecus is dated 1 July 1549. 
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Bonds of mament and maintenance were also means through which Marie de 
Guise granted pensions to Scots. 1 Although many of these bonds have been lost, it is 
nevertheless significant that the majority of those entered into with the Queen Dowager 
date to the period 1548-1549 and, in what were usually only personal declarations of 
loyalty and service, contain financial provisions. Consistent with Guise's policy of 
patronage as a whole, royal bonds of mament and maintenance were entered into with 
Scots of all religious and political persuasions - including committed reformers such as 
George Meldrum of Fyvie2 and John Erskine of Dun/ and faithful adherents to the 
crown and Church, such as Robert Camegy of Kinnaird,4 Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch 
and Branxholme,5 his son and heir, William of Kirkurd [Kirkhope],6 the Earl of Huntly7 
I For more on this topic, see Wonnald, Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent, 1442-1603 
(Edinburgh, 1985), especially pp. 168-373, for a comprehensive list of 'Bonds and Contracts of Manrent 
of Maintenance , . 
2 14 March 1548/9, SRO, SP13/65. George Meldrum of Fyvie was a noted refonner and anglophile, 
although he did fight for Scotland at the battle of Ancrum (1545). 
3 30 September 1549, ibid, SPI3/68. A refonner whose political allegiances were not always consistent 
with his religious convictions, John Erskine of Dun opposed Somerset during his occupation of Scotland 
as the Constable of Montrose. For this, and his surrender of Montrose Castle to the French, he received 
the heartfelt thanks of Marie de Guise (Spalding Misc., IV, pp. 48-51). In what would also seem to be a 
clash of interests after signing the 'First Band' of the Congregation in December 1557, Dun went on to 
negotiate Mary, Queen of Scots' marriage contract and help Guise to 'stay' the Congregation during the 
opening stages of their rebellion in 1559. In essence, Dun is a prime example of how Guise sought to 
accommodate her Protestant subjects and assure them that her dynastic policies, which aimed to unite the 
French and Scottish Catholic crowns, were not incompatible with the refonn movement. 
4 14 April 1548, SRO, SP13/59. A loyal servant to the crown, Carnegy entered into his bond with Guise 
in return for an annual payment of £ I 00 from the rents and duties of Orkney and Shetland. 
513 August 1548, ibid, SP13/61; Fraser, Buccleuch, II, pp. 187-8. 
614 March 1548/9, SRO, SP13/65, 66; Fraser, Buccleuch, II, p.195. 
7 14 April 1548, SRO, SP13/58. While being held in Newcastle after being taken prisoner at Pinkie, 
Huntly was promised that the French King would pay his ransom and award him the 'order of France [St. 
Michael]'. He was also promised an annual pension of £2,000 and investiture in one of the earldoms of 
Orkney, Ross or Moray, and provision for his kin imd followers. By 13 February 1548/9, he had been 
made a knight of the Order of St. Michael (confinned during his trip to France in 1550-1 and giving rise 
to his nickname 'Cock 0' the North') and had been granted the lands and earldom of Moray. In the 
following May, Huntly also received a charter for the hereditary bailiary of all the lands in the bishopric 
of Aberdeen. RMS, IV, 299, 319, 366, pp. 71,75,84. 
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and his younger brother, Alexander Gordon, the postulate of Caithness. 1 Of these, 
Camegy was granted an annual pension of £1 00, Dun a pension of 500 crowns per 
annum (in addition to a ruby and diamond for his relinquishment of Montrose Castle), 
Sir Walter Scott of Kirkurd the annual fees formerly received by the late John Melville 
of Raith, and Alexander Gordon an annual pension of £200 Scots.2 In addition to her 
bond of mament, Guise also entered into an obligation with Gordon to compensate him 
for his renunciation of the bishopric of Caithness in favour of Robert Stewart on 13 
April 1548, and to ensure that he 'perpetuellement demeurer son [Henri's] fidel 
serviteur et subgect'. 3 As such, he was promised another benefice of the same calibre 
with an annual revenue of 500 merks Scots in either France or Scotland, an annual 
pension of 1,000 livres that Guise was to obtain from Hemi and, in the interim, a 
pension of 400 livres tournois from the French King. 
The effectiveness of bonds of mament and pensions in binding the Scots to the 
interests of France, however, was limited. Patrick, lord Gray, for example, entered into 
his bond of mament with Guise just weeks after he had sworn allegiance to 'take the 
King's [Edward VI's] part in his godly purpose'.4 The 500 merks he received as an 
annual pension merely lined his pockets rather than persuading him to abandon the 
I 17 January 1547/8, SRO, SP13/55. For a survey of Alexander Gordon's ecclesiastical career, see 
Donaldson, Reformed by Bishops: Galloway, Orkney and Caithness (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 1-18,54-5. 
2 SRO, SP13/59, 68 and E34/15/5; Fraser, Buccleuch, II, p.170. 
3 SRO, SP13/55; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 662-3; NLS, MSS.2991, f.68; Fourquevaux Mission, pp. 18-9; 
Scottish Correspondence, clxi-ii, clxxi, pp. 227-9, 239-40. Gordon entered into a bond of mament with 
Guise on 17 January 1547/8 and an obligation on 14 April 1548. 
426 March 1548, CSP Scot., I, 148, pp. 71-2; SRO, SP13/56. Gray was a noted anglophile and reformer, 
who pledged to promote the Tudor-Stewart maniage and sunender Broughty Castle to the English. Two 
weeks after the battle of Pinkie, in which he did not fight, the said castle was relinquished to the English. 
CSP Scot., I, 4, 129, 141, pp. 2, 60-1, 66. 
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English cause. On the other hand, Guise's bond ofmanrent with the earl of Sutherland 
seems to have been decisive in securing his support for the French cause. 1 
Traditionally, Sutherland's religious and political sympathies were staunchly Catholic 
and anti-English. A clash with Huntly over the tacks of Moray, however, appears to 
have led him to consider switching allegiances, if only to force a favourable decision 
over the disputed earldom.2 In his letter assuring Guise of Sutherland's loyalty, 
Methven hinted that his stepson's fealty was conditional on her granting 'the takkis of 
Mwrray ... to the erll of Sotherland nor till ony utheris'.3 Such a decision would also, of 
course, be characteristic of Guise's 'greit wisdom ... don evir for the commoun weill 
persever,.4 Methven's warning was further substantiated by reports that, despite his 
ostensible displays of loyal service,s Sutherland was actually 'of good mind to the 
King's godly purpose ... beand honestly entyrtaynit'.6 It would appear, therefore, that 
Marie de Guise's bond of manrent, in which Sutherland was granted tenancy in the 
I 20 February 1548/9, SRO, SP13/63. 
2 Scottish Correspondence, clxvi, clxx, ccxvlii, ccxvliii, pp. 234, 237-9, 365-7; Fraser, Sutherland, I, pp. 
106-7 and III, pp. 110-3; ADCP, p.615. Although fragile, Marie de Guise's resolution of the Huntly-
Sutherland dispute over Moray in 1552 is a prime example of her political acumen and ability to use land 
and ecclesiastical disputes to her political advantage. By satisfying both parties in the feud, Guise 
ensured that both Huntly and Sutherland remained in her service as opposed to one of them supporting 
Chatelherault out of disaffection. 
3 1 June [1548], Scottish Correspondence, clxx, pp. 237-8. 
4 Ibid, clxx, p.238. 
5 In the same letter, for example, Methven informed Guise that Sutherland 'has promyttit to do his utir 
delygens in thay partis for gud rewill and concord, and to cause all the folkis be in armour and wappines 
and to sarve the auttorite', and later reported on 17 July 1548 that, 'This day the erle Sotherland and the 
northtland folk departis of Edinbrogh to the camp, - xvt men, and, as tha say, rna is cummand'. Ibid, 
clxx, clxxvii, pp. 238, 251. 
628 August 1548, CSP Scot., 1,323, p.163. In addition to Sutherland, Lord Gray cited Atholl, Crawford, 
Marischal, Rothes and Errol as potential supporters of the English cause and, therefore, suitable 
candidates for bribery. 
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earldom of Ross, was a direct response to his alleged wavering loyalties, 1 Whether 
Sutherland's temporary lapse of faith was genuine or simply a ruse for personal gain, 
Guise's bond nevertheless succeeded in its objective and secured the steadfast support 
of Sutherland for the French cause. 
Despite the example of Lord Gray, Marie de Guise considered the distribution of 
French pensions to be an effective and necessary policy - albeit an expensive one. 
Initially, she covered the costs personally, but in 1549 informed Henri that she could no 
longer afford to do so. In her request for financial assistance, Guise revealed that a total 
of 'XXV mils francz par an' was needed to 'distribuer aux personnages qui ly pourrount 
faire Ie plus de service'? The combined total of the pensions subsequently granted to 
the Queen Dowager (10,000 francs), Arran (6,000 francs) and Huntly (6,000 francs) 
suggests that they were intended for redistribution as opposed to personal gain.3 But, 
according to Guise, offers of French gold were not the only means by which support for 
the Franco-Scottish alliance could be maintained or procured. The resources of France 
extended beyond the monetary to include the titular, and both Henri and Marie de Guise 
were astute enough to realise the importance and effectiveness of benefices and 
preferments. 
The offer to Arran of a French duchy and investiture in the Order of St. Michael 
IS, perhaps, the best example of how effective titles and honours were in securing 
120 February 1548/9, SRO, SP13/63; Fraser, Sutherland Book, III, p.107. 
2 NLS, MSS.2991, f.67v; Fouquevaux Mission, p.18. Fourquevaux agreed that 'XXV ou trente mils 
escuz' was needed from Hemi, 'pour faire presentz aux seigneurs descosse tels que ladite dame [Guise] 
ly dira. Et ce faisant tout Ie Royaulme marchera arme a sa faveur et la devotion desdits seigneurs sera 
tout plus enc1ine au service et bien du Roy'. NLS, MSS.2991, f.78v; Fourquevaux Mission, p.36. 
3 BN, MSS.f.fr.18153, fos. 66-8; Fourquevaux Mission, p.18 n.l. 
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support, or at least a resigned acceptance of the Franco-Scottish alliance. I Arran's sons 
were also beneficiaries. In 1548, for instance, Master James Hamilton was assigned a 
post in Guyenne worth 10,000 francs a year and 50 lances in an attempt to keep Arran 
'well in hand, firm in his own devotion, and willing to foster it among the other Scottish 
lords'.z For his part, Arran was quick to take advantage of Henri's generosity and asked 
that he send two of his sons 'au college a Paris et laisne servir Roy'.3 But, as in the case 
of pensions, Guise realised that this was a policy that needed to be extended to other 
Scots. In February 1548/9, she reiterated to Henri that by bestowing French titles on 
'des principaux contes et seigneurs .. , ilz ly seront plus fideles et affectiones serviteurs,' 
and proceeded to nominate the Earls of Cassillis, Erroll and Marischal, Lord Home and 
Sir George Douglas of Pittendreich for honours, in addition to the Earls of Angus, 
Argyll and Huntly, 'les trois chevaliers de lorder [of St. Michael]'.4 Guise's 
recommendations were taken seriously by the powers that be in France. Following one 
such request, a son of Lord Erskine was soon provided to Cambuskenneth Abbey.5 
Huntly, in particular, seems to have been earmarked for special recognition. 
Guise wanted it expressly known by Henri, of 'la conduite dudit seigneur de hontelay 
entout ce qui touche et conceme son service et quil sera tres bon quil plaise au Roy Ie 
1 Following the ratification of the treaty of Haddington, Arran, his heirs and successors were also issued 
with letters of natura lis at ion. Bonner, 'French Naturalization of the Scots', pp. 1109-11. 
2 CSP Spain, IX, pp. 303-4. As has already been discussed in Chapter I, Master James was also promised 
the hand of the Duke of Montpensier's eldest daughter in 1548. 
3 NLS, MSS.2991, f.74r; Fourquevaux Mission, p.29. 
4 NLS, MSS.2991, f.67v; SRO, E34/14/5; Fourquevaux Mission, p.18 n.b; Knox, History, I, p.103 and 
Works, I, p.217; RMS, IV, 299,366, pp. 71, 84. 
5 NLS, MSS.2991, f.68 v; SRO, SP2/4, f.321; Fourquevaux Mission, p.20. 
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bien traiter doresnavant'.1 As for his brother, Guise had not forgotten her obligation and 
implored Henri to provide Alexander Gordon with some 'benefice pour luy donner 
moyen de sentretenir et de continuer a ly faire Ie service quil a commence'.2 Henri, 
however, did not need reminding as he had already taken steps to compensate Gordon 
for the loss of Caithness with the archbishopric of Glasgow. Alexander Gordon's 
subsequent provision to the see of Glasgow on 5 March 1549/50 would prove to be as 
controversial as it was short-lived.3 
Upon the death of Gavin Dunbar on 30 April 1547, the vacancy of the prized 
western see of Glasgow became the source of great contention. No sooner had the 
bishopric become vacant than Chatelherault nominated his half-brother, James, to the 
post. Arran's recommendation of the Dean of Brechin, however, was flatly rejected by 
the Court of Rome - ostensibly because the Council of Trent had prescribed lawful birth 
as a prerequisite for all episcopal appointments.4 But James Hamilton's rejection was 
due less to his illegitimacy than to his half-brother's over-riding dynastic ambition in 
the ecclesiastical sphere and, in particular, his exploitative use of the right of 
recommendation as Governor. 5 The papacy had become increasingly wary of 
Chatelherault's nepotistic recommendations - especially in light of the fact that a 
Hamilton was already the Archbishop of st. Andrews. The prospect of having 
I NLS, MSS.2991, f.68 r ; Fourquevaux Mission, p.18. 
2 NLS, MSS.2991, f.68 r ; Fourquevaux Mission, pp. 18-9. 
3 HEC, p.313. For discussions on the controversy surrounding Gordon's provision to the see of Glasgow, 
see Hannay, 'Some Papal Bulls', pp. 25-41, especially pp. 32-5, and Scottish Correspondence, pp. 325-
33. 
4 Hannay, 'Some Papal Bulls', p.34. 
5 Finnie, 'The House of Hamilton' ,pp. 8-17; Mahoney, 'The Scottish Hierarchy', pp. 52-3. 
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Hamiltons holding the two most important ecclesiastical offices in Scotland was 
daunting and less than ideal. As a result, the papacy was extremely reluctant to confer 
the archbishopric of Glasgow on James Hamilton, and used his illegitimacy to justify 
their refusal. When Alexander Gordon was provided to the see of Glasgow on 5 March 
1549/50, Chatelherault was far from pleased.! Apart from the fact that his dynastic 
ambitions had been thwarted, Chatelherault was particularly upset because he had not 
recommended Gordon for the office. As the Governor and representative of the crown, 
it was his prerogative to nominate individuals for vacant ecclesiastical offices. In the 
case of Alexander Gordon, his right of recommendation had not only been eclipsed, but 
also sanctioned by the papacy: 
La Royne d'Escosse, soubsage, avec Ie Gouverneur du royaulme 
aultrefoys et nagueres traictantz des.matieres concernantz Ie faict 
dudict royaulme et les libertez parcydevant a luy donnes par plusieurs 
papes, Ie tout par Ie conseil et consentement des grandement blessez 
et preiudiciez d'une telle quelle dicts provision de la personne d'un 
quidict Alexandre Gordoun a l'eglise de Glasgo, faicte par Notre Sainct 
Pere Ie pape.2 
Chatelherault did not take being snubbed lightly. His immediate response was to place 
Gordon on a charge of barratry and to lodge a formal protest with Pope Julius III, 
requesting that an inquiry be launched to investigate the events surrounding Gordon's 
appointment. 3 
The French King seems to have 'been the principal agent behind Gordon's 
unorthodox provision to Glasgow. In this, he was naturally supported by 'les Guises' 
1 HBC, p.313. 
2 Balcarres Papers, II, 1, pp. 68-9. 
3 In his letter to the Queen Dowager dated at Peebles, 14 June [1551], Archbishop Hamilton reports that 
Gordon '00. is cumit and stollying this benefice [Glasgow] and tharfor dec1arit ane barratour in this 
cuntre'. Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxix, p.352; Hannay, 'Some Papal Bulls', pp. 34-5. 
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and the papacy, but had also written to Chatelherault 'for his consent of Glasquha'.1 
The Queen Dowager, conversely, was in a difficult position - she could not publicly 
support Gordon's claim for fear of antagonising Chatelherault and directly challenging 
his authority as Governor. Although Gordon was keen to have Guise's unqualified 
support, he was nevertheless mindful of her situation. He reassured her that, 'I put 
nocht zour grace to pain in this mater in aventeur my lord governor suld think zour 
grace did him tort, and I salbe laitht to gyff my lord governor occasion but to do zour 
grace service as partenis him.,2 And, in what must be seen as a clear indication that his 
provision to Glasgow was the result of French intrigue, he pledged that: 
... gyff God pleis put me in that rome, I salbe als necessair and sedabill 
to the werk ofzour grace as any of may estait borne in ony of the realmes. 
I sek bot ane lyf and to haif the moyance to serve zour grace and my natife 
princes zour grace dochter, and that I wer provydit therein, sall all I haif 
done be dischergit as the King and zour grace plessis. 3 
Yet, despite the high esteem with which both Henri and Marie de Guise held Gordon,4 
they were nevertheless reluctant to take steps to resolve the controversy surrounding his 
prOVIsIOn to Glasgow.s As a result, the papacy had no choice but to rule in 
I Balcarres Papers, II, Appendix B, ii, pp. 309-10. 
2 Ibid, II, p.309. 
3 Ibid, II, p.309. 
4 Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxix, pp. 352-4. Archbishop Hamilton, in particular, objected to the 
favour shown by Henri and the Queen Dowager to Alexander Gordon, despite the latter's charge of 
barratry. This, he complained, has led to rumours that 'the kyngis mageste and your grace is nocht 
contentit with my lord [Governor] in na sort, ... for the kyngis mageste hes gevin to the said master 
Alexander the respeck to ane abbacy and hes relevit his pension and bakoris and hes don na thyng on the 
wther twart Glasg[o]w'. See also Balcarres Papers, II, p.309, where Gordon thanks Guise for the 
gracious reception he received from her family in France. 
5 See, for example, Scottish Correspondence, ccxxvii, ccxxxvii, ccxxxix, pp. 323-4,349, 352-4, in which 
James Beaton, abbot of Arbroath, Huntly and Archbishop Hamilton all wonder what Guise and Henri 
have decided to do about Gordon's provision to Glasgow. Beaton had a particular interest in the outcome 
of the Glasgow controversy as he had been gifted the temporalities of the archbishopric on 6 January 
1549/50. RSS, IV, 533, pp. 89-90. 
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Chatelherault's favour and uphold his objections to Gordon's nomination. In a series of 
papal bulls dated 4 September 1551, James Beaton, the abbot of Arbroath, was provided 
to the archbishopric of Glasgow, while Gordon received the titular archbishopric of 
Athens, Inchaffray in commendam and other emoluments in Scotland, presumably in 
compensation for his loss of Caithness and Glasgow.! 
The cessation of hostilities with England did not witness the end of the 
distribution of patronage, but rather saw its continuation - most notably during Marie de 
Guise's celebratory return to France. The fact that patronage had been distributed 
extensively throughout the period 1548-1549, and to Scots whose sympathies lay all 
across the political and religious divide, negates the suggestion that the purpose of her 
trip was exclusively to provide Henri with an opportunity to 'buy off the Scots -
particularly those, as Donaldson stresses, with anglophile and/or reformist tendencies? 
Rather, the expedition to France provided Guise and Henri with an ideal opportunity to 
reinforce a policy that had been successfully implemented for the past two years. 
Daniel Barbaro is largely responsible for the prevalent view that Marie de 
Guise's trip to France was for the sole purpose of buying the political support of the 
Scottish nobility.3 In his report on England, the Venetian ambassador claimed that, 'the 
Queen Dowager, having gone to France, taking with her the chief nobility of Scotland, 
the King bought them completely; so that in France there is neither Scottish duke, nor 
lord, nor prelate, nor lady, nor dame, but who is munificently bribed by the most 
I Hannay, 'Some Papal Bulls', p.35; HBC, p.313. 
2 Donaldson, All the Queen's Men, p.25 and James V-James VII, p.80. 
3 CSP Venice, V, 703, pp. 338-362; APC, III, p.lli. 
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Christian King'.' Barbaro's observations and interpretation of events, however, are not 
entirely accurate. Firstly, there were many Scots of note who did not accompany Guise 
to France and, more importantly, who had been recipients of French patronage during 
1548-1549. The most obvious example of this is, of course, Chatelherault. Someone 
had to stay and govern the realm, although it was reported that d'Oisel wielded almost 
sovereign authority during the Queen Dowager's absence.2 Other recipients in this 
category included the Earls of Angus and Argyll, Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch and 
John Erskine of Dun.3 An examination of the patronage that was distributed in France 
reveals further inconsistencies in the argument that Guise went to France so that Henri 
could buy the Scots off completely. 
Commenting on the distribution of patronage in France, Knox wrote that, 'What 
thei [the Scots] receaved we can nott tell; but few maid ruse at thare returnyng'.4 Whilst 
it is impossible to determine what every member of Guise's retinue received in the form 
of patronage, if anything at all, it is certain that this policy was continued in France and, 
more importantly, benefited Scots who were not all pillars of the English and reforming 
cause. Moreover, several of them had already profited from the 'luf and all gudnes in 
the kingis graice of France' prior to their journey.s Cassillis, Huntly, Marischal, 
Fleming, Lord James Stewart, commendator of Kelso and Melrose, James Ogilvy of 
I CSP Venice, V, 703, p.361. 
2 CSP Spain, X, p.559. 
3 SRO, E34/14/5, E34/15/5, SP13/14/12 and SP13/68; NLS, MSS.2991, f.67v; Fourquevaux Mission, 
p.18; RMS, IV, 299,366, pp. 71, 84. 
4 Knox, Works, I, p.242 and HistOlY, I, p.116. 
5 See Appendix A. Patronage was also distributed by the Scottish government in the form of gifts of 
escheat, non-entry and grants of crown land etc. 
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Deskford, Gavin Hamilton, commendator of Kilwinning Abbey, John Beaton of Creich 
and Patrick, Master of Ruthven, all received pecuniary benefactions in France.' 
Nominations to ecclesiastical offices were also on offer in France. Lord John 
Stewart, commendator of Coldingham, for example, was recommended to the 'abbacie 
of Flawgeny [Flavigny], and his half-brother, Lord James, commendator of St. 
Andrews, to another.2 Indeed, the strong contingent of James V's bastard sons in France 
suggests that they were targeted for support in particular. Rumours of Lord James' 
double dealings with England may have also played their part - especially if he 
influenced the political and religious loyalties of his half-brothers.3 In addition to their 
pensions and ecclesiastical nominations, it is significant that both Lord James and Lord 
John were also granted letters oflegitimation on 7 February 1550/1.4 But the example 
of Lord John's nomination to Flavigny highlights another feature of Guise's policy of 
distributing patronage - the granting of 'empty promises'. Indeed, Guise would later be 
forced to rely on this technique during her negotiations with the Congregation in the 
hope that she could buy enough time for reinforcements to arrive from France. This is 
not to say that all of her promises were empty from the outset, but there is some 
evidence to substantiate Sir John Mason's rather exaggerated claim that this was a 
deliberate policy to keep the Scots impoverished with 'the intent that, being brought to 
I NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.5, fos. 143, 146, 140, 142, 138, 136, 150, 148, 151; Scottish Correspondence, 
ccxxxv, pp. 345-7. 
2 Ibid, ccxxxiii, p.343; Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.80. 
3 Along with other noted agents such as Bothwell and the zealous reformers, John Cockburn, laird of 
Ormiston, and James Hemison, Lord James received several payments from the English during the period 
1550-1552. APC, III, pp. 103,347 and IV, pp. 103, 190. 
4 RMS, IV, 565, p.l25; RSS, IV, 1064, p.l74. 
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extreme need, they may be compelled upon hope of relief, like slaves to hang upon the 
Queen'.l It is in this respect that the example of Lord John Stewart is most revealing. 
Despite having been nominated for the ecclesiastical office, Lord John found he could 
not come into possession of the abbacy ofFlavigny because the: 
... sowme is gret that I man gif for my bullis ... and it is nocht wnknawne 
to your grace [Guise] that I have gottin na proffet of my benefice in 
Scotland sen the begynnyng of the weiris. And be ressone that I can nocht 
gett possesioun of the benefice that the kyngis grace hes vouchasit apoun 
me ther will na bancquier tak on hand to furnis the prowisioun of my bullis, 
for I have na othir way to recompence the bringis hayme of my provisioun 
bot allanerlie the dewtie of my said benefice. Heirfor I beseik your grace 
to laubour affectuousslie at this tyme that I may have ane commissioun of 
the kyngis grace to put me in possessioun, otherwayis I will gett na credett 
of na bancqueir for the expeditioun of my bullis for I have na othir esperance 
bot in your grace alanerlie.2 
Just as the English ambassador had described, Lord John was completely dependent on 
the help of Guise and Henri to escape a predicament that they themselves had created, 
perhaps unintentionally. In such a state of desperation, Lord John had no choice but to 
remain loyal to those who had the power to determine the fate of his existence. 
To all intents and purposes, the continuation of this policy during 1550-1551 
seemed to be effective in securing support for the French cause - at least in the short-
term. In return for his pension of 'ij thousand iiijcc frankis', for example, Glencairn 
promised Guise that 'Quhat service your grace plesis cornman me vith in Scotland let 
me be advertyst and it salbe reddy don vith sic gud vill as I am able to do'.3 Maxwell is 
another case in point. Upon hearing the news that, in addition to the 'xij hunder frankis, 
I Tytler, Edward VI and Mary, I, pp. 354-5. 
2 Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxiii, p.343. 
3 Ibid, ccxxxvi, pp. 347-8. 
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... ye [Guise] appontid to gewe me', he was to receive 'viW frankis mair' and 'be ane of 
the gentilmen in the [ki]ngis chalmer,' Maxwell was not only 'mair adettid to serve [the] 
king and you,' but also 'redy to serve ... quhair it sall pleis the king or you to command 
me ... for I sall reserwe nathing to my parte bot only my allagence to quene my 
soverane'.1 Marie de Guise soon took advantage of Maxwell's offer of ready service 
and, in February 155011, sent him back to Scotland on a special mission to join 
Chatelherault and d'Oisel on the Borders, where tensions with England were mounting.2 
Time would tell how effective patronage would be in securing and maintaining 
long-term support for the proposed dynastic alliance. Glencairn, for example, was the 
first magnate of significance to support the Congregation's rebellion openly and 
militarily in May 1559, and was followed soon after by Argyll and Lord James Stewart. 
In the mean time, offers of French pensions, titles and offices were eagerly accepted by 
the Scottish nobles who profited immensely from their position as pawns in the game of 
European dynastic politics. It was exactly because of their position as pawns that the 
Scots could afford to change their loyalties if the price was right. If patronage was 
going to be an effective policy, therefore, it needed to be a continuous and long-term 
endeavour. The fact that French patronage had predominantly taken the form of annual 
pensions was one way of providing for this, but actually making these yearly payments 
was another matter altogether. Lord Homes's pension of2,000 livres, for example, was 
in arrears by 1556.3 When it had been determined that she would return to Scotland, 
I Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxviii, pp. 349-51. 
2 Chapter II, pp. 69-71. 
3 'MSS of the Duke of Athole and Earl of Home', HMC Twelfth Report, Appendix viii, p.l84. 
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Marie de Guise was adamant (even to the point of falling out with Henri) that she had 
with her a considerable sum of money presumably for this purpose. 1 Because of this, 
her trip to France cannot be seen as a one off attempt to buy the Scots, but rather as the 
continuation of a policy that had been implemented since 1548 and would continue after 
1551. Neither should it be assumed that this policy was directed exclusively at those 
Scots whose political and religious loyalties clashed with the interests of France, or as 
part of an elaborate brainwashing scheme. The composition of those who were 
recipients of French patronage and/or were part of Guise's retinue in France clearly 
indicates that favour was shown to Scots all across the religious and political spectrum. 
By taking into account these considerations, Guise's trip takes on a far less sinister tone. 
The timing of her return to coincide with Henri's entry into Rouen, which was a 
celebration of Scotland's liberation, Mary Stewart's dynasticism and the new Franco-
Scottish alliance, suggests that the ostensible purpose was rather more festive in nature. 
But could the distribution of patronage alone, or a trip whereby a select group of 
Scots were exposed to the grandeurs of france, ensure the long-term support of the 
Scots to the French cause or guarantee that the Franco-Scottish union of the crowns 
would become a reality? What was needed in Scotland was an administration that was 
not only willing to promote, but also act in the interests of France and, more 
importantly, secure the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots to the Dauphin. The question 
remained as to whether Chatelherault could be relied upon to act in such a capacity. 
Matters pertaining to the government of Scotland, therefore, were of extreme 
I CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,305,341, pp. 79,103. 
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importance to Henri if his imperial obj ectives had any chance of being realised. It is in 
this respect that Marie de Guise's trip to France might better regarded as a 
'brainstorming' rather than a 'brainwashing' expedition. Now that the Anglo-Scottish 
hostilities had ceased, France's policy in Scotland not only needed to be determined, but 
also who was going to implement this policy with the greatest chance of success. 
*** 
By early September, it was clear that Scottish affairs of state were going to be a major 
topic of discussion with the arrival of Marie de Guise in France. When asked about the 
liberation of the Scots who had been taken at the siege of St. Andrews Castle (30 July 
1547),1 Henri responded that 'he would defer the question of their full liberty till the 
arrival of the Queen Dowager, when that and all matters connected with Scotland should 
be adjusted'.2 There was much 'adjustment' needed with respect to Scotland. 
Chatelherault had agreed to resign his regency when Mary, Queen of Scots reached her 
age of majority and the question at hand was who was going to replace him and, as it 
would later emerge, when. The question of government in Scotland, therefore, was the 
I Bonner, 'The Recovery of st. Andrews Castle in 1547: French Naval Policy and Diplomacy in the 
British Isles', EHR, cxi (June 1996), pp. 578-98; C. Edington, 'John Knox and the Castilians: A Crucible 
of Reforming Opinion?', in Mason (ed.), John Knox and the British Reformations (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 
29-50. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 238, p.55. At the urging of Marie de Guise, Henri released the 'Castilians' 
who had been transported to prison in France on 7 July 1550. In the words of Knox, they were shortly 
thereafter, 'called to Scotland, thare peax proclamed, and thei thame selfis restored to thare landis, in 
dyspite of thare ennemies. And that was done in hatterent of the Duck, becaus that then France begane to 
thrist to have the regiment of Scotlan in thare awin handis ... Thare rested a nomber of commoun 
servandis yitt in the gala yes, who war all delivered upoun the contract of peace that was maid betuix 
France and England, after the tackin of Bullon [Boulogne]; and so was the haill cumpany sett at libertie'. 
Knox, Works, I, p.233 and HistOlY, I, p.111. The release of all the hostages and prisoners was a lengthy 
process and, although the treaty of Boulogne had stipulated their liberation, it was still an issue that had to 
be specifically addressed in the negotiations for the Anglo-Scottish treaty of Norham. For additional 
references to the release of the 'Castilians' at this time, see CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,215,221, 224, 314, 
pp. 48, 50-1, 83-4; APC, III, pp. 95,205; and Jordan, Chronicle, p.38. 
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subject of great consultation during Guise's visit, as, indeed, she had expected it to be.' 
Henri and his ministers had been eager to hear Guise's thoughts and proposals on this 
matter as early as May 1550. In his flattering letter to Guise, Montmorency wrote: 
Quant au surplus des affaires dela [Scotland], il est impossible de 
mieulx les acheminer que vous faictes, dont ledict Seigneur [Henri] 
a grant contentement, les voyant disposees pour venir au poinct qu'il 
desire et s'asseure qu, avant vostre partement de la pour venir icy, 
vous y pourvoyerex de sorte que vous en serez tous deux en repos; 
... M' asseurant que au retour de Sieur de Bresze, mous scaurons la 
deliberation que vous aurez sur ce prinse.2 
Whether Guise's proposals included standing for the regency herself is unknown, but 
the matter soon became the subject of great debate in France. 
According to Lesley, discussions pertaining to the government of Scotland took 
place at Blois, where the French Court, including 'the Quene of Scotlande and the 
Quene douarier hir moder, and the nobill men of Scotlande', took up residence for the 
winter season after Henri's entry into Chartres on 20 November 1550.3 It was at this 
time, Lesley contends, that: 
... the Quene douarier did oppin the caus ofhir cuming into France to 
the King and his secreit counsallouris, be the adwyse of the duike of 
Guise and Cardinall of Lorane hir brethir, principallie for advancing 
ofhir to the goverement of the realme of Scotland, quhilk was thocht 
verrey guid, and approved by the King and his counsall, quha referrit 
the ordering and dres of the hoill matter principallie to the Quene hir 
self, specialie quhat was to be observed to draw the govemement of 
the realme furth of the Duik ofChattillirailt handis without ony tumult.4 
I CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,255, p.61. 
2 Balcarres Papers, II, Ii, pp. 70-1. 
3 Lesley, HistOlY, pp. 236-7; McKerlie, Mmy o/Guise-Lorraine, pp. 146-7. 
4 Lesely, HistOlY, p.237. Similarly, Lindsay contends that Guise lobbied for the government of the realm, 
'because scho saw the realme nocht weill gydit at that tyme, ffor scho saw nothing bot awarice and 
gredienes in the place of Iustice, nor nothing sought ffor the weillfair of the realme nor for the profeit of 
hir dochter that was to succeid thairto. The king of France and cons all heirand this grantit immedeatlie to 
hir desyre, that is to say [to] be regent of Scotland and he to tak on him to satisfie the govemour ffor his 
goode will and tyttill thairof and that he did schortlie'. Pitscottie, Historie, II, pp. 112-3. 
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At Caudebec on 3 November 1550, Sir John Mason reported that there had been 'great 
consolation [sic] as to Scotland, the French desiring to keep the Queen Dowager in 
France, and to appoint a Frenchman there, to which the Scots will not agree'. 1 Clearly, 
Marie de Guise was not the prime candidate to succeed Chatelherault as Regent, nor 
was it she to whom the idea of a French gentleman acting as viceroy was anathema, but 
the Scots themselves. This may be due to the fact that the Scottish political elite had 
looked to Guise, and not Chatelherault, for the restoration of law and order, having 
commissioned her on 22 April 1550 to provide for the 'execution of justice and [the] 
ordouring of the cuntre'.2 As Queen Dowager and Queen Mother, Guise was a familiar 
and respected figure in Scotland, who had also established herself in recent years as a 
direct channel to the resources of France. 
Neither had Marie de Guise's political acumen gone unnoticed in France. Upon 
his arrival in Scotland, for example, the French captain, M. de la Chapelle de Biron, 
commented that: 
... sans Ie bon ordre et conduicte que y mect la Royne Ie tout yroit 
mal. Maiz en rna vie ne congeuz prince ne princesse, veu ces affaires, 
s'i scavoir mieulx gouverner. Elle est bien aymee en ce pays et y a 
beaucoup de gentilzhommes qui m'ont dict que, si se n'estoit pour 
l'amour d'eIle, ne feroient aucune chose pour monsieur Ie Gouverneur.3 
From a French perspective, the fact that Guise dynastic ambition was synonymous with 
Henri's dynastic and imperial objectives ensured that the Queen Dowager would serve 
French interests if she returned to Scotland. The Scots' apparent preference for Guise, 
1 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,255, p.61. 
2 RPC, I, p.90. 
3 Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 659-60. For similar comments on Guise's management of Scottish affairs, see 
Balcarres Papers, I, cxxxv,cxlv, lxiii, pp. 179, 188-9,239 and II, Ii, pp. 70-1; and Maitland Misc., I, 4, 
pp.214-5. 
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moreover, would theoretically render them more amenable to the implementation of 
Franco-centric policies by her as opposed to a French stranger, who might adversely be 
seen as a symbol of French hegemony. This was something d'Oisel had come to 
understand first hand. Despite having been 'laisser ... chef pardela' by Henri during the 
Queen Dowager's absence, d'Oisel considered the return of Guise to be imperative for 
the ultimate success of Henri's objectives: 1 Guise's absence, he declared, One pourra 
porter aucun fruit mays au contraire beaucoup de domaige aux affaires du Roy et aux 
siens, qui sont une mesme chose'.2 For all parties concerned, therefore, Marie de Guise 
emerged as the best candidate to return to Scotland to assume the regency from 
Chatelherault and govern Scotland during her daughter's majority. As such, it was 
hoped that she would secure the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots to the Dauphin, and 
complete the establishment of French power in Scotland with the least amount of 
resistance from the Scots. 
The decision surrounding Marie de Guise's return to Scotland appears to have 
been made at Blois during the winter months of 1550/1. This would seem to be 
confirmed by the disparaging and foreboding tone of Sir John Mason's report on 23 
February: 
The Scottish Queen desireth as much our subversion, if it lay in her 
power, as she desireth the preservation of herself, whose service in 
Scotland is so highly taken here, as she in this Court made a goddess. 
Mons. de Guise and M. d' Aumale, and the Cardinal of Lorraine, partly 
at her egging, and partly upon an ambitious desire to make their house 
great, be no hindrance of her malicious desire. 3 
I Balcarres Papers, II, xlix, p.66; CSP Spain, X, p.339. 
2 Balcarres Papers, II, lvii, p.79. 
3 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,295, p.75. 
116 
Chapter III: Marie de Guise's Ascent to Power. 
Such noteworthy praise had not been afforded to Guise since her arrival in France, and 
the fact that Mason felt it necessary to comment on it, albeit negatively, suggests that 
something was afoot. Guise, however, seems to have been reluctant to return without 
some form of personal compensation and, more importantly, a guarantee that her 
administration would be supported financially by Henri and the coffers of France. In 
March 155011, therefore, Marie de Guise received an annual pension of 50,000 francs 
for the maintenance of her estate, and an additional 50,000 francs 'more to bestow as 
she shall see cause'. 1 But by May, it was almost with glee that Sir John Mason reported 
that, 'The Dowager of Scotland maketh all this Court weary of her, from the high to the 
low, such an importunate beggar she is for herself and her chosen friends. The King 
would fain be rid ofher'.2 The cause of this alleged ill feeling was the money promised 
by Henri, who wanted Guise to return to Scotland 'upon a promise of payment'. Guise, 
however, was insistent that she 'have the money with her'.3 The Queen Dowager knew 
all too well the importance of money in procuring the support of the Scots. She was 
astute enough to realise that the mere promise of money would have a limited effect in 
achieving her dynastic and political objectives, let alone pay the annual instalments of 
the French pensions she and Henri had been so free in distributing throughout 1548 and 
1549.4 
118 March 1550/1, CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,305, p.79. 
2 Ibid, 341, p.103. 
3 Ibid, 341, p.103. 
4 NLS, MSS.2991, fos. 67v, 78v ; Fourquevaux Mission, pp. 18,36. 
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Despite the wishful thinking of Sir John Mason, Henri and Marie de Guise's 
difference of opinion over money did not result in a permanent rift.! The Queen 
Dowager and her Scottish entourage remained the honoured guests of Henri, and spent 
the following spring and summer travelling with him to places such as Tours, Angers 
and Nantes. 2 Only at the end of her sojourn did Guise part company with the French 
Court in order to visit her family at Joinville before she embarked on her journey back 
to Scotland. 
*** 
In September 1551, thirteen months after her departure for France, Marie de Guise 
prepared to return to her adoptive kingdom at the dawn of a new era of peace. 3 Henri's 
control over Scotland's military security and diplomatic affairs had successfully ended 
the Anglo-Scottish conflict and resulted in Scotland's comprehension in the treaty of 
Boulogne, and the treaties of Binche and Norham. While this was the cause for great 
celebration in France, Marie de Guise's homecoming was marred by personal tragedy. 
In April 1551, an assassination plot to poison Mary, Queen of Scots was uncovered4 and 
the following September, her son died in her arms at Amiens.5 Shortly after the 
I Marie de Guise's trip to France is an area that requires much more investigation, especially in the 
archives of France. The sources I have consulted for the purpose of this thesis, for example, do not reveal 
whether Guise actually left with the promised 50,000 francs or not. In the French King's accounts for 
1554 it is recorded that an annual payment of 60,000 livres was granted 'a la Royne d'Ecosse', but it is 
unclear as to whether this is a reference to Mary, Queen of Scots or her mother. Bouille, Dues de Guise, 
II, Appendix vi, p.592. 
2 Lesley, HistOlY, p.239. 
3 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,449, p.174; APC, III, pp. 364,397; Jordan, Chronicle, pp. 80, 84, 89; Lesley, 
HistOlY, pp. 239-40. 
4 Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 249-60 and Relations, I, pp. 260-70; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553, 332, 371, pp. 97-
8, 121; Jordan, Chronicle, p.62. Robert Stewart's motives are uncertain. For more on his plot to poison 
the Queen, see Merriman, 'James Hemisoun', pp. 100-1 
5 NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.1, f.90. 
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internment of Franyois, Guise made her way to Dieppe in order to await passage across 
the Channel. 
The decision to return to Scotland through England was a shrewd political move 
by the Queen Dowager - though reports of Flemish ships along the coast and the desire 
to avoid a long and potentially rough sea voyage also made this decision a practical 
one.! A 'state' visit through England would provide Marie de Guise with an ideal 
opportunity to launch her political campaign officially and promote herself as a political 
force on the international stage. Her visit also served the interests of France. The 
Habsburg-Valois rivalry was on the verge of erupting into a full-scale war in Italy, and 
Henri was particularly concerned to maintain favourable Anglo-French relations in the 
hope that England would remain a neutral party in the conflict. 
Landing at Portsmouth on 22 October 1551, Marie de Guise officially began her 
royal progress through England.2 As in France, she was honourably received and 
lavishly entertained by the flower of the English nobility. Upon hearing that she had 
arrived, Edward VI immediately issued orders for the 'honourable entertainment' of the 
Queen Dowager, who was not only to be greeted by members of English nobility, but 
escorted all the way to Borders where she would eventually pass into Scotland? The 
likes of the Dukes of Northumberland and Suffolk, the Earls of Warwick and Wiltshire, 
the Marquis and Marchioness of Northampton, the Countess of Lennox and a plethora 
of other ladies and gentlemen were all on hand to welcome Guise who, on 4 November, 
1 Pimodan, La Mere des Guises, p.143. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,477, pp. 190-1; Jordan, Chronicle, p.89. 
3 BL, Harley MSS, 290.2, fos. 6-8; CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,477, pp. 190-1; Jordan, Chronicle, pp. 89-
94. 
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'was most honourably and princely received and welcomed by the King's Majesty' at 
Westminster.! That evening, Guise dined with Edward, who took great pains to record 
the most banal details of the banquet, down to the serving staff and number of sewers 
[2].2 'After dinner, when she had heard some music,' Edward noted that he then 
'brought her to the hall and so she went away' - but not before receiving a diamond ring 
and two nags as a gift from the king the next day. Unfortunately, Edward's journal 
gives no indication as to whether affairs of state were discussed, but based on the 
elaborate reception Marie de Guise received throughout her journey, and the 
composition of the party which escorted her from Portsmouth to Berwick, the Queen 
Dowager was deemed a very esteemed and important guest. 
Marie de Guise finally returned Scotland in late 1551. Met by the Earl of 
Bothwell, Lord Home 'and utheris barronis apoun the bordouris' , Guise was 
immediately conveyed to Edinburgh, 'quhair the Governour receaved hir with gret 
honour and fawour'.3 But for Chatelherault, the return of the Queen Dowager was 
anything but a cause for celebration; it marked the beginning of the end of his political 
career. Rumours had already begun to circulate that measures were being taken in 
France 'to prevein the tyme of the governouris office afore the quenis cuming to perfite 
age'.4 Although Chatelherault denounced such rumours publicly, the fact that he felt it 
necessary to remind Henri and Guise of their 'promis and appoyntment' portrays a man 
I CSP Foreign, 1547-1553,477, pp. 190-1. 
2 Jordan, Chronicle, pp. 93-4. 
3 Lesley, Histmy, pp. 240-1. 
4 Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxiv, p.344; CSP Spain, X, pp. 339-40. 
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on the defensive. 1 This is further substantiated by his intention to send 'the Abbe [de 
Villouin] towards his Majesty, to ascertain his intentions regarding the administration of 
the country after the Queen's minority expires'.2 While the return of Marie de Guise 
clearly revealed who was designated to succeed Chatelherault as regent, it was less clear 
when this transfer of power would actually occur, as Mary, Queen of Scots' perfect age 
was conveniently brought into question by the French. But reports that Chatelherault 
had openly declared that 'while he lived there should be no other Regent in Scotland 
than he', indicated that it was not only a question of when, but if Chatelherault would 
resign as regent at all. 3 
At the behest of Henri, the Parlement of Paris considered the question as to when 
exactly Mary, Queen of Scots, reached her age ofmajority.4 Specifically, was it during, 
or upon completion of her twelfth year? After examining many historical and legal 
precedents, the Parlement of Paris determined that at any time during her twelfth year, 
Mary, Queen of Scots could officially assume control of the government of Scotland, 
and her kingdom 'administre par I' advis et conseil de tels personnages qui seront a ceste 
fin esleuz selon Ie bon plaisir due Roy'. 5 With this piece of legislation behind him 
I Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxiv, p.345. 
2 CSP Spain, X, p.585. In response to this news, Marie de Guise advised Chatelherault to 'put off the 
Abbe de Villouin's journey until a more suitable season', while d'Oisel reminded him that it was his duty 
'to endeavour to enable his Majesty to rest secure and tranquil. In the meantime he might be sure he 
would have to do with a King so good, sincere and virtuous that as long as the Regent should serve him 
and the Queen Dowager loyally, he might confidently look forward to great favour and advancement'. If 
Chatelherault persisted, Guise and d'Oise1 assured Hemi that they would do their best to dissuade him 
and/or delay Villouin's departure in order to give the King time to act accordingly. This report, dated at 
Falkland, 6 October 1552, was intercepted by the Imperialists. Ibid, X, pp. 586-7. 
3 Ibid, X, p.586. 
4 Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 261-6 and Relations, I, pp. 274-8. 
5 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.261 and Relations, I, p.274. 
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confirming his role as 'Protector', Henri could insist that Marie de Guise assume the 
regency as early as 8 December 1553, the date of her daughter's eleventh birthday and 
one year earlier than Chatelherault's anticipated date of resignation. But the question as 
to when Guise should actually assume the regency remained a matter of great debate at 
the French Court.! In d'Oisel's opinion, Henri and Guise's brothers were 'plustost trop 
de chaleur pour effectuer et advancer la besogne dont est question'.z The Cardinal de 
Lorraine, in particular, seems to have been pushing the hardest for his sister to assume 
the regency during Mary, Queen of Scots' eleventh year. Because of 'la mauvaise 
volunte envers elle du Gouverneur', the Cardinal argued that Chatelherault should be 
deposed immediately before he had the chance to fortify himself with friends. 3 D'Oisel 
disagreed and the matter was ultimately left to Guise's discretion, who was to report on 
Chatelherault's activities so that Henri et al could better assess the situation and supply 
her with reinforcements ifnecessary.4 
Marie de Guise duly complied and sent two reports, prompting Henri and his 
ministers to meet once again to discuss the timing of the Queen Dowager's assumption 
of the regency.s By 30 November 1553, it appears that the decision to proceed had been 
made. Montmorency wrote to Guise that, 'je veoy Ie temps et l'occasion si apropoz 
18 August 1553, Balcarres Papers, II, Appendix A, pp. 302-6. 
2 Ibid, II, p.304. 'Les Guises' were in a position to push for their sister's advance because of the Duc de 
Guise's recent military victory in capturing the Three Bishoprics of Lorraine (Metz, Tou1 and Verdun) for 
the French King. 
3 Ibid, II, p.304. 
4 Ibid, II, pp. 304-5. 
531 October 1553, ibid, II, cxx, pp. 174-6. Marie de Guise's reports were dated the 15th and 25th of 
September 1553. 
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pour ceste heure de conduire a fin ce que nous avons tant actendu et desire'. 1 The 
decision to act had no doubt been prompted by Guise's suspicion that Cha.telherault was 
intriguing with, or at the instigation of the English to prevent her from assuming the 
reins of power.2 Voicing her suspicions to the French ambassador in England, Sr. de 
Noailles, Guise wrote that, ' ... les Commissaires que nostre Gouverneur a envoyez pour 
demester les affaires de nos frontieres s'accordent bien. Mais je trouve leur demeure 
trop longue, qui me faict avoir doubte de quelque praticque, ou je feray dilligence d'en 
scavoir la verite'.3 The Queen Dowager obviously shared her brother's belief that 
Chatelherault must be deposed as soon as possible. 
Just four days after Mary, Queen of Scots' eleventh birthday, therefore, Henri 
wrote to Chatelherault informing him that, 'madite fiUe est '" entree en aage pour Joye 
de ses droictz cy ce present moys december Que de mectre cy ses manis 
[administratioun] et gouuernement dudit Royaume'.4 Thanking him for 'les bons officer 
et bonnes les depportement dont vous auez cydevant use cy ce que a touche Ie bien 
honneur service et satisfaction de la Royne v[ot]re souueraine rna petite fiUe,' Henri 
hoped Chatelherault would be content with Mary's recommendation that he be 
'lieutenant general soubz ladit dame sa mere Regente', and with his own offers that 
130 November 1553, Balcarres Papers, II, cxxv, pp. 181-2. 
2 The British and European context of Marie de Guise's assumption of the regency, particularly in 
relation to Mary Tudor's accession and marriage to Philip of Spain, will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
3 AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 123r, 108, 139. 
4 12 December 1553, NLS, Adv.MSS, 33.1.9, f.1r. As we shall see in Chapter IV, the approval of Mary 
Tudor's marriage contract to Philip of Spain on 7 December 1553 also influenced the timing of Henri's 
declaration. 
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d' Oisel was to present on his behalf. 1 Unsurprisingly, Henri's offers were largely 
designed to appeal to Chatelherault's greed. 
On 19 February 1553/4, Chatelherault agreed to resign the regency in favour of 
Marie de Guise in April 1554.2 In a private contract with Guise, Chatelherault was 
promised all monies owing to the crown and a discharge of all goods intromitted since 
the death of James V. His position as second person in the realm was guaranteed in the 
event that Mary, Queen of Scots should die without issue, whereby it was promised that 
all the castles and forts in French possession would be returned and the Hamilton claim 
to the Scottish succession safeguarded. Chatelherault was also absolved from 'ony 
maner of cryme of quhatsumevir gretnis' during his regency and was to receive a formal 
declaration that he had faithfully performed his duty as Regent in Parliament. For his 
part, Chatelherault agreed that his resignation of the regency was 'of his awin free will' 
and that Edinburgh Castle would be immediately handed over to Lord Erskine for the 
use of Marie de Guise.3 
Securing Chatelherault's capitulation, however, had been a gruelling task for 
d'Oisel, who reported that it took two days to reach a settlement that even resembled 
'l'intention du Roy'. But, 'avecques l'ayde de Dieu, la conduitte de cette Princesse, 
joinct aussy que ledict Gouverneur a veu et congneu quasi tous les Seigneurs de ce 
Royaulme tant spirituels que tempore Is, accompaigner nostre & cy demeurer fermes et 
I NLS, Adv.MSS, 33.1.9, f.1r-v. 
2 ADCP, pp. 630-2. See also ibid, pp. 629-30, for the Three Estates' bond with Chiitelherault stipulating 
the terms of his resignation, registered at Edinburgh, 20 February 1553/4. 
3 On 5 March 1553/4, d'Oisel reported that Edinburgh Castle had been delivered as promised on 3 
February 1553/4. AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 273, 277 and XII, f.322. 
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constans, nous en avons finablement obtenu la victoire au grand regret dudict 
Gouverneur' . I The true extent of France's victory was realised on Thursday, 12 April 
1554 when Marie de Guise was formally invested in the office of Regent. 2 Following 
the ceremonial resignation of Chatelherault, the transfer of power was completed when 
d'Oisel placed the crown of Scotland on the Queen Dowager's head and handed her the 
sceptre and sword of state.3 
As in matters of diplomacy and military security, Henri's 'protectorate' of 
Scotland enabled him to control Scotland's government. His appointment of Marie de 
Guise to the regency effectively completed the process establishing French power in 
Scotland, which was to be consolidated by marriage of Mary Stewart to Franyois Valois 
four years later. It should not necessarily be presumed, however, that Marie de Guise 
always had aspirations of becoming regent. Had it not been for her past political 
experiences in Scotland and the Scots professed affection for her, there was a very real 
possibility that Marie de Guise would not have returned to Scotland at all in 1551. But 
the integral role she did play in securing French military and financial intervention and 
Scottish support for the proposed dynastic alliance, most notably through the effective 
distribution of patronage, had rendered her the best candidate to ensure that the interests 
of France would be served in Scotland. Marie de Guise's assumption of the regency, 
'au grand contentement de to us les Estatz', was crucial to the realisation of Guise 
121 February 1553/4, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 321-2, 333 and IX, f.258. 
2 Ibid, XII, f.379. See Balcarres Papers, II, cxxxvii, cxxxix, cxl, pp. 200-7, for letters of congratulation 
from Guise's mother, Antoinette de Bourbon, and her brothers, the Cardinal de Lorraine and Duc de 
Guise. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.379; Marshall, Mmy a/Guise, p.198. 
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dynastic ambition and, more importantly, Henri's vision of a Franco-British empire. I 
As one well-wisher remarked to Guise shortly after becoming regent, 'Je luy fais en ce 
lieu tres humble requeste de voulois tellement fortuner et accroistre vostre nouveau 
Gouvernement que je puisse bientost voir toute l'isle en vostre obeissance'.2 But as we 
shall see, Marie de Guise's administration would be continually affected (largely in a 
negative sense) by the international scene and, in particular, by events in England - no 
more so than during the reign of Mary I. 
I AB, Cor. Pol., Ang1eterre, XII, f.398. 
2 Noailles to Marie de Guise, 27 Apri11554, ibid, IX, f.321. 
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Mary Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial Threat: Anglo-Scottish Relations 
(1553-1556) 
Apart from the obvious dynastic considerations, Marie de Guise's regency in Scotland is 
characterised by her overwhelming concern for law and order. The debilitating effects 
of seven years of 'rough wooing' had resulted in dearth, prolific violence and a general 
state of lawlessness and disorder. After the cessation of hostilities with England, and 
even before it had been determined that Marie de Guise would remain in Scotland to 
supplant Chatelherault as regent, the Scottish political elite looked to the Queen 
Dowager ' for [the] executioun of justice and ordouring of the cuntre'. 1 It is of great 
significance and testament to the perceived ineffectualness of Chatelherault's governing 
abilities that Guise was entrusted with such a formidable and important task. Having a 
vested interest in strengthening royal authority and advancing the interests of the crown 
at the expense of local jurisdictions, Marie de Guise naturally accepted this commission 
with relish. Almost immediately following her return from France, Guise worked 
laboriously to 'put the realme to ane quyatenes' - at no time more vigorously than 
during her tenure as Queen Regent.2 The Highlands and, in particular, the Borders 
demanded most of Guise's attention in this respect, but a concerted effort was made to 
pursue royal justice and impose law and order ,throughout all of Scotland. Guise's 
I RPC, I, p.90. 
2 An apt phrase describing Marie de Guise's objec~ive taken from 'Notes of Advice for Punishment of 
Crime' in Scottish Correspondence, cc1iii, p.379. 
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efforts to combat the dual problems of dearth and disorder, however, were severely 
undermined by international events, and it is impossible to treat them in isolation. 
The accession of Mary Tudor in 1553 and her subsequent marriage to Philip of 
Spain (later Philip II) in 1554, inaugurated a period of renewed tension and intense 
suspicion between the 'auld enemies'. Through the forging of dynastic alliances, 
England and Scotland had become inextricably, although not necessarily directly 
involved in the Habsburg-Valois conflict, which now met tete a tete on the Anglo-
Scottish Border. The struggle for power on the Continent had, consequently, evolved 
into a quest for supremacy in the British Isles. But, on a more immediate level, fears of 
an Anglo-Imperial invasion of 'Valois' Scotland dictated that matters of defence 
become a top priority - particularly on the Borders. It is for this reason that, throughout 
Mary Tudor's reign, matters of national security assumed great significance and were a 
primary and predominant concern for Marie de Guise. Set within the wider context of 
European dynastic politics, therefore, this chapter will examine the effects of 
dynasticism on Scotland's relations with England and consider the events that led up to 
England's formal declaration of war against France on 7 June 1557. 
*** 
The overthrow of Lady Jane Grey as Queen of England by Mary Tudor in July 1553 
was a political, dynastic and imperial disaster for Henri II. As the cousin of Charles V, 
Mary Tudor's natural affinity to the Habsburgs made the prospect of an Anglo-Imperial 
alliance a very real possibility. In such a situation, the best Henri could hope for was 
that England remain neutral in the Habsburg-Valois conflict. But when rumours began 
to circulate that a marriage with Philip of Spain was on the cards for the English Queen, 
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Henri's hopes quickly diminished. An Anglo-Imperial dynastic alliance had far more 
serious repercussions for France and Scotland - namely, complete encirclement by the 
enemy. As his French Ambassador resident in England, Antoine de Noailles, foresaw, 
this scenario spelled disaster, for Henri would most certainly be engaged in a perpetual 
war with both his traditional and current enemy at the same time. 1 But the potential 
military force that an Anglo-Imperial alliance could muster was not the only way in 
which Mary Tudor's accession and marriage to Philip threatened France. From a 
dynastic point of view, it also prevented the immediate realisation of Henri's vision of a 
Franco-British Empire - which could have happened if Queen Jane had reigned supreme 
and not been superseded. 
The imperial opportunities that the Franco-Scottish alliance afforded Henri were 
the cause of great concern at the Imperial Court, at no time more so than on the eve of 
Edward VI's death and during the short reign of Queen Jane. When, in the spring of 
1553, it was clear that he was not going to survive his recent bout of pulmonary 
tuberculosis, Edward made it clear that he did not want his Catholic half- sister, Mary, 
to succeed him. As this directly contravened the terms of Henry VIII's 'Third Act of 
Succession', Edward decided to follow in his father's footsteps and prescribe the order 
of the succession in his last will and testament. The result was his 'deuice for the 
succession'.2 By-passing the Tudor line in favour of the Suffolks, the descendants of 
1 On 6/7 September 1553, Noailles wrote to Henri that, 'la chose me semble estre d'une extresme 
importance, estimant que ce soit pour vous et les vostres une perpetuelle guerre estans tous vos anciens et 
presens ennemis joincts ensemble pour estre aprez si fortz'. AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 61r-2"; 
L'Abbe de Vertot, Ambassades de MM de Noailles en Angleterre (Leiden, 1763), II, pp. 144-5. 
2 Inner Temple, Petyt MSS, 538/47, fos. 317r.v; lG. Nichols (ed.), The chronicle a/Queen Jane and two 
years a/Queen Mmy (Camden Society, 48, 1850), pp. 89-90. I am extremely grateful to Alan Bryson for 
his help and advice on the 'Device' and the reign of Edward VI as a whole. 
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Henry VIII's younger sister, Mary, Edward stipulated that the succession would pass to 
'the Lady Fraunceses heires masles, if she haue any such issu befor my death', and then 
to 'the Lady Jane'.1 Because Frances, duchess of Suffolk had no male heirs, her eldest 
daughter, Lady Jane Grey, officially became Edward's successor. No mention was 
made to either Mary or Elizabeth and, on 21 June, letters patent were issued confirming 
their illegitimate status. 2 
News of the 'Device' sparked alarm in the Imperial camp. It was feared that 'if 
the Princess [Mary] and Elizabeth are exchided, the King of France may claim a right to 
the Crown through Scotland' on the grounds that Mary Stewart was a descendant of 
Henry VIII's elder sister, Margaret.3 If the terms of the 'Device' were upheld and Lady 
Jane Grey did succeed Edward as Queen of England, the way was then clear for Henri to 
advance the superior claims of Mary Stewart to the English throne by right of descent. 
In 1553, therefore, the realisation of Henri's imperial objectives depended on the 
success of Lady Jane Grey over Mary Tudor. 
Following the death of Edward VI on 6 July 1553, the Imperial Court was 
inundated with reports detailing the intrigues of France against Mary Tudor in support 
of Lady Jane. Charles V was repeatedly warned that the French 'were carrying on 
intrigues for the purpose of stirring up trouble in England and discord between that 
kingdom and your Majesty', their object being 'to gain a foothold in England for their 
I Inner Temple, Petyt MSS, 538/47, f.317 r • 
2 CSP Spain, XI, p.82; Guy, Tudor England, p.226. 
3 CSP Spain, XI, pp. 54-5, 98. See also ibid, XI, pp. 90, 96-7, 99, 101-2, 104, 115-17, 157, 188,301-2 
for additional reports on the intrigues of France concerning the succession and the advancement of Mary 
Stewart's claim. 
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own ends and to the advantage of the Queen of Scotland and that of her affianced 
spouse, the Dauphin of France'.! Northumberland's delay in proclaiming Lady Jane as 
Queen of England, however, would prove disastrous to Henri and any hopes he had for 
a Franco-British empire at this time.2 Why Northumberland waited three days before 
making his announcement is uncertain. Irrespective of whether it was because he was 
unprepared or simply inept, the fact remained that these three days enabled Mary Tudor 
to rally enough popular and military support to overthrow Queen Jane, bring an abrupt 
end to her nine day reign and quash Henri's imperial ambitions in the process.3 
Needless to say, Mary's accession was viewed ominously by the French. 
Protocol, however, dictated that publicly a more favourable reception be given to 
England's new Queen. Both Hemi and Marie de Guise sent letters of commendation, 
congratulating Mary on her accession and reciprocating her professions of friendship, 
'good will and disposition to peace,.4 But beneath this veneer of amity, lay a deep 
rooted suspicion that emanated from the dynastic alliances forged by both Queens on 
the Continent. The perceived threat that Mary Stewart's betrothal to Franyois Valois 
posed to England's national security, for example, was used by Imperial propagandists 
to foster support in England for a Spanish marriage.s For the French, Mary Tudor's 
I CSP ~pain, XI, p.85. 
2 Northumberland had also failed to secure Parliamentary support for the 'Device', the legitimacy of 
which was dubious anyway because it was uncertain as to whether a minor could make a will let alone 
determine the succession, and because it was a privilege granted only to Henry VIn in the first 'Act of 
Succession'. 1534: 25 Henry VIII, c.22, Statutes of the Realm, III, pp. 471-4; Loades, Mmy Tudor, pp. 
15-6. 
3 Lady Jane Grey was executed on 12 February 1553/4. 
4 CSP Scot., I, 398, p.192; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558; 12,66, pp. 6,23-4. 
5 See, for example, CSP Spain, XI, pp. 334-5, 340-1, 409-11. Interestingly, the Franco-Scottish dynastic 
alliance was also used by those opposed to the Spanish marriage to demonstrate the inherent dangers of a 
queen regnant marrying a foreigner. Grounds for opposition also lay in the possible reaction of France to 
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determination to wed Philip of Spain was viewed as an inevitable precursor to war. As 
such, French fears that Scotland would be the obvious target of an Anglo-Imperial 
invasion prompted Henri to take defensive measures there. 
By 7 December 1553, the terms of the marriage treaty between Mary and Philip 
had been approved by the English Council and the council of state for the Low 
Countries.! While Henri 'expressed his pleasure that her Majesty desired a continuance 
of the amity', his fears that Mary Tudor's marriage would bring Spanish troops to 
England for the sole purpose of invading Scotland prompted him to take steps to ensure 
that Scotland was in a state ofreadiness.2 D'Oisel, who had been serving in the French 
campaigns on the Continent,3 was immediately despatched back to Scotland on a 
renewed commission to serve as Henri's Lieutenant-Genera1.4 The purpose of his return 
was the source of much speculation among foreign observers, and the rumours that were 
simultaneously leaked out of the French Court that the Vidame de Chartres was also 
being sent with a number of French troops to occupy Scotland's strongholds, heightened 
suspicions that France was preparing for war against England.s Although there was 
the Spanish marriage. Stephen Gardiner, bishop of Winchester, for instance, feared that the French 
would intrigue with England's Protestant community, possibly with a view of supplanting Mary with 
Elizabeth, or in the worst possible scenario, incite them to declare war. CSP Spain, XI, pp. 332-7. 
I Ibid, XI, pp. 397-8; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 193, p.77; Loades, Mmy Tudor, p.73. The council of 
state for the Low Countries actually approved the draft treaty on 27 November 1553, two days after it 
was submitted. For discussions on the marriage negotiations and the Spanish marriage in general, see 
ibid, pp. 57-95, and M.l Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II and 
Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 79-85. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1553-1558,66,131, 144(i), pp. 23-4,46-7,55. 
3 D'Oisel returned to France in February 155112. APS, II, p,489; CSP Scot., I, 389, p.189; CSP Spain, 
XI, pp. 160, 173; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 60-2r. 
4 CSP Scot., I, 402, 403, p.194; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 115, p,43; AE, Cor. Pol., Angletene, IX, 
f.112r. 
5 CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 115, 131, 170, pp. 43, 46-7, 55,58,66-7; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, 
f.139r. 
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nothing behind these rumours, except the hope they would deter Mary Tudor from 
actively joining the Habsburg-Valois conflict on the side of the Imperialists, one aspect 
of d'Oisel's commiSSion did concern the militarisation of Scotland. He was to 
coordinate the mobilisation of troops and to ensure that Scotland, and in particular 
Edinburgh, were in a state of readiness to implement the King's will if necessary. In 
this, d'Oisel worked closely with Marie de Guise, who went to Edinburgh in March 
1553/4, 'pour faire pourvoir et munir Ie Chasteau de toutes choses necessaires', and to 
make provisions for a reduction of French troops on the Border, 'pour estre prestz a 
semployer en ce que Ie Roy commandera'. 1 Despite their efforts, the army was only 
partially ready when Henri's orders 'pour aller veoir leve lennemye' came on 17 May 
1553.2 
As Lieutenant-General of Scotland, d'Oisel's fundamental concern was with 
Scotland's military security, but this was not the only reason for his return. He was also 
to initiate proceedings for the formal transfer of power from Chatelherault to Marie de 
Guise, perhaps Henri's most significant response to Mary Tudor's dynastic policy. As 
we have already seen, the decision to begin proceedings for Guise's assumption of the 
regency was made by 30 November 1553, by which time a draft of the marriage treaty 
between Mary and Philip had been submitted for approval to the respective councils of 
England and the Low Countries.3 Although the Spanish marriage was never cited 
specifically as the reason, the timing of this decision cannot be regarded as mere 
18 March 1553/4, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.150 r • 
2 16 June 1554, ibid, IX, f.208. 
3 Balcarres Papers, II, CXXV, pp. 181-2. 
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coincidence.! This view is further substantiated by Henri's declaration of 12 December 
1553. Just five days after the English Council approved the terms of the marriage 
treaty, the French King declared that Mary, Queen of Scots had 'entree en aage pour 
Joye de ses droictz cy ce present moys decembre Que de mectre cy ses manis 
[administratioun] et gouuernement'. 2 In addition to giving Chatelherault official notice 
that his tenure as regent was over, d'Oisel was also commissioned to negotiate the terms 
of the Governor's resignation on behalf of the French King. Given this chain of events, 
Marie de Guise's assumption of the regency cannot be viewed purely from a Scottish 
perspective. By taking the wider context of British and European dynastic politics into 
consideration, it becomes clear that her own accession was a direct response to that of 
Mary Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial dynastic alliance. 
Other events arising in England also contributed to the sense of urgency 
surrounding Marie de Guise's assumption of the regency. In October 1553, it was 
reported that the Earl of Lennox was intriguing to secure the government of Scotland for 
himsele This was particularly worrying for two reasons: firstly, Lennox's strong 
claim to the Scottish succession and, secondly, the privileged position his wife enjoyed 
at the English court as Mary Tudor's best friend and ideal successor to the English 
throne.4 Lennox intended to exploit his wife's Scottish connections in order to achieve 
his political objective. Noailles informed Guise that Lady Margaret Douglas was to 
I Balcarres Papers, II, Appendix A, pp. 302-6; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 150-1 and XII, fos. 
192,221,252-4. 
212 December 1553, NLS, Adv.MSS, 33.1.9, f.lr. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 88-9r and IX, f.83. 
4 CSP Spain, XI, pp. 393-5. 
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travel north and make overtures to her father on behalf of her husband, with the hope 
that the Earl of Angus would then procure support amongst his friends in Scotland for 
Lennox 'avoir Ie maniement & gouvernement de vostre Royaulme'.! Yet, despite all 
indications to the contrary, Noailles was certain that Mary I was above suspicion - for 
although it was widely recognised that the Countess of Lennox was the Queen's 
principal favourite, such favour did not naturally extend to her husband. Moreover, by 
supporting an enterprise that would inevitably be regarded as an overture of war, Mary 
would be endangering her plans to re-establish Catholicism in England, 'a quoy Elle & 
son Chancellier [Stephen Gardiner] courent de telle affection qu'il semble qu'ilz voynt 
assez obseur en toutes autres choses'.2 
Noailles, however, seems to have been naIve in his assumptions. A report to 
Charles V clearly reveals that Lennox was not only acting with the knowledge, but also 
on the advice of Mary Tudor and her Council. 3 What is even more striking is the 
revelation that Marie de Guise provided the English with such an opportunity in the first 
place. In her quest to weaken Chatelherault's power base prior to her assumption of the 
regency, Guise had apparently written to Lennox offering to restore his lands in 
Scotland 'and show him treatment befitting his rank', in return for his political support 
against Chatelherault. Guise's letter came to the attention of the English Queen and was 
quickly acted upon. It was decided that, because of his particularly strong claim to the 
Scottish succession, Lennox should: 
1 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.88 Y• 
2 Ibid, XII, f.88Y • 
3 CSP Spain, XII, pp. 204-5. 
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. " draw near to the Scottish border and reply that, if they will treat him 
better there than in the past, he will very willingly return to his country 
on account of his natural affection for it and because he does not find 
himself welcome in England. This he will say in order to have a grievance, 
and if he is encouraged he will cross over to Scotland and secretly enter 
into communication with the Regent [Chatelherault] against the Dowager, 
with a view not only to driving her from the country, but to making himself 
King if possible and throwing Scottish affairs into confusion. Ifhe is able 
to do this, the Queen will help him with money to the best of her ability.! 
In this, it was hoped that money would be forthcoming from Spain so that Mary 'would 
be able to follow up the said intrigue, and would make ready to aid your Majesty 
[Charles V] and his Highness [Philip] against the French'. 2 
The proposed intrigues of Lennox in Scotland may offer some explanation as to 
why Henri, the Cardinal de Lorraine and the Duc de Guise were overly anxious to 
depose Chatelherault and declare Mary, Queen of Scots of age in her eleventh year. 
Chatelherault's 'mauvaise volunte' towards Marie de Guise was no secret at the French 
court. 3 His declaration that, 'while he lived there should be no other Regent in Scotland 
than he', fuelled French fears that he would fortify himself with friends and come to an 
understanding with the English and/or the Imperialists in order to retain his position in 
Scotland.4 Marie de Guise's own suspicions that Chatelherault was intriguing with the 
English in September 1553 was the deciding factor in the decision to proclaim Mary, 
Queen of Scots' of age and immediately begin the proceedings to remove Chatelherault 
from office. It is uncertain, however, whether Chatelherault's suspected intrigues 
involved Lennox. Although the nature of the Hamilton-Stewart rivalry would render 
I CSP Spain, XII, p.204. 
2 Ibid, XII, pp. 204-5. 
3 Balcarres Papers, II, p.304. 
4 CSP Spain, X, p.586; Balcarres Papers, II, p.304; AE, Cal'. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 108, 123r, 139. 
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such a prospect highly unlikely, Chatelherault's over-riding personal ambition would 
not have made an alliance with even his arch-enemy impossible if it provided him with 
the opportunity to retain his power and position in Scotland. As for the Countess of 
Lennox, she never made the journey north. After Marie de Guise successfully assumed 
the regency in April 1554, Mary Tudor 'conveniently' found the Countess' presence at 
Court indispensable.! Lennox, however, was undeterred in his quest to become 'master' 
of Scotland. Throughout 1554 and 1555, reports continued to flow out of England 
detailing the movements of Lennox and that of his brother, Robert Stewart, bishop of 
Caithness.2 
From a French perspective, these intrigues served only to highlight how 
important Marie de Guise's control ofthe government was, not only for the security and 
welfare of Scotland, but also for the success of the French cause in general. As d' Oisel 
commented to Noailles on 8 March 1553/4: 
Je demeure tousjours en rna premiere opinion, que plustost vauldroit il 
mieulxjouer ajeu descouvert, si aultrement ne s'y pouvoir remedier, 
que de souffrir ny veoir ung si grand mal advenir au bien des affaires de 
sa Majeste. Car il n'y a doubte que s'estans impatronisee l'angleterre, 
ilz seroient Ie semblable de irlande et par ce moyen, demeureroit ce 
pauvre Royaulme assiege de toutes partz des ennmys de sa Mageste.3 
In what was fast becoming a game of strike and counter-strike, it is fitting that, just 
weeks after Marie de Guise became Queen Regent, the marriage treaty between Mary 
Tudor and Philip of Spain was formally ratified by the English Parliament on 28 April 
1554.4 This, together with Philip's arrival in England the following June, prompted 
I Noailles to Marie de Guise, 24 December 1554, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.lOSV. 
2 See, for example, ibid, XII, f.206 r and IX, fos. IS4, 239v, 33SV-sr • 
3 Ibid, IX, f.150. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 193, p.77. 
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Henri, Guise and d'Oisel in tum, to implement more tangible defensive measures in 
Scotland. 
Accompanied by a naval entourage of 100 vessels, Philip of Spain set foot on 
English soil on 11 June 1554.1 His arrival inaugurated a period of renewed suspicion 
and mounting tensions on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border. The size of Philip's 
convoy, for example, was not simply a matter of prestige, but a precautionary measure 
taken in response to Noailles' threats that Philip could expect to be attacked by the 
French whilst crossing the Channe1.2 But unbeknownst to Philip, Henri had no intention 
of backing his ambassador's plans. These empty threats served only to augment the 
number of Spanish troops that Philip brought with him to England and exacerbate an 
already tense situation. Now that the Habsburg-Valois powers had come tete a tete on 
the Anglo-Scottish border, the major preoccupation for both sides was the fear of 
mvaslOn. 
In August 1554, this was a predominant worry for d'Oisel. All indications 
suggested that Philip was preparing to launch an attack, and Scotland was ill-prepared to 
withstand an invasion, let alone be in a position to provide Henri with 'good service' 
should he require it,3 D'Oise1 attributed this to the lack of justice and inadequate 
defence on the Border, which provided Philip with not only the opportunity, but also a 
virtually free passage into Scotland: 
Je ne veoy nos dicte affairers si bien dressez pour Ie bien du seruice du 
Roy comme je desirerois de l'ayde duquel nous nauons peu de besoing 
I CSP Spain, XII, p.283; Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, pp. 84-5; Loades, Mmy 
Tudor, p.94. 
2 CSP Spain, XII, pp. 143,204,248. 
3 D'Oisel to Noailles, 22 August 1554, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.253 r • 
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vouldra s'asseurer de ce Royaulme a ladvenir comme semble estre temps 
d'y Commancer, tant pour y establir la justice qui y a este par cy deuant 
peu honoree et obseruee comme pour nous fortisfier en notre frontieres 
pour arrester Ie passaige a nos voisins qui leur est tous ouuert. 1 
Noailles, however, turned a deaf ear to d'Oisel's concerns and was eager for Scotland to 
enter the Habsburg-Valois conflict o fficially.2 The Lieutenant-General strongly 
disagreed, thinking that Scotland's formal participation would make little difference in 
the war effort; Scotland could offer Henri little more than those Scots who were already 
serving in France. Rather, French troops were desperately needed in Scotland to fortify 
and reduce the Border in fear and good obedience.3 Fortunately for d'Oise1, the French 
King had not felt it necessary for the Scots to declare war on Charles V just yet. 
*** 
The Habsburg-Valois conflict had re-erupted on 15 January 1551/2. Having 
successfully secured an alliance with the German Lutheran Princes of the Holy Roman 
Empire, Henri felt he was in a position to declare war against Charles V.4 Not unlike his 
alliance with the Scots, Henri's treaty with Charles' disgruntled Protestant subjects 
established a protectoral relationship. The French King was granted the right to possess, 
govern and protect the Imperial towns of Cambrai, Toul, Metz and Verdun as the 
1 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.253 r • 
2 Ibid, IX, fos. 342-3r• 
3 Ibid, IX, f.343 r • 
4 Baumgartner, He1l1Y II, pp. 146-57; Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, pp. 41-72; 
Jean-Daniel Pariset, Relations entre la France et I 'Allemagne au milieu du sezieme siecle (Strasbourg, 
1983), pp. 84-114 and 'France et les princes allemands', Francia, 10 (1980), pp. 259-81; Cloulas, Les 
Guise, pp. 25-8; R.J. Knecht, French Renaissance Monarchy: Francis I and He1l1Y II (London, 1984), 
pp. 44-5. See also Balcarres Papers, II, lxxxi, lxxxiv, lxxxv, xc, xci, xciii, xciv, xcvii, xcviii, cxvii, 
cxxxix, c1iv-vi, c1xxvii, pp. 111-3, 115-6, 116-8, 122-4, 124-5, 126-8, 128-9, 131-3, 133-6, 168-70,203-
5, 229-35, 267, for the continuous stream of reports keeping Guise up to date on the progress of the war 
on the Continent. 
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defender of Gennan liberties, in return for financial assistance.! Henri's declaration of 
war, however, had potentially serious implications for Scotland and the Scoto-Imperial 
peace that had been contracted at Binche just weeks before. France's comprehension in 
this treaty placed the Scots in a very precarious position - did this mean that they, too, 
were now at war with Charles? Henri clearly thought so, and wrote to the Three Estates 
shortly after the outbreak of war asking them 'to dec1air thame selffis and tak his part 
according to the tennour of the auld treatys'. 2 The Scots, having just endured seven long 
years of hostile relations with England, were in no position to enter into another conflict 
and hoped to persuade Henri of this by demonstrating 'quhat incommodite may cum to 
this realm, gif the peax with Emperour beis brokin; quhat hanne may be done thairthrou 
to the said Emperour, his enemy; and quhat chargeis his Maj estie salbe constranit to 
entere in to on this side in caise the Emperour put ony greit force to thir seyis'. 3 Yet, 
despite their reluctance, the Scottish political elite still recognised Henri's authority and 
control over their foreign affairs as the 'protector' of Scotland: 
... bot gif alwayis his Majestie persistis and abidis at that poynt, that he 
will haif decaratioun of weir maid to the Emperour in naim and behalf of 
this realme, in that cais thair salbe send to the Emperour ane sufficient 
personaig to gif up the samyn peax, and dec1air unto him that this realme 
can nocht remane at freyndschip with him, he standand at inmymite with 
the said maist Cristin King of France, maist anciant and maist speciale 
freynd unto the Quenis Grace our Soverane Lady, and this hir realme.4 
I Baumgartner, Henry II, pp. 147-8. 
2 RPC, I, p.120. See also Balcarres Papers, II, lxxvi, pp. 105-6, for Montmorency's letter to Marie de 
Guise on 31 December 1551 in which he states: 'vous priant, Madame, donne ordre suivant ce qui vous a 
este demmierement escript que voz subjectz et vaisseaulx se mectent en mer pour courir sus et 
endommaigner ceulx de l'empereur, qui sont et doynent estre vos enemys aussi bien que les nostres'. 
3 RPC, I, p.120. 
4 Ibid, I, p.120. 
140 
Chapter IV: Mmy Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial Threat. 
The extent to which Henri's protectorate of Scotland was not an exercise in absolute 
power is demonstrated by the fact that he took into consideration the feelings of the 
Scottish political community and acceded to their request. In June 1552, Marie de 
Guise was informed that, 'la Roy na este dopinion que pour ceste heure la guerre fust 
declaree entre les Escossois et lempereur, affin que vous puissiez vivre plus a votre 
aise'.1 This is not to say that Scotland was not expected contribute in some way to the 
war effort. 
In November 1552, the Privy Council issued a stent for 'ane certane number of 
fitmen be resit and upliftit of this realme, to be send in France for the support of the 
maist Christinet Kyng'.z For every 40 merks of land (including crown, temporal and 
church lands), one footman was to be raised and 'weill furnischit, cled in new hoise, and 
ane new doublett of canves at the lest, with a jack of plett, steilbonet, splent slevis, of 
mailyie of plait, withe ane speir of six elne lang'.3 Similarly, the burghs were to provide 
300 hundred hackbutters adequately furnished with 'powldir flask, morsing hornis, and 
all uthair geir belanging thairto', 400 horsemen were to be raised from the Borders and 
the Lowlands, and two ensigns of footmen were to be raised from Huntly's lieutenantry 
in the Highlands.4 So eager were some Scots to support Henri's military campaign, that 
a number of those who attended a Convention at Edinburgh on 12 December 1552, 
volunteered out of their own 'fre will and benevolence' to raise even more horsemen -
I Wan'ender Papers, xxix, p.22; Balcarres Papers, II, lxxxviii, pp. 120-1. 
2 RPC, I, pp. 129-31. 
3 Ibid, I, pp. 129-30. 
4 The Privy Council re-issued this order on 6 December 1552. Commissioners were also appointed to 
oversee the 'rolling' of all the Scottish troops who were being sent to France. Ibid, I, pp. 131, 132, 134, 
136-7. 
141 
Chapter IV: Mmy Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial Threat. 
albeit at the King's expense. For those who did not attend the Convention, they too 
were given the opportunity to show their 'benevolence' to the French cause. They were 
'taxt be the remanent to fumis horsmen like as utheris thair nychbouris hes done'. 1 
Cassillis was appointed to command the Scottish army on the Continent as Lieutenant-
General, while Patrick, lord Ruthven was made 'Coronet of the futmen'.2 
Scotland's contribution to Henri's military campaign, therefore, was 
considerable. Approximately 3,000 Scottish soldiers were sent to the Continent to 
participate in the Habsburg-Valois conflict. 3 When Philip of Spain arrived in England, 
however, circumstances and priorities changed. Rumours that Spanish troops were 
being sent to Berwick precipitated Henri's decision to redeploy men back into Scotland 
in order to replenish d'Oisel's French companies and to reinforce the ScotS.4 By the end 
of February 1554/5, six bands of 'Scottishe footemen ". with a force also of dyvers 
other Frenchemen, bothe fotemen and horssemen', numbering about 3,000-4,000, 
arrived in Scotland.s 
For d'Oisel, the arrival of reinforcements could not have come soon enough. 
His commission to place Scotland in a state of readiness had been seriously undermined 
I RPC, I, pp. 134-5. 
2 Ibid, I, p.135. See also ibid, I, pp. 135-6 for a list of 55 other notables who went to serve in France, 
including Cassillis' brother, Archibald, Sir Hew Kennedy of Girvanmains, Ruthven's brother, James, and 
the Laird of Kinnaird, who were exempted from any legal proceedings against them during their absence. 
3 See also BL, Harley MSS, 353.41, fos. 125-6; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.61; Balcarres Papers, II, 
cxvi, pp. 164-8, CSP Spain, XI, pp. 2-3, 5, 13, for additional references to Scots serving in the French 
campaigns. 
4 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 302, 316-8, 320, 329, 332-5, 373; PRO, SP1517133; CSP Foreign, 
1553-1558,307, 307i, 316, 356, 356i, pp. 146-7, 151-2, 166; APC, V, pp. 91, 94, 95, 98; CSP Venice, 
IV, p.l2. 
S APC, V, pp. 94, 95; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 325v_6 r, 373 r• 
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by the number of men (French and Scottish) committed to the war effort on the 
Continent. Equally detrimental was the lack of resources needed to maintain the French 
soldiers serving in Scotland and the irregularity with which these payments came from 
France, if they came at all. The non-arrival of the banker, Timothy Cagnioli, with the 
'frainchemans money', for example, left d'Oisel with no choice but to borrow the 
necessary sums within Scotland.! This was something he complained bitterly about to 
Noailles: 'j'ay lesse et ennuye toutes les bourses de mes amys a trouuer finances, tant 
pour I' entretenement denoz gens de guerre que pour toutes autres choses necessayres'. 2 
Fortunately, d'Oisel found many 'friends' in Edinburgh and 'nuchtbouris of this toun', 
from whom he borrowed £1,000 'for sik effaris as thai haif ado'.3 But no greater friend 
had he than Marie de Guise who, once again, was forced to shoulder much of the 
financial burden involved in the establishment of French (military) power in Scotland 
while waiting for funds to arrive from France. Although she committed her personal 
resources to this purpose, such as agreeing to pay the unpaid balance of d'Oisel's loan, 
she was also now in a position to allocate funds from the public purse as Regent.4 The 
French captain, Galliard, for example, received regular payments of £75 from the Lord 
High Treasurer 'for [the] supporting of certane horsmen Franchmen in Annand's and, on 
I SRO, SP13/76/61. 
2 AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.357 r . 
3 Edinburgh Burgh Recs., pp. 206-7, 214-5, 215-6. As Michael Lynch discusses, Edinburgh's merchants 
acted as moneylenders to the crown. This soon became a source of tension within the burgh, as these 
voluntary loans soon became forced exactions under the threat of imprisonment. Lynch, Edinburgh and 
the Reformation, pp. 71-2. 
4 Guise, for instance, granted two other obligations on 16 and 17 May 1555. Edinburgh Burgh Recs., pp. 
215,226. 
5 TA,X,pp. 241,263,265,268,270,272,275,277,281,284,287. 
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two occasions in August and October 1555, a dearth of provisions necessitated that the 
Government cover the costs of feeding the French troops and supplying them with 
bread. I The Queen Regent also relied on the private sector to victual the French troops 
serving in Scotland. Throughout 1555, numerous proclamations were issued to the 
inhabitants of Lasswade, Musselburgh, Fisherrow, Preston, Inveresk, Dalkeith, 
Newbattle, Jedburgh and Dunbar, ordering them 'to cause provisioun be maid for thair 
[the Frenchmen] vivers ... and to provide thair lugeingis,.2 Collectively, however, the 
Scots' greatest contribution went towards Marie de Guise's fort-building and 
modernising policy. 
As with the redeployment of troops back to Scotland, the urgency surrounding 
the construction and fortification of Scotland's strongholds came in response to Philip 
of Spain's perceived indisposition to peace in late 1554 and early 1555.3 In February 
1554/5, Noailles wrote urgently to Marie de Guise and Henri warning them of 
Scotland's 'impending subservience' at the hands of the Imperialists, if, as the French 
ambassador suspected, they attacked France and its outposts next season [the summer of 
1555V In such an eventuality, the French King's protection of Scotland could not be 
guaranteed as he would more than likely be preoccupied on the Continent. 5 It was thus 
imperative that Guise fortify Scotland's strongholds and prepare for war while she still 
had the time. Edinburgh Castle, 'Ie coeur & Ie meilleur endroict dud[ict] Royaulme', 
I TA, X, pp. 287,295. 
2 Ibid, X, pp. 281, 291, 297. 
3 AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 302, 316-8, 320, 332-5, 347" 370 and XII, fos. 336-7. 
4 Ibid, IX, f. 370 and XII, fos. 336-7. 
5 Ibid, IX, f.370v• 
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Leith and Dunbar Castle, reportedly in a bad state of repair, were all considered by 
Noailles to be integral to Scotland's defence.! More importantly, these places were 
ideal locations from which Henri could launch an attack or declare war against England 
if the need arose.2 
The English were only too well aware of the advantageous position Henri 
enjoyed within the archipelago as result of the establishment of French military power 
in Scotland. The English, Noailles wrote: 
'" congoissent que1que grand advantage soit du couste d'Escosse ou de 
France pour se declairer a la Guerre, Ils ne faudront point de Ie prendre, 
mais aussi Je ne fais doubte que silz voyent que les villes de vostre 
Royaulme qui sont a leur teste & voisines de Calais, soient en bon estat 
comme Bouloigne, Ardres, Montreuith & DorIan, Ils se pourront 
facilement refroidir ayant este aussi Sire pourveu aux affaires d'Escosse, 
comme il vous a pleu tres bien & prudemment considerer, d'y avoir envoye 
les souldatz, qui sont comme il s'entend icy desja arrivez & qui ont este 
cause de mettre ceulx cy en quelque soubcon & jalousie.3 
Marie de Guise did not need to be told of the importance of fortifying her strongholds 
and securing Scotland's frontiers at this particular time. Her brother, Franyois, had 
proffered similar advice even before Philip arrived in England: 
... j e scaiche que estes dame pour govemer Ie royaume et disposer de 
toutes choses non seullement en paix mais en guerre et y pourveoir ainsi 
qu'avez bien et saigement faict par Ie passe, suyvant ce qu'il vous a pleu 
me commander, que Ie temps qui est douz et paisable requiert que vostre 
frontieresoyt plus forte qU'elle n'a este jusques icy, de sorte que vos 
voysins ne puissent vous venir veoir si a leur ayse et qu'il y ayt quell que 
place qui les arreste.4 
1 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.337r. 
2 Ibid, XII, f.336V • See also, ibid, IX, fos. 370, 377-8r, 398-9 and XII, fos. 306-7; Teulet, Papiers, I, 
p.721; PRO, SP1517135. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 336v_7r. 
427 May 1554, Balcarres Papers, II, el, pp. 220-2. 
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Having secured some money in January 1554/5 for this purpose, Marie de Guise set 
about repamng, fortifying and victualling Scotland's existing strongholds and 
constructing new ones on the Border - the most notable of which was planned at Kelso. l 
By March 1554/5, however, the Kelso enterprise had suffered a serious setback and 
seemed doomed to failure. The non-arrival of engineers from France threatened to ruin 
it even before it began and prevented essential repairs from being carried out at Dunbar 
and Leith. Progress was further hindered by the short supply of workmen, which 
d'Oisel contended had been promised but as yet had not arrived. 2 
The greatest problem was, and would continue to be, a lack of money to finance 
the works. D'Oisel was left with the difficult task of trying to explain to his colleagues 
why significant advances had not been made to place Scotland in a state of surety and 
good defence. In his letters to Noailles and the Duc de Guise, d'Oisel stressed that 
while both he and Marie de Guise knew what needed to be done, it was more a question 
of means than will: 
... louant la Royne, '" tres grandement vostre conseil de ne laisser perdre 
une seule heure de temps a bien fortiffier ses places et les munir de vivres, 
me commandant vous dire, sur ce propos, que selon la puissance et les 
moyens qU'elle en pourra avoir, elle y fera de toute le'extreme diligence 
que faire ce pourra avoir. ... Ce que je solliciteray soigneusement et aultant 
que je congnois en estre besoing; mays nous avons souvent l'argent en ce 
pals plus a loysir et avec plus de difficulte que on ne pense et que l'occasion 
d'un tel service, qui est l'advancement des places, ne Ie requiere. Ce qui 
procedde eniterement des moiens qui n'y sont pas et non de faulte de 
bonne volunte en cest endroict,3 
1 RPC, XIV, p.13; Edinburgh Burgh Recs., II, pp. 214-5; Aberdeen Council Register, pp. 209-10, 215-6, 
298,299; PRO, SP1517135; CSP Spain, XIII, p.145; Teu1et, Papiers, I, p.721; AE, Cor. Pol., Ang1eterre, 
IX, fos. 377-8r, 398-9. 
2 Teu1et, Papiers, I, p.721. 
3· .' IbId, I, p.721, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 398-9. 
146 
Chapter IV: Mmy Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial Threat. 
In the meantime, the Queen Regent laboured tirelessly to fortify her daughter's kingdom 
with what resources she could muster. In March 1555, for instance, Guise was forced to 
requisition funds for the repair of Inchkeith that d'Oisel hoped would enable him to 
begin similar work at Dunbar soon after.! But with the Three Estates' rejection of 
Guise's tax reassessment scheme in 1556,2 the delays at Kelso, and the extraordinary 
expenses involved with the maintenance of d'Oisel's standing force of light horse on the 
Border, all building activity became concentrated on the strongholds at Annan and, in 
particular, Langholm.3 Yet, despite these efforts, very little progress had been made by 
January 1556/7. Scotland was still ill-prepared for war and did not have one 'bonne 
place pour sa defendre et soustenir ung siege'.4 
But even if the Scots had approved her tax reassessment scheme of May 1556, 
which would have provided her with emergency funds to finance her defensive policies, 
Marie de Guise could derive little comfort from the fact that there would not have been 
enough troops to garrison the forts she would have then been able to build. Following 
the Franco-Imperial truce of Vaucelles in February 1555/6, the majority of the troops 
that had been sent to Scotland in 1554/5 were redeployed back to the Continent, leaving 
Scotland almost destitute of armed forces. Those that did remain were primarily 
concerned with reducing the Border to obedience and pursuing of thieves and rebels. So 
1 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.nl; PRO, 3/31/22, fAl; CSP Spain, XII, pA3. 
2 This will be the subject of further discussion in Chapter V. 
3 AE, Mbnoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 7r-" lOv; Papal Negotiations, pp. 428-9; LPL, Talbot 
MSS, 3194, fos. 336-7; APC, V, p.280; Colvin, King's Works, IV, p.609 1104. In 1556, the work at 
Langholm cost the crown £453 15s Id. Up until 1558, this seems to be the only place where a significant 
amount of money was spent. TA, XI, pA09. 
4 AE, Mbnoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 8v, lOv; Papal Negotiations, p.429. 
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few were the number of Frenchmen serving in Scotland that the Border was actually 
garrisoned and policed by an itinerant regiment of light horse and a small number of 
foot soldiers,! Even in this respect, the scarcity of armed forces seriously undermined 
Guise's attempts to fortify, police and implement good rule on the Border. 2 
Nevertheless, the presence of French troops on the Border, the little work that 
was being done on Scotland's strongholds and the discovery of the Kelso enterprise was 
enough to raise alarm in England and contribute to the mounting tensions and increased 
suspicions that prevailed throughout the period 1554-1556.3 Philip promised the 
English Council that for every fort Marie de Guise built on the Border he would build 
three and forever continue the rumours that the Spanish were being sent to Berwick.4 
Verbal threats such as this were backed up by orders for the interception of all 
communication passing through England between Scotland and France; the fortification 
and victualling of Berwick, Wark and Norham; and placing the Border on one hour's 
notice for the defence of the kingdom.s The Border, however, was not Mary Tudor's 
only concern; she was equally worried about Franco-Scottish intrigues in Ireland. 
*** 
Mary Tudor had every reason to be suspicious of French subversive activity. Her 
accession and choice of husband directly conflicted with the interests of France, whose 
I AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 9\ lOr_11 v; Papal Negotiations, p. 430. 
2 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 7', 8v, 9v, 10v; Papal Negotiations, pp. 428-9. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.377 r; PRO, 3/31/32, f.41; CSP Spain, XII, p.43. 
4 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.347v. See ibid, IX, fos. 302, 316, 320, 332 and 342 for references to 
rumours of Spanish activity on the Border. 
5 PRO, SP11/3/31, 12/93/18, LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 39, 43 47; APC, IV, pp. 397,411 and V, pp. 6, 
7,14,15. 
148 
Chapter IV: Mmy Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial Threat. 
alliance with Scotland not only provided a conduit through which intrigues could be 
conducted, but also ready access to Mary's own discontented subjects to whom her 
dynastic and religious policies were equally anathema. As a traditional hotbed of 
unrest, Ireland was a logical and susceptible target for foreign intrigues. Unsurprisingly, 
Mary Tudor's accession did spark a flurry of renewed insurgent activity in Ireland and 
reports that Henri 'had incited them thereto'. 1 
Although Mary I had little, if any concern for Irish political affairs per se, the 
revolts that had accompanied her accession gave rise to her suspicions of French 
complicity.2 These suspicions were fuelled by reports that the Irish revolts had involved 
a number of Scots and by rumours that France was planning an invasion of Ireland. In 
October and November 1553, two possibly related rumours were circulating to this 
effect. One concerned the imminent execution of: 
... a plan conceived some time ago for making an attack on Ireland to 
seize two places that might be converted into two roomy harbours, able 
to hold one thousand ships and more. With these ports in their hands, the 
French might harm England, aid Scotland, and prevent, or at least render 
difficult, your Majesty's [Charles V] subjects' fisheries, commerce 
and carrying trade.3 
The second was the rumour that the Grand Prior of France (Franyois, duc de Guise) was 
being sent to Ireland with 60 gentlemen and a great number of soldiers, 'to assist the 
Wild Irish against the Queen' and foster the troubles in Ireland that they themselves had 
1 CSP Foreign, 1553-1558,66, pp. 23-4. 
2 Brady, 'Court, Castle and Country: the framework of government in Tudor Ireland' in Brady & R 
Gillespie (eds.), Native and Newcomers: Essays on the making of Irish Colonial Society, 1534-1641, 
p.31. Ireland did not even warrant a mention on Mary Tudor's list of political priorities for her 
administration, but the revolts there, which were being 'kept alive by the French and the Scots', did 
figure in Simon Renard's list of problems facing the Queen along side matters of religion and crown-
magnate relations. CSP Spain, XI, p.335. 
3 Ibid, XI, p.261. 
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started. 1 Henri took great pains to dispel these rumours and refute the allegations that he 
was behind the seditions in Ireland. 'As for the incursions of the Scots in Ireland, and 
the report spread that he incited them thereto', the English Council was informed that 
the French King, 'took God to witness that he never thought of such a thing. For 
knowing her Majesty's desire of peace with her neighbours, he should do all he could to 
assist her against such as might go about to molest her' .2 Noailles was also instructed to 
convey the same assurances with haste to Mary and proffer a possible explanation for 
the origin of these rumours: 
Quant au bruict qui court par del a du voyaige de mon Cousin Ie grand 
Prieur de France en yrlande Je ne voudrois de riens tant prier lad[icte] 
Dame que de faire tres bien chastier celluy qui dict I' avoir veu audict 
pays d'yrlande, comme ung Imposteur malhereux qu'il est a tiltre, ainsi 
quil fault penser, pour essayer d'alterer nostre amitie, laquelle de rna 
part, Je mettray peyne d'observer de tous poinctz si sincerement, qu'elle 
ne doibt craindre telz allarmes et tant s'en fault, qu'il ait prins ce chemin 
la, ne que jamais je y aye pense qu'il est party passe a quinze jours pour 
aller a Malte en sa Religion faire son debvoir envers Ie nouveau grand 
maistre [Claude de la Sangle] Et passera par l'isle de Corsque ouje se 
fayz conduire par mes gallaires que je luy ny prestees a cest effect, vous 
priant faire tres bien entendre a lad[icte] Dame que nous sommes si pres 
l'ung de l'autre que en troys ou quatre Jours l'on peult tousjours syavoir 
laverite d'une chose et que Je la prie quand e1le sera en doubte de quelque 
affaire deppendant de moy, qu'elle m'en veuille faire advertir etje 
l'asseure de luy en esc1arcir Incontinant Ie Cueur.3 
I AE, COl'. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 96, 97r, X, fos.·114-5', 116r and XII, f.98; CSP Spain, XI, pp. 358-9, 
401; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558,66, pp. 23-4. 
2 Ibid, 66, pp. 23-4. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.96 and X, fos. 114-5'. See also ibid, XII, f.103 r and IX, f.97 r and X, 
f.116 r, for Constable Montmorency's instructions to Noailles regarding the rumours surrounding Ireland, 
in which he orders the French ambassador to 'feist promptement responce pour vous donner assurance du 
contraire, affin den advertir incontinent la royne et les siegneurs de son conseil que peuuent bien croyre 
que de son couste i1 ne se dementira jamais de la droicte et sincere amy tie quil a conceise delle et desa 
bonne volunte en son endroict'. For more on Malta and Corsica, see Tytler, Edward VI and Mary, II, pp. 
250-3,255. 
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Publicly, of course, Mary and her Council never really thought that the rumours were 
true or that Henri was actually behind the troubles in Ireland. 1 But the fact that some 
Scots had been cited as participants in the insurgent activity did bring into question 
whether their involvement had been sanctioned by the Scottish Government or, given 
her obvious French connections, the subversive work of Marie de Guise. 
Although Henri was assured that Mary Tudor 'did not believe that these 
disturbances were done by the privy maintenance of the Scottish rulers, but reckoned 
such a report to be untruly spread by those light savage people', the French King was 
nevertheless compelled to defend Guise publicly. The English Queen was reassured 
that the 'Queen Dowager of Scotland is as glad of her Majesty's accession as any may 
be, and equally desirous of peace'? As for the Scots who participated in the revolts, 
blame was specifically attributed to 'les Sauvages', presumably a reference to the 
redshanks and gallowglasses of the Western Isles who, as Jane Dawson notes, 'provided 
the backbone of the fighting forces of the Gaelic chieftains and were the basis of their 
successful resistance to the English'.3 But was the activity of these mercenaries an 
exercise in intrigue and, if so, at whose instigation? 
The answer to the first question is more than likely no. The government in 
Edinburgh had very little control over the mercenary trade to Ireland and even less 
control over the activities of the MacDonalds there - a situation which the English found 
completely foreign and incomprehensible. This is not to say that intrigues in Ireland 
I AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 108r, 114r. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1553-1558,66, pp. 23-4. 
3 Dawson, 'Two Kingdoms or Three?', p.llS. 
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had not been considered. Noailles, for one, strongly advocated a policy of intrigue in 
Ireland as part of an overall attempt to sway English public opinion against the Tudor-
Habsburg dynastic alliance. In October 1553, he suggested to Marie de Guise that, 
owing to the discontent brewing in certain sectors of English society over Mary Tudor's 
marital intentions, the time was right to fan the flames of discord in Ireland. 1 There is 
no evidence to suggest, however, that Guise heeded the French ambassador's advice; 
then again, did she really need to when the Scots were already causing the English 
Queen so much aggravation? All that could be done to allay English fears was to ply 
Mary with fair words. Reassuring her that the Scots who had travelled to Ireland to 
participate in the revolts were 'les Sauvages' and exiled Scots of bad lives, it was 
actually claimed that Marie de Guise wanted them placed in the English Queen's hands 
so that they would then receive the punishment they deserved.2 
Similarly, in 1555/6, Scottish insurgent activity in Ireland was the source of 
contention between the 'auld enemies'. In November 1555, Archibald Campbell, 
Master of Argyll and Lord Lome, led his first independent military expedition to Ireland 
in order to assist Calvagh O'Donnell in his quest to overthrow his father, Manus 
O'Donnell of Tyrconnell.3 On 1 November 1555, Calvagh, Lome and his expeditionary 
I AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.89 r • In December 1553, Sir James Croft, former deputy of Ireland 
(1551-1552) and one of the conspirators behind Wyatt's rebellion, offered to 'susciter infinis Troubles en 
Angleterre et Irlande' on behalf of the French King. Nothing, however, came of this offer. Ibid, XI, 
f.1llr. 
2 Ibid, XII, fos. 108r, 114r-v. 
3 BL, Lansdowne MSS, 155.153, f.374 r ; NLS, Adv.MSS, 34.1.11, f.llOv; CSP Scot., I, 410, p.196. The 
4th Earl of Argyll promised O'Donnell military support in a contract dated 13 July 1555. See J. 
Mackechnie, 'Treaty Between Argyll and O'Donnell', Scottish Gaelic Studies, vii (1953), pp. 94-102; 
Highland Papers, IV, pp. 212-6. I am extremely grateful to Jane Dawson for her advice on this matter 
and for providing me with some background information on Lord Lome, who is the subject of her 
forthcoming work on the 5th Earl of Argyll. 
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force of Highland troops invaded Donegal and, together with the MacDonalds, 
succeeded in capturing Manus O'Donnell, while also taking possession of several 
castles, killing and imprisoning many Irish subjects, and generally laying waste to an 
area of approximately 60 square miles.! Needless to say, the insurgent activity of such a 
large number of Scots evoked a rapid response from Mary Tudor. Sir Thomas 
Challoner was immediately sent to Scotland in February 1555/6 to seek redress from the 
Queen Regent. But during this diplomatic mission, Challoner was also commissioned 
to engage in some covert activity - namely, to discover by whatever means possible, 
'what practises they [the Scots] haue with France, and ... what their meaninge is in the 
matter ofIreland' .2 
Challoner's instructions clearly reveal the English government's incredulity that 
Lord Lome's expedition was staged without the involvement of the Scottish 
government. Their suspicions were raised by the fact that Lome had 'sondrie good 
vessells well furnished for the warres' and 'divers great peeces of ordennce of brasse', 
which did not seem to be 'the furniture of a comon subiect', but ordnance that was 
'more than like to have comen from some greater power than themselues'.3 Although 
Marie de Guise was aware of the naval preparations being made by Argyll, she did not 
authorise, sanction or furnish Lord Lomes expedition to Ireland.4 On the contrary, 
I BL, Lansdowne MSS, 155.153, f.373r-v; NLS, Adv.MSS, 34.1.11, f.110v; CSP Scot., I, 410, p.l96; CSP 
Foreign, 1553-1558,486, p.213. 
2 See BL, Lansdowne MSS, 155.153, fos. 373-5r; NLS, Adv.MSS, 34.1.11, fos. 110-1; and CSP Foreign, 
1553-1558,410, p.196, for Challoner's complete set of instructions. 
3 BL, Lansdowne MSS, 155.153, f.374r; NLS, Adv.MSS, 34.1.11, f.100v. 
4 TA, X, p. 287; RPC, XIV, p.14. Marie de Guise had commissioned the Earls of Argyll and Atholl to 
pass into the Western Isles on 27 June 1555. 
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Guise tried to stop the expedition by sending explicit instructions to Argyll on 8 October 
1555, 'nocht to pas in Irland,.l Whether Argyll received Guise's instructions too late to 
prevent his son's departure or whether he simply chose to ignore them is unknown. 
What this episode does reveal, however, is the lack of control the Scottish government 
had over the activities of certain Scots in Ireland and Scotland, who more often than not 
and despite appearances to the contrary, acted independently of the crown. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, this was a particular problem that Marie de Guise sought to 
rectify in her domestic policy, which aimed to strengthen the authority of the crown and 
assert royal power in the localities. 
*** 
Mary Tudor had every reason to be suspicious of Franco-Scottish intrigues in England 
and Ireland. The complicity of the French in Wyatt's ill-fated rebellion in January-
February 1553/4 was no secret. Both Noailles and d'Oisel had been in communication 
with the leaders of the conspirators, who planned to oppose their Queen's dynastic 
policy through a series of revolts in Devon, Leicestershire, Kent and the Welsh borders 
in March 1554.2 Part of d'Oisel's commission upon returning to Scotland in January 
1553/4, was to reiterate Henri's willingness to back the conspiracy on condition that the 
rebellion received enough public support that its success could be guaranteed.3 By the 
I TA, X, p. 298. 
2 Edward Courtenay, earl of Devonshire, Sir James Croft, Sir Peter Carew, Sir Edward Rogers and Sir 
Thomas Wyatt. E.H. Harbison, Rival Ambassadors at the Court of Queen Mary (Princeton, 1940), pp. 
109-36, especially pp. 120-5; Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 12-88; Wernham, 
Before the Armada, pp. 208-20. 
3 On 23 November 1553, Hemi instructed d'Oisel that, 'si vous voyez that ce soit a bon essient que 
leschoses s'eschauffassent et que la dicte Royne se resolvent a prendre pour mary Ie deict Prince 
d'Espaigne, aussi qu'il y ait apparence que ledict de Coumtenay soit despose et ait moyen de brouiller les 
cartes vour pourrez encoures plus asseurement dire que vous estes [sure] que pour ung si grand bien audit 
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time d'Oisel had returned to the archipelago, all indications were that public opinion 
was decidedly against the marriage. As early as December 1553, Noailles had written 
optimistically to Marie de Guise that, 'ie la [Mary] pense plus espagnolle que Angloise 
et qu'elle porte une hayne conceue de long temps a sa propre nation de quoy e1le n'est 
rien deceue car ses subjetz ne luy portent pas meilleure volunt6'.1 While the Queen 
Regent sincerely hoped that the Anglo-Scottish peace would continue, she nevertheless 
shared the belief that Mary Tudor's marriage to Philip of Spain would prove disastrous. 
Writing to Noailles in December 1553, Guise commented that, 'Quant au mariage de 
vostre Royne, je ne puis penser que Ie pays ne soit fort mal content si elle se marie hors 
d'ice1uy et il en fauldra voir la fin',2 In this, Guise was of the same mind as d'Oisel, the 
Duc de Guise and the Cardinal de Lorraine, who believed that the Habsburg threat 
emanating out of England could only be countered by a pro-active policy,3 The 
aggressive stance that Henri was willing to take in England in November 1553 can be 
attributed to the influence of 'les Guises', who took advantage of Montmorency's sick 
leave from court to promote their interventionist policy over the Constable's favoured 
and precautionary course of action - diplomacy.4 
It was during his week's sojourn in London, that d'Oisel became directly 
involved in the anti-Marian conspiracy. In' an attempt to translate public sentiment into 
Royaulme [England], Je ne voudrois pas luy desnier ma faveur, ny-aux aultres seigneurs qui cognoissant 
Ie mal que cell peult amener a leur Royaulme si vouldroient opposer'. AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, 
f.99; Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 115-6. 
I 24 December 1553, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.106; Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, p.119. 
27 December 1553, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, f.123 r • 
3 Ibid, IX, fos. 142, 143, 148,21,185. 
4 Ibid, IX, f. 90; Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 115-20. 
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effective action, d'Oisel worked closely with the conspirators and all but promised them 
that if the enterprise was to go ahead as planned, men, money and munition would be 
forthcoming from France. 1 But by the time Henri had finally made the decision to 
support the English rebels on 26 January 1553/4, it was too late.2 When his messenger 
reached London with the news, the rebellion had already come and gone. Details of the 
conspiracy had been leaked and had reached the ears of Mary. Reports that she and her 
council were working to break up the enterprise forced the conspirators to act 
prematurely and, as it would tum out, unsuccessfully.3 
The collapse of Wyatt's rebellion on 7 February 1553/4, however, did nothing to 
quell anti-Marian sentiment, reduce opposition to the Anglo-Imperial alliance or put an 
end to French intrigues in England. 4 The English exiles who fled to France to escape 
persecution continued to plot against Mary and to look to Henri for support in their 
quest to overthrow the English government by armed insurrection.s Fears of armed 
insurrection and foreign invasion were also kept alive by French intrigues emanating 
from Scotland. 
I Neither d'Oise1 nor Noailles had been authorised to give an official promise of aid at this time. They 
were simply to encourage the conspirators with the' prospect of French military and financial assistance. 
But according to Croft and Wyatt's confession, d'Oisel had promised them men, money and munition. 
AE, Cor. Pol., IX, fos. 114-5, 273v-4; Tytler, Edward VI and Mmy, II, p.306; Harbison, Rival 
Ambassadors, pp. 122-4. 
2 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 156-7r • 
3 For details of the rebellion see ibid, IX, f.118 and XII, fos. 167v-9; Loades, Mmy Tudor, pp. 81-2; 
Harbison, Rival Ambassadors, pp. 125-36; Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 215-6. 
4 See, for example, Noailles' comments to d'Oise1 on 21 February 1553/4 in AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, 
XII, fos. 172-3r • Nothing substantial came of these plots. Henry Dudley'S plan to lead a revolt in 
England and later, to take Calais, was abandoned because details of the plot had been leaked, while 
Thomas Stafford's invasion of England led only to a brief occupation of Scarborough Castle. Loades, 
Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 151-75; Wernham, Before the Armada, p.231. 
5 Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 151-75. 
156 
Chapter IV: Mmy Tudor and the Anglo-Imperial Threat. 
Throughout 1554, various plots were concocted to cause problems for Mary 
Tudor on the Anglo-Scottish Border. One such conspirator was Mark Antony (Mario 
Antonio Erzio), a servant of Courtenay, who 'fled' to Scotland in January 1553/4 on the 
pretence that he was dissatisfied in his patron's employ. I On the surface, Scotland was a 
logical place for Antony to flit to because he was married to a Scot, but the fact that he 
was also one ofNoailles' agents and an acquaintance of d'Oisel caused more than one 
eyebrow to be raised in London. 2 It did not take long before the English Council's 
suspicions proved correct and reports filtered through that Antony was indeed plotting 
at Berwick.3 Contemporaneous with these reports were d'Oisel's own communiques to 
Noailles in which he described the practices of a gentleman, 'qui en fou mon amy et 
grandement allee en ladicte frontiere' to enlist the services of various English officials, 
such as Lords Wharton and Dacre.4 It is quite possible that this particular gentleman 
was Antony, who was sent by Noailles and used by d'Oisel to rally the support of the 
gentlemen of the north against the Spanish marriage and 'pour s' ayder de leur part a 
maintenir et conserver leur liberte et se garder de tumber en ceste servitude miserable ou 
l'Empereur et ledict Prince [Philip] desirent les mettre,.5 Orders for Antony's arrest 
were consequently issued and, by 10 March, he had been captured and scheduled to be 
interrogated by Dacre.6 The Council's request that a transcript of Antony's 
I CSP Spain, XII, p.17. 
2 A.B, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 98v_9r• 
3 CSP Spain, XII, p.17. 
4 A.B, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 142, 148; Tytler, Edward VI and Mary, II, p.307. 
5 Noailles to d'Oise1, 22 January 1553/4, A.B, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.121. 
6 APC, IV, pp. 382, 408. 
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interrogation be returned to them 'with speede' is perhaps indicative of the seriousness 
with which they perceived the threat that French intrigues posed to Mary's 
administration on the Anglo-Scottish Border. 
Philip's anticipated arrival in England sparked a renewed attempt to stir up 
trouble on the Border by soliciting the Percys of Northumberland to 'raise ane 
commotioun and insurrectioun of the leigis of England' against Mary Tudor and her 
authority.l This plot is of particular significance not simply because Scotland served as 
a conduit for French intrigues in England, but because it was instigated by and directly 
involved the Scots? The principal agent in this enterprise was a servant of Bothwell, 
John Pringle. While travelling through England as part of the Bishop of Ross' retinue, 
Pringle made contact with Henry, 8th earl of Percy, a staunch opponent of the Spanish 
marriage, and offered him 'great pensions, rewards, prerogatives and armed support to 
start trouble near the Scottish border'. 3 But before anything could come of this 
association, Pringle was arrested and detained in English custody on 16 April 1554.4 
When it came to pointing the finger and assigning blame, Pringle left no holds barred. 
In his confession, the French King, the Queen Regent, d'Oisel, Bothwell and the Bishop 
of Ross were all named as the chief devisers of the plot, upon whose instructions Pringle 
claimed he was acting. 5 
I RPC, XIV, p.126. 
2 CSP Spain, XII, pp. 221-2; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 199, pp. 80-1; AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, 
f.185 v • 
3 CSP Spain, XII, p.221; AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.185 v• 
4 Ibid, IX, f.165. 
5 CSP Spain, XII, pp. 221-2; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 199, pp. 80-1; AB, Cor. Pol., IX, Angieterre, 
f.185 v • 
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For their part, Guise and d'Oisel denied that they 'motionit tresown or 
conspirasy aganis ony Prince', and implored Mary Tudor to 'haif na sic conssait of ws 
that we suld haif committit sic chargis to sic as James Hoppringill ... for he had nowther 
lettre nor credit of ws to nane within hir realme, and, gif we had bene evill myndit, we 
culd haif gottin mony hiear consalis to haif set furth the samin nor be this Hoppringill'.1 
Privately they shifted the blame onto Bothwell. According to d'Oise1, Bothwell was the 
one who had devised this plot and proposed it to the Queen Regent in the hope that he 
could weasel his way back into her favour. If he was allowed to return to either 
Scotland or France, Bothwell assured Guise that he would then have the means to do her 
service, as he was a man who had many friends in the north of England. Naturally 
Guise's interest was raised by such talk, but she was determined not to show it in front 
of Bothwell. Instead, she chose to let him know her long held opinion of him - that he 
was an 'homme vain et mol et ne pas pour manier quelque bonne praticque'.2 It was 
presumably at this point that Guise took charge of the affair and began working out the 
finer details of the conspiracy. As for Pringle, he remained in English custody until 14 
February 1554/5, when he was 'delyvered out of the Kinges Benche, and was ordered 
by the Lords within tenne dayes after his delyverie to tary no lenger within the realme, 
but to departe the same at his further peril' .3 
I RPC, XIV, pp. 126-7. Quinten Kennedy, the abbot of Crossraguel and Cassillis' brother, was sent to 
convey Guise's denial to the English Queen. Ibid, XIV, pp.126-7; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 
184, 197, 198-9. 
2 Ibid, IX, f.185 V • 
3 APC, V, p.97; PRO, 3/31/33. Despite the fact that Pringle had also implicated Bishop of Ross in the 
conspiracy, the latter escaped with only a warning, 'although such dishonourable dealing might by law 
have justified the detention of the Bishop'. CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 199, pp. 80-1; CSP Spain, XII, 
p.222. 
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Ultimately failing in their objective to prevent the Spanish marriage, and, later, 
to prevent the arrival and coronation of Philip as King of England, Franco-Scottish 
intrigues succeeded only in heightening the tensions within the archipelago that 
climaxed in the summer of 1555. Never before during Mary Tudor's reign had Scotland 
and England been so close to becoming directly involved in the Habsburg-Valois 
conflict as enemies. What threatened to tip the balance between war and peace, 
however, had nothing directly to do with either of the Habsburg-Valois powers. Rather, 
the potential catalyst came from a somewhat surpnsmg source, Christian III of 
Denmark. 
In June and July 1555, reports that great naval and military preparations were 
being made by the King of Denmark for a descent on Scotland sent shock waves 
throughout the archipelago. The reason for the widespread alarm was the uncertainty 
surrounding the purpose of Christian Ill's naval expedition and, more importantly, 
whether Scotland or England was the Danish King's ultimate destination. Rumours and 
supposition gave both sides cause for worry. For the Scots, rumours that Charles V had 
furnished the Danish King's naval expedition with munition seemed to confirm reports 
that Scotland was the intended target. 1 The lack of intelligence coming out of France on 
the matter also served to substantiate and fuel Scottish fears. The failure of Henri and 
Montmorency to respond to d'Oise1 and Noailles' repeated requests for news, 
particularly with respect to the state of Franco-Danish relations, left them only to 
presume that Christian was no longer observing the peace with France and that Scotland 
I' . AE, COl. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 468-72. 
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was, indeed, the focus of his attention.! As to the purpose of Christian's expedition, 
Marie de Guise and d'Oisel first thought that he intended to reclaim the Orkney and 
Shetland Isles as Danish territory. If this was indeed the case, the remoteness of these 
isles and the absence of any armed forces there, made them extremely vulnerable and 
ready for the taking. If, however, the Danish made their descent at St. Andrews or 
Leith, as later reports suggested they would,z the chances of fending them off with the 
combined forces of France and Scotland were greatly improved.3 Although Christian 
had written to the Queen Regent assuring her that the only purpose of his naval 
expedition was to suppress piracy round his shores, alarming reports continued to flow 
in that the Danish army was planning to make a descent on Scotland, and neither Guise 
nor d'Oisel were prepared to take any chances.4 A force of 12,000 men was assembled 
and deployed to Shetland and Orkney, where several ships were stationed to act as a 
hopeful deterrent.s Steps were also taken to secure and reinforce the Border. Marie de 
Guise ordered two musters to meet at Dumfries in July and August for the purpose of 
'repressing the West Bordouris'.6 So well fortified was Dumfries in the summer of 
I AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 468-72, 476r, 480-1, 482r, 488r, 489, 490, 493. 
2 Ibid, IX, fos. 482r, 486, 490, 492, 501-2, 503r; st. Andrews University Library, Special Collections, 
msDA784.7, ms4347. 
3 ' AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.471r. 
4 12 July 1555, SRO, SP13/77. Noailles wrote to Montmorency that the rumours of a Danish invasion 
were 'si chaud en Escosse que mesmes la royne regente et ledict Sr DOisel auoient pourveu acequils 
auoient cognu estre necessaire ne scachant qu penser pour vn temps comrne ils ne necessaire ne font 
encores ainsy que Ie roy et vous pourrez reoir par la lettre que ledict Sr DOisel men a escrite'. AE, Cor. 
Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.493 r. 
5 Ibid, IX, fos. 480-1; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.7Y. 
6 RPC, XIV, pp. 13-4, 162-3; AE, Cor. Pol., IX, fos. 501-2, 503r; St. Andrews University Library, Special 
Collections, msDA784.7, ms4347; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.107; TA, X, pp. 259-61; RSS, IV, 3038-9, 
3155, pp. 534, 557. 
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1555 that even Lord Conyers felt compelled to comment that 'the Danishe fleete shold 
moch inquier of the state and streneth of this towne'.l 
The English were similarly unenlightened as to Christian Ill's real intentions, 
and just as worried. 2 Another rumour circulating at the time and one personally 
favoured by d'Oisel, was that the Danish King intended to use Scotland as a back door 
to England in order to provide Princess Elizabeth and England's Protestants with 
military support against Mary and Philip.3 Once again, the conspicuous absence of any 
news from France left room for speculation. Could Henri's silence be interpreted as a 
sign of his complicity?4 The nature and extent of French intrigues in England left no 
doubt as to Henri's true feelings for Mary Tudor, and as no word had come from France 
intimating that the Franco-Danish peace had broken down, Christian's expedition could 
be seen as yet another Valois attempt to stir up trouble in England. As a result, orders 
were issued by the English Council to the Wardens of the Marches 'to leame by thier 
best espialles what tyme the shippes of Denmarke cam into scotland, and to what port 
they intend, and what is said to be their meanyng', while the Earl of Shrewsbury, the 
newly appointed Lord President of the Council of the North, was sent north with orders 
to place the Borders in readiness to fight at one hour's notice. s 
I LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.l07. 
2 APC, V, p.160; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 75r, 125r • 
3 ' AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 465, 480-1. 
4 Ibid, IX, fos. 480-1. 
5 APC, V, p.160; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 465,490,493. For Shrewsbury's appointment see 
RPC, XIV, pp. 159-62. . 
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In the end, the Danish threat came to nothing and Scotland and England were 
spared formal entry into the Habsburg-Valois conflict. No descent was made at St. 
Andrews or Leith, nor was there an attempt to take the Shetland and Orkney Isles. In 
fact, there was not even a single sighting of the King of Denmark's navy anywhere 
along Scotland's north or east coastlines.' On 21 August 1555, a Danish envoy arrived 
in Scotland with letters of explanation from Christian III to Marie de Guise. According 
to these, naval and military preparations were made in response to a rumour that Henri 
was plotting, with the support of the Scots, to oust Christian from his throne in favour of 
Charles III, duc de Lorraine and Marie de Guise's second cousin.2 As this rumour was 
circulating at a time when several thousand of his subjects were already revolting 
against him, the Danish King felt it necessary to assemble his forces and deal with a 
particular gentleman named 'Pillard', who had apparently already made several naval 
descents on Denmark in the name of France and Scotland.3 Upon hearing these 
explanations, the Danish envoy was assured by Guise that, 'il n'ya a aujourd 'huy un 
seu! navire de Guerre Escossoys a la mer' - the naval fleet sent to the Orkney and 
Shetland Isles in July, presumably having been recalled. The Dane then made the 
I AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 501-2, 503 r • 
2 Although technically an independent duchy, Lorraine had been governed by a French regent, Nicolas de 
Vaudemont, duc de Mercoeur, since 1552. Vaudemont was the Duc de Lorraine's uncle and Marie de 
Guise's first cousin. He supplanted his pro-Habsburg sister-in-law, Christina, Duchesse de Lorraine and 
Charles V's niece, as regent after Henri persuaded her to resign her post, send her son to reside at the 
French Court and consent to the latter's marriage with the French King's daughter, Claude. This, in 
addition to Henri's successful capture of the Three Bishoprics of Lorraine, helped to establish and 
maintain the permanent influence France would have in Lorraine up until its formal annexation in 1766. 
See Baumgarter, HenlY II, pp. 150-3, and pp. 146-57, for his discussion on Henri's treaty with the 
German Princes and his subsequent 'Promenade on the Rhine' in 1551-2. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XII, fos. 417'-8. 
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cunous observation that neither the Scots nor the French l had had an ambassador 
resident in Denmark for about two years, whereas the Emperor had sent one about the 
same time Christian began to raise his army.2 Was he suggesting that the Habsburgs 
were behind these intrigues with the purpose of turning allies into enemies? This was 
certainly not implausible, but the extent or nature of Imperial involvement is unclear 
and d'Oisel did not elaborate on this point when relating it to Noailles. Nevertheless, 
the uncharacteristic ignorance of d'Oisel and Noailles on French affairs, especially as 
they pertained to Scotland, together with the Danish envoy's attestations that Christian 
III 'continue en bonne & seure amitie avecques Ie Roy nostre Masitre, & la Royne & 
Royaulme d'Escosse & ne nous faict ... aucune querelle des Isles Dorquenay & de 
Chitland', suggests that both parties were the victims of some sort of foreign intrigue. 3 
Amicable relations having been restored, or rather reconfirmed between France, 
Scotland and Denmark, the immediate crisis was over. For the time being, Scotland and 
England had avoided being drawn into the Habsburg-Valois conflict despite all 
indications to the contrary. In February 1555/6, the five year truce of Vaucelles brought 
a short respite to the Continental wars, taking away at least some of the pressure from 
the Habsburg and Valois allies within the archipelago. As we shall see in Chapter VII, 
I It is unclear from d'Oisel's statement, 'Ledit Gentilhomme m'asseure que no us n'avons poinct 
d'Ambassadeur Resident comme de coustume par dela, II y a plus d'ung an & demy ou deux, & au 
contraire que l'Empereur ye en a tousjours tenu ung depuis Ie commencement de la levee de ladit armee', 
whether 'nous' refers to the Scots, the French or both. For convenience, I have taken it to mean the latter, 
implying that the French and the Scots were united in their opposition to the Imperialists. AE, Cor. Pol., 
Angleterre, XII, f.418 V • 
2 Ibid, XII, f.418 V • 
3 Ibid, XII, f.418 v • 
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however, England's fonnal declaration of war against France in June 1557 meant that 
Scotland's days of non-involvement were fast coming to a close. 
*** 
For Marie de Guise, the tensions that arose from Mary Tudor's accession and marriage 
to Philip of Spain served only to highlight the importance and the need for law and 
order in Scotland. It has already been mentioned on several occasions how the Queen 
Regent regarded the lack of justice on the Borders not only as an impediment to the 
peace, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a threat to national security. The next 
two chapters seek to examine the ways by which Marie de Guise attempted to fulfil her 
commission for the 'execution of justice and ordouring of the cuntre' during her 
regency.' Chapter V will set out the general aims of the Queen Regent's policy in 
Scotland, while Chapter VI will focus specifically on the Borders and the Highlands and 
Isles, examining the various methods Guise employed to impose order and provide for 
the effective administration and execution of justice. As we shall see, Marie de Guise's 
quest to restore law and order was inextricably connected with her detennination to 
assert her own authority, and extend royal authority into the localities. 
1 RPC, I, p.90. 
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Although the extremely volatile international situation was her predominant concern, 
domestic affairs were also of prime importance for Marie de Guise during her regency. 
The debilitating effects of seven years of 'rough wooing', coupled with a decade of 
plague and famine had resulted in widespread dearth, prolific violence and a general 
state of lawlessness and disorder. Maty Tudor's accession and marriage to Philip of 
Spain served only to highlight the underlying need for law and order and, in 
consequence, the importance of restoring stability to the realm through a powerful 
monarchy and strong central government. The general aims of Marie de Guise's 
administration and policy in Scotland, therefore, were overwhelmingly concerned with 
asserting the authority of the crown and pursuing royal justice. 
Adhering to the tradition established by her Stewart predecessors, Marie de 
Guise turned to Parliament to respond to the events that had disrupted Scottish society. 
On the whole, the legislation enacted during Guise's regency aimed to advance the 
interests of the crown at the expense of local jurisdictions. By extending royal authority 
into the localities, Guise was not only shifting the balance of power to the advantage of 
the crown, but was also making a clear statement as to the role the Second Estate was 
expected to play in her administration. Magnates such as Chatelherault, Huntly, Argyll, 
Sutherland and Maxwell were required to enforce, execute and administer the Queen's 
laws as extensions of royal power, not as autonomous agents of the crown. As we shall 
see in Chapter VI, this was particularly true with respect to the Highlands, Western Isles 
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and Borders, where the assertion of royal power was seen to be of paramount 
importance for the defence and stability of the realm, and where failure to execute the 
Queen's will met with fierce recrimination. But Guise also recognised her own role in 
asserting and enforcing the authority of the crown. From the time she returned to 
Scotland in 1551, Guise took an active interest in affairs of state and was determined to 
establish a strong, yet personal royal presence. Her progresses to the Border and 
Highlands, for instance, were deliberate attempts to impose law, order and royal power 
through a visible display of force. 
But these were not Marie de Guise's only objectives. War had also emptied 
Scotland's coffers, and the complete absence of any sound fiscal policy during 
Chatelherault's administration (a problem which was exacerbated by his own personal 
greed) made the augmentation of crown revenue another priority for the Queen Regent. 
Again, the pressing matter of finance was inextricably associated with Euro-British 
dynastic politics. Guise needed money not only to subsidise her defensive policies 
against the Anglo-Imperial threat emanating from England, but also to finance the 
establishment and maintenance of her daughter's household in France. Upon becoming 
regent, therefore, Marie de Guise faced many obstacles before she could fulfil her 
commission for the 'ordouring of the cuntre' and putting the 'realme to ane 
quyateness,.1 To help her in this task, Guise relied on the support and advice of the 
Frenchmen and Scotsmen who served officially and unofficially on her council. 
*** 
1 RPC, I, p.90; Scottish Correspondence, ccliii, p.379. 
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Much of the negative imagery surrounding Marie de Guise and her regency in Scotland 
is based on the allegedly dominant role Frenchmen played in her administration, and, in 
particular, the key offices of state they held to the exclusion of the Scottish nobility - the 
natural born councillors of the realm. This is largely due to the fact that Marie de 
Guise's regime is conventionally used to establish the context of the Reformation 
Rebellion. The fact that modern scholarship also tends to be written from the 
perspective of the Lords of the Congregation (the victors of the conflict) and based on 
sources such as John Knox's History of the Reformation in Scotland serves only to 
reinforce and perpetuate this negative image. The composition of Guise's council is one 
area in which historians have done very little to test the extent to which the 
Congregation's propaganda bore any relation to the facts. The presence of Frenchmen 
and, in particular, the 'officiers francois qui avoient este constituez aux plus grandz 
offices du royaulme comme garde des sceaulx', was one argument used by the 
Congregation to show that Guise's true objective was the 'interpysed destructioun of 
thair ... commoun-weall, and overthrow of the libertie of thair native cuntree, be the 
meanes of the Quene Regente and celiane strangearis her Prevey Counsallouris'.1 But, 
as we shall see, only three Frenchmen had any formal position of power in Scotland 
during Guise's regency, and only two of them were actually on the council, which 
continued to be dominated by the Scots. 
As with any new administration, changes in the composition of the council 
inevitably followed Marie de Guise's assumption of the regency. However, this did not 
I Brosse Missions, p.150; Knox, History, I, p.140 and Works, I, pp. 292-3,444. 
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entail a complete 'cabinet re-shuffle'. Many of those who comprised Guise's inner 
circle were veterans of Chatelherault's administration. l Huntly, for example, retained 
his Chancellorship,2 while James, 4th lord Fleming, and David Paniter, bishop of Ross, 
both carried on in their respective posts as Royal Chamberlain and Secretary until their 
deaths in 1558.3 Sir John Bellenden of Auchnoul also continued to serve as Justice 
Clerk, as did Alexander Livingston of Donypace as Director of the Chancery. Yet, there 
were inevitable changes. Donald Campbell, Abbot of Cupar, for example, replaced 
George Durie, Commendator of Dunfermline, as Keeper of the Privy Seal, while James 
Makgill of Nether Rankeillour replaced Thomas Mmjoribanks of Ratho as Clerk 
Register.4 The most significant change was the appointment of Gilbert Kennedy, earl of 
Cassillis, as Lord High Treasurer. 5 Cassillis' appointment is but one example of how 
Guise continued to use patronage as a means of consolidating political support, and 
accommodating those who had Protestant and/or anglophile inclinations. A noted 
reformer and ex -' assured Scot', Cassillis had already profited by supporting Guise and 
I For the composition of both Chatelherault and Marie de Guise's councils, see the sederunt and witness 
lists contained in RPC, I, and RMS, IV. 
2 Appointed on 5 June 1546, Huntly retained this office until his death on 28 October 1562. Annie 
Cameron suggests that the only reason Huntly retained the Chancellorship was because Guise was not 
strong enough to oust him. But, as we shall see in Chapter VI, it seems that Guise was making an example 
of Huntly in order to assert her authority over the rest of the nobility. HEC, p.183; Scottish 
Correspondence, pp. 374-5; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.722. 
3 Fleming was appointed Chamberlain on 12 November 1553. After his death in December 1558, the 
office was left vacant until his successor, John, 5th lord Fleming filled the post on 30 June 1565. David 
Paniter was appointed Secretary on 20 January 1543. Serving in both Arran and Guise's administrations, 
he held this post until his death on 1 October 1558 - save for four months in 1543, when Henry Balnaves 
of Halhill held the office. He was succeeded by William Maitland of Lethington on 4 December 1558. 
HEC, pp. 186, 193. 
4 Ibid, p.I97. 
5 Ibid, p. I 88. 
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the proposed Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance. 1 His appointment as Lord High 
Treasurer in 1554 was no doubt an attempt by Guise to consolidate this support. Of 
greater importance, perhaps, was the message she simultaneously sent to her Protestant 
subjects. By including them in her administration, they were reassured that they would 
not be marginalised or made to suffer, personally or politically, simply on account of 
their faith. As we shall see in Chapter VII, Guise's accommodating position was never 
more apparent than in her choice of negotiating commissioners for her daughter's 
malTiage treaty. The prominent role played by Lord James Stewart and Erskine of Dun 
in forging the dynastic union of the French and Scottish Catholic crowns sent the clear 
and reassuring message that Guise's dynastic policies were not necessarily incompatible 
with the reform movement in Scotland. 
The composition of Marie de Guise's council seems to have changed very little 
during her regency. The witness lists contained in the Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum 
Scotorum for this period show the regular attendance of those listed above, in addition 
to the noted reformer, Archibald Campbell, 4th earl of Argyll (until his death in 1558), 
and John Hamilton, archbishop of St. Andrews. From late 1557 onwards, James 
Douglas, 4th earl of Morton, a signatory of the First Band of the Congregation, and 
James Hepburn, 4th earl of Bothwell were in regular attendance, the latter in his capacity 
as Lord High Admiral of Scotland. James Beaton, archbishop of Glasgow, William 
Chisholm, bishop of Dunblane, and Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney and Lord President 
I NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.5, fos. 143, 146 and MSS, 2991, f.67 v ; FOllrqllevaux Mission, p.18. 
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of the Court of Session, conversely, are recorded as having appeared only once. l As 
with her distribution of patronage, therefore, Scots of all religious and political 
persuasions had representation in Marie de Guise's council. What these witness lists do 
not contain, however, are the names of the two Frenchmen who were also members of 
the Privy Council- Bartholomew de Villemore, Comptroller, and Yves du Rubay, vice-
Chancellor. 
Appointed on 1 May 1555, Villemore was the receiver general of all crown 
revenue? This consisted of the fruits, rents and ordinary revenue from duchies, 
earldoms and crown lands, plus all the customs duties from burghs and ports.3 But it 
was not a Frenchman at the helm of the exchequer that became a bone of contention for 
the Scots - it was du Rubay's possession of the Great Seal as vice-Chancellor that was 
particularly disliked. The Congregation's complaint of 12 May 1560 concerning the 
Frenchmen who held the key offices of state was directly aimed at du Rubay. However, 
the conspicuous absence of du Rubay's name from sederunts and witness lists, 
particularly during Huntly's period of disgrace (1554-5), raises certain questions.4 By 
20 November 1554, Huntly's name disappears completely from the witness lists and 
does not reappear until 19 October 1555, by which time he had been restored to favour 
and reinstated as Chancellor.5 If du Rubay was acting vice-Chancellor, why is his name 
I Robert Reid died in 1558. HEC, p.198; RMS, IV, 1221, 1258, 1261, 1269, 1272, 1280-2, l305, 1315, 
1334, 1350, 1356, 1358, 1371-2, 1376-81, 1384-7, pp. 271, 280-1, 283-5, 287-8, 291-2, 293, 296-7, 300, 
302,306-12. 
2 HEC, p.191. 
3 P.O.B. McNeill (ed.), 'Discours Particulier d'Escosse, 1559/60', The Stair Society Miscellany, II (1984), 
pp. 100-1. 
4 Huntly's disgrace is discussed in Chapter VI, pp. 227-8. 
5 RMS, IV, 962-1006, pp. 217-26. 
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absent from the sederunts during this period? Marie de Guise's response to the Lords of 
the Congregation in 1560 may offer a possible explanation. 
Dismissing the Congregation's complaint that French officers had been 
appointed to the most impOliant offices of state, Guise reminded her accusers that du 
Rubay's position as 'garde des sceaulx' had received the consent of Parliament. But 
what Guise was in fact refening to was the Three Estates' ratification of Mary, Queen of 
Scots' maniage contract in April 1558, wherein it had been written that Guise had 
invested du Rubay with some of Huntly's powers as Chancellor. 1 The same treaty also 
naturalised the Scots as French citizens, which, in the words of Guise, enabled 'tous 
escossoys pourroient tenir offices e benefices en france comme les naturels subiectz'? 
So, if neither the act of naturalisation nor du Rubay's powers as vice-Chancellor 
received Parliamentary consent until 1558, there is the possibility that he was acting in a 
purely 'unofficial' capacity and, therefore, ineligible to deputise for Huntly in every 
capacity of his Chancellorship. There is also the possibility that Guise, aware of the 
Scots' sensitivity to all forms of foreign domination, real or perceived, wished to play 
down the activities of her French ministers and advisers in Scottish affairs of state. The 
lack of source material for Guise's domestic administration, however, makes it difficult 
to come to grips with the machinations of her councilor even, for example, to determine 
how often it met. This is, perhaps, an indication that council meetings were just a 
formality and the real business at hand was conducted within the Queen Regent's 
household, which was predominantly French and included such figures as de Villemore 
1 APS, II, p.513a. 
2 Ibid, II, p.507; Brosse Missions, pp. 150, 152. 
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and du Rubay.l But the most powerful Frenchman in Scotland was not a member either 
of Guise's councilor her household; he was Henri's ambassador resident in Scotland, 
Henri Cleutin, seigneur d'Oisel et de Villeparisis.2 The extraordinary role he played in 
Scottish affairs of state suggests that this is where the real power lay. Interestingly 
enough, moreover, it was a role that generally went uncriticised by the Scots. 
D'Oisel's diplomatic post assumed far greater significance as a result of the 
Franco-Scottish protectoral alliance and the establishment of French power in Scotland. 
His appointment as the French King's Lieutenant-General of Scotland, which was made 
at the behest of Marie de Guise in the spring of 1552, essentially placed matters of 
national security, including Scotland's military affairs, within his jurisdiction.3 More 
importantly, d'Oisel was also Marie de Guise's principal adviser and right-hand man. 
As such, he enjoyed a rather unique and powerful position within Scotland, enabling 
him to exert a considerable amount of influence and control over Scottish affairs of state 
- arguably more than Chatelherault did during the closing years of his regency. This can 
be evidenced by Henri's decision to leave d'Oisel in charge during Marie de Guise's trip 
to France in 1550-1551.4 During the Queen Dowager's absence, he was reported to 
I See Marie de Guise's household accounts in NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.5; SRO, E33!4, 5 and E34112, 14, 17, 
18,20,21,25,26,27; TA, Xl, pp. 24-7. On 13 January 155617, the Queen Regent asked Henri to provide 
du Rubay with some honourable estate in Scotland as a reward for his good service in her household, 
which he had apparently done at his own expense, and as means of inducing him to stay in Scotland. AB, 
Mel110ires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 9v_10r; Papal Negotiations, p.430. 
2 D'Oisel was the French King's ambassador resident in Scotland fi'om 1546 to 1560. 
3 In the spring of 1552, Claude de l'Aubespine informed the Queen Dowager that, 'M. d'Oisel s'en est aile 
satisfaict ainsi que vous desirez, pourveu d'estat gentilhomme de la chambre, establi lieutenant general du 
Roy par dela, present deux mille excuz et de six cens francz par moys pour son estat, oultre sa pension et, 
qui est myeulx, avecques la tres bonne grace du Roy comme aussi en est-il tres digne'. Balcarres Papers, 
II, lxxxiv, lxxxi, pp. 111-3, 115-6. 
4 19 May 1550, Scottish Correspondence, xlix, pp. 65-7. 
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have 'wielded almost sovereign authority in matters of state and justice,.1 But it is the 
overall acceptance of d'Oisel by the Scottish political community that is of greater 
significance. At no time was d'Oisel the subject of criticism or the target of collective 
opposition like his compatriot and colleague, du Rubay. Rather, the French Ambassador 
was a well liked and well respected figure amongst the Scots.2 When, for example, he 
was recalled by Bemi to do service on the Continent during the Habsburg-Valois 
conflict in 1552, the Three Estates ordained that a remembrance of d'Oisel's 'guid 
seruice done in thir partis baith in tyme of peax and weir sould be writtin to the said 
maist Christin King not allanerlie thankand his grace of the samin bot alswa suppleand 
to thank and reward the said Monsieure Dosell' ? 
D'Oisel's direct access to both Marie de Guise and Bemi also contributed to his 
importance and boosted his 'popularity' amongst the Scots. During Huntly's disgrace 
and imprisonment in Edinburgh Castle, it was d'Oisel to whom he turned for help. 'My 
lord', he wrote, 'I man mast hmiie dyssyir your lordship be say gud as to contenew in 
your lawbris for me, and that your lordship wyll tak one yow my part and serwyce to the 
quenyis grace,.4 Even the Lords of the Congregation pleaded with the French 
Ambassador to act on their behalf during the Reformation Rebellion in May 1559, 
'requiring of him, that by his wisdome he wold mitigate the Quenis raige, and the raige 
I CSP Spain, X, pp. 339, 340. 
2 See, for example, Cassillis' remarks upon hearing of d'Oisel's appointment as Lieutenant-General and of 
his imminent return to Scotland in May 1552: 'I am glaid of the gwd treitment and awansement of 
monsieur DOisel, and also glaid of his retwirning bayth for the Kengis serwis and weil of this contre'. 
Balcarres Papers, II, ccxlii, p.360. 
3 APS, II, p.489. 
44 January 1554/5, Scottish Correspondence, cclxiii, pp. 395-6. 
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of the Preastis,.1 As with Marie de Guise, Knox's opinion of d'Oisel changed 
drastically after the latter refused to do as the Congregation had asked, but rather chose 
to suppress their letters 'to the uttermost ofthair [the French] power'? 
Together, Marie de Guise and d'Oisel were a formidable political team. They 
not only 'wrolet' [ruled], but were also fortunate that 'allin Scotland obey and lyketh 
them,.3 As such, d'Oisel commonly received presents alongside the Queen Regent. On 
16 December 1555, for instance, the 'prouest baillies and counsale' of Edinburgh 
thought it expedient 'to propine the Quenis grace with four scoir pundis worth of wyne 
walx and spycery ... and xx Ii worth to Monsieur Dosell', while in August 1556, their 
Aberdeen counterparts ordained that a propine of 'two tonnis of wyne, with spycerie and 
wax, extending to the sowme oftuenty poundis' be given to the Queen Regent and 'half 
ane twn of wyne, ane dossain of torchis, and two dossund bustis of scorchettis' be given 
to d'Oise1.4 As with any double act, the death of Marie de Guise in June 1560 marked 
the end of d'Oisel's diplomatic and military career in Scotland. However, throughout 
the 1550s, he was not only the most influential and, arguably, the most powerful 
Frenchman in Scotland, but also Marie de Guise's closest ally. 
The power and position of Frenchmen in Scotland did not assume any great 
significance for the Scots themselves until after the malTiage of their Queen to the 
Dauphin in 1558 and the death of Henri II in July 1559. The formal union of the French 
I Knox, Works, I, p.327 and HistOl)!, I, p.166. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.329 and History, I, p.166. 
3 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.173'. This observation is all the more poignant having come fi'om an 
Englishman, Sir Thomas Wharton, on 30 October 1555. 
4 Edinburgh Burgh Recs., II, pp. 227, 257; Aberdeen Council Register, pp. 300, 298. 
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and Scottish crowns brought into question the traditional role of the Scottish nobles in 
governing the kingdom. In this respect, Huntly's fall from grace assumed great 
importance. Although he nominally retained his chancellorship and theoretically 
remained the most important Scottish minister of state, Huntly's loss of power in favour 
of a Frenchman had serious ramifications. It symbolised what could legitimately happen 
to the entire Scottish nobility in the Franco-Scottish union of the crowns - loss of their 
political authority and control as the natural born councillors of the realm. Irrespective 
of their number or how much power they really exercised, the mere presence of 
Frenchmen on Guise's council was taken and used by the Congregation as a sign of 
things to come. This worst case scenario of French usurpation became a central theme 
of the Lords of the Congregation's propaganda that was designed to play on the 
xenophobia of the Scots and, hopefully, attract widespread political support for their 
rebellion against the Queen Regent in 1559-60. Yet, while several Frenchmen did hold 
impOliant posts in Marie de Guise's administration, the Congregation's propaganda 
cannot be taken at face value. We must not forget the important offices and positions 
the Scots themselves occupied. Nor for that matter should the influence native Scots 
had over their Queen Regent be ignored - after all, the realisation of Guise's political 
and dynastic objectives ultimately depended on their support and official sanction. 
Marie de Guise's immediate concern upon becoming regent, however, was not 
the realisation of her dynastic objectives, but responding to the events of the past decade 
that had disrupted Scottish society. Years of warfare and famine had resulted in prolific 
dearth, lawlessness and violence. To impose some degree of stability, Guise followed in 
the footsteps of James I, James IV and James V, by attempting to restore a powerful 
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monarchy in Scotland. 1 Her administration and policy in Scotland aimed to advance the 
interests of the crown at the expense of local jurisdictions, pursue royal justice and, 
ultimately, to assert the authority of the crown throughout the entire kingdom. In the 
Stewart tradition, Guise relied heavily on parliamentary legislation to convey and 
impose royal power. 
*** 
Marie de Guise held her first Parliament at Edinburgh on 20 June 1555.2 This meeting 
of the Three Estates was extremely productive. A total of forty-one statutes were 
passed, many of which were re-enactments of statutes from previous reigns. The nature 
of this legislation gives us a clear insight into the Queen Regent's agenda for the 
governance of Scotland and the nature of her longer term programme to impose law and 
order, extend royal government into the localities and, generally, keep society together. 
Society, however, had been, and was continuing to be severely disrupted by the dearth 
that had come as a direct result of war and famine, and Guise sought to rectify this 
problem primarily through parliamentary legislation. 
Dearth was a particular and immediate concern for Marie de Guise even before 
she assumed the regency. During Chatelherault's administration, Guise made a 
concerted effort to respond to the subsistence crisis and rampant inflation. With the 
advice and consent of the Queen Dowager, the Parliaments of May 1551 and February 
I For more on these monarchs see M. Brown, James I (Edinburgh, 1994); Macdougall, James IV 
(Edinburgh, 1997); Cameron, James V; lM. Brown, 'The exercise of power' in 1.M. Brown (ed.), 
Scottish Society in the Fifteenth Centlll}1 (London, 1977), pp. 33-65; Wormald, Court, Kirk, and 
Community, pp. 3-26. 
2 APS, II, pp. 492-501. 
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155112 passed a wide range of statutes imposing price scales, hunting restrictions, 
trading regulations and sumptuary laws. The prices for Bordeaux and Rochelle wines, 
malt, and wild and tame fowl were all stipulated, while the slaughter of lambs and 
young fowl was completely banned for three years, 'except in Nobillis and greit 
BalTonis housis to thair meit'.1 Similarly, the dearth of wild meat prompted the 
(re)enactment of legislation against the slaying of hares, 'Dais or Rais thair calfis or 
kiddis', sheep and 'cuningis' [rabbits].2 In response to the exorbitant prices charged by 
craftsmen in the burghs, which had doubled and in some cases tripled, the Parliament of 
155112 passed legislation restricting the powers of deans of craft.3 Instead, 'reasonable' 
prices were to be determined in each burgh by a joint committee of the provost, bailie, 
the deacons of every craft and all the craftsmen, and then submitted to the Lords of the 
A11icles in Parliament for approval. If these revised prices were deemed reasonable, 
they would be authorised; if not, the process would begin all over again.4 But perhaps 
the most interesting response to the 'greit and exhorbitant derth ryssin in this Realme of 
victuallis and vther stuffe for the sustentatioun of mankynde', was the enactment of a 
sumptuary law. 'Because of the superfluous cheir vsit commounlie in this Realme 
alsweill amangis small as greit men to the greit hurt of commoun weill of the samin and 
dampnage to the bodie quhilk maIds ane man vnhabill to exerce all leifull and gude 
I APS, II, pp. 483-4, 486. 
2 Ibid, II, pp. 487-8. See also ibid, II, pp. 52, 107,344, for similar pieces oflegislation enacted during the 
reigns of James II, James III and James V. 
3 Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, pp. 70-2 and Scotland: A New HistOlY, p.208; M. Verschuur, 
'Merchants and craftsmen in 16th-century Perth' in Lynch (ed.), The Early Modern Town in Scotland 
(London, 1987), pp. 45-8, 60-l. 
4 APS, II, p.487. 
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warkis necessare,' meat was rationed according to rank and status. Archbishops and 
Earls, for example, could enjoy eight dishes of meat, Abbots and Lords were permitted 
only six, and burgesses 'bot iij discheis and bot ane kynd of meit in euerie dische'.1 
By the time Marie de Guise assumed the regency, the dual problems of dearth 
and inflation had not subsided. Instead, it had continued to increase on a daily basis. 
Scotland's new Queen Regent duly responded by enacting and, in many cases, re-
enacting statutes from previous reigns in the hope of resolving the crisis. In the 
Parliament of June 1555, therefore, one sees the reappearance of acts for 'the stanching 
and slaying of wylde foul is and wylde beistis and shuting at thame with culueringis half 
hag and pistolate',2 the slaughter oflambs (for three years), and the stealing of 'HaUds 
Hundis Pertriks Dukis', rabbits and fowl. 3 James V's statute demanding set and 
reasonable prices for imports of wine,4 timber and salt was similarly re-enacted, as were 
the statutes from James I and James Ill's reign imposing a universal system of weights 
and measures. 5 But Guise did not rely solely on legislation enacted by her predecessors. 
In many cases, she added to past legislation, such as in the act prohibiting the slaughter 
1 APS, II, p.487. 
2 On 28 January 155617, seven persons were charged for breaking the acts of Parliament forbidding the 
slaying of game with 'culveringis' and 'pistolettis' from May 1552 to November 1556 inclusive. Pitcairn, 
Trials, I.i, p.395. 
3 APS, II, pp. 497, 498, 499. See also ibid, II, pp. 483, 107, 343, 344, for similar pieces of legislation 
from previous reigns. 
4 Guise had made a declaration to this effect on 7 December 1554. On 4 May 1555, George Hume, 
Walter Cant and thirteen other residents of Leith were charged with selling French wines at higher prices 
than those prescribed by the Queen Regent. Pitcairn, Trials, I.i, p.377. See also ibid, I.i, pp. 389-90, for 
the prices Guise set for 'all maner of victuaIIis, sic as flesche, fische, meitt, fowale, and vther necessaris, 
be brocht to the mercat and sauld for reddie money'. The timing of this proclamation to coincide with her 
royal progress to the Highlands and, in particular, her visit to Elgin to attend a justice ayre, suggests that 
Guise was trying to prevent the inevitable price rise that occurred during royal visits. 
5 APS, II, pp. 10,90,373-4,496,499. 
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of wild fowl and beasts, which contained additional clauses prohibiting, amongst other 
things, hunting during particular times of the year, or enacted statutes that were entirely 
of her own making. I Guise's acts prohibiting the carriage of all victuals, flesh and 'woll 
skin hydis or vther stapill gudis customabill furth of this Realme be land in the Realme 
of Ingland', are two such examples.2 The effectiveness of these measures is difficult to 
gauge. The fact that many of these statutes were re-enactments from previous reigns 
and from Parliaments held just three years before suggests that there were problems 
executing and enforcing this type of legislation? As for Marie de Guise, international 
considerations meant that her subsequent Parliaments were concerned with national 
security and the marriage of her daughter, shedding little light on the progress of her 
campaign against demih. 
Another feature of the legislation enacted in the Parliament of 1555 reflects 
Marie de Guise's determination to strengthen the role of the central government, 
particularly with respect to the administration of the realm. Procedures for the reversion 
of lands and reversions involving the transfer of gold and silver, the appointment of 
curators, the granting of resignations by vassals to their superiors, the warning of tenants 
to flit, and the nullification of contracts and infeftments were all stringently detailed and 
I APS, II, p.497. 
2 Ibid, II, pp. 495, 496. 
3 The ban imposed on the slaughter and sale of lambs in 1551/2, for instance, was extended for another 
three years in 1555, while the statute against the shooting of wild beast and fowl 'with culueringis half hag 
and pistolate', was similarly passed in both the parliaments of May 1551 and June 1555, and was itself a 
re-enactment of legislation from the reigns of James I, II, III and V. By 155617, however, the shooting of 
wild beast and fowl with culverings stilI seems to have been a problem as Patrick, lord Ruthven was 
issued with a justiciary commission to punish those malefactors who continued to do so. Ibid, II, pp. 483, 
486,497,498; ER, VIII, p.614. 
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outlined. 1 As in her reaction to dearth, Guise looked to the legislation of her late 
husband to advance the interests of the crown at the expense of local jurisdictions and 
extend royal government into the localities. Thus, the 'greit and mony falsettis daylie 
done ... be Notaris' prompted Guise to re-enact James V's statute summoning all 
notaries, spiritual and temporal, to appear before the Lords of Council for an 
examination of their protocol books? Years of war with England had allowed the 
activities of notaries to go unchecked and resulted in lapses in procedure. This was not 
always a deliberate attempt by the notaries to abuse the system - political necessity often 
required that protocol be abandoned. One patiicular phenomenon that was the source of 
great trouble, and the result of war, was the granting of sasines by some notaries upon 
precepts not issued by the Chancery, and the reluctance of others to do so. The 
controversy surrounding the legitimacy of these non-royal precepts needed to be 
resolved, and Guise duly responded by using and amending legislation of her late 
husband. James V's act outlining the procedures for the giving of sasines upon precepts 
issued from the Chancery was accompanied by Guise's declaration that sasines were 
also to be issued upon precepts 'past furth the Chancellerie', the validity of which was 
confirmed in a separate statute.3 Realising, however, that there would be a continued 
reluctance by some notaries to accept the legality of non-royal precepts, Guise 
interestingly chose not to punish them, but placed the onus of responsibility on the 
precept holder to find a bailie who was prepared to issue them with an instrument of 
I APS, II, pp. 492, 493, 494, 495. 
2 Ibid, II, p.496, 359-60. 
3 Ibid, II, pp. 493, 497. 
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sasme. While this may be viewed as being inconsistent with Guise's quest to increase 
the efficiency of the administration of the realm, it does reveal her ability to compromise 
and adapt when circumstances dictated. 
In other areas, Marie de Guise was less inclined to compromise. This was 
particularly true in the case of the burghs, where the effects of war had resulted in great 
disorder and the' infinit skaith baith of thair landis and gudis' . 1 In an attempt to address 
this problem and keep Scotland's Third Estate sweet, the Queen Regent confirmed with 
the greatest emphasis, 'all [the] priuilegeis and actis of Parliament grantit and maid in 
fauouris of Burrowis Burgessis and Merchandis' by Mary, Queen of Scots' 'maist 
Nobill progenitouris,.2 But the problem of disorder within the Burghs ran far deeper 
than this. The choosing of craft deacons, in particular, was a 'rycht dangerous' process 
that had caused 'greit troubill in Burrowis commotioun and rysing of the Quenis lieges', 
and the 'making of liggis and bandis amangis tham selfis and betuix Burgh and Burgh,.3 
In order to prevent such outbreaks from occurring in the future, Guise attempted, firstly, 
to regulate the appointment of craft deacons, by ordaining it as the exclusive 
responsibility of the provost, bailies and burgh council; and secondly, they were to 
ensure that their chosen candidate was 'the mais honest mand of craft of gude 
conscience', who 'laubour[ed] sufficientlie' and produced 'sufficient stuffe and wark,.4 
Guise had effectively abolished the office of craft deacon and all the privileges 
I APS, II, p.497. 
2 Ibid, II, p.497. 
3 Ibid, II, p.497. 
4 Ibid, II, pp. 497-8. 
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craftsmen enjoyed within the burgh. Within a year, however, financial pressures proved 
too much and the Queen Regent reversed her position by granting a charter nullifying 
the act of 1555. As Michael Lynch has shown, this was 'a manoeuvre by the regent to 
extract more revenue out of the burgh rather than, as some have argued, a last stand for 
catholicism and the French alliance'. I At a time when money was desperately needed 
for the defence of the realm, Guise received an offer of four thousand merks from the 
craftsmen in return for her volte-face in policy.2 
For Guise, the more disturbing matter was the making of leagues and the giving 
and taking of bonds of manrent and maintenance in the burghs and throughout the entire 
kingdom.3 This, she thought, was 'aganis all Law and obedience of subiectis towart 
thair Princis' and, therefore, deserving of' greit punischment'.4 In a sweeping piece of 
legislation, Guise took the drastic and rather ambitious step of nullifying all leagues, 
bonds of manrent and bonds of maintenance, including those made in the future. 
Equally ambitious was her decree that 'ony proffeit be lyferent of landis taldds teindis 
bailliereis or zeirlie payment grantit or geuin for the saidis bandis of manrent to returne 
to the gifaris'. 5 Those who dared to continue in such practices faced imprisonment, 
'thair to remane during the Quenis grace will'. Intentional or not, this was a direct 
attack on the very infrastructure of Scottish society - the localised kin groups and the 
I Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, p.7l. 
2 Ibid, pp. 70-2; Edinburgh Burgh Recs., II, pp. 188-9,230-2,234-6,236. 
3 See Wormald, Lords and Men, Appendix A, pp. 168-373, for a list of bonds ofmanrent and maintenance 
made c.1442-1603. According to this list, approximately 164 bonds were entered into from December 
1542 to January 1554/5, while only 23 were contracted following the Parliament of 1555 until the Queen 
Regent's death in June 1560. 
4 APS, II, pp. 495, 497. 
5 Ibid, II, pp. 495-6. 
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complex network of alliances that were traditionally forged between these groups and 
between lords and their dependants. For Guise, the problem of disorder in Scotland 
was, therefore, inextricably linked with its localised organisation. To rectify both these 
'problems', she sought to eradicate the mechanisms, such as bonds of manrent, that kept 
power in the localities and prevented the effective exercise of central authority. 
Needless to say, legislation such as this was difficult to enforce and had little effect in 
abolishing what was a customary practice and defining characteristic of Scottish society 
as a whole. l However, it is indicative of Guise's desire to assert the crown's authority at 
the expense of local and regional structures of power. 
But what of the royal bonds of manrent that Guise herself had entered into with 
numerous Scots during 1548-1551? Are we to presume that these were also rendered 
null and void, or did the statute only apply to those made between lieges? The 
preamble, 'it is thocht aganis all Law and obedience of subiectis towart thair Princis in 
the making of particulare liggis ... and geuing and taking of bandis of manrent and 
mantanance', tends to favour the latter scenario, but the wording of the statute itself 
makes no such distinction. All leagues and all bonds of manrent and maintenance were 
null, and the cited exceptions (heritable bonds and bonds for the asythement of murder) 
did not include those of the Queen Regent. There are arguments either way for Guise 
wanting to nullify all leagues and bonds. If Guise was trying to break the traditional ties 
between lords and men in the localities, there is no reason why she would want to sever 
the ties that kept individual lords exclusively bound to her service. But as we saw in the 
I Wormald, Lords and Men, p.95 and Court, Kirk, and Community, pp. 27-40; K.M. Brown, Bloodfeud in 
Scotland, 1573-1625 (Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 108-43. 
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last chapter, and as Marie de Guise herself realised, unwavering loyalty came at a price. 
By 1555, however, circumstances had changed. Guise had secured sufficient political 
support not only for the proposed Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance, but also for her own 
regency. A semblance of stability coupled with her financial difficulties may have 
prompted Guise to 'cut corners' and get out of paying the annual pensions she so often 
granted in her bonds of mament with members of the Scottish political elite. 
Upon becoming regent, Marie de Guise inherited a financially strapped kingdom. 
Chatelherault had taken full advantage of the terms of his resignation that absolved him 
of all financial expenses incurred during his regency, and he left his successor with a 
deficit of £31,184 12s 6d. 1 As we have already seen, Guise was particularly anxious for 
ready cash at this time, owing to Mary Tudor's maniage to Philip of Spain and the 
threat this posed to security on the Scottish Border. At no time since Somerset's 
occupation of Scotland had the need to construct and fortify strongholds on the Border 
been more urgent, and the deficit inherited from Chatelherault's administration had 
deprived Guise of adequate funds to finance this project - thus intensifying the urgency. 
Added to this were Guise's personal financial problems. In June 1552, the Cardinal de 
Lonaine had to send Gilbert de Beaucaire, Seigneur de Puiguillon to Scotland 'pour 
I TA, X, p.216. One need only refer to the Accounts a/the Lord High Treasurer a/Scotland (X) to see the 
inordinate amount of money Chatelherault spent on himself, his family and friends during the latter years 
of his governorship - expenses which, significantly, disappear during Marie de Guise's administration. 
Regular features of the accounts were the monthly 'expensis debursit upoun my lord governour, his graces 
lady and barnis awne personis'. While these accounts are mainly for clothing, they also contain entries for 
other extravagances such as the purchase of' gold to cord ane dosane of napkynnis', (p.l8) and 'vj pair of 
gilt knyffis quhilk Ladye Jene [Chatelherault's daughter] send to gentillwemen of the Courte of France' 
(p.205). So full are these accounts with payments made to Chatelherault's immediate and extended family 
and his dependents, that it is impossible just to cite a few examples. As James Balfour Paul notes in his 
introduction to this particular volume, the greed of Chatelherault is evidenced simply by the fact that out 
of 200 pages relating to the closing years of his regency, approximately 50 pages are discharges for 
clothes alone (p.xli). 
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satisfaire a vos [Marie de Guise's] debtes et pour vous envoyer argent ainsi quil vous a 
pleu mescripre'.! War with England had not only been costly for Hemi II, but also for 
Guise, who had to dip regularly into her own purse to pay the wages of French soldiers 
serving in Scotland in addition to the French pensions awarded to many Scots? This 
had clearly been a drain on the Queen Regent's resources. The accounts of her treasurer 
in France, Jacques Girard, reveal that her charges exceeded her yearly household 
allowance of 10,000 livres by 4,000 livres turnois in 1549, and peace did not lessen 
Guise's financial obligations? The establishment of Mary, Queen of Scots' household 
in France in 1553/4 would prove to be yet another financial burden. 
Proposals for the establishment of a separate household for Mary Stewati first 
came from the Cardinal de Lorraine in February 1552/3. In a letter to his sister, the 
Cardinal expressed the opinion that since Hemi 'faict un estat a part a M. Ie Daulphin', 
the time was now also right for Mary Stewart to have the same.4 Even at this embryonic 
stage, it was clear that establishing a household was going to be an expensive enterprise. 
The Cardinal estimated that it would cost at least 55,000 francs to set up and 60,000 
francs if it was to be done well. Added to this was the devastating news that Guise 
I Wan'ender Papers, xxix, p.22. 
2 See, for example, NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.S, fos. 40, 63-4, 68, 71, for military related expenses included in 
Marie de Guise's household accounts. As has already been discussed in Chapter IV, these payments were 
over and above those she made to Scots in the form of patronage during IS48-S1. 
3 NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.S, fos. 27, 28, 3S-7; SRO, E34126, 27; Balcarres Papers, I, pp. xxvi-xxix. See 
also NLS, Adv.MSS, 29.2.S, fos. 26, 4S-8, 67,84, 8S, IS3-4, IS7-61; SRO, E33/4-S and E34112, 14, 17, 
18, 20, 21, 23, 2S; TA, X, pp. 22S, 228, 294, for additional accounts of Marie de Guise's household 
expenditure rendered by Lieger Chesnieu, Jean Bougouin, Astier, and Lady Livingstone, who was often 
emp loyed for the 'outtredding of the Quenis grace effaris' . 
4 Balcarres Papers, II, ciii, pp. 141-2. See also, ibid, II, ci, pp. 138-9, and A. de Ruble, La premiere 
jeul1esse de Marie Stuart, 1542-61 (Paris, 1891), pp. 267-80, for the establishment of the Dauhpin's 
household. 
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could not expect any assistance from Henri, 'par ce que Ie Roy dict que Ie revenu du 
royaulme est bien petit s'il ne la peut entretenir' - putting even more financial pressure 
on the Queen Regent. 1 The major problem facing Guise, therefore, was how she was 
going to come up with the necessary funds not just to establish her daughter's 
household, but also maintain it in years to come. 
Marie de Guise's dowry from the Longueville estate was one source of income 
that was used to finance Mary Stewart's household. The untimely death of Fran90is, 
duc de Longueville, without an heir in 1551 sparked a lengthy dispute over the division 
of his estate, primarily between his mother, Marie de Guise, his uncle through marriage, 
Philip of Savoy, duc de Nemours, and Fran90ise d'Alen90n, duchesse de Vendome, his 
father's first wife? The terms of the settlement took years to hammer out, and it was 
not until October 1553 that Jacques Girard wrote to Guise with an estimate of her 
pOliion. Although she could expect to receive approximately 32,000 livres and another 
large, unspecified sum from Normandy, the size of the Queen Regent's debts left her 
with very little to work with, if anything at all. Even if Guise accepted Jacques Girard's 
generous offer to forego the 7,000 livres owing to him, 'ce n'est pas somme pour 
commancer a embrasser telle affaire,.3 Despite these financial setbacks, Mary, Queen of 
Scots 'began hir hous' on 1 January 1553/4, two weeks after having been officially 
1 Balcarres Papers, II, eiii, p.143. 
2 Philip of Savoy was the husband of the late Charlotte d'Orleans, sister of Franyois d'Orleans, due de 
Longuevil\e, Guise's first husband. See ibid, II, eiii, exix, exxxv, pp. 143-4, 171-4, 195-7, for details of 
this dispute and the division of the Longueville estate. 
3 Ibid, II, exix, eeiii, exxxv, pp. 171-4, 143-4, 195-7. 
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declared of age by the French King. l The accounts for her household in 1556 reveal that 
Guise not only relinquished her personal pension of 20,000 livres from Henri to finance 
her daughter's household, but also her dowry of 13,000 livres from her son's estate.2 A 
sum of 25,000 livres was also to be provided from the crown revenues of Scotland for 
the same purpose. 
Marie de Guise's public and private financial obligations during her regency 
were, therefore, considerable. Given the sizeable deficit she inherited from 
Chatelherault's administration and the size of the Scottish government's financial 
commitment to Mary, Queen of Scots' household, it comes as no surprise that a major 
concern for Marie de Guise during her regency was the augmentation of crown revenue. 
This concern is effectively demonstrated by the act of revocation of 1555, which 
revoked 'all maner of infeftmentis and dispositiounis' made by Chatelherault during his 
regency and returned them to the crown.3 Of greater significance, perhaps, was the act's 
scathing criticism of Chatelherault's conduct, that made an act of revocation necessary 
in the first place. Thus one reads of the 'hurt and detriment' Chatelherault had caused 
by the granting of 'Crowne landis rentis possessiounis patronageis of benficis and 
1 SRO, E34125; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 131, pp. 46-7; NLS, Adv.MSS, 33.1.9, f.l'. See also SRO, 
E34126-27 and Balcarres Papers, II, cxxxv, eli, clii, elvii, clviii, elxxx, pp. 195-7, 222-6, 226-7, 235-7, 
238-241,270-5, for additional details of the establishment and maintenance of Mary Stewart's household 
in France. 
2 SRO, E34/26; Balcarres Papers, II, pp. Ii-liii. Marie de Guise received an annual payment of 7,000 
livres from the Marquise de Rothelin, who served as a guardian to her son, 1,000 livres as rent from the 
estate of Estrepagny, and an annual income of approximately 5,000 livres from the estate of 
Moustenbellay, her dowry and inheritance from her son, the late Due de Longueville. 
3 APS, II, pp. 500-1. As with any revocation, those who had benefited from the distribution of crown 
lands during a minority government were bound to be unhappy about having to give it back. On 9 August 
1555, for instance, Heruy Balnaves of Halhill wrote to the Queen Regent from Paris to put her 'heighnes 
in remebrance of sick thingis as ather mycht hurt, or proffeit, hir grace [Mary, Queen of Scots'] 
patrimonie and privilege of hir majesties crown, or the office quhilk you heighnes presently beads in hir 
grace name and authorite'. Scottish Correspondence, cclxx, pp. 404-5. 
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offices', most of which went to Hamiltons and their adherents. But the most 
controversial attempt by Guise to augment the crown's revenue came in 1556 when a 
new tax assessment scheme was proposed and subsequently rejected. 
On 2 May 1556, the Lords of the Articles submitted to Parliament for approval a 
proposal for the 'better vplifting of the present taxatioun,.1 On the surface, this was a 
standard piece of bureaucratic legislation, outlining, for example, the procedures for the 
submission of tax rolls to the Treasurer and prescribing the information that these rolls 
should contain. It is with respect to the latter that the Lords of the Articles' proposal 
was so controversial. For, in addition to a list of 'all landis within the realm', the tax 
rolls were also to contain the names of every freeholder, feuar, tenant, craftsman, cottar 
and parishoner 'togidder with the ... qunatitie of their substance & gudis mouable & 
Inmovabill', so that the 'qualitie of their personis & quantitie of their guidis & landis 
may be knawn & put In roll,.2 In essence, the Lords of the Articles were proposing that 
the rate of taxation should be assessed on the value of one's possessions over and above 
the 'auld extent', which was assessed exclusively on one's lands. 3 This new 'goods tax' 
met with great opposition in Parliament. For some members of the Three Estates, the 
prospect of having to inventory their 'estate and substance', as if 'to make their last 
willes and testamentes', was anathema. For others, the idea that this was to become a 
perpetual annual tax was grounds for opposition and rejection in itself.4 
I APS, II, Appendix 10, pp. 604-5; RPC, XIV, p.14. 
2 APS, II, pp. 604-5. 
3 1. Goodare, 'Parliamentary Taxation in Scotland, 1560-1603', SHR, Ixviii (1989), pp. 23-52; T. 
Thomson, Memorial on Old Extent, J.D. Mackie (ed.), (The Stair Society, 1946). 
4 CSP Scot., I, 411, pp. 196-7. 
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There is some question as to whether the Lords of the Articles were actually 
proposing a perpetual tax. Their failure to stipulate the duration of this new tax 
assessment scheme does give that impression, yet there is some evidence to suggest that 
it was actually an attempt by Marie de Guise to raise emergency funds for the 
construction and fortification of strongholds. In a letter to the Cardinal de Lorraine 
dated 13 January 155617,1 Guise wrote despairingly of her ill-preparedness for war, 
stating that she had not 'une seulle bonne place pour sa defendre et soustenir ung 
seige,.2 This, she claimed, was due to the 'extraordinary expenses' involved in 
maintaining a standing force on the Border to quell 'ung grand nombre de larrons et 
rebelles qui destruirent to us la pais'? Guise cited another reason why funds were not 
readily available to finance her fort-building policy: Parliament's rejection of the 
'goods tax' proposed by the Lords of the Aliicles.4 Even though she had the money 
ready for the construction of new forts for the security of the realm, Guise complained 
that, 'Jaurya esperance que laffaires qui auroit este mis cy aucun au dernier parlement 
pourrois pour y satisfaire voyans que les grans I' avonts trouve Ie meilleur du monde, 
I AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 7-lOr; Papal Negotiations, pp. 427-33. See also AE, 
Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 10-11 for a similar letter written by Guise to Constable 
Montmorency on 13 January 1556/7. 
2 Ibid, XV, f.7v; Papal Negotiations, pA28. 
3 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 7v_8 r ; Papal Negotiations, pA28. Contrary to 
Lesley's contention, the 'perpetual tax' was not for the maintenance of a standing army on the Border; this 
had already been paid for. Lesley, HistOlY, p.254. 
4 This tax was introduced in Parliament on 6 May 1556. On 9 May, Wharton reported to Shrewsbury that 
, '" the noble men was togwetheris at Edinburgh the vjth and was thought then that their parlyament wold 
contynew vj or vij daies more. The dowager demandyth a grete soume to hir borne of the Realme, which 
at the fyrst the Lords denied'. On 13 Maya second report followed: 'The Scots mayd end of their 
parliament the ix The Dowager in hir own person gave thanks to all their bodys of hir parlyament. And 
comendyd their consyderacion for the Surety of hyr Realme which she ... answered was nathir of her self 
nor of the french And understandyng hir wyse oppynyons did commend them. And upon Wedynsday 
befor them breakynd up she in fayr maner tho not well pleased departed'. LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 
237 r,249r. 
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Mais la commune noblesse et Ie peuple sous entrez cy vne tels Jalousie que est pour ... 
une perpetuelle taille.' I 
It would appear, then, that the new tax reassessment scheme was not intended to 
be permanent. If it had been, why would Guise feel the need to state otherwise to her 
own brother and confidante? On the other hand, if this extra revenue was going be used 
to finance Guise's fort-building policy, why was this not cited as the reason for the 
introduction ofa goods tax? Marie de Guise's supplications to Rome in 1555,1556 and 
1557, for example, explained that a subsidy of two-tenths of all ecclesiastical revenue 
was needed for 'the fortification of castles and border strongholds ... and for the repair 
of them' against England.2 Similarly, the Privy Council had no problem approving a tax 
of £20,000 on 22 January 1554/5, so that 'ane forth [could] be bigged besyde Kelso,.3 
Of this 'grete extent', £1 0,000 was to be subdivided between 'the Barronis, Landed 
Men, Temporall Estait, and Burrowis', while the other half was to be paid by the clergy, 
who seem to have been remiss in their payments. Instead of enforcing the law and 
putting the offenders to the horn as rebels, Marie de Guise changed tactics and adopted a 
far more lenient position. In an attempt to induce the clergy to pay their taxes by means 
of gentle persuasion, the punishment for non-payment was rescinded by Parliament in 
1555.4 Yet beneath Guise's accommodating veneer was a steely determination to 
1 AB, MelllOires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 8v_9'; Papal Negotiations, p.429. 
2 Ibid, pp. 3-4, 522-5; Mahoney, 'The Scottish Hierarchy', p.74; Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.87. 
3 RPC, XIV, p.l3; Edinburgh Burgh Recs., II, pp. 209-10, 214-5, 215-6; Aberdeen Council Register, pp. 
298, 299. It was not until 8 June 1556 that the burgh of Aberdeen paid off 'thair hail! taxt that the said 
toune was sett to ... for the bigging certane forthis vpoun our souerane ladyis bordouris', which amounted 
to £66.5.0. For additional references to the Kelso enterprise, see AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 377-
8', 398-9 and XX, f.222. 
4 APS, II, p.498. 
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collect the revenue owing to her from the First Estate for the Kelso enterprise. It was 
made perfectly clear that this act was to remain in effect only as long as 'the Lordis of 
the spiritualitie prouyde and find sum vther sure and ressonabill maner how the samin 
salbe inbrocht to our Souerane Lady and hir grace payit thairor . 1 
Money for the defence of the kingdom, therefore, was clearly a priority for Marie 
de Guise during her regency.2 This is hardly surprising given the 'cool' relations 
between Scotland and England during the reign of Mary Tudor. Guise's financial 
burdens were already weighty enough without the added pressure of war and/or an 
Anglo-Imperial invasion. The deficit she inherited from Chatelherault's administration 
left her with little or nothing for emergency defensive policies, let alone long-term 
financial commitments such as the establishment and maintenance of Mary, Queen of 
Scots' household in France. But the augmentation of crown revenue and matters of 
defence were not the only concerns for Guise - the pursuit of royal justice and the 
imposition of law and order were equally important. 
*** 
Marie de Guise's regency is, perhaps, best characterised by her overwhelming concern 
for law and order. Central to this was her quest to provide for the effective 
administration and execution of justice throughout the entire kingdom. In order to 
achieve this, Guise naturally turned to Parliament, where legislation was passed to 
standardise and regulate legal procedures as they pertained to criminal cases. In the 
I APS, II, pA98. 
2 Schemes to extract money from the church and laity were also submitted to the Queen Regent for her 
consideration. These included 'Suggestions for augmenting the queen dowagers revenue without grudge, 
hurt or feiling of the people'. NLS, Adv.MSS, 34.2.17, f.124. 
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Parliament of June 1555, for example, statutes were enacted stipulating the procedures 
for the issuing of summonses and the time allotted for charges of murder to be 
processed. 1 Legislation regulating cOUli protocol was also enacted. Those called to 
underlie the law were required to show up on the day appointed, defendants were asked 
to bring the testimonies of only their most honest, wise and substantial friends and, of 
course, their advocates, while the pursuers of the action were allowed the testimonies of 
four of their friends. 2 The Parliament of 1555 also passed legislation against specific 
crimes such as fraud and peljury. In particular, Guise sought to eradicate the problem of 
peljurious witnesses by imposing stiff penalties. Persons who bore false witness or 
induced witnesses to peljure themselves were to be punished 'be [the] peirsing of thair 
toungis and escheting of all thair gudis to our Souerane Ladyis vse and declairit neuer to 
be habill to bruke honour office or dignitite,.3 They were to receive further punishment 
at the discretion of the Lords according to the extent of their crime.4 Another prevalent 
problem that Guise sought to address was that of retributory justice. Because of the 
odious crimes of slaughter daily committed within the realm, and in particular, the 
slaying of parties pursuing and defending their actions, a statute was enacted that 
outlined the legal procedures if the defendant in a murder case slayed the pursuer of the 
action and vice versa. 5 In accordance with her programme to strengthen royal power by 
advancing the interests of the crown at the expense of local jurisdictions and extending 
I APS, II, pp. 492-3. 
2 Ibid, II, p.49S. 
3 Ibid, II, p.497. 
4 Ibid, II, p.497. 
5 Ibid, II, pp. 494-S. 
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royal government into the localities, Guise's attacks on the 'private' justice of the feud 
was, ultimately, an attempt to promote the 'public' justice ofroyal courts. 
The nature of this legislation clearly reflects Marie de Guise's determination to 
provide for the effective execution of royal justice through the centralisation of 
Scotland's legal system and standardisation of procedure. But for Guise, it was the 
administration of justice that was in the greatest need of reform. This, she claimed, and 
not necessarily Scots law itself, was the greatest source of injustice in Scotland. 1 Upon 
becoming regent, Guise was determined to rectify this problem by looking to the French 
legal system as a model for reform. Her request that two French lawyers be sent 
immediately to Scotland was granted on 24 October 1554, when Montmorency informed 
her that, 'les deux hommes de robbe longue que avez pour Ie faict et administration de 
votre justice affin de Ie vous envoyer incontinent,.2 Unfortunately, it is not known what 
advice these legal envoys gave the Queen Regent, nor are there any sources detailing 
their activities in Scotland. Nevertheless, their very presence may offer some 
explanation as to why the administration of justice eventually became a source of 
discord between Guise and the Scots. 
In January 155617, Guise wrote a very revealing letter to the Cardinal de 
Lorraine in which she confessed that for the first time in her political career she actually 
felt estranged from her Scottish subjects.3 According to the Regent, the primary reason 
for this deterioration in crown-magnate relations was her determination to 'voir la 
I Papal Negotiations, p.430; AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.9 v. 
2 Balcarres Papers, II, cJxvi, pp. 251-2. 
3 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angieterre, XV, f.9[; Papal Negotiations, p.430. 
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Justice aller par ledroict chemin'. 1 The Scots, she complained, and in particular the 
great lords, are: 
... si peu desirent de la Justice quilz sont plustost aise de veoir tousiours 
quelque chose a desmettre qui lempescher, Et ne peult on parla demander 
lay Justice quils ne disent Incontinant veult Ion ladicte veult changer leur 
loix .... Dieu scait Monsieur mon frere quelle vie Jay, ce nest peu de chose 
que damener ung peuple nouveau a parfection et nouuelle servuitude a 
eulx qui ont enuy a de voir regnir Justice.2 
But in her desire to see justice reign, Guise confessed that she had been a 'peu austere' -
the end result being that the Scots will not endure it: 
... et disent que ce sont les loix dela francais et que leur vieilles loix sont 
bonnes, la pluspart desquelles sont les plus Injustes du monde, non dicelles 
mesmes mais cy la manier quilz cy vsent, la qui est cause de tous nostre 
discord, que Ie passe toustesfois la plus doulcement que je puis sans biens 
gaster attendans meilleure saison, et que Je voye au quil plaira adieu 
de disclose [ sic]. 3 
Guise's request for French judicial intervention, coupled with her desire to reform 
Scotland's legal system, gave the appearance, rightly or wrongly, that she wanted to 
replace Scotland's ancient laws with those of the French. For the Scots, any alteration 
to their ancient laws and liberties, the cornerstones of their cultural and institutional 
independence, was a form of sacrilege. We have already seen in Chapter I how the 
Scots went to great pains to ensure that their ancient laws and liberties were safeguarded 
in the treaties of Birgham, Greenwich and Haddington. This was also a stipulation of 
Marie de Guise's assumption of the regency. The Scots insisted that Guise procure a 
bond from Henri guaranteeing that 'this realme with all dominiounis and possessiounis 
tharof or subj ect tharto and lieges of the samin sall brouke and j ois the awld libelieis and 
1 AB, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.9 r; Papal Negotiations, p.430. 
2 AB, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.Sr; Papal Negotiations, p.42S. 
3 AB, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.9v; Papal Negotiations, p.430. 
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privilegeis tharof, and salbe onlie governit ... be the lawis ... and consuetudis of this said 
realme .. , without ony alteratioun or innovatioun'.1 Any attempt on the pmi of Guise to 
reform Scottish law, therefore, was bound to meet with fierce resistance - not least if it 
was aimed at the elite's own exercise of power in the localities. 
Unsurprisingly, this deterioration in crown-magnate relations was picked up on 
by the Lords of the Congregation during their rebellion, and Guise was accused of 
attempting to 'changer leur loix'? The Scots' opposition to the Queen Regent's legal 
reforms in 1556-7, however, prevented their implementation and ironically enabled 
Guise to deny this charge outright. The Congregation was subsequently told that, 'au 
regard des lois quelle ne savait quil eust Jamais este contrevenu a pas une. Et si ainsi 
estoit qui Ion y eust Innove uilque chose Hz sen debvoient plaindre et Ie remonstrer,.3 
Marie de Guise's pursuit of royal justice and quest for law and order, however, 
consisted of far more than the mere formulation of policy. It also involved putting these 
policies into practice. Justice not only needed to be legislated for, but also duly 
executed - nowhere more so than on the Borders and in the Highlands and Western Isles 
of Scotland, the traditional hotspots of lawlessness, violence and disorder. Yet, as we 
shall see in Chapter VI, this was no easy task and the international situation that 
prevailed throughout most of Guise's regency served only to frustrate matters further. 
The Habsburg-Valois conflict and, more directly, Mary Tudor's marriage to Philip of 
I ADCP, p.630. In the treaty of Haddington, for example, Henri promised that he would 'obseruand and 
keipand this Relame and liegis thairof in the samin fredome liberteis and Lawis and hes bene in all kingis 
of Scotlandis tymes bypast'. APS, II, p.4S1. 
2 Brosse Missions, pp. 150,151. 
3 Ibid, pp. 152, 153. 
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Spain necessitated that Guise focus almost all of her time, energy and resources on 
matters of national security. This was particularly true of the Anglo-Scottish Border, 
where the Continental superpowers now met tete a tete as a result of the dynastic 
alliances each had forged within the archipelago. Yet, it was precisely because of the 
international situation that the need for law and order on the Border was the greatest, not 
only for the security of the realm, but also to maintain what was already a precarious 
peace between the 'auld enemies'. Moreover, the undue attention Guise was forced to 
pay to the Borders also frustrated her attempts to deal with the so-called 'Highland 
problem' - violent insurgent activity that had returned with a vengeance during Mary, 
Queen of Scots' minority. Both of these areas were earmarked for special recognition in 
Marie de Guise's quest for law and order, and it is to the Borders and the Highlands and 
Western Isles that we now turn. 
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The Borders, Highlands and Western Isles 
Shortly after her assumption of the regency, Marie de Guise received some advice for 
the punishment of crime. 1 Written in response to 'the mone slawchtiris commettit with 
in this realme', and for 'the ordour of the bordour quhilk is the maist prencipall thing to 
put the realme to ane quyatenes', this memorandum outlined the social ills that Marie de 
Guise had been commissioned to cure - disorder, lawlessness and violence. 2 At no other 
place were these problems more prevalent than on the Anglo-Scottish Border, where: 
... the aquentenc at is betwen Scotland and Ingland amangis the theifis 
one bayth the bordouris, to gether with the deidli feidis quhilk, ... beyng 
nocht wei11luket apone, sall ever hald your grace in ane bessenes: for 
your grace man tak respeik to ther thingis be your grace self, for your 
grace knawis the natour of the pepell and effectione at is amangis thame, 
throw the quhilk effectione your grace hes knawyng the cowmon weill 
perreche dywiris tymes.3 
It was generally perceived that the key to a quiet, peaceful and law abiding kingdom 
was the Borders, and 'withowt your grace haif ane respeik to it, consederane the 
partecularaty and effection at your grace knawis in Scotland, it is unabill to be weill,.4 
One major factor contributing to the prevalent lawlessness and disorder on the 
Border was the continued existence of the Debatable Land in the West March. As we 
have seen, according to the terms of the treaty of Norham, the Debatable Land was to 
I Scottish Correspondence, ccliii, pp. 379-80. It is not known who wrote this letter, or when. 
2 Ibid, ccliii, p.379. 
3 Ibid, ccliii, p.380. 
4 Ibid, ccliii, p.380. 
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return to the status quo ante bellum. l As long as the boundaries and sovereignty of the 
Debatable Land remained in dispute, the chances of imposing order there were 
drastically reduced. Added to this was the refusal of the inhabitants of the Debatable 
Land to evacuate their premises - another stipulation of the treaty of Norham? As a no 
man's land, the Debatable Land was a safe haven for the less desirable elements of 
Scottish and English society. As a first step in tackling the problem of disorder on the 
Border, therefore, the Scottish and English governments resolved to evict the inhabitants 
of the Debatable Land by force - specifically, by burning them out of their homes.3 
The joint incursion was planned for 10 December 1551 and was to be led by 
both the Wardens of the West March, Lords Maxwell and Conyers.4 On 26 November, 
proclamations were despatched to Selkirk and Roxburgh charging the inhabitants of 
those shires to convene at Hawick on 8 December, 'to pas upoune the thevis of the 
Debatable ground with lord Maxwell,.5 But by 7 December, the English had suddenly 
withdrawn their support for the enterprise. Lord Conyers not only 'refusit to keip the 
dyat, bot wold haiff the samyn stayit'.6 The reason behind the English Council's 
decision to pull out of the exercise, and their order for Conyers to suspend all 
communication with the Scots, was the murder of a member of the house of Armstrong. 
I Foedera, XV, pp. 265-6; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 58-9. 
2 Foedera, XV, p.266; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 58-9. 
3 TA, X, pp. 34, 39-40. 
4 RPC, I, p.1l7; TA, X, p.34. In November 1551, the logistics of the raid for 'the recovery of the 
Debaitabill land' were hannnered out between Maxwell and a special depute acting for Conyers at 
Dumfries, where Chatelherault was holding a justice ayre. RSS, IV, 1416-1428, pp. 225-7; TA, X, p.31. 
5 Ibid, X, p.34. 
6 RPC, I, p.l17 
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The possible repercussions of a military expedition directed against the illegal 
inhabitants of the Debatable Land, among whom the Armstrongs were prevalent, 
sparked fears in the English camp that 'somme greater inconvenience might growe, and 
thereby the peace and amitie empayred'.1 Marie de Guise, Chatelherault and the Privy 
Council, conversely, had no such qualms and remained fully committed to the 
enterprise. Maxwell was ordered to proceed as planned, 'provyding alwayis that the 
said Lord do, nor procure to be done, upoun the severall ground of Ingland that may 
tend to the ruptor of the peace and violatioun thairof.2 On 10 December he set out on 
his course of destruction, intent not only on the 'bimyng of the Debatable ground', but 
also the demolition of the inhabitants' homesteads.3 
Maxwell's raid, however, failed to reduce the Debatable Land to a state of 
uninhabited neutrality. The Grahams and the Armstrongs, the primary targets of the 
raid, stood their ground and remained a permanent fixture within the disputed territory. 
If anything, Maxwell's raid worsened the situation by inaugurating a particularly violent 
feud between his house and that of the Grahams, several of whom were slaughtered 
during the Warden's expedition.4 As a result, lawlessness and disorder continued to 
plague the Borders and it became patently clear that in order to rectify the situation, the 
Debatable Land had to be divided and its boundaries settled once and for all. 
I APC, III, pp. 363-4,430, 443. 
2 RPC, I, pp. 117-8. 
3 Maxwell was accompanied by hackbutters, masons, quarrymen and 'peonaris' who were armed with 
'pikkis and mattokkis'. TA, X, pp. 39-40. 
4 RPC, I, pp. 117-8, 118-9, 144-6; R.B. Armstrong, The HistOlY of Liddesdale, Eskdale, Ewesdale, 
Wauchopedale, and the Debateable Land, (Edinburgh, 1833), Appendix liii, pp. xciii-xciv. 
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Just weeks after Maxwell's raid, the Privy Council described in detail the 
degenerate state of the Borders on account of the existence of the Debatable Land. It 
was reported that: 
... the greit and hevy attemptatis committit upoun our Soverane Ladys 
pur liegis be thevis and uthairis malefactouris, brokin men, and the 
diverse murthuris and slauchteris committit be thaim in tyme bigane, 
and specialie be the inhabitantis [of] the Debatabilliand, quha nychtlie, 
day, and continualie rydis and makis quotidiane reiffis and oppressionis 
upon the pur; and in likmaner, all evill doaris and faItouris resortis to the 
said Dabatabilliand, and quhatsumever fait thai commit thai ar we1cum 
and ressett be the inhabitantis thairof, and assistis and takis plane part 
with theif and tratour in thair evill deidis, and na trew man offendit to 
can get rameid, nor na trespassour can be put to dew punischment; and 
als understandand that the said Debatabilliand and inhabitantis thairof 
hes bene thir mony yeris the occasioun ofweris, and ay hes beine the 
principall brekaris of the pece, and as yit daylie intendis to do that is in 
thaim to do the samyn. 1 
They concluded that the only viable solution was that the 'Debatabill land be dividit ... 
for the commoun weill of this realme, rest and quitenes of the lieges thairof, and 
interteneyng of the peax in all tymes to cum'.2 The English had reached the same 
conclusion at approximately the same time and approached the French ambassador then 
in London, Claude de Laval, Seigneur de Boisdauphin, to set the wheels in motion.3 On 
20 March 155112, Cassillis, Maxwell, Sir James Douglas of Drumlanrig and John 
Bellenden of Auchnoul were appointed to meet with the negotiating commissioners for 
England, the Earl of Westmorland, Sir Thomas Palmer and Sir Thomas Challoner, for 
the equitable division of the Debatable Land.4 
127 January 1551/2, RPC, I, pp. 118-9. 
2 Ibid, I, p.119. 
3 BL, Cotton MSS, Caligula B.vii, f.490. 
4 Richard Maitland of Lethington also became involved in the negotiations and was one of the signatories 
of the final agreement on 24 September 1552. RPC, I, pp. 120-1; APC, III, pp. 492-3; Foedera, XV, pp. 
315,318-9. 
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It had been decided early on that the negotiations would take place at Dumfries 
and Carlisle as opposed to somewhere in the Debatable Land, because it was feared that 
the inhabitants there, 'being affectyoned to their owne pryvate purpose', would prevent 
the realisation of its division. Cassillis' advice to Marie de Guise, that 'it is best that 
nain knaw qwhow thir materis standis', was echoed in the English Council's declaration 
that 'the lesse pryvey the Borderers be made to the devision hereof, the more likely it is 
the thing shall take place'. 1 In the end, it was not the reaction of the Grahams or the 
Armstrongs that threatened to jeopardise the negotiations, but the terms of the 
settlement itself. 
The fate of Cannobie Priory and, in particular, two stone houses belonging to 
Sandy Annstrong and Thomas Graham were the major points of contention that 
eventually broke up the negotiations just weeks after they had begun in May 1551.2 The 
Scottish government issued explicit instructions to the negotiating commissioners that 
'ye enter nocht to na divisoun of the landis of the Priorye of Cannoby as debatabill,.3 
They were, however, willing to adopt a far more compromising position on the matter 
of the Graham and Armstrong residences. Ideally, they would have preferred the 
'downputting of baith the stane houssis', but the Scottish commissioners were instructed 
to abandon this point if it proved to be a stumbling block for the division of the 
I Scottish Correspondence, cc1xii, pp. 359-60; APC, III, pp. 491-4. 
2 On 22 April 1552, the Scottish Commissioners were ordered to make their way towards the West March 
to begin the negotiations, but the English Commissioners' initial reluctance to deal with Lord Maxwell 
and the dispute over whether the first meeting should be held in Scotland or England, meant that the 
actual division of the Debatable Land was not discussed until early May. RPC, I, pp. 124-5; Scottish 
Correspondence, cc1xii, pp. 357-60; BL, Cotton MSS, Caligula B.vii, fos. 461-5; Boscher, 'English 
provincial government', pp. 137-8. 
3 RPC, I, p.122. See ibid, I, pp. 121-2, for the Scottish commissioners' complete set of instructions. 
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Debatable Land as a whole.! The English commissioners, conversely, had been issued 
with far more stringent instructions.2 In addition to Black Bank, a strategic location 'by 
the which there is a strayte and yet a good passage for the entrye or convoye of 
ordynance owt of Skotland over the water of Esk into England', they were to secure 
both houses, especially Sandy Armstrong's, and the areas of the Debatable Land in 
which they stood.3 The negotiating commissioners had come to the table, therefore, 
with a clear conflict of interest. 
Cassillis reported as much when he detailed the events of their meeting to Marie 
de Guise: 
... we dessyirrit them [the English commissioners] to mark in the plat, as 
they wald answ[ e]r afoir ther Consel, [qwhat] war ane ressonabil dewision 
and we swld do the lyik. Sa, madame, they maid ane merk and passit throw 
ane part of Cannabe and maid al the best land to them and bayth Sande 
Armestaringis hows and Thome Gramis. Than we dessyirrit to geif them it 
that they offerit to ws and to tak the toder, qwilk they [cu ]ld nocht aggre to, 
as they said. Than we dewydit it in twa maners and offerit them ther chois, 
qwhilk they said they mycht nocht accord to, ... Madame, the caws ofwr 
defference presantly is that [they] exteim Cannabe debatabil, qwhilk we cwld 
nocht accord onto. Nocht theles, madame, the mater is brocht to ane neir 
poinct.4 
Despite the impasse over Cannobie Priory and the English Commissioners' rejection of 
the Scots' proposal that both sides take one house each, the Queen Dowager was 
nevertheless heartened by the way the negotiations seemed to be progressing. So 
optimistic was she that on 25 May 1552 the Due de Guise was informed that a 
I RPC, I, p.122. 
2 BL, Harley MSS, 289.26, fos. 36-8. 
3 Ibid, 289.26, f.38. 
48 May [1552], Scottish Correspondence, ccxlii, pp. 358-9. 
203 
Chapter VI: The Borders, Highlands and Western Isles 
settlement was imminent. 1 Marie de Guise had either been misinformed or grossly 
misled. By the time she wrote to her brother, the negotiations had effectively broken 
down. Once again, it would take the intervention of Boisdauphin to get the negotiations 
up and running. 2 
Recommencing in June, the second round of negotiations made little headway 
and dragged on through the summer of 1552. While the English had agreed to concede 
the lands of Cannobie Priory, they had become more resolute in their determination to 
gain possession of both the Armstrong and Graham homesteads. It was not until 16 
August that some definite progress was made. Frustrated by the proceedings, 
Boisdauphin presented 'the Scotes last offer towching the particion of the Debatable' to 
the English Council, for which Edward VI's assent was finally received.3 Interestingly, 
the treaty dividing the Debatable Land, which was formally concluded on 24 September 
1552, greatly resembled the terms initially proposed by the Scots' in April-May 1552.4 
The lands of the Priory of Cannobie and the house of Sandy Armstrong fell to Scotland, 
while the English gained possession of the area dominated by the Grahams. Once again, 
an Anglo-Scottish treaty had largely been effected by French diplomatic intervention. 
As P.G. Boscher comments, 'it would be wrong to view the division of the Debatable as 
I Balcarres Papers, II, lxxxii, pp. 118-9; Boscher, 'English provincial government', pp. 138-9. 
2 APC, IV, p.69; PRO, SP10/14/36. 
3 APC, IV, pp. 113, 118. 
4 Foedera, XV, pp. 315-9; CSP Scot., I, 394, p.191, Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 316-9; RPC, I, pp. 
121-2; Scottish Correspondence, cclxii, pp. 358-9; Boscher, 'English provincial government', p.141. See 
Foedera, XV, pp. 319-20 and 325-6, for MaIY, Queen of Scots' ratification of the treaty and Sir John 
Maxwell of Terregles and John Johnstone's commission to exchange this confirmation with Sir Thomas 
Dacre and Sir Richard Musgrave, which took place on 15 December 1552. 
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a product of Anglo-Scottish cooperation; it came about chiefly as a result of French 
pressure to resolve the controversy once and for all'.1 
The existence of the Debatable Land, however, was but one factor contributing 
to the prevalent lawlessness and disorder on the Borders. A more serious problem was 
the general disregard for Border Law and the ineffective administration and execution of 
justice by warden officials on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish divide. The rectification 
of these problems became an over-ridin~ concern for Marie de Guise during her 
regency. Her extensive involvement in every aspect of Border affairs, from the most 
trivial task to those more befitting her rank, reflected her determination to fulfil her 
commission and provide for the 'executioun of justice and ordouring of the cuntre'? 
The methods she employed to combat disorder and reduce the Border to obedience, 
moreover, are representative of the methods she employed throughout all of Scotland. 
Mary Tudor's accession, and her expressed desire for peace and the maintenance 
of law and order, provided Marie de Guise with an ideal opportunity to seek redress for 
the numerous outrages committed by the English on the Border against the ScotS.3 
Antoine de Noailles, the new French ambassador resident in London, was ordered to 
present letters from Marie de Guise congratulating the English Queen on her accession 
and reciprocating her good will to peace.4 More importantly, he was to describe in 
detail the nature of the outrages committed by the English on the Border, and to 
I Boscher, 'English provincial government', p.141. 
2 RPC, I, p.90. 
3 Noailles informed Marie de Guise of Mary Tudor's inclination to peace on 6 September 1553. AE, Cor. 
Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.68; CSP Scot., I, 398, p.I92. 
4 Ibid., I, 398, p.I92. Chatelherault also sent a letter to Mary Tudor on 25 September 1553, which simply 
reiterated Guise's message. Ibid, I, 398.i, p.I92. 
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'perswaid the Queen and Counsale to direct Commissioneris ... to meit ane lyke nomer 
Commissioneris for Scotland, ... for redressing of sic attemptatis, stancheing of 
malefactouris, and ordorying of the Bourdouris, manteinance of the peax and quiet of 
the liegis of baith the realmes'.' If Mary refused to comply, Noailles was further 
instructed to 'mak the Kyng [Henri] advertisment thairor. Marie de Guise was fully 
prepared to use Henri's protectorate of Scotland, and the latent threat of his intervention, 
to force the English Queen into compliance.2 
Noailles presented the Queen Dowager's letter on 8 October 1553.3 From him, 
the English Queen heard numerous complaints and charges against her Border subjects 
in great detail. They were accused, for example, of making daily incursions into 
Scotland for the purpose of 'takand heirschippis of gudis, committand slauchteris and 
utheris gret crymes and rangis upon the liegis of this realme'.4 The more serious charge, 
however, lay in the fact that for these crimes the Scottish Wardens 'can get na redress, 
quhilk apperis manifestlie to move occasioun of weir betwix the realme, gif hiasty 
remeid be nocht providit and ordour put thair to'.5 This also applied to the infraction of 
Lord Home's fishing rights of the Tweed by the Captain of Norham, a matter that the 
Deputy Warden of the East March for England, Mr. Gray of Chillingham, refused to 
settle. This may be because he was allegedly involved in criminal activity himself. 
Chillingham had been accused of making cattle and sheep raids into Scotland with 
I RPC, I, p.149. 
2 Ibid, I, p.149. 
3 CSP Foreign, 1553-1558,53, pp. 17-8; RPC, I, pp. 148-51. 
4 Ibid, I, p.148. 
5 Ibid, I, p.148. 
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Cuthbert Musgrave, Captain of Harbottle. The Captain of Wark was similarly accused, 
but with the murder of two Scots 'nocht half ane Scottis myle fra the said metynge place 
of Roddane burne, and scant tua houris afore the meting of the Wardanis'. 1 These 
charges reveal the truly lawless state of the Borders. Not only was justice failing to be 
executed, but there was also the more serious problem of the responsible officials 
having a complete disregard for Border Law themselves. How could one expect Border 
Law to be observed when the very people who were employed to enforce it, and 
dispense impartial justice, were themselves engaged in criminal activity? 
In response to these allegations, Mary Tudor adopted a non-committal position. 
She neither admitted nor refuted the charges made against her subjects, but simply 
acceded to Marie de Guise's request for a meeting of commissioners on the Anglo-
Scottish Border.2 Sir Thomas Cornwallis and Sir Robert Bowes were appointed to meet 
with the Scottish commissioners, Sir Robert Carnegy of Kinnaird and Sir John 
Bellenden of Auchnoul, 'to determine all past quarrels, and give order to avoid the like 
in future'.3 In late October 1553, the English Commissioners proceeded to Berwick 
armed with their instructions and a similar list of outrages committed by the Scots 
against the English.4 
The result of this meeting of commissioners was an indenture dated 4 December 
1553. A reassertion and redefinition of Border Law and practices, the 'Indenture' aimed 
I RPC, I, pp. 148-9; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558,53, pp. 17-8. 
2 Mary Tudor to Marie de Guise, 13 October 1553, CSP Scot., I, 400, p.193. See also CSP Foreign, 
1553-1558, 53, pp. 17-8, for the English Council's account of Noailles' audience with Mary and their 
thoughts on the charges levied by the Scots. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 400, p.193; APC, IV, p.357; RPC, I, p.150. 
4 BL, Harley MSS, 289, f.160 and 1757, f.314. 
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to provide for the effective administration and execution of justice. 1 It dealt with a wide 
range of issues, from individual disputes, such as Lord Home's fishing rights, to the 
general backlog of umedressed bills at Days of Truce, and outlined the correct 
procedures for the punishment of crime. In cases of murder, for example, Wardens were 
ordered to observe all points of the law and exact the full penalties because the 
'negligent omission of offences in executioun and performing the said treatie and lawis 
in that poynt hes bene the occasioun of sic greit enormiteis and discordes upone the 
bordouris of baith the saidis realme'.2 While the payment of damages remained the 
customary penalty for arson and assault, the commissioners added a further stipulation 
that the perpetrators of these crimes were to be delivered to the Warden opposite and 
'punissit be him in strait presoun be the space of sex monethis'.3 The 'Indenture' of 
1553, therefore, served as the legal foundation upon which Marie de Guise sought to 
implement good rule on the Borders as Queen Regent. 
During the first three years of her regency, Marie de Guise worked laboriously to 
see that Border laws were being observed and enforced. In May 1554, d'Oisel reported 
to Noailles that, since her advancement to the regency, Guise has been 'continuellement 
empeschee tant a reuire noz frontieres en meilleur repos qU'elles n'ont este par cy 
devant comme aussy a donner provision a toutes autres choses concemans Ie bien police 
et Justice de ce Royaume qui en a tres grand besoing en quoy ladicte Dame a desja tres 
bien commence,.4 One way she sought to remedy these problems was to take a direct 
1 RPC, XIV, pp. 115-22; Nicolson, Leges Marchiarum, pp. 71-83. 
2 RPC, XIV, pp. 119-20. 
3 Ibid, XIV, p.120. 
4 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 185, 232r • 
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hand in all aspects of Border affairs. The Register of the Privy Council for Scotland 
(XIV) reveals the extraordinary lengths Guise went to ensure that Border Law was being 
administered and executed properly.! As one would expect, she corresponded with 
Mary Tudor or used the French Ambassador resident in England to voice her complaints 
and seek redress at the English Court. But she also took the unusual step of regularly 
writing directly to England's Wardens on routine matters of business that one can only 
describe as trivial, and certainly not what one would expect a Queen Regent to have 
concerned herself with. In her correspondence with Lord Conyers and Lord Dacre, for 
example, she discussed the return of fugitives and the delivery of pledges, fought for the 
release of Scottish subjects who had been illegally detained in England and sought 
redress for crimes committed against individual Scots. By keeping in constant 
communication with Dacre and Conyers, Marie de Guise placed a great deal of pressure 
on the Wardens to enforce and execute Border Law. She reinforced this policy by 
maintaining a high profile in the area. 
In the summer of 1554, Scotland's new Queen Regent made an extensive and 
prolonged visit to the Border. Her progress was intended to be a visible display of royal 
power, whereby her authority and that of the crown was asserted on a personal level. It 
also provided her with an opportunity to ensure first hand that justice was being served 
on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish divide. Informing Dacre of her upcoming visit, 
Guise declared that the purpose of her progress was 'nocht only for our pastyme, bot to 
put ordour amangis sic misreulie peple as wald tend to raise ony truble or disquiet 
I RPC, XIV, pp. 122-64. 
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betuix the trew subjectis ofthir twa realmes'.1 She then made the extraordinary move of 
summoning him to a meeting with Lord Yester, Warden of the Middle March for 
Scotland, at Hexpethgate on 20 June to dispense the justice that should have been 
disponed at an earlier meeting in May.2 The Queen Regent's scheduled appearance at 
this conference was to ensure that it was. By her shrewd manipulation of events, Dacre 
was in no position to ignore the Queen Regent's summons or decline her 'invitation' to 
administer justice without adding to the friction that already existed between the two 
sides.3 
The precarious nature of Anglo-Scottish relations in 1554 led the English to 
view Marie de Guise's visit to the Border with great suspicion. Although she had 
clearly stated the purpose of her journey to Dacre, an ulterior motive was nevertheless 
suspected.4 Conyers was particularly worried. On 6 June 1554, he wrote to Shrewsbury 
expressing his concern: 'to what purpose hir commyng is, I am not (as yet) suer ... But 
whatsoever hir intent is, I thinke (by the grace of god) with the small powre I have to 
put my self in such arreadyness as for the suddyn (if her purpose so were) that she and 
hir force sholde be resisted'.5 As a precautionary measure, Shrewsbury subsequently 
ordered that all the English Wardens place themselves at one hour's notice for the 
I RPC, XIV, p.129; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, f.232 r • 
2 RPC, XIV, pp. 128-9. 
3 Ibid, XIV, pp. 130-1. 
4 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 43r, 47r. 
s Ibid, 3194, f.47r. 
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defence of the Border, 'ifnede shall so require'.) In the meantime, the Queen Regent's 
movements were to be watched and reported scrupulously. 2 
The highlight and, arguably, main purpose of Guise's trip to the Borders was to 
attend a justice ayre at Jedburgh in mid-July.3 The fortnight she spent in the burgh 
satisfied her SUSpICIOUS English observers that she was genuinely concerned with 
justice, having 'travelled verie ornestlie to bring hir subiectes unto amytie and love on 
with an other'.4 Leaving Jedburgh on 23 July, the royal party, which was escorted by a 
company of French light horse under the command of d'Oisel, made its way to Kelso, 
arriving there that same evening. From Kelso, the Queen Regent and her military 
entourage then proceeded to Home Castle, Langton, Eyemouth, Dunbar and Haddington 
respectively.S Clearly, Guise was determined to cover as much ground as possible 
during her progress in order to 'puttand reull vpoun the Bordouris' through a visible 
display of royal power. She also sought to achieve this by taking hostages as pledges 
for good behaviour and obedience to the crown. 
In accordance with the advice she received for the punishment of crime and for 
'the handillyng of the bourdour men',6 Marie de Guise used her royal progress, and the 
justice ayre at Jedburgh in particular, as an opportunity to take 'plegeis of the clannis 
1 Conyers to Shrewsbury, 1 July 1554, LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.43'. 
2 Ibid, 3194, f.43'. 
3 RSS, IV, 2783-90, pp. 481-3; TA, X, p.264; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 43', 51, 57, 59'; RPC, XIV, 
p.137. 
4 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 51, 59. 
5 Ibid, 3194, f.59'. 
6 Scottish Correspondence, cc1iii, pp. 379-80. 
211 
Chapter VI: The Borders, Highlands and Western Isles 
and vtheris quhilkis mycht be maist noysum to the peax,.1 The Scotts and the Kerrs 
were two such clans that fell into this category. The Queen Regent regarded their 
longstanding feud in the Scottish Middle March, which climaxed on 4 October 1552 
with the murder of Sir Walter Scott of Buccleuch, as a 'grit impediment [to the peace] 
this lang tyme bygaine' .2 One of her first acts was to summon the principal members of 
both houses to Edinburgh and enter them into a bond of assurance binding them to the 
peace.3 In an attempt to ensure that this and other such bonds were upheld, Guise took 
'dyverse surnames [as] pledges, for the observing and keping of good rule, as the 
Carres, the Scotte with dyverse others, wherefore there may be kuytt frendshipp one 
with other'.4 As we shall see, this policy failed to pacify the Middle March or bind the 
Kerrs of Cessford permanently to the authority of the crown. 
Indeed, Marie de Guise's progress as a whole did little to quell the endemic 
lawlessness and violence of the Borders. International considerations and, more 
immediately, the Scots' contribution to the Habsburg-Valois conflict undermined 
Guise's efforts and deprived her of valuable resources needed to reduce the frontier to 
obedience. In January 1554/5, d'Oisel complained of this bitterly to Noailles and 
pleaded that French troops be sent to Scotland 'pour la besongne qui nous avons en 
main qui est de reduyre nos frontieres en craincte et bonne obeyssance'.5 By the 
summer of 1555, the rapid deterioration of conditions on the Border led d'Oisel to 
I Fraser, Wemyss, III, pp. 9-10. 
2 RPC, XIV, p.122. 
3 Ibid, XIV, pp. 122-3 and I, pp. 152-3. 
4 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.59; RPC, I, pp. 153-4. 
5 AE, Cor. Pol., Ang1eterre, IX, f.343'. 
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sunnise that it was the worst the area had seen for 50 years. The French Lieutenant-
General attributed this specifically to the failure of England's Wardens to observe and 
enforce Border Law, and warned that if they did not do something about it soon, Marie 
de Guise would. l The heightened tensions between England and Scotland in 1555 did 
little to improve the situation and, as d'Oisel predicted, left the Queen Regent with no 
choice but to implement a decidedly more aggressive Border policy. 
Throughout 1555, Guise attempted to reduce the Borders to obedience through 
force. In May 1555, she called a muster to support Huntly, Cassillis and Morton in their 
commission 'to punish and repress certain crimes and Slaughters committed upon the 
Borders,.2 The military objective of this expedition was to invade Lauder and force the 
Laird of Cessford 'and utheris of this cuntre men his freyndis' to follow the Queen 
Regent's 'direction anent the ordowring and putting of gude rewll in the cuntre,.3 In 
July and August, two additional musters were called at Dumfries, where Guise and 
d'Oisel sought to effect the same on the West Border.4 But even these military 
campaigns failed to produce the desired results. The same was also true in 1556, even 
though changes in the international situation had allowed the Queen Regent to focus her 
attention exclusively on domestic concerns. 
l' • AE, COl. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 468-72. 
2 Pitcairn, Trials, I.i, p.384; TA, X, p.264; Scottish Correspondence, cclxvi, pp. 400-1. Those who failed 
to observe the muster and assist Huntly, Cassillis and Morton in their commission were subsequently 
charged. Pitcairn, Trials, I.i, p.384. 
3 Ibid, I.i, p.384. 
4 TA, X, pp. 259-61; RSS, IV, 3038-9, p.534; RPC, XIV, pp. 13-4; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 
501-2, 503 r; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.107; st. Andrews University Library, Special Collections, 
msDA784.7, ms4347. 
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The Habsburg-Valois truce of Vaucelles (contracted in February 1555/6) 
provided a welcome respite in the Continental wars and enabled Marie de Guise to step 
up her efforts to impose good rule on the Border. In May, she successfully levied a 
police tax of £4,000 'for [the] furnessing of certane horsemen vpoun the west 
bordouris', and commissioned Bothwell, her newly appointed Lieutenant-General of the 
Marches, to lead a military expedition there for the repressing of thieves and traitors -
starting at Sandy Armstrong's house.! Yet, despite being accompanied by a large 
number of French and Scottish troops/ Bothwell's campaign against the Scottish rebels 
in July 1556 was disastrous.3 During the raid, approximately eighteen of the Queen 
Regent's forces were killed and an additional forty taken prisoner - including Bothwell 
himself.4 Even when combatted with force, the endemic lawlessness and violence of the 
Border prevailed and would continue to do so for the remainder of Marie de Guise's 
regency. But this problem was not exclusive to the Borders. It was also true of the 
Highlands and Western Isles, where Guise was equally determined to restore law and 
order after the failure of Chatelherault's Highland policy. 
*** 
I AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.31'; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.269 and Relations, I, p.279; RPC, XIV, p.14; 
Aberdeen Council Register, pp. 296-7. 
2 400 Scottish light horse and 'quelque nombre de gens de cheval et de pied de ceulx que Ie Roy 
entretient par dec;:a' comprised the Queen Regent's forces 'pour reduire en l'obeissance quelques rebelles 
habitants en icelle frontiere'. AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.31'; Teulet, Pap iers , I, pp. 269-70 and 
Relations, I, p.28l. 
3 See AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 665-8 and XIII, fos. 30v-33, 45, 47-9; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 
267-77 and Relations, I, pp. 279-88; and LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 262, 266, for specific details of 
Bothwell's ill-fated expedition. 
4 AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 31-2', 49v; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 270-1, 276-7 and Relations, I, pp. 
282-3,287-8; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, f.266. 
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The untimely death of James V in 1542 inaugurated a period of renewed lawlessness 
and violence in the Highlands and Western Isles. The semblance of order that the king 
had managed to impose there prior to his death quickly evaporated under Arran's 
administration. The factionalism that accompanied Mary Stewart's accession, together 
with Donald Dubh's attempt to restore the Lordship of the Isles and the intrigues of 
England during their 'rough wooing' of Scotland, all contributed to the revival of the 
'Highland problem', which manifested itself in virulent disorder, lawlessness and 
violence. As in the Borders, Marie de Guise attempted to deal with this problem by 
providing for the execution of justice, making royal progresses as a visible 
demonstration of royal power and, ultimately, by extending and asserting the authority 
of the crown through force. But, as we shall see, much of the 'Highland problem' that 
Guise was faced with upon becoming regent was a direct result of Chatelherault's 
ineptitude. 
In 1543, Scotland's new regent, James Hamilton, earl of Arran, chose to release 
the clan chiefs and hostages that James V had captured and imprisoned during his naval 
expedition and royal progress to the Highlands and Western Isles in May 1540.1 
Arran's power struggle with Cardinal Beaton, who vehemently opposed his position on 
reform and dynastic union with England, prompted him to release these prisoners in a 
deliberate attempt to revive the 'Highland' problem' and deprive Beaton of the active 
support of HuntIy and Argyll, the respective Lieutenants of the North and Western Isles. 
In this, Arran had been unwittingly helped by Donald Dubh, who had escaped from 
I For an overview of James' Highland policy, see Cameron's 'Daunting the Isles' in James V, pp. 228-54. 
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Edinburgh Castle in 1543 and returned to the Isles to claim his patrimony. The 
resuscitation of Donald's campaign to regain possession of the Lordship of the Isles and 
the earldom of Ross, while ousting Argyll and Huntly in the process, was hindered by 
the absence of many of his supporters.l Indicative of how effective James V's policy of 
imprisoning clan chiefs was in maintaining law and order in the Highlands and Isles, 
Arran's release of these prisoners was a deliberate and open invitation to rebellion. 
On an immediate and practical level, Arran's policy produced the desired results. 
In the summer of 1543, Donald Dubh and his insurgent cohorts launched an attack 
against Argyll, who was compelled to stay and defend his lands. But in the end, it was 
Arran himself who suffered the devastating effects of this policy. On 3 September 
1543, Arran recovered from his so-called 'godly fit'. Abandoning the reforming and 
anglophile cause, the Regent reversed his position and aligned himself with Cardinal 
Beaton and Marie de Guise. Having done so, Arran then had to try and put an end to the 
chaos he had unleashed in the Highlands and Isles - a task which was made all the more 
difficult by the intrigues of his arch-rival, Matthew Stewart, earl of Lennox, during 
Henry VIII's 'rough wooing' of Scotland. 
In 1544, shortly after the Earl of Hertford began his campaign to 'bum 
Edinburgh town', sack Leith and ravage the Borders and Lowlands of Scotland, Lennox 
embarked on an equally savage naval expedition to the Western Isles.2 With a fleet of 
18 galleys, Lennox invaded the Isles of Arran and Bute before proceeding to 
Dumbarton, where he planned to deliver its castle to Henry VIII and render it a key 
1 D. Gregory, The Hist01Y a/the Western Highlands and Isles a/Scotland (London, 1881), pp. 154-5. 
2 Hamilton Papers, II, pp. 325-7; Gregory, Hist01Y, pp. 361-9, 371-2, 379-80. 
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English stronghold in Scotland.! In order to achieve his military objective, Lennox was 
relying on the support of Glencairn, whom he had urged to 'ramayn with in the castal 
qwel I com haym ... and kep yowr lordschip self and trest with na man bot with in the 
sayd plays'.2 Lennox's fears of disaffection were justified. Glencairn had been secretly 
reconciled with Marie de Guise, and a plot was subsequently devised to capture Lennox 
upon his return to Dumbarton and foil his attempt to deliver the castle to the English 
King.3 In his letter of 25 September 1544, Glencaim informed Guise of the 'guid 
wordes '" gifand me' by the wife4 and friends of Lennox's retainer, George Stirling of 
Glorat, captain of Dumbarton Castle, which were made on behalf of Lennox and 'my 
lord of Lennax freindis'. Despite these efforts to keep him onside, Glencaim accurately 
predicted that they 'sall failzie [in] thare entent'.5 Upon arriving at Dumbarton Castle, 
Lennox sensed something was wrong and hastily departed for the safety of his ships. 
When Sir George Douglas of Pittendreich arrived in Dumbarton with a force of 4,000 
Scots soon after, Lennox decided to make a hasty retreat to the Isle of Bute only to be 
attacked by the Earl of Argyll en route.6 
I L &P of Hemy VIII, XIX, ii, p.312. 
2 Scottish Correspondence, lxxvii, pp. 99-100; L & P of HelllY VIII, XIX, i, p.809. 
3 Gregory, History, p.165. 
4 Annabel, daughter of Sir William Edmonstone of Duntreath, captain of Doune. 
5 Scottish Correspondence, lxxxiv, pp. 106-8. On 19 March 1546, the Government issued an act of 
indemnity to George Stirling and discharged him of all the 'diverse and sindrie attemptatis, reiffis, 
spulyeis, slauchteris, depredationis and uthairis, committit and done be the personis bein the said Castell' 
when in the possession of Lennox, on the grounds that there were 'utharis that wes principale committeris 
of the saidis reiffis, spulzeis, and heirschippis' and that, after the flit of Lennox to England, he 'randerit 
the said Castell to my said Lord Govemour'. RPC, I, p.66. 
6 In September 1544, Marie de Guise offered Sir George Douglas of Pittendreich a pension of 1,000 
crowns in return for his support and service. As has already been mentioned, Sir George and his brother, 
the Earl of Angus, were the nominal leaders of the English faction in Scotland until they became 
disgruntled with Henry VIII and Somerset's overly aggressive Scottish policy. Scottish Correspondence, 
lxxxv-lxxxvii, pp. 108-33; Gregory, HistOlY, pp. 163-7. 
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It was during this conflict with Argyll that Lennox first entered into 
communication with Donald Dubh, whose own vendetta against Argyll made him a 
logical choice of ally. On his part, Donald was in favour of any alliance that would help 
him in his own quest to reclaim his patrimony, for which he had the active support of 
many clan chiefs and prominent Islemen, several of whom had been released from 
prison by Arran. A military alliance was thus formed. Lennox immediately returned to 
England to report on these developments and plan for future events, while Donald and 
his insurgent cohorts were left to continue their attacks against Argyll and Huntly, the 
bastions of central government in the Highlands and Western Isles. 1 Once again, Arran 
was to suffer the consequences of his ill-conceived decision to release the clan chiefs 
and hostages that James V had imprisoned in 1540. By 1545, the 'Highland problem' 
had taken on a distinctly British dimension. The' gret invasions and persute maid be 
Donald alleges and him of the His and utheris hieland men his part takaris', was 'nocht 
alanerly throw thair awine pissance bot also throw the suppli myance and favour of the 
King of Ingland, talkand gude deid of him and his thairfore, tending to do that is in 
thame to bring the hale Ilis and ane grete part of the ferme land of this relame to the 
obesance of the King ofIngland'.2 
Arran's attempt to counter the effects of this alliance was feeble at best. In June 
1545, a proclamation was issued by the Privy Council ordering Donald and his 
followers to 'desist and ces fra all maner of persewing or invading of our Soverane 
Ladyis liegis als wele duelland in the Ilis as in the ferme land of this realm, or invading 
I Gregory, History, pp. 167-8. 
2 RPC, I, pA. 
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of our Soverane Ladyis liegis to byrn hery slay or distroy ony of thame, or mak ony 
oppressionis upoun thame, ... under the pane of treasoun'.1 Given the events that 
followed the issuing of this ordinance, the Government's threats of legal action and 
'thair utir rewyne and distructioun' by 'the hale body of the realm of Scotland with the 
succour laitly cumin fourth of France', had absolutely no effect in daunting Donald into 
submission. Rather, they seem to have had the opposite effect and strengthened 
Donald's alliance with Lennox. 
In July 1545, Donald commissioned two plenipotentaries to negotiate with 
Lennox the terms of his submission to the English King. These negotiations ultimately 
proved successful. On 5 August 1545, Donald and the Lords and Barons of his Council, 
which included such notables at Hector MacLean of Dowart, Rory MacLeod of Lewis 
and Alexander MacLeod of Dunvegan, swore an oath of allegiance to Henry VIII and 
recognised Lennox as the true Regent of Scotland and second person in the realm.2 
More importantly, Donald would have the backing of the English in his quest to reclaim 
the Lordship of the Isles and the earldom of Ross. In return for his military and political 
support, Henry VIII confirmed Donald's annual pension of 2,000 crowns and agreed to 
pay the wages of 3,000 Islemen for two months.3 
By the time Arran had finally decided to initiate legal proceedings against 
Lennox and other 'certane genillmen of the Ilis', it was too little, too late. 4 In 
I RPC, I, pp. 4-5. 
2 Gregory, HistOlY, pp. 170-1. 
3 Ibid, pp. 170-4. 
4 APS, II, pp. 452-4, 456, 459, 464, 468-9. 
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September 1545, preparations for a large-scale invasion of Scotland from Ireland had 
already been made.! Lennox was to command the expeditionary force of 2,000 Irish 
soldiers provided by the Earl of Ormond, who was also to participate in the invasion, 
and 8,000 of Donald's men. However, delay and a certain amount of disorganisation 
prevented this invasion from becoming a reality. Lennox had been called away to assist 
Hertford in his military campaign on the Borders, and during his prolonged absence, 
dissension within the Highland contingency grew over the payment of wages and 
eventually led to its disbandment. 2 The death of Donald Dubh shortly thereafter, and 
the selection of John MacDonald of Islay as his successor, served only to intensify the 
dissension within the Highlands and Western Isles. Lennox's plans for the invasion of 
Scotland were severely undermined by the disaffection of many clan chiefs, such as the 
MacLeods of Lewis and Harris, who refused to recognise John of Islay as Lord of the 
Isles and sought to reconcile themselves with Arran. Lennox and the English party 
suffered a further blow when, on 18 June 1546, Arran successfully negotiated a truce 
between Argyll and John oflslay, who renounced his title as Lord of the Isles.3 But, as 
we have already seen, this was not the last the Scottish government would hear of 
Lennox or of his intrigues to become 'master' of Scotland. 
Reconciliation did not necessarily imply active support for the government. 
While many Highlanders and Islemen fought at the battle of Pinkie during the second 
phase of England's 'rough wooing' under Protector Somerset, many still ignored 
I Scottish Correspondence, cvii, p.146; Diurnal ofOccurents, p.39. 
2 Gregory, Hist01Y, p.174. 
3 RPC, I, p.30; Scottish Correspondence, ccxxxix, p.353. 
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Arran's summonses to muster out of indifference or fear of arrest. The MacLeods of 
Lewis, for example, were noticeably absent even though they had been reconciled with 
the government. The absence of John Moydart, chief of the clan Ranald, and Ewan 
Allanson of Lochiel, clan chief of Cameron, however, was far more understandable. In 
his proclamation against 'the grete slauchteris, murthouris, reiffis, and commoun 
oppressionis, with convocatiounis of our Soverane Ladyis liegis, committit and done be 
diverse personis', Arran promised that he 'sall newther giff respect nor remissioun, 
supersedere nor relaxatioun, to an maner of persoun nor personis that sal happin to 
committit slauchter or mutilatioun, reiff and commoun oppressioun' or those 'personis 
resttaris and manteinaris of sik rebellis, oppressouris, and malefactouris, bot sall use his 
Graces authorite aganis thame'.' The insurrection of the Clanranald and the 
Clancameron against Huntly and the Frasers of Lovat made them prime targets for 
prosecution.2 Needless to say, it was in their best interest to stay out of Arran's way in 
the comparatively safe haven of the Highlands and remain conspicuously absent from 
any national campaign that could result in their own internment. 
By the time the Anglo-Scottish conflict ended in 1549-50, there was thus a great 
need to restore order to the chaos that war and Arran's policies had created in the 
Highlands and Western Isles. Upon returning to Scotland from France in November 
1551, Marie de Guise immediately set out to fulfil her commission to 'put the realme to 
I RPC, I, pp. 59-60, 71. Argyll's name in the sederunt for this meeting of the Privy Council suggests that 
'sik reb ellis, oppressouris and malefactouris' included the insurgents of the Highlands and Isles, such as 
the Clanranald and Clancameron. 
2 Culminating in 1544 at the battle of Lochy, this insurrection resulted in many deaths including those of 
Hugh, lord Fraser and his son and heir, Simon. W. MacKay (ed.), Chronicles of the Frasers: The 
Wardlaw Manuscript entitled 'Polichronicon Seu Policratica Temporum, or, The True Genealogy of the 
Frase1·s. 916-1674. By Master James Fraser. (SHS, 1905), pp. 134-40; Gregory, Hist01Y, pp. 157-63. 
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ane quyatenes' even though she had yet to assume power in an official capacity. In 
what would be the first indication that she would emulate her late husband's Highland 
policy, Guise and Arran, now styled Chatelherault, embarked on a progress throughout 
the Highlands in the summer of 1552.1 Guise's influence on this expedition did not 
escape the notice of contemporary observers. In his History, for example, Lesley wrote 
that 'the Govemour be advyse of the Quene and nobilitie, determinit to hald justic aris 
throuch all the partis of the realme, and that rather for staying oftrubles in tymis, nor for 
rigorous punishment of anye offences by past; and to that effect, he being accumpaneit 
with the Quene and syndre uther nobill men, past in the north partis of Scotland'.2 
Many commentators have also viewed this expedition as a self-serving enterprise on the 
part of the Queen Dowager, who used this progress to secure support for her own 
political ambitions against Chate1herault,3 This no doubt played a part, but it must 
ultimately be regarded as an attempt to deal with the 'Highland problem' by asserting 
the authority and will of the crown through a visible display of royal power and the 
pursuit of royal justice. 
Upon becoming Queen Regent, Marie de Guise determined to take an aggressive 
stance with respect to the 'Highland problem' and resolved to follow in the footsteps of 
her Stewart predecessors by daunting the Isles into submission. In order to achieve this, 
Guise relied on the work of crown agents such as Huntly, Argyll, Sutherland and Sir 
Hew Kennedy of Girvanmains. In June 1554, Guise commissioned Huntly and Argyll 
I Cameron, James V, pp. 245-8. 
2 Lesley, Hist01Y, p.243. 
3 Marshall, for instance, claims that 'Mary was not solely interested in the punishment of the disturbers of 
the peace. She used the expedition to further her own cause'. Marshall, Mary of Guise, p.195. 
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to raise annies and by land and sea, 'to pas with fyre and sword to the utter 
extennination of the Clarannald, Donald Gonne [of Sleat], Mac10yde of the Lews, and 
thair complices, that sends not and enters thair pledges as they ar chairged'. 1 Guise's 
vehemence stemmed from the failure of the Clamanald and Clancameron to render 
themselves before the crown at the justice ayre held at Inverness in 1552, despite having 
been summoned to do SO.2 Huntly and Argyll had immediately been instructed to 
pursue the Clamanald and Clancameron at the time, but only Argyll succeeded in 
extracting an explanation for John Moydart of Clamanald's absence - namely, 'that he 
wald haif cumin to the Quenis lawis, and done obeysance, giff my Lord Governouris 
lettres and chargeis had cumin to his knawledge befoire his passing to the lrland'.3 The 
Council, having accepted Moydart's explanation, then gave Argyll until December 1552 
to bring John Moydart before the Governor and Council so that he could fonnally offer 
his submission and obedience to the crown.4 By September 1553, Huntly had managed 
to secure the Clamanald's submission. At Ruthven in Badenoch, he entered into a 
contract with John Moydart of Clamanald, his son, Alan, and 'thair kyne, freindis, allys, 
and pertakaris', whereby the latter agreed to submit to the authority of the crown in 
return for a general pardon of all their past crimes.5 Guise's commission of June 1554, 
however, reveals that John Moydart's submission was not worth the paper it was written 
on. 
I RPC, XIV, p.12. 
2 Ibid, I, pp. 125-6. 
3 Ibid, I, p.126. 
4 Ibid, I, p.126. 
5 Scottish Correspondence, ccxlviii, pp. 366-7. 
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Argyll set off on his military expedition for the 'surprissing of the Rebellis of the 
Ilis' on 12 August 1554. He informed Guise that his army was to pass to Mull, 'quhar 
James McConnill and McClane wyth ther haill folkis ar convenit and remanis upoun my 
cuming. And quhen we ar all convenit thaire, saIl tak purpos to pas forthwarttis upoun 
the saidis rebellis' .1 What happened during Argyll's expedition to the Isles is unknown, 
but we are to presume that, like Huntly, he failed. Unlike Huntly, however, Argyll was 
fortunate to have escaped the wrath of Marie de Guise. 
The personal price paid by Huntly for failing in his commission to establish 
order in the Highlands was high. The reason for this is not entirely clear. According to 
Lesley, the Lowland contingent of Huntly's army refused to serve on foot, and Huntly 
refused to 'merche with the hieland men onlie, for the lait hattrent that thai had 
conceaved aganis him for the deithe ofMcIntoche, and thairfore he retumed'.2 Huntly'S 
failure to carry out his commission resulted in his being summoned before the Queen 
Regent on 11 October 1554 to explain his actions. It was subsequently 'descemed that 
he had not used his commISSIOn according to his acceptation and dewtie, bot had 
failzied thairin, and thairfore wes ordaned to be punissed at the Quenis pleasour,.3 
Guise's 'ewyll opponzeone' to Huntly was made manifestly clear by the extent to which 
she chose to punish the 'Cock 0' the North' - she was not going to tolerate such self-
1 Scottish Correspondence, cclix, pp. 388-9; TA, X, pp. 229, 287. 
2 Lesley, HistO/y, p.251; Scottish Correspondence, cclxiii, p.395 n.2. Huntly had many enemies in the 
north, one of which was the Clan MacKintosh. At a lieutenant court in Aberdeen in August 1550, Huntly 
had arbitrarily charged Mackintosh with conspiracy against his life. Although the burgh council 
overturned this verdict, Mackintosh was nevertheless executed by the Countess of Huntly, allegedly at the 
instigation her husband. The Huntly-Mackintosh feud was exacerbated further by the murder of Huntly's 
sheriff-depute on 30 September 1551. Ibid, ccliv, p.381 n.1; Lesley, RistO/y, p.381; Mackintosh, The 
Mackintoshes and Clan Chattan, pp. 128-40. 
3 RPC, XIV, p.13. 
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serving disregard for her authority from any of her nobles. 1 Huntly was subsequently 
imprisoned and sentenced to be banished to France (although this was later remitted), 
imposed with a heavy fine and suffered the revocation of his interests in Orkney and 
Moray. Perhaps the most severe punishment, or at least the one with the greatest 
repercussions, was the passing of the Great Seal to Huntly's vice-Chancellor, du Rubay, 
which effectively stripped him of any real power as Chancellor. 2 
There is, however, some question as to the real motive behind Marie de Guise's 
extremely harsh treatment of Huntly. Was this a genuine attempt by Guise to assert her 
authority or does the nature of Huntly's punishment reveal an ulterior motive? 
Frenchmen certainly benefited from Huntly's disgrace. Du Rubay exercised a 
considerable amount of power as keeper of the Great Seal and M. de Bonot benefited 
from the revocation of Huntly's interests in Orkney by being appointed bailie there in 
March 1555.3 Guise was also able to satisfy Sutherland's claims the same way, 
appointing him bailie of Moray on 2 August 1555.4 Yet, the fact that Huntly was 
restored to favour within a year of his disgrace suggests that Huntly was, as d'Oisel had 
intimated, being used as an example to the rest of the nobility.s It was impossible for 
Guise to effect a strong monarchy and extend royal government into the localities if 
powerful nobles disregarded her authority when it served their own interests. 
I Scottish Correspondence, cc1xiii, p.395. 
2 Huntly entered into his contract with the Queen Regent at Stirling Castle on 30 March 1555. Ibid, 
cc1xiv, cc1xiii, pp. 396-8,395-6; Lesley, History, p.252; Diurnel o/Dccurents, p.52. 
3 Scottish Correspondence, cc1xv, pp. 389-9; Lesley, History, pp. 256-7. 
4 Fraser, Sutherland, I, pp. 106-7; Scottish Correspondence, p.374. 
5 Teulet, Papiers, I, p.722. 
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Unlike Huntly and Argyll, Marie de Guise did have some success with the Earl 
of Sutherland. He managed to capture and imprison lye du MacKay, lord Reay, who 
had been wreaking havoc on his lands since 1550, when Sutherland had been away in 
France with Marie de Guise.! By 1554, MacKay's 'mischeif had not abated. He 
continued to spoil and molest the lands of Sutherland and, on a recent occasion, had 
taken 'away certane wemen and gudes'.2 In July 1554, therefore, Sutherland received a 
commission to arrest MacKay and reduce the country to obedience. In this, he was to be 
assisted by his stepfather, Sir Hugh Kennedy of Girvanmains, who sailed from Leith 
with a naval force on a command of the Justiciary dated 11 August 1554.3 Sutherland 
invaded Strathnavar, successfully captured and demolished the principal MacKay 
stronghold at Borve and forced Lord Reay's capitulation. By 14 October 1554, 
Girvanmains informed the Queen Regent that his submission was imminent. On 11 
November, MacKay formally submitted to the crown and sailed with Girvanmains to 
Dumbarton Castle, where he was subsequently imprisoned.4 
In 1555, Marie de Guise renewed her efforts to combat the 'Highland problem'. 
A process of treason was issued against Rory MacLeod of Lewis, and in June, the earls 
of Argyll and Atholl were commissioned to pursue rebels, including MacLeod and the 
Clanranald, and to reduce the Isles to obedience.5 These expeditions met with limited 
I As an 'assured Scot', MacKay had assisted the English in their capture of Haddington in 1548. Scottish 
Correspondence, cc1viii, pp. 386-8. 
2 Ibid, cc1viii, pp. 387. 
3 Ibid, cc1xi, pp. 390-3; ER, XVIII, p.584; TA, X, p.28l. 
4 MacKay, Chronicles of the Frasers, pp. 142-3. 
5 RPC, XIV, p.14; TA, X, pp. 229, 277, 278, 286, 287; Pitcairn, Trials, I.i, p.392. 
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success. Through Argyll, MacLeod made certain offers to the Privy Council for his 
submission and was granted a respite, while Atholl succeeded in bringing John Moydart 
of Clanranald and two of his sons before Marie de Guise to offer their obedience to the 
crown. In a serious lapse of judgement, however, Guise pardoned the Clanranald of all 
their past offences and incarcerated them at Perth and Methven Castle, where they 
escaped only to resume their insurgent activity in Highlands.! It was presumably 
because of this that Guise decided to embark on another royal progress of the Highlands 
and Isles to pursue royal justice and to daunt the area into submission. Accompanied by 
such notables as Huntly, Argyll, Atholl, Marischal and the Bishops of Ross and Orkney, 
Guise's progress of 1556 took her to Inverness, the earldom of Ross, Elgin, Banff and 
Aberdeen.2 She held justice ayres in all these places and disponed 'the most extreme 
and rigorous punishment'.3 Emulating her late husband's policy, she 'charged everie 
ane of the capitanis of the hie landis to bring in the offendaris of thair awin kin, 
according to the ordour prescribit in King James the Fiftis tyme onder gret panis; 
quhairthrow mony was entered,.4 But just when she was starting to make her authority 
felt and having some success in her pursuit of royal justice, changes in the international 
situation quickly undermined her efforts, and prevent us from knowing how effective 
Marie de Guise's Highland policy would have been in the long term. 
1 Gregory, History, p.185. 
2 Lesley, Hist01Y, pp. 256-7; RMS, IV, 1095, 1097, 1110, pp. 243, 247; TA, X, pp. 308-9, 311-13, 317-9; 
AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 47-9. 
3, Lesley, Hist01Y, pp. 256-7; Pitcairn, Trials, I.i, pp. 390-2; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 49r-\ 
Teulet, Papiers, I, p.275 and Relations, I, pp. 286-7: 
4 Lesley, Hist01Y, p.256. 
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The renewal of the Habsburg-Valois conflict in January 155617 and the outbreak 
of war between England and France the following June, dictated that Marie de Guise 
focus her attention, once again, on matters of national security and the Border. The 
Congregation's rebellion of 1559-60 served only to distract her attention further, 
expending all of her time and energy during the final years of her administration. It was 
during periods of neglect such as these that the 'Highland problem' was allowed to 
fester virtually unfettered. Continuity, time and adequate resources were the essential 
ingredients for an effective Highland policy. During the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, however, these ingredients were in short supply. A string of minority 
governments and the disruptions of war constantly undermined any efforts to pacify the 
Highlands and impose royal authority. In this respect, the reign of Mary, Queen of 
Scots and the regency of Marie de Guise were no exception. 
*** 
The first years of Marie de Guise's regency were dominated by international 
considerations. The tensions that arose out of the Habsburg-Valois conflict and, in 
particular, Mary Tudor's accession and marriage to Philip of Spain, forced Guise to 
focus her attention almost exclusively on matters of defence and national security. 
These tensions also highlighted the need for Guise to assert her authority and reduce the 
kingdom to obedience if law and order had any chance of being imposed and, more 
importantly, if peaceful relations with England had any chance of being maintained. 
Ironically, these very same tensions undermined the execution of Guise's domestic 
policy as a whole, which aimed to put the realme 'to ane quyatenes' through a powerful 
monarchy and strong central government. 
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Yet, despite these frustrations, Marie de Guise's commitment to the pursuit of 
royal justice and the ordering of the country did not falter. She even began to make 
some headway in the Highlands and in her attempts to advance the interests of the 
crown at the expense of local jurisdictions. The frustrations of 1554-1556, however, 
were just a glimpse of things to come. The Franco-English war of 1557 soon brought 
dynastic issues to the fore. The Scots were faced with the prospect of entering into a 
war they did not necessarily want or feel they had to fight and, as we shall see, this 
invariably brought into question the marriage of their own queen. For many of 
Scotland's magnates, the Franco-Scottish protectoral alliance had run its course and now 
needed to be placed on a more permanent footing that only dynastic union could bring 
about. 
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Just eleven months after it had been contracted, the five year Habsburg-Valois truce of 
Vaucelles had completely broken down. By the end of January 155617, Henri and 
Philip, now the King of Spain and ruler of the Netherlands, were at war.l Henri's 
military alliance with Pope Paul IV, however, presented Philip with some senous 
problems rendering him a less than willing participant in the conflict. The religious 
ramifications of waging war against the papacy, for instance, would give credence to 
Pope Paul IV's diatribes accusing both Philip and his father of being heretics and 
oppressors of the Holy See.2 Added to this was the more immediate problem of 
financing the war and Philip naturally turned to his wife for support, travelling to 
England in March 1557 in the hope of procuring financial and military assistance. As 
before, the English government remained hostile to the idea of fighting Philip's war and 
refused to commit resources to the Continental campaign. Yet within a matter of 
months, the English government had dramatically reversed its position by issuing a 
formal declaration of war against France on 7 June 1557. Years of French intrigue 
against the Marian regime had taken their toll and had the adverse effect of making the 
English more disposed to war than to peace. Reports that the French had facilitated 
Thomas Stafford's invasion and subsequent capture of Scarborough Castle on 28 April 
1 For Charles V's abdication and the formal transfer of power to Philip in October 1555, see Rodriguez-
Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, pp. 126-32, and pp. 137-252 for the war that was formally 
declared between France and Spain on 31 January 1556/7. 
2 Pope Paul IV deeply resented Spain's domination ofItaly and, in particular, his native Naples. 
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1557, was the straw that broke the camel's back, giving Mary the perfect excuse to push 
her government into supporting Philip in the Habsburg-Valois conflict.! 
England's declaration of war against France, however, had far wider 
implications than simply the English joining the Continental wars. The Habsburg-
Valois conflict had now officially come to the British Isles, and it would be only a 
matter of time before Scotland also became involved, directly or indirectly, on behalf of 
the French. Scotland's inevitable participation was something that Marie de Guise had 
predicted with a great sense of foreboding when she learnt of the Duc de Guise's 
military expedition to assist Pope Paul IV against the Duke of Alva in Naples in January 
1556/7. Foreseeing that this would lead to a breach of the truce of Vaucelles, Guise 
wrote to the Cardinal de Lorraine that, 'Je supplie et suppliray tout les Jours nostre 
seigneur ... quilluy plaisir enuoy dun paix, Ne doubtans luy que si jai Ion dun ny nest la 
main, et qune si les choses un fois aromper du ceste de deca [France], 11 est malaise que 
n' en ayons aussi nostre [ Scotland] part'. 2 
War was the last thing Marie de Guise wanted at this particular time. Scotland 
was in no position to fight a war let alone defend itself against a foreign invasion.3 This 
was primarily due to the Scots' reluctance to finance Guise's defensive policies. For 
many members of the Scottish political elite, the question of Mary Stewart's marriage 
I Two French galleys reportedly convoyed Stafford and his expeditionary force from France to England. 
Noailles, however, knew nothing of this enterprise and recognised the damage it had done with respect to 
England's neutrality. LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.31; AE, Cor. Pol., XIII, fos. 195 v-7; PRO, SP3113/23, 
fos. 161-2, 172, 179; APC, VI, p.80; Loades, Two Tudor Conspiracies, pp. 151-75. 
2 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.7v; Papal Negotiations, pA28. 
3 See AE, Mbnoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 7-11, for Marie de Guise's comments to the 
Cardinal de Lorraine and Constable Montmorency on the substandard condition of Scotland's defences. 
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needed to be settled before they committed any more money for the defence of the realm 
on account of France's foreign policy.! As Guise would later learn, this was one reason 
why the Three Estates' rejected the proposed tax re-assessment scheme in May 1556. 
With the Habsburg-Valois truce now on the verge of collapse, the Scots' refusal to 
finance her defensive policies made the question of Franco-Scottish dynastic union a 
matter of political necessity and national security. Explaining this to the powers that be 
in France, however, was no easy matter. The only way she could account for Scotland's 
ill-preparedness for war and the substandard condition of its defences was to explain the 
Scots' position, but in order to do this, Guise had to broach the subject of dynastic 
umon. 
Raising the sensitive matter of marriage to the French King without seeming to 
do so from self-interested motives was a very delicate operation, so Guise first turned to 
her family in France for a more sympathetic audience. Referring to the Three Estates' 
rejection of the tax-reassessment scheme, the Queen Regent confided to the Cardinal de 
Lorraine that: 
'" aucuns m'ont dict cy lesdicts cy parlans que Je ne VOliS refer pour 
vouloir accelera et haster les choses, Mais pour vous faire cognoister 
les oppinions de ceste nation, Qui fin quils mectoys la charrue deuans 
les boeufs Et me trompoys de pense riens aspirer de deca si ... Ie mariage 
nestans accomply, Car lIs estents tousiours cy doubte soubz quil seigneur 
lIz debuonts tomber. 2 
Guise conjectured that another factor contributing to the Scots' reluctance to finance her 
defensive policies was the reported ill health of Mary, Queen of Scots. Throughout the 
lAB, Mbnoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 7-11. 
2 Ibid, XV, f.9 r ; Papal Negotiations, p.429. Marie de Guise does not elaborate on the identity of these 
Scots who wanted the marriage question settled. 
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summer and autumn of 1556, Mary had been afflicted by a string of fevers that the 
Queen Regent claimed 'a rendu beaucoup des choses doubteuse' in the minds of the 
Scots. 1 If she were married, such doubts would be irrelevant. The impetus behind 
Franco-Scottish dynastic union, therefore, came mainly from the Scottish political elite, 
whose desire to see their Queen married sprang from a greater desire for political 
stability in the extremely volatile arena of European dynastic politics. While it is true 
that for Scots with Protestant sympathies, the union of the French and Scottish Catholic 
crowns may have been seen as a direct threat to the reform movement in Scotland and 
grounds for opposition to the Valois-Stewart marriage, this was a domestic issue and not 
a dynastic one. The sources give no indication that there was any opposition to Guise's 
dynastic policies or, for that matter, that religion was a particular concern for the Queen 
Regent at this time. 
The desire for political stability was also true for Marie de Guise, whose 
relationship with her magnates had reached an all time low by January 155617. For the 
very first time in her adoptive kingdom, Guise felt estranged from her subjects. 'Les 
esprits des hommes', she complained, 'ont este de tous desorte doppinioun et tellement 
cy suspends que Jay trouve eulz ausquilz jesparoys Ie plus, estes cy a que Jay desire les 
plus estranges que Je ne les avons Jamais venu, Non seulement depuis que Je ladictes 
commande, Mais depuis quil Je cognoy descosse'.2 This feeling of political alienation 
was no doubt enhanced by the Three Estates' rejection of the tax reassessment scheme, 
I Fraser, Mmy, Queen of Scots, pp. 89-90; AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, [os. 9', lOr; 
Papal Negotiations, pp. 419-21, 429. 
2 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, [.9r ; Papal Negotiations, p.430. 
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and gave new meaning to the random acts of violence that continued against the French 
soldiers serving on the Border, despite Parliament's act of June 1555 against those 'that 
rasis murmuris sclanders and seditioun betuix the liegis of this realme and the maist 
Christin Kingis lieges'. 1 But in Guise's opinion, the real cause of the discord was her 
determination to see justice take a straightforward course.2 Her attempts to implement 
legal reform met with fierce opposition from the Scottish political community who, as 
we have already seen in Chapter V, claimed that she was really trying to replace their 
old laws with those of the French.3 By January 155617, therefore, Guise's political 
position in Scotland had weakened considerably and, as a result, she was finding it 
increasingly difficult to impose her will and authority. 'Les grandes charges', she 
would lament, 'sont ayses aprandre, mais malaisees a s'y luy acquister vrais dieu,.4 
Marie de Guise's growing sense of estrangement from her subjects indicates the 
extent to which the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots was just as necessary for her own 
political stability as it was for Scotland's magnates. As long as the Franco-Scottish 
alliance remained in a state of limbo, the implementation of her defensive and legal 
policies would continue to be frustrated. The Franco-Scottish protectoral alliance had 
run its course and now needed to take on a more definite and concrete form that only 
dynastic union could bring about. 
I PRO, SP 3113122, f.19; APS, II, pp. 499-500. 
2 AE, Mbnoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.9 r ; Papal Negotiations, p,430. 
3 AE, Mbnoil'es et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos.8 r , 9r-v ; Papal Negotiations, pp. 428,430. 
4 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.8 r ; Papal Negotiations, p,428. 
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Yet, at this stage, Marie de Guise was reluctant to broach the subject of dynastic 
union directly with Henri for fear that he 'pouvroit estimer que Je Ie disse pour mon 
affection particullier'. 1 While this was true to a certain extent, the nature of Henri's 
protectorate dictated that the decision to proceed with the marriage was ultimately his to 
make, and in order for this to happen, it was imperative that he consider the marriage to 
be politically expedient. 2 There was, for example, a faction opposed to the Valois-
Stewart marriage at the French Court led by Constable Montmorency, the steadfast rival 
of 'les Guises'. He was of the opinion that the Queen of Scots should wed a French 
duke or prince instead of the Dauphin, so that she could return to Scotland with her 
husband 'to hald ther awen contre in gud obedience'.3 As Sir James Melville of Halhill 
recounts, the basis of the Constable's argument was that 'when prencis ar absent, and far 
af fra ther awen, rewling ther contrees be lieutenantis, maist commonly the subiectis of 
sic contrees vses to rebell; quhilk gene the subiectis in Scotland did, it wald be hard and 
coistly to get them reducit'. 4 But in reality, Montmorency's opposition to the marriage 
had more to do with the extraordinary power and prestige it would give 'les Guises' at 
the French Court than with the prospect of civil unrest in Scotland and its financial 
ramifications. 
I AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.9 r ; Papal Negotiations, p.429. 
2 We have already seen in Chapter III how Hemi, as 'Protector' of Scotland, made the decision as to 
when Mary Stewart came of age and who would govern the kingdom during her majority. These 
precedents, in addition to Guise's deference to Hemi on the subject of dynastic union, suggest that he had 
the final say as to when the marriage of Mary and Franyois would proceed. 
3 Melville, Memoirs, p.72. 
4 Ibid, p.72. 
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Countering the arguments of Montmorency were, as ever, the Due de Guise and 
the Cardinal de Lorraine, who predictably extolled the advantages of dynastic union 
with Scotland. While their own dynastic ambition and the prestige of having their niece 
as the future Queen of France were, unquestionably, the prime motivating factors behind 
their support of the Valois-Stewart marriage, the Guise brothers were more subtle in 
their arguments to Henri. He would hear 'how it wald be baith honorable and 
proffitable to the crown of France, and that ther wald be revenus anough to mantean 
garnissons within the contree, to hald the subiectis vnder obedience; bigging rna 
citadelis, and hauyng the haill strenthes in ther handes'.1 Like their sister, however, they 
had to tread carefully lest their support for the Valois-Stewart marriage be perceived as 
merely the self-promotion and aggrandisement of the house of Guise. While the Queen 
Regent could count on the support of her brothers in France when the time came, her 
domestic troubles dictated that she could not wait for Henri to make the first move. 
Rather, she had to take matters into her own hands and push things along discreetly 
within the Scottish political community - no mean feat, given her estrangement from the 
'grandz seigneurs' who, she confessed, were 'plus malaysez a manier que J amais' .2 
In late February 155617, Marie de Guise summoned a Convention of her 'lordes 
lairdes and gentry' to meet at Stirling on 4 March ostensibly to gain their support for 
France in the Habsburg-Valois conflict.3 Recognising that this was a highly contentious 
issue, Guise used the developing international situation to play on the Scots' fears of an 
I Melville, Memoirs, p.n. 
2 AB, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.8 r ; Papal Negotiations, pA28. 
3 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 314, 328. 
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English invasion that, she claimed, was inevitable given the nature of the Anglo-
Imperial alliance. Guise's tactics proved successful. At a Parliament held in Edinburgh 
shortly after the Convention, the Three Estates promised that they would support the 
French King, but only if the English invaded Scotland. 1 Moreover, by highlighting the 
threat that Mary Tudor's marriage to Philip of Spain posed to Scotland's national 
security, a threat which was intensified by the substandard condition of the kingdom's 
defences, Guise had shrewdly and simultaneously increased the resolve of the Scots to 
see the conclusion of their own queen's marriage. So persuasive was she in her 
arguments that the Three Estates requested that either she, a special envoy, or a 
delegation of commissioners go to France in order to bring the matter to a 'bon fin'.2 
They even consented to raise a small tax to finance this diplomatic expedition.3 Yet, 
despite the fact that the Scots had played directly into her hands, Guise was careful not 
to show her relief by immediately acceding to their requests. Instead, she coolly 
responded that she herself could not make the journey to France because Scotland 
would more than likely be at war with England this coming season, and as for a 
delegation of commissioners, she would have to think about it. In the meantime, she 
would write to Henri regarding these developments and seek his advice on the matter. 4 
1 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 314, 328; AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.12'. 
2 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.178v and Mbnoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.12v; Teulet, 
Papiers, I, p.283 and Relations, I, pp. 293-4. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.l78'; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 282-3 and Relations, I, pp. 293-4. In 
December 1557, a tax of £15,000 was levied in response to Henri's formal request that a delegation be 
sent to France in order to commence the marriage negotiations. APS, II, p.504; RPC, XIV, p.14. 
4 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.178v and Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.12\ Teulet, 
Papiers, I, p.283 and Relations, I, pp. 293-4. 
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By her shrewd manipulation of events, Guise was finally in a position to raise 
the issue of dynastic union directly with Henri, without appearing to do so from self-
interested motives. By assuming the role of messenger, she was conveying the wishes 
not of herself, but of the Scottish political elite. In her letter to Henri dated 29 March 
1557,1 Guise related how the Scots, seeing that they did not have the power to defend 
their kingdom and because the Queen of England was married to the King of Spain, had 
come to the conclusion that, 'Ilz ne pouuouns estre assez fortz sans auoir ung maister'.2 
The marriage of their 'mistress' to the Dauphin was crucial for the strength and surety 
of their realm and, in return for Henri's due consideration of the matter, the Three 
Estates had consented to support their 'auld ally' militarily in the event of an Anglo-
French war. Of greater importance for the Queen Regent herself, was the Three Estates' 
declaration that she, 'se pourra faire servir s'illuy plaist soit ala guerre soit ala paix des 
subjects dudict Royaulme, ainsy que les Roys predecesseurs de la Royne sa fille avoient 
accoustume, & que pour cet effect ils n'y espargneroient rien'.3 
The ball was now in Henri's court as to when the Valois-Stewart marriage would 
proceed. All Marie de Guise could do was wait for word to come from France. The fact 
1 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 11 v_3r. Letters of the same date were also written by 
Guise and d'Oisel to Montmorency and d'Acqs, informing them, and giving details of this Parliament. 
Ibid, XV, fos. 13v-14 and Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 177-8; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 278-84 and 
Relations, I, pp. 290-5. 
2 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.12r. By this, it is unclear as to whether 'ung maister' 
refers specifically to the Dauphin or is a more general reference to Henri, who, in all probability, would 
rule on behalf of his son as the 'Protector' of Scotland. However, the Scots' suggestion that 'ung 
maister' would reign superior to their mistress is of interest when considering Parliament's consent to 
grant the crown matrimonial to Franyois in November 1558. Is this an early indication of the Scots' 
predisposition to do so and, if so, was this issue ·as really as contentious as many contemporary and 
modem historians have made it out to be? As we shall see, the sources do not reveal any substantial 
opposition to Marie de Guise's dynastic policies by Scotland's Protestants or otherwise. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.l78v; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.283 and Relations, I, p.294. 
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that matters had come this far at all, however, demonstrates the sheer political acumen 
of the Queen Regent. At a time when she felt estranged from her nobles and was 
consequently being frustrated in her attempts to govern the kingdom, she was 
nevertheless able to manipulate the less than favourable international situation to her 
own advantage. Henri received assurances of Scottish military support in his conflict 
with Philip, while Guise received political backing for her dynastic policies and, more 
importantly, regained the support of her nobles for her administration - at least in 
matters of defence. While greatly lamented by the Queen Regent as a whole, the 
renewal of the Habsburg-Valois conflict enabled her to satisfy her own need, and that of 
the Scottish political community, for political security. For all parties concerned, this 
stability was inextricably associated with Franco-Scottish dynastic union and the 
marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots to the Dauphin. 
Yet, when all was said and done, neither Marie de Guise nor the Scots wanted a 
war with England. Both hoped that the peace between the' auld enemies' would prevail. 
War with Scotland was similarly the last thing Mary Tudor wanted while 
simultaneously engaged in a war with France, and she took diplomatic steps to prevent 
this from being the case. In its attempt to neutralise the Scots through diplomacy, 
however, the English government grossly underestimated the affect their proclamation 
of war against France would have on the Scots and, more importantly, the loyalty of the 
Scots to their' auld ally'. 
*** 
It was during a meeting of Border Commissioners in early June 1557 that the English 
government attempted to prevent Scotland's formal entry into the Habsburg-Valois 
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conflict and to ensure that the Anglo-Scottish peace would survive their hitherto 
unannounced declaration of war against France. Despite Marie de Guise's best efforts, 
the Borders had still not been reduced to a state of obedience. The endemic problems of 
lawlessness, violence and disorder still existed and continued to strain Anglo-Scottish 
relations to near breaking point. In January 1556/7, therefore, the Queen Regent 
commissioned Sir Robert Carnegy of Kinnaird to present Mary Tudor with a detailed 
list of Border complaints against the English on her behalf. I As a show of unity and 
force, Carnegy was to be accompanied by the newly appointed French ambassador in 
London, Franyois de Noailles, bishop d' Acqs/ something which, d'Oisel noted, the 
English did not like to see - the French and Scots together.3 The grievances they 
presented to Mary and her council in April 1557, mainly concerned the refusal of 
English Border officials, especially Lords Dacre and Wharton, to hand over certain 
Scottish fugitives, to provide redress for various crimes committed against the Scots and 
to dispense justice in general. A case in point was Richard Norton, Captain of Norham. 
He had still not paid the £20 fine levied against him in the 'Indenture' of 1553 for his 
illegal occupation of the Tweed.4 The most serious of Guise's charges, however, 
I APC, VI, p.80. The arrangements for Camegy's diplomatic mission were finalised in March. AE, 
Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.14V and Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 146-7, 177-8, 194; 
Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 278-82 and Relations, I, pp. 289-92; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.17; Foedera, XV, 
pp. 457-8. For copies of Camegy's instructions, see AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 665-8 and 
Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 15-20. 
2 Antoine de Noailles wrote to Marie de Guise on 31 October 1556 to inform her that his brother, 
Franc;:ois, would be replacing him as ambassador. AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.63 V • 
3 Ibid, XIII, f.178 r ; Teu1et, Papiers, I, pp. 281-2 and Relations, I, pp. 292-3. 
4 On 16 December 1556, Richard Norton was summoned before the English Council and 'commaunded 
againe to cause indelaied restitucion to be made of the XXii by the Commissioners in the Borders to paye 
unto the Scottes, toke upon him to cause the same to be doone out of hand, so as no further matter of 
complaynte shulde be made thereofhensfourthe'. APC, VI, p.30. 
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concerned the illegal activities of the Grahams in the West March. Contrary to the 
dictates of Border Law, none of that surname had been handed over to the Scottish 
authorities for their numerous acts of pillaging, spoliation, murder and larceny 
committed during their devastating and frequent incursions into Scotland. Moreover, 
Wharton and Dacres' refusal to administer and execute justice against them led Marie de 
Guise to believe that they were deliberately encouraging and supporting the Grahams in 
their criminal activities against the Scots'- the most notable example of which was 
Bothwell's military expedition to the Western Border in July 1556. To all intents and 
purposes, the conduct of the Grahams and the English Wardens resembled a breach of 
the peace, which, Guise added, would not be the case if Mary and Philip maintained 
order on the Border. The Queen Regent, therefore, demanded redress and reparation 
from the English government and warned that she did not know for how much longer 
she could contain her subjects to tolerate such outrageous and injurious acts.! 
In response to these charges, the English government consented to a meeting of 
Border Commissioners and, on 25 May 1557, representatives from both England and 
Scotland were appointed to meet at Carlisle.2 Scotland was to be represented by 
Carnegy, Cassillis, the Bishop of Orkney and later, by James Makgill of Nether 
Rankeillour, while the Earl of Westmorland, the Bishop of Durham, Robert Hyndman, 
Chancellor of the Bishopric, and Dr Thomas Martin, President of the Chancery, 
constituted the English delegation. For the English, this meeting had far greater 
significance than the settling of Border grievances. Carnegy's diplomatic mission had 
I AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, IX, fos. 665-8 and Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 15-20. 
2 Foedera, XV, pp. 464-5; PRO, SP5118/12. 
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coincided with Thomas Stafford's invasion and capture of Scarborough Castle, which 
proved to be the catalyst for England's declaration of war against France. This Border 
Commission, therefore, provided the English government with an ideal opportunity to 
try and prevent Scotland from entering a conflict they themselves were just about to 
enter. As we have seen, Border disputes continually threatened to jeopardise the already 
precarious Anglo-Scottish peace, and one possible way of ensuring that the amity 
between the 'auld enemies' was maintained was the reparation of 'attemptates' 
committed against the Scots. In this, however, the English government had imposed 
clearly defined parameters and was not willing to satisfy all of Marie de Guise's 
demands outright. Their continued refusal to hand any of the Grahams over to the 
Scottish authorities as pledges, for example, proved to be a point of contention that 
would eventually break up the Border Commission in July 1557. 
As in 1550, the fear of losing the Grahams as allies was the principal reason for 
the English government's obstinacy.l If they complied and handed the Grahams over as 
security for compensation, there was the possibility that the Graham clan would not be 
able to pay for their release. The only option that would then be left open to them 
would be to renounce their affiliation with England and side with the Scots.2 As 
effective agents of the English crown, this scenario was completely unacceptable. The 
Scots, however, would not settle for anything less. When it became clear that no 
headway was to be made on this matter, the English government took the extraordinary 
step of offering to pay the damages of approximately £3000 directly out of the 
1 Chapter II, pp. 61-3. 
2 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3194, fos. 336-40. 
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Exchequer. 1 This gesture alone signifies the extent to which the English government 
was determined to maintain peaceful relations with the Scots in order secure their 
neutrality in the Habsburg-Valois conflict. Yet, even this offer proved unsatisfactory to 
the Scots, who were determined to have the matter settled on their own terms and 
according to the dictates of Border Law. 
The Scots' resolve may be explained by the fact that, during these proceedings, 
England had formally declared war against France on 7 June 1557.2 From the outset, 
the English Commissioners were acutely sensitive to the mood of the Scots - especially 
after their declaration of war had been proclaimed. On 11 June, Thomas Martin filed a 
report to Mary Tudor describing the reaction of each of the Scottish Commissioners to 
the news.3 Although they were all appalled by England's breach with France, Martin 
nevertheless reported that each was of the opinion that this would not affect the Anglo-
Scottish peace. Robert Reid, for example, wished only for 'equal restitution on both 
parts to preserve amity, nothwithstanding the French', while James Makgill saw no 
reason to break with the English on account of the French, because 'thEmperours warres 
with the French empeacheth not owre league and amytie with thEmperour,.4 But it is 
Cassillis' response that is, perhaps, most famous. In response to Westmorland's 
assumption that 'my lord, I thinke hit but foly for us to treate now togyther, we havinge 
1 Estimates of the compensation due to the Scots ranged from £907 to £3000. LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, 
f.36 and 3194, f.306. 
2 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 225-7. See also ibid, XIII, fos. 232v-6" for Henri's letter of 
acknowledgement, and fos. 224-5, for a copy of the letter Mary Tudor circulated around England 
publicising the war against France. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 416, pp. 198-9. 
4 Ibid, I, 416, p.198. 
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broken with France, and ye beinge French for your lyves,' Cassillis stated that '1 am no 
more French then ye ar a Spanyard', and then proceeded to divulge the movements of 
French troops in Scotland. l While Cassillis' anti-French comments are not surprising in 
themselves, it would be foolish to conclude that either he or the rest of the Scottish 
Commissioners were being totally honest with their English counterparts. The 
movements of the French along the Border had never been any secret in England, and 
the eagerness with which Cassillis was willing to disclose this information seems to be 
just a little too deliberate, so as to suggest an 'official' leak or, as Boscher contends, a 
deliberate ruse to allay English suspicions of Scottish intentions.2 
Even more suggestive are Sir Robert Carnegy's comments upon hearing of Mary 
Tudor's 'sincere meaning for continuance of the league with Scotland'. 3 While he gave 
'his faith of a Christian, and honour of a Scottish knight, that his mistress meant the 
like', he then added the stipulation, 'As farre as we yet ken,.4 Even the author of this 
report had his suspicions as to the Scots' real intentions. Having heard from Cassillis, 
'Doe yowe my lordes, what yowre commissions directe ye to, and so wyll we' ,5 Martin 
took the opportunity to study the Scots' commission. On doing so, he found what he 
hoped was a clerical error. Reading, 'Damus potestatem nostris commissariis audiendi, 
tractandi, concordandi, concludendi, et jin a liter dissidendi', Martin realised that if this 
were indeed correct, no agreement would ever be reached because the Scots had not 
1 CSP Scot., I, 416, p.198. 
2 Boscher, 'English provincial government', pp. 260-1; Vertot, Ambassades, IV, pp. 317-8. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 416, p.198. 
4 Ibid, I, 416, pp. 198-9. 
5 Ibid, I, 416, p.199. 
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been commissioned to do SO.l The Scottish Commissioners had not been instructed to 
settle rJinaliter decidere], but rather, to disagree rJinaliter dissidere].2 There was also 
some suspicion that the Scottish Commissioners were employing delaying tactics in 
order to give Marie de Guise more time to prepare for war against England. This was a 
particular fear of Westmorland, who believed that war with Scotland was imminent. 
The Scottish Commissioners' insistence that redress be given for crimes not contained 
within their commission led Westmorland to 'verely beleve, that they mynd no trueth 
but to delay and tasle the tyme with us unto they be prepared and redy (if they may) 
uppon a sudden to work some displeasour unto this realme'.3 The English Council was 
inclined to agree, and saw the introduction of new business, especially that which could 
have been handled by the Wardens themselves, as a sign of the Scots' ill-will: ' ... for if 
there had byn nowe other things ment by the appointing of the commissioners but the 
rigoure and extremitie of the lawe then it had byn in vayne to send expresse personages 
to the borders for the onely doings of that which might well enough have byn don by the 
wardens,.4 
The suspicion that the Scots were really preparing for war put a new slant on the 
English government's offer to compensate the Scots with cash from the Treasury. 
Dacre, for one, regarded this as a very bad idea given that, in his opinion, 'shortly it will 
growe to open warr'. The considerable amount of money owing to the Scots for 
I CSP Scot., I, 416, p.l99. 
2 Ibid, I, 416, p.199. 
3 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.44; CSP Scot., I, 417, p.199. 
4 PRO, SP5111126, 27. 
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damages, he argued, would enable them to 'get all they might, and then be at libertie to 
spye their tyme and to make warres uppon us with our owen money'. 1 There was the 
danger that, in trying to maintain the peace by offering financial restitution, the English 
would be inadvertently financing the Scottish war effort against them. While the 
Scottish Commissioners' refusal to accept this method of payment ruled out such a 
possibility, it also meant that a settlement was not going to be reached during this 
particular Border Commission. On 13 July, therefore, the Commissioners agreed to 
disband, depart in peace as they had come, and reconvene on 15 September 1557.2 As a 
gesture of their mutual goodwill, it was further decided to issue a joint declaration of 
peace. So, on 17 July, 'standing together ... at the highe crosse at Carlisle', the 
Commissioners for both England and Scotland 'made open proclamation for peace, ... 
and the like ... sent to the wardens of both realms'.3 As events would soon transpire, 
Marie de Guise had no intention of enforcing the Commissioners' instructions to the 
Wardens of the Marches, to detain the principal 'owtrydars' of both realms in order to 
prevent future raids and incursions. 
While the Scots were eager to declare publicly their commitment to the Anglo-
Scottish peace and give the appearance that they 'covet peace [rather] then warr', their 
actions following the break up of the Border Commission reveal their true feelings 
about England's declaration of war against France.4 Almost immediately after its 
I LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.36. 
2 CSP Scot., I, 419, pp. 200-1; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.46. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 421, pp. 201-2. 
4 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, fos. 34v; 40, 46, 49. 
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disbandment, the Scots waged an 'unofficial' war against England. Although they 
suspected that the Scots would engage in some sort of hostile activity, the English 
government was nevertheless unsure as to what form it would take; namely, ' ... if they 
denounce warr woll invade with an army or not, and that it may bee that they woll rather 
onely make incursions than otherwise'. 1 It did not take long for them to realise that the 
Scots' chosen means of expression, at least initially, was the launch of small-scale raids 
across the Border. 
Conducted over a three-month period and overseen by Marie de Guise stationed 
at Dunbar, these guerrilla like raids were led by such notables as d'Oisel, Maxwell, 
Huntly (lieutenant of the Borders) and other members of the Scottish nobility, and to 
devastating effect,2 On 4 August, Shrewsbury reported that, 'The Scots nightly And 
dayly mayketh incursions And prepareth so to doo to dystroye the howses And comes 
And thereby leave fortresses Towars and howses distytut. Ther haith ben great damaige 
done whereby the bordours is mych wasted'.3 As Guise had intended, these raids were 
proving to be a 'grette annoyance' to the English.4 But perhaps the most devastating of 
the raids in the summer of 1557 was the assault against Ford Castle. At five in the 
morning on 5 August, Lords James and Robert Stewart, Lord Home and a complement 
of Scottish soldiers invaded the East March. Armed with certain pieces of ordnance, 
they 'attempted to wynne the castell of forde, and ... bymt syndrie townes there aboute 
I PRO, SP15/8/17. 
2 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, fos. 42,52, 103, 115; Lesley, History, p.260. 
3 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.66. Reports that the Scots were making 'inrodes almost nyghtly and doth 
great Annoyaunce' were still being sent in September 1557. See, for example, ibid, 3195, f.l77v. 
4 Ibid, 3195, fos. 115,253. 
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called the ten townes of glendale'. Cattle was seized and countless inhabitants either 
slain or taken hostage before the Scottish incursionary force retreated back into 
Scotland. l 
While these raids were worries in themselves, the English government became 
seriously alarmed when reports that Marie de Guise was planning a full-scale military 
invasion of Northumberland began to file in. Throughout August and September, 
details of an extensive military assault on Wark and Norham were received with 
increasing concern.2 This was particularly true with respect to the news that the Queen 
Regent had assembled a great Scottish army to carry out the enterprise. In addition to 
the 3,000 hackbutters that had been summoned from the burghs, Guise had also called a 
general muster of all men between the ages of 16 and 60 to assemble at Edinburgh 
provisioned with enough victuals to last 40 days.3 The Scottish army was to be 
commanded by Chatelherault as Lieutenant-General, and supported by the 'holle 
nobylytie of Scotland', with Argyll, Cassillis, Morton and Huntly (who helped plan the 
siege) all playing prominent roles alongside d'Oisel and his contingent of French 
troops.4 But the assembly of a Scottish army on the Anglo-Scottish Border was not the 
only cause for concern. Another factor that intensified the overall threat Scotland posed 
to England was the refortification of Eyemouth. 
1 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, fos. 72, 74,115. 
2 Ibid, 3195, fos. 98,99,150-1,153,162,177,179,182,189,197,200,207,214. 
3 Ibid, 3195, fos. 98, 99, 153, 197. 
4 Ibid, 3195, fos. 99, 197; Lesley, HistOlY, p.260. As recommended by Mary, Queen of Scots, 
Chatelherault was appointed the Lieutenant-General of Scotland upon resigning the regency in April 
1554. He was discharged from this office on 25 October 1557. Chapter III, p.124; NLS, Adv.MSS, f.1; 
RPC, XIV, p.15. 
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Dismantled in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Norham, Marie de 
Guise ordered the reconstruction of Eyemouth in direct response to England's 
declaration of war against France. Its strategic location as a defensive check to, and a 
potential launch pad for, military campaigns against England's principal Border 
stronghold at Berwick were no doubt major considerations in the Queen Regent's 
decision to resurrect Eyemouth. But of more immediate and practical value, especially 
in light of the planned siege ofWark and Norham, was Eyemouth's capacity to serve as 
an arsenal of ordnance and munition. As Lord Herries noted in his Historical 
Memoires, ' ... it was thought necessar to build a fort at Aiimouth, which might both 
stop these incursions of the Engish and be a strength to keep cannon and munition in 
that pairt of the cuntrie; for it was trublesome upon everie occasion to draw cannon and 
other necesars from Edinburgh'. 1 For defensive and offensive purposes, therefore, 
Eyemouth was deemed to be of paramount importance for Scotland's challenge to the 
Anglo-Imperial threat emanating from England. 
The actual refortification of Eyemouth was essentially a French endeavour. 
French soldiers under the supervlSlon of d'Oisel, who were also garrisoned there, 
carried out most of the work. While the most intensive phase of its reconstruction and 
1 John Maxwell, lord Herries, The Historical Memoires of the Reign of Mmy Queen of Scots and a 
portion of the Reign of King James the Sixth (Abbotsford Club, 1836), p.30. William Maitland of 
Lethington, conversely, regarded this decision in a far more cynical light: ' ... the Quein Regent be 
advyse of the Frenchemen and uthers of the Councill ... did resolue to mak warre against Ingland and to 
induce or force the nobilitie and Cuntrie verye unwilling thai resolvit to mak ane fort neir to Heymouthe 
on the seysyde in the Mers and in 6 myles to Berwik vnder colour to be a fronteire to the cuntrie for 
safetie thairof in tyme of warre'. W.S. Fitch (ed.), Maitland's Narrative of the Principal Acts of the 
Regency during the minority '" of Mary, Queen of Scotland (Ipswich, 1842), p.9. See also Merriman, 
'The Forts of Eyemouth', pp. 152-3. 
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fortification occurred during the Anglo-Scottish truce in 1558,1 work had nevertheless 
advanced enough in 1557 for Marie de Guise to declare in August that 'she well uyset 
Aymowth shortly'.2 English reports later confirmed that cannon, demi-cannon and other 
great pieces of ordnance intended for the assault against Wark and Norham, were indeed 
being stored at Eyemouth.3 
Yet, despite these extensive preparations and the steady stream of intelligence 
confirming that an invasion of England was imminent, no such event ever occurred, 
prompting Shrewsbury to complain that the Scots 'have dyvers tymes this yeare illudyd 
us with their apperences of settforwerds' ,4 By mid-October, the military campaign was 
finally set into motion, The Scottish army advanced to the Border and assembled at 
Kelso, where they were joined by d'Oisel and the French troops and ordnance he 
brought with him from Eyemouth, in full readiness to cross the River Tweed and launch 
the assault against Wark.5 Accompanied by Marie de Guise, who decided to oversee the 
military campaign from the safety of Home Castle just a few miles north of Kelso, the 
Franco-Scottish army heard rousing words of encouragement from their Queen Regent. 6 
Words, however, were not enough to see the siege of Wark become a reality, On 18 
October, Chatelherault and other members of the Scottish nobility took the sudden and 
I TA, X, pp. 331, 334, 341, 344, 345, 353, 360, 368, 377, 387, 394, 401, 405, 409, 415, 418, 421-31; 
SRO, E34/2115. 
2 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.66 r• See also Astier's accounts for the refortification of Eyemouth (22 July -
18 December 1557) in SRO, E34/2114. 
3 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.99. 
4 Ibid, 3195, fos. 105\ 153,200,214,220,228,230. 
5 Ibid, 3195, f.238; Knox, HistOlY, I, pp. 124-5 and Works, I, p.255. 
6 Knox, HistOlY, I, p.125 and Works, I, p.255; Pitscottie, Historie, II, pp. 119-20. 
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unilateral decision to disband the anny and abort the siege of Wark even before it had 
begun. l Directly contravening the order and authority of Marie de Guise, the decision of 
Chatelherault et at not to invade England, was ostensibly made to save the honour of 
Scotland. Foul weather conditions, being 'most contagious [for] the tyme of the yere', 
had weakened the resolve of the anny and had resulted in many of the men 'Rynnyng 
away, dying and in mysery'? This, in addition to the preparedness of the English to 
resist the Scots, rendered such an invasion unwise. 3 
The steady leak of infonnation detailing Guise's planned assault of Wark and 
Norham had given the English ample time to set up their defences accordingly. To their 
detriment, the Scots had earlier misconstrued the absence of an English anny on the 
Border as an encouraging sign ofweakness.4 They soon discovered that, in fact, a force 
of 4,000 men had arrived at Newcastle on 2 October 1557. This, in addition to the 
garrisons stationed at Wark, Norham and Berwick and the 600 horse and 400 foot which 
had also been levied for the occasion, meant that the English were not only well 
fortified, but amply prepared to meet any threat emanating from Scotland. The strength 
of England's Border defences was further enhanced by the presence of a sizeable naval 
force along the eastern seaboard, the mere sight of which was reported to have caused 
even more desertions from the Scottish anny, as men returned home to protect their 
J BL, Tablot MSS.3195, fos. 231, 248, 251-2, 253; Lesley, Hist01Y, p.260; Knox, Hist01Y, I, p.125 and 
Works, I, pp. 255-6; Pitscottie, Historie, II, pp. 119-20; Diurnal ofOccurents, p.267. 
2 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, fos. 248,253,258. 
3 Ibid, 3195, f.258. 
4 Shrewsbury received the order from the English Council that, 'Ye shall not nede to make any full 
assemblie of the armie one1ess they sholde go abowte with theyr mayne power to invade the realme'. 
Ibid, 3195, fos. 153, 184. 
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lands.! Even without an 'English anny', therefore, England's Border defences were 
fonnidable - a fact that Shrewsbury had thought could be enough of a deterrent to avert 
a large-scale invasion at the hands of the Scots: 'it may now come to passe, that 
consyderynge the countenans of our force and preparacon, they may now chaunge ther 
purpose, to lye at the defence of ther owen contrey, then, otherwyse to invade till the 
light of the mone by wastyd,.2 
But bad weather and the strength of England's defences may not have been the 
only contributing factors to the Scottish nobility's decision to abandon the siege of 
Wark. Events on the Continent may also have played a part. The summer of 1557 was 
not a particularly successful period in Henri's conflict with Philip. In August, 
Emmanuel-Philibert, the exiled duke of Savoy, led a successful Spanish invasion of 
France's northern frontier that culminated in the fall and Imperial occupation of Saint-
Quentin.3 Montmorency's military expedition to relieve the town was, in short, 
disastrous on both a personal and national scale. Despite his efforts, Saint-Quentin 
remained in Imperial hands, and after sustaining a heavy loss of 3,000 French troops, an 
additional 7,000 were taken prisoner - Montmorency himself being captured on 10 
August 1557.4 Henri's losing battle against Philip and, in particular, the disaster at 
Saint-Quentin seemed to have a degenerative effect on Scottish morale and led some 
I Boscher, 'English provincial government', pp. 274-6; LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.231. 
2 Ibid, 3195, f.228. 
3 For more on the siege of Saint-Quentin, see Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, pp. 
176-9; Potter, 'The Duc de Guise and the Fall of Calais', EHR, ccclxxxviii (1983), pp. 486-8; 
Baumgartner, HenlY II, p.202; C.S.L. Davies, 'England and the French War, 1557-9' in J. Loach & R. 
Tittler (eds.), The Mid-Tudor Polity, c.J540-J560 (London, 1980), pp. 165-6; Bouille, Histoire des Ducs 
de Guise, I, pp. 397-401. 
4 Davies, 'England and the French War', p.165. 
252 
Chapter VII: War and Marriage. 
Scots to question their participation in France's war with England. As ever, English 
observers were keen to pick up on this seemingly low ebb in Franco-Scottish relations 
and comment on the dissension that was apparently growing within the Scottish Court. 
On 18 September, for example, Thomas Wharton reported that: 
... the Scotts myche grudgeth against this warr ocasioned by the french 
And saith that there ar Sondrie noble men in Scotland who wold haue 
peace with this realme ... they are Discontented with the greate vyctories 
the Kings Majesty [Philip] hath had over the frenche And that the Scotts 
do not trust the fayire promises of the french nor in their Assystaunce 
which [the] Scotts loked for.' 
Discontent had also arisen, allegedly, over a disagreement as to the target of invasion. 
D'Oisel, it was reported, 'movet to Assaylle barwyk', but the Scots prevailed in their 
insistence that the targets remain Wark and Norham with devastation to the surrounding 
countryside. 2 Naturally, the English saw this as an ideal opportunity to exacerbate the 
situation and foster discord between the Scots and Marie de Guise. Shrewsbury, for 
one, suggested that 'such practyse myght have ben used and with money as at the least a 
dessention shold have bene sowne amongst them'.3 
Some caution is necessary when considering these English observations. It is 
only natural to presume that the Scottish nobility would have some say in the logistics 
of a military exercise they were leading, and that in such discussions opposing or 
conflicting viewpoints should be expressed. Moreover, the fact that the Scottish army 
did advance to Kelso, ostensibly with every intention of carrying out the siege of Wark, 
suggests that some sort of consensus had been reached and that the final decision not to 
I LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, fos. 177r. See also his report of23 September, ibid, 3195, f.189. 
2 Ibid, 3195, f.l77r. 
3 Ibid, 3195, f.189. 
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invade was, as Chatelherault implied, simply to avoid a humiliating defeat at the hands 
of the English. It should also be remembered that, at the outbreak of the Habsburg-
Valois conflict in early 155617, the Scots had assured Marie de Guise that they would 
support Henri militarily in the event of an Anglo-French war, but only if they suffered 
an invasion at the hands of the English. 1 In this respect, their decision not to embark on 
a full-scale military campaign, complete with a 'national' army furnished with great 
pieces of ordnance, was consistent with their previous position. But, as we have just 
seen, the Scots were more than willing to make small-scale incursions to express their 
displeasure, and even hostility at England's declaration of war against France. 
Nevertheless, the fact that reports of internal dissension and the Scots decision to 
abandon the siege of Wark were contemporaneous with the fall of Saint-Quentin does 
suggest that Scottish support for France in the Habsburg-Valois conflict ultimately 
depended on whether Henri was winning or losing. The same cannot be said, however, 
for their support of Marie de Guise. Contrary to the received view of contemporary and 
modem historians, such as Knox, Lesley, Pitscottie, Tytler, Marshall and Donaldson, the 
Scottish nobility's decision to abandon the siege of Wark did not mean they were 
abandoning either their Queen Regent or the war effort against England.2 
Marie de Guise was, understandably, shocked and angered by the news that her 
magnates had unilaterally decided to act against her wishes. When Chatelherault 
informed Guise of what he and the others had done, she 'raged and repreived them of 
I AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.12r. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 255-6 and HistOlY, I, p.125; Lesley, History, pp. 260-1; Pitscottie, Historie, II, pp. 
119-20; Tytler, HistOlY o/Scotland, IV, pp. 24-5; Marshall, Mmy o/Guise, pp. 214-5; Donaldson, James 
V-James VII, p.88. 
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theire promysses which was to Invade and anoy England. Theyre determynacione to 
departe and the consideracione they told hir and therupone arguments grew great 
betwene them wherwith she sorrowed and wepp openly'.! For his part, d'Oisel, 'in 
great hevynes and with high woords ... wisshed hymself in Fraunce'.2 Chatelherault, 
however, had not acted in accordance with the wishes of all the Scottish nobles. Huntly, 
for one, shared Guise and d'Oisel's feelings of condemnation. According to English 
sources, the others were 'so offended with hym and said that he shuld have no rule of 
their doings and restrayned his Libertie for a day', and apparently 'axed playnely 
whatever he wolde be a Skottsman or a Frensheman'.3 Nevertheless, the actions of her 
nobles had left Guise without an army and she had no choice but to order that the 'siege 
of the castell of Werk be left', promptly discharging Chatelherault from his commission 
in the process.4 
But a fact that most historians have ignored is that the immediate aftermath of 
the Scottish army's disbandment did not witness the complete disappearance of Scottish 
forces from the Border, or an end to Scotland's 'unofficial' war against England.s After 
120 October 1557, LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.253. 
2 Ibid, 3195, f.253. In his commentary, Knox writes that the Scots refusal to invade England 'putt ane 
effray in Monsieur Dosell his breathe, and kendilled such a fyre in the Quein Regentis stomak, as was 
nott weall slockened till hir braith failled'. Knox, Works, I, pp. 255-6 and HistOlY, I, p.125. 
3 LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, fos. 248,253. 
4 RPC, XIV, p.14; Lesley, HistOlY, p.261. D'Oisel was still determined to go ahead with the attack and, 
on 27 October, led his French troops across the Tweed with a few pieces of ordnance. Losing two men 
and eight horse to drowning in the process, all d'Oisel managed to achieve was a small and insignificant 
skirmish at Wark. According to English intelligence, d'Oisel felt so threatened upon retuming to 
Scotland that he needed a bodyguard of 100 soldiers to ensure his personal safety. It was also alleged 
that d'Oisel was similarly concerned for Marie de Guise's safety, but there is no evidence to substantiate 
this claim. LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, fos. 248, 253, 265; Boscher, 'English provincial government', 
p.275. 
5 War was never formally declared between the 'auld enemies', and all Knox writes to indicate that the 
Scots still engaged in warlike activity against the English after the siege of Wark had been abandoned 
was, 'Butt yitt warre continewed'. Knox, Works, I, p.256 and History, I, p.125. 
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leaving Kelso, Chatelherault proceeded to Jedburgh with an unidentified chosen few and 
placed garrisons along the Border, adopting what was primarily a defensive position 
against the English.l Given the strength of England's defences and the strong military 
presence on the Border, this was not an unwise position for the Scots to adopt. The 
Scottish nobility's abandonment of the siege of Wark, therefore, did not automatically 
mean that Guise's defensive policies would also be abandoned. Chatelherault had 
assured the Queen Regent in no uncertain terms that despite their refusal to launch a 
full-scale attack against the English, they would 'devise [how] to furnyshe their fronters 
for this wynter,.2 After this had been done, Chatelherault returned to the Borders to 
implement their resolutions, while others, such as Argyll and his 'company of Yrish 
men', returned to their own 'cuntries'.3 But of even greater importance was the fact that 
Marie de Guise's offensive policies had not been abandoned in their entirety either. The 
Franco-Scottish force that was maintained on the Border, most notably at Kelso and 
Eyemouth, continued, as before, to conduct guerrilla like raids into England and to 
devastating effect. 4 
Both Northumberland and Shrewsbury were deeply concerned at the sustained 
threat to English national security. Northumberland sent urgent and repeated requests 
for reinforcements because the Scots had not only 'kept there own frontiers plenished to 
the uttermost but have destroyed and laid waste agreate parte of the borders of this 
I LPL, Talbot MSS, 3195, f.253. 
2 Ibid, 3195, f.248. 
3 Ibid, 3195, fos. 231, 253, 248; Lesley, HiSt01Y, pp. 260-1. 
4 Ibid, I, p.261. 
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realme.'l For Shrewsbury, the only solution to this Scottish problem was for the Scots 
' ... to be scourged with armyes or with great garysons for frontier war or both'.2 So, 
while the Scots were specifically unwilling to carry out the assault on Wark and 
Norham, they did not withdraw altogether their general support for the Queen Regent's 
offensive policies. Rather, they continued to make incursions into England until an 
Anglo-Scottish truce was negotiated on 14 January 1557/8.3 
As with Marie de Guise, there is no evidence to suggest that the Scots' refusal to 
invade England on 18 October 1557 was a statement against the Franco-Scottish 
dynastic alliance. If anything, it served to highlight the importance and the need for the 
marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots to be concluded once and for all. One has to wonder 
whether such an event would have occurred if Scotland and France had been united 
dynastically, and the order to invade had come directly from their king and master. 
Until the Franco-Scottish alliance was set on a more secure footing through dynastic 
union, the implementation of Franco-centric policies in Scotland would continue to be 
frustrated, while the political stability of both Marie de Guise and the Scottish political 
community at large would continue to be undermined and their working relationship 
I PRO, SP15/8/41. 
2 Ibid, SP15/8/41, 52, 52i. For a discussion of England's Border defences at this time, see Boscher, 
'English provincial government', pp. 276-7. 
3 This was the ftrst of many temporary peace agreements between the 'auld enemies', the negotiations for 
which cannot be dealt with effectively or comprehensively in this thesis. Sufftce to say, the ftrst truce 
was negotiated by Lord Home, the Earl of Northumberland and Sir Henry Percy on 14 January 1557/8 
and was contracted to last for just 12 days. In February, the peace was extended to 15 March 1557/8 and, 
on 6 March, Bothwell and Northumberland contracted another truce to last two months. Fighting 
resumed in April and cut this last agreement short. See CSP Scot., I, 422, 423, 426, 428, 429, 433, 434, 
pp. 202, 203-4, 204-5; CSP Foreign, 1553-1558, 665, pp. 335-6; HMC Twelfth Report, Appendix viii, 
pp. 183-4; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 285-91 and Relations, I, pp. 296-300, TA, X, pp. 331, 337, 420; APC, 
VI, p.275; and Boscher, 'English provincial government', pp. 296-301 for references concerning these 
truce negotiations and compacts. 
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counter-productive. Ironically, the disaster at Saint-Quentin sparked a chain of events in 
France that would bind the 'auld allies' closer and tighter than they had been in years. 
Montmorency's imprisonment marked the ascendancy of 'les Guises' at the French 
Court and, with it, a general desire to see the Valois-Stewart marriage formally 
concluded. 
*** 
The Imperial occupation of France's northern frontier forced Henri to take prompt and 
drastic action. His immediate response was to recall the Duc de Guise from Italy and 
make him the 'lieutenant-general du roi'.1 As such, the Duc was invested with 
extraordinary military and diplomatic powers, enjoying similar authority to the 
'Constable of France', though without the title. 2 Together with the Cardinal de 
Lorraine, who enjoyed similar powers in the realm of administration, the Guise brothers 
now reigned supreme at the French Court and exercised almost total control in all 
matters of state.3 Their prestige at Court and, more importantly, their influence over 
Henri gave 'les Guises' the perfect platform from which to promote their dynastic 
ambitions and advance the Valois-Stewart marriage without fear of opposition or 
intrigue from Montmorency. But even in captivity, Montmorency still managed to pose 
a potential threat to Guise dynastic ambition. In December 1557, he had tried to throw a 
spanner in the works by suggesting that the Dauphin marry Philip's sister, and Henri's 
daughter, Elisabeth, marry Philip's son, Carlos.4 But by this time, Henri had already 
I Michaud et Poujolat, Memoires-Journaux, pp. 387-90. 
2 Ibid, pp. 387-90; Bouille, Les Dues de Guise, pp. 412-3; Baumgartner, Hemy II, p.202. 
3 Potter, 'The Duc de Guise', pp. 486-7. 
4 Baumgartner, Hemy II, p.207. 
258 
Chapter VII: War and Marriage. 
sent letters to the Three Estates acceding to their previous request that a delegation of 
commissioners be sent to France for the 'accompleishment' of the marriage of Mary, 
Queen of Scots to the Dauphin. I 
While the influence of 'les Guises' cannot be dismissed as a motivating factor 
behind Henri's decision to proceed with the marriage, events in Scotland arguably had a 
more immediate impact. The timing of his decision to send 'speciallettres and writingis 
direct vnto the ... thre estatis' on 29 October 1557, followed in the wake of the Scots' 
abandonment of the siege of Wark. 2 Significant as this was in its own right, the Scots' 
refusal to carry out the Queen Regent's orders against the English assumed even greater 
significance given that the English had assisted their Imperial allies in the capture of 
Saint-Quentin, Le Catelet and Ham.3 Control over Scottish foreign policy and, in 
particular, the obedience of the Scots in carrying out this policy was imperative, now 
even more so that a major assault on Calais was being planned for the winter of 1557/8.4 
If the Calais expedition was successful and France recaptured the last English held 
territory on the Continent, Scotland would then become England's primary target 
against the French. In such an event, Scottish cooperation and their military assistance 
1 APS, II, p.504; AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.l78v and Mernoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, 
f.12v; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.283 and Relations, I, p. 294. 
2 APS, II, p.504. 
3 Davies, 'England and the French War', pp. 165-6; Potter, 'The Due de Guise', pp. 487-8; Rodriguez-
Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, pp. 176-9. Although they missed the Duke of Savoy's initial 
assault on Saint-Quentin on 10 August, the Earl of Pembroke's 2000 English troops did participate in the 
battle that led to fall of Saint-Quentin on 27 August. They remained in France to aid their Imperial allies 
in the subsequent capture and occupation of Le Ciitelet and Ham, and stayed until 27 November 1557, 
when the Anglo-Imperial troops retreated from France's northern frontier. 
4 See Potter, 'The Due de Guise', pp. 481-512; Davies, 'England and the French War,', pp. 168-78; and 
Bouille, Les Ducs de Guise, I, pp. 420-30, for detailed analyses and discussions on the siege and 
recapture of Calais. 
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would be essential. As it happened, France's counter-attack on Calais was a resounding 
victory for France and for the commander of the campaign, the Duc de Guise. 
Launching his assault on 1 January 1557/8, Marie de Guise's brother easily took 
Rysbank and Newnham Bridge before capturing Calais castle just one week after the 
campaign had begun. By the end of the month, the Duc had also managed to take 
Guisnes and Ham, the remaining two fortresses in the Calais Pale. 
Finally, one must not forget the role that Henri's imperial ambitions in the 
British Isles played in his decision to proceed with the Valois-Stewart marriage. Mary 
Tudor had still not produced an heir and, at forty-one, her chances of doing so were 
remote at best. Although the English Queen had reluctantly named her Protestant half-
sister, Elizabeth, as her successor, there was the possibility that she could be kept off the 
throne on account of her illegitimacy. According to the dictates of canon law, Elizabeth 
was a bastard and, therefore, ineligible to succeed her half-sister as Queen. The next 
legitimate and Catholic claimant to the English throne was Mary Stewart, whose 
marriage to the Dauphin would provide for the creation of a Franco-British Empire. 
While these considerations may have prompted Henri to push for the marriage 
when he did, there was still the possibility that, given the events of the past few months, 
the Scots no longer wished to undergo dynastic union with France. Henri need not have 
worried, for the opposite was true. The marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots was still seen 
as the precondition of political stability. The Habsburg-Valois conflict and, in 
particular, the Anglo-French war served only to accentuate this need in the eyes of the 
Scots. On 14 December 1557, the Three Estates convened at Edinburgh to discuss the 
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marriage question and issue a fonnal response to Hemi' s 'speciallettres and writingis'. 1 
There, it was detennined that a delegation of eight commissioners would be sent to 
France to negotiate the tenns of the marriage compact. Gilbert, earl of Cassillis, 
George, earl of Rothes, Lord James Stewart, James, lord Fleming, George, lord Seton 
and Provost of Edinburgh, John Erskine of Dun, Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney and 
James Beaton, archbishop of Glasgow, were all appointed to conduct the negotiations.2 
In her absence, Marie de Guise appointed her mother, Antoinette de Bourbon, to 
represent her in the negotiations.3 Their commission was to be financed by the tax 
Parliament had agreed to in March 155617, when the Scots first solicited Marie de Guise 
to advance the marriage of their Queen. Having now received the French King's 
consent, the Three Estates accordingly levied this tax of £15,000.4 It is essential to 
reiterate that, despite some historians' assertions to the contrary, both Henri's request 
and the Three Estates' consent to begin fonnal negotiations for the marriage of Mary, 
Queen of Scots, took place before the Calais expedition had even been launched. The 
assumption that Henri decided to go ahead with the Valois-Stewart marriage only 
because he had successfully recaptured Calais, a major turning point in the Habsburg-
Valois conflict, and wished to reward 'les Guises' for their part in securing its recapture 
is, as the chronology indicates, an inaccurate interpretation of events.s Rather, it appears 
I APS, II, pp. 501-2; Lesley, HistOlY, pp. 262-3. 
2 APS, II, pp. 504-5, 506, 511, 514, 518; NLS, Adv.MSS, 54.1.2(i), f.lr; SRO, GD/204/559. 
3 Ibid, 54.1.2(i), f.l r. 
4 APS, II, p.504; RPC, XIV, p.14; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.l78r and Mbnoires et Documents, 
Angleterre, XV, fos. 12-3r; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 282-3 and Relations, I, pp. 293-4. 
5 For example, Marshall writes: 'In January 1558 the Duke of Guise, Mary's eldest brother, captured 
Calais from the English and the power and popularity of his family rose to new heights. Eager to reward 
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that the disaster of Saint-Quentin, the subsequent ascent to power of 'les Guises' and the 
Scots' refusal to carry out the siege of Wark were the catalytic events that moved both 
Henri and the Scottish political community to see the Valois-Stewart marriage 
concluded. France's resounding victory at Calais served only to boost morale and 
bolster the support that already existed for Franco-Scottish union. 
Armed with their instructions,1 the negotiating commissioners set sail for France 
in early February 1557/8, escorted by a fleet of merchant and private vessels.2 Upon 
arriving in France, they were 'honorable convoyit to Pareis, quhair thay war with gret 
honour and fawour receaved be the King of France and his nobilitie in the monethe of 
Merche'.3 By 19 April 1558, agreement had been reached and a treaty contracting the 
marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots and the Dauphin Franyois was formally concluded.4 
As in the treaties of Birgham, Greenwich and, to a lesser extent, Haddington, this treaty 
was fundamentally concerned with the protection of Scotland's cultural and institutional 
independence in a dynastic union. As per the commissioners' instructions, the treaty 
contained the provision that, in the marriage, all 'heirs and successors sal observe and 
keip the fredomes Liberteis and priuilegeis ·of this realme and lawis of the samyn and In 
them, Henri II agreed to go ahead with the marriage plans'. Marshall, Mmy 0/ Guise, .p.215; Fraser, 
Mmy, Queen o/Scots, pp. 90-1. 
1 See NLS, Adv.MSS, 54.1.2(i), fos. 1-5'; APS, II, pp. 511-3, 504-6; and Prince Alexandre Labanoff, 
Lettres, Instructions et Memoires de Marie Stuart, Reine d'Ecosse (London, 1844), I, pp. 46-50, for the 
specific details of the Scots' commission. 
2 TA, X, pp. 330, 332, 333. On 5 February 1557/8, Marie de Guise ordered that 'all sindrie awnaris, 
skipparis and marinaris of schippis to be in reddines to depart witht the commissionaris the vj day of 
Februar instant, ... and to pas fordwart witht thame unto the tyme the saidis commissionaris beis landit in 
France'. See also Lesley, Hist01Y, pp. 262-3; Papal Negotiations, p.9. 
3 Lesley, HiSt01Y, p.263. 
4 NLS, Adv.MSS, 54.1.2(i), fos. 1-5'; APS, II, pp. 511-3. See also ibid, II, pp. 516-7; SRO, SP7/38, 39; 
and BL, Harley MSS, 1244.35, f.202, for the commission to investigate consanguinity (Mary and 
Franyois were third cousins) and subsequent papal dispensation for the marriage. 
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the samyn maner as hes bene keipit and obseruit in all kingis tymes of Scotland of 
before'. 1 It also stipulated that, if Mary should die without issue, the Scottish crown 
would revert, without impediment, to her nearest blood relative - namely, Chatelherault 
and his heirs and successors.2 As heirs apparent to the Scottish throne upon the failure 
of the Stewart line, the house of Hamilton and, in particular, Chatelherault's rights to the 
Scottish succession were safeguarded, at least ostensibly, in the dynastic union of the 
French and Scottish crowns.3 A series of documents secretly signed by Mary, Queen of 
Scots on 4 April 1558, however, revealed the extent to which Henri was not prepared to 
relinquish his interests in Scotland in the event that his future daughter-in-law died 
without issue.4 
Directly contravening the terms of the 'official' marriage treaty, these secret 
documents renounced the rights of the house of Hamilton to the Scottish succession in 
favour of the royal house of Valois. The first document was a letter of donation, 
whereby Mary willingly bequeathed the sovereignty of Scotland and all her claims to 
the English succession to the King of France and his successors.s It was decreed that, 
because of the special favour and affection Henri had bestowed on Scotland and its 
queen, Mary: 
1 APS, II, p.504. 
2 Ibid, II, p.505; SRO, SP7/40. 
3 The commissioners had been instructed to ensure that 'the richtuis blude of the croun of scotlande to 
succeid without any impediment Bot to be aydit fortifyit and supportit be the kingis maiestie and his 
successouris And all the auld Ligis in that cace to stand in effect as thai wer before the completing of the 
said mariage and obseruit betuix the twa realmis'. For his part, Chatelherault lodged a protest to ensure 
that his rights were safeguarded in the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance. His rights and title were later 
confirmed by Mary and Franyois in April 1558. APS, II, pp. 605, 517. 
4 Labanoff, Lettres, I, pp. 50-6. 
5 Ibid, I, pp. 50-2. 
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. .. a donne et donne par ces presentes, par pure et libre donation, faicte 
pour cause de mort, au Roy de France qui est ou sera, Ie royaulme 
d'Escosse selon qui se consiste et comporte, oultre tous et telz droictz 
que lui peuvent ou pourront, ores et pour l'advenir, compecter et 
appartenir au royaulme d' Angleterre, et aultres terres et seigneuryes, 
qui par ce titre lui sont escheuz ou pourrount escheoir et advenir; 
ensemble tous et chacuns les droictz, tant en pensions que auitrement, 
qui, a cause de ce, peuvent et pourront, ores et pour l'advenir, compecter 
a icelle Dame envers et contre toutes personnes, mesmes envers et a 
l' endroict du Roy de France et ses successeurs Roys, sur les terres de 
son royaulme, en que1que sorte que ce soit, dont les Roys ou Roynes 
d' Angleterre leur pourroient faire demande, debat ou querelle, desquelz 
icelle Dame, ou cas susdict, a fait a iceulx Roys de France don, quietance, 
cession et transport ces presentes. I 
Mary's second letter of donation was also hedged in protectionist rhetoric, but this time 
the French King's voluntary 'protection, tuition et deffence du royaume d'Escosse' was 
revealed to have come at a price. In the event that Mary should die in the near future, it 
was decreed that the kingdom and the revenues of Scotland were to be retained by 
France until Henri was reimbursed of all the expenses he incurred in Scotland's defence 
and Mary's education at the French Court.2 Estimated to be in the region of one million 
d'or, the sheer size of the Scots' debt to Henri was yet another guarantee that Scotland 
would remain in French possession for a very long time. 
Given the nature of these two documents, it is understandable that Henri wanted 
not only to ensure their secrecy, but also to safeguard the provisions contained therein -
provisions which would undeniably prove unacceptable to the Scots. To protect his 
interests, therefore, the Queen of Scots simultaneously issued a letter of renunciation 
nullifying any future contract or agreement made by the Three Estates that contravened 
the terms of her two donations. The articles safeguarding Scotland's sovereignty and 
I Labanoff, Lettres, I, p.51. 
2 Ibid, I, pp. 52-4. 
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Chatelherault's claim to the Scottish succession in the 'official' treaty of 19 April 1558, 
therefore, would technically be rendered null and void in the event of Mary's death by 
virtue of the letter of renunciation dated 4 April 1558.1 What these secret arrangements 
clearly show is that, just as the Scots were adamant in safeguarding their cultural and 
institutional independence in a dynastic union with France, so too was Henri determined 
to protect the interests that Mary Stewart's dynasticism afforded him through marriage -
interests which could provide for the realisation of his vision of a Franco-British empire. 
Yet, there were some terms of the 'official' marriage contract that were 
unaffected by the secret deal. It was agreed, for example, that upon marriage, Franyois 
would assume the title 'King of Scotland', and until he succeeded his father, he was to 
be officially styled the 'King-Dauphin' and Mary, the 'Queen-Dauphiness'.2 Only when 
Franyois acceded to the French throne would France and Scotland truly be united. In 
the meantime, the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance would be celebrated and symbolised 
by the joining of the French and Scottish crowns on Mary and Franyois' coat of arms 
(something which was later altered to include that of England following the death of 
Mary Tudor), and the naturalisation of both the Scots and the French in each other's 
kingdom.3 Marie de Guise's position in Scotland was also safeguarded in the Franco-
Scottish dynastic alliance. According to the Scottish Commissioners' instructions, it 
was agreed that a commission would be granted for Guise to retain the regency of 
I Labanoff, Lettres, I, pp. 54-6. 
2 The use of these styles was confirmed in an act of Parliament recognising the marriage of Mary to 
Franyois (30 April 1558) and in a letter of congratulation (26 June 1558). APS, II, pp. 518,519. 
3 Ibid, II, pp. 518-9, 507, 513; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 303-6; Bonner, 'French Naturalization of the Scots', 
p.1115. 
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Scotland for as long as Mary and Franc;ois remained in France. 1 This is of particular 
significance in light of the Lords of the Congregation's attempt to suspend Guise from 
the regency during the Reformation Rebellion on 21 October 1559, in which they 
claimed to be acting in the 'name and authority of our Sovereign Lord and Lady'.2 In 
accordance with the Scots' demand that the articles of the treaty of Haddington be 
confirmed and ratified by Mary and Franc;ois, Henri's protectorate of Scotland was 
similarly maintained.3 Finally, provlSlons were made for the event that Franc;ois 
predeceased Mary, and the succession of any offspring this marriage might produce. In 
the first instance, Mary would have the option either to return to Scotland or stay in 
France, living off the income she received from her dowry (600,000 livres from lands 
assigned to her in Tours, Picardy, Champagne and Poictou, together with an annual 
pension of 30,000 francs).4 Ifthere existed an heir male, he would naturally inherit both 
the French and Scottish thrones, but if the marriage only produced an heir female, she 
would only be able to lay claim to the Scottish succession as Salic law prohibited the 
succession of females to the French throne. These terms having been agreed, the 
marriage of Mary and Franc;ois was then celebrated in a manner befitting a King and 
Queen at the Cathedral of Notre Dame on 24 April 1558. 
1 Guise's regency was confirmed by Mary and Franyois on 29 April 1558. APS, II, pp. 519, 504; SRO, 
SP13/81. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 444-9 and HistO/y, I, pp. 251-5. As we shall see in Chapter VIII, the 
Congregation's attempt to depose Guise was ultimately unsuccessful; she chose simply to ignore their 
'Act of Suspension'. 
3 APS, II, pp. 504,518-9; SRO, SP7/41. 
4 APS, II, pp. 505,517; Lesley, History, p.263. 
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As in Henri's triumphant entry into Rouen, the ceremony solernnising the 
marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots and the Dauphin Franyois was a grand and lavish 
display celebrating the 'auld alliance'.' It was also a celebration of 'les Guises', their 
recent accomplishments at Calais, and the realisation of their dynastic ambitions. This 
can be evidenced by the prominent role the Duc de Guise played in the marriage 
ceremony, leading not only the marital procession, but also acting as the master of 
ceremonies. Through throngs of spectators, the bride's uncle led a massive procession 
into the Cathedral of Notre Dame, including brightly adorned musicians, a hundred 
gentlemen-in-waiting to the King, princes of the blood, abbots and bishops, among them 
the Cardinal de Lorraine and the Cardinal de Guise.2 Next came the Dauphin, preceded 
by Antoine, King of Navarre and escorted by his brothers, Charles, duc d'Orleans and 
Henri, duc d' Angouleme. Then came the bride. In a resplendent and unconventional 
white gown, Mary was led by Henri and the Duc de Lorraine, and followed by the 
French Queen, Catherine de Medicis.3 Crowds lined the streets and people strained to 
watch the ceremony through the windows of the cathedral, after which, a festive string 
of banquets, balls and entertainment lasted for several days.4 In Scotland, news of their 
sovereign's marriage was also cause for celebration. Immediately following Mary and 
I Teulet, Relations, I, pp. 292-303 and Relations, I, pp. 302-11. 
2 The fact that the Duc de Guise should lead the 'princes of the blood' is of great symbolic impOliance 
given that 'les Guises' were regarded as foreigners and, consequently, of lower status. This was due to 
the fact that the house of Guise was a scion of the princely house of Lorraine, rulers of the independent 
duchy of Lorraine, which was only incorporated into France in 1766. 
3 White was the traditional colour ofmouming for royalty. 
4 For more details on the wedding ceremony and celebrations in France, see W. Bentham (ed.), Discours 
du Grand et Magnifique Triomphe Faict du Mariage de Frmu;ois et Marie Stuart, (Roxburghe Club, 
1818); Lesley, Hist01Y, pp. 264-5; Merriman, 'Mary, Queen of France', pp. 42-4; Fraser, Mary, Queen of 
Scots, pp. 98-102. 
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Franyois' proclamation of 26 June 1558, in which they formally announced their 
marriage to the nobles and the rest of the estates in Scotland, Marie de Guise ordered 
that fires and processions be made throughout the entire kingdom, in order to mark the 
'completing and solemnizing of the mariage betuix our Soverane Ladie and the 
Dolphine of France'.1 
For 'les Guises', the marriage of their niece to the heir to the French throne 
consolidated their own power and position at the French Court, and marked the 
beginning of their ascendancy in France. But, the dynastic ambitions of the house of 
Guise and the imperial ambitions of Henri were only partially realised with the marriage 
of Mary and Franyois. Until the Dauphin was bestowed with the crown matrimonial, 
his kingship of Scotland was nominal - the sovereignty of Scotland and the rights to the 
English succession technically remained with his wife, Mary. Central to Henri's vision 
of a Franco-British empire, the crown matrimonial would enable the Dauphin to lay 
claim to the throne of England as husband and king of Mary Stewart. Immediately 
following the return of the Scottish Commissioners from France in November, 
therefore, Marie de Guise summoned a Parliament to secure the Three Estates' 
ratification of the 'official' marriage contract, and, more importantly, to gain their 
consent for the crown matrimonial to be bestowed on the King-Dauphin? 
I SRO, SP13/82; NLS, MSS, 3137, fos. 13-4; TA, X, pp. 365, 366. Both Mary and Franyois sent Marie 
de Guise personal letters announcing their marriage. SRO, SP13179, 80. 
2 Having left the French Court in August 1558, the Scottish Commissioners then travelled to Dieppe for 
their return voyage home. There, a mysterious illness took the lives of four of the Commissioners: 
Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney (6 September); George, earl of Rothes (9 November); Gilbert, earl of 
Cassillis (14 November) and James, lord Fleming (14 December at Paris). There was some suspicion that 
the illness was poison induced and that 'les Guises' were behind it because the Commissioners found out 
about the 'secret' marriage contract. This, however, has neither been proved nor disproved. If such a 
plot had been discovered, the question must then be asked why was nothing said by the surviving 
commissioners to prevent the ratification of the 'official' marriage treaty or mentioned in the 
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The attendance at this session of Parliament, held at Edinburgh on 29 November 
1558, clearly reflects the perceived importance of Mary, Queen of Scots' marriage and 
the matter of the crown matrimonial amongst the Scottish political community.l 
Virtually every member of the Three Estates is listed in the sederunt, with the notable 
exception of Chatelherault, for reasons that will become clear shortly. As intended, one 
of the first matters of business to be concluded was the ratification of the articles 
comprising Mary and Franyois' marriage contract, and the formal discharge of the 
surviving members of the negotiating delegation from their commission.2 This having 
been done, it was decreed that: 
The quenis grace dowriare and regent foirsaid and thre estaitis of 
parliament findis and declaris the saidis commisssionaris abonewrittin 
and thair colleigis hes dewlie & detfullie compleitit and performyt the 
haill contentis of thair commissionis articlis and Instructionis gevin vnto 
thame And hes ressauit detfull and dew answeris and sufficient securiteis 
ffor fulfilling keiping and obsweruing thairof And hes satisfyit thair saidis 
commissionis articlis and Instructionis foirsaidis in all poyntis Eftir the 
forme and tennour of the samyn And thairfore hes exonerit and 
dischargeit and exoneris and dischargeis the saidis commissionaris and 
every of thame havand detfullie and dewlie done thair offices In that 
parte for now and evir. 3 
Marie de Guise's greatest accomplishment during this Parliament, however, was gaining 
the formal consent of the Three Estates for Mary, Queen of Scots to honour her husband 
with the crown of Scotland. In accordance with the wishes of their Queen, the crown 
matrimonial was granted to Franyois: 
Congregation's propaganda to substantiate their claims of French conquest. SRO, SP13/83-4; Labanoff, 
Lettres, I, pp. 57-60; TA, X, p.393; Knox, HistOlY, I, pp. 13 nA, 130, 140-1; Lesely HistOlY, pp. 266-7; 
Fraser, Mmy, Queen a/Scots, pp. 111-2; Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.88. 
I APS, II, p.504. 
2 Ibid, II, pp. 504-6. 
3 Ibid, II, p.505. 
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. .. be way of gratificatioun during the mariage without ony maner of 
preiudice To hir hienes self the succesioun or hir body Or lauchfull 
successioun ofhir blude quhatsumeuir And this crowne to be send 
with twa or thre of the lordis ofhir Realme To the entent that the maist 
cristin king and king dolphine hir husband may vnderstand with quhat 
zele and affectioun hir subictis ar myndit To obswerue and recognosis hir 
said spous. 1 
With this, the Dauphin's kingship of Scotland was no longer nominal. He assumed all 
of Mary's rights and powers as sovereign, and more importantly, her dynastic claim to 
the English succession. In short, Franc;ois became King of Scots. To further show their 
support for and commitment to the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance, the Three Estates 
reciprocated Henri's earlier gesture and bestowed the same privileges and rights that the 
Scots enjoyed on all French subjects.2 This Parliament, therefore, was the culmination 
of Marie de Guise's political career in Scotland. Motivated by her own dynastic 
ambitions, and those of 'les Guises' in France, Marie de Guise had successfully 
provided for the union of the crowns and kingdoms of France and Scotland. In the 
wider context of European dynastic politics, however, the fulfilment of Guise's dynastic 
objectives assumed even greater significance because, in doing so, she had also laid the 
foundations for Henri's imperial scheme for a Franco-British empire. 
The death of Mary Tudor on 17 November 1558 and the 'dubious' accession of 
Elizabeth, at least in Catholic eyes, brought Henri one step closer to realising his 
imperial ambitions within the archipelago. According to the dictates of canon law, 
Elizabeth was illegitimate and, therefore, ineligible to succeed to the English throne. 
The next legitimate Catholic claimant to the English throne was Mary Stewart, and, by 
1 APS, II, p.506. The outbreak of the Refonnation Rebellion prevented the crown from being sent to 
France as Mary, Queen of Scots had wished. 
2 Ibid, II, pp. 506-7; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 303-9 and Relations, I, pp. 312-7. 
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consequence of the crown matrimonial, the Dauphin. Mary Stewart's dynasticism had 
provided Henri, through the marriage of his son, with the prospect of uniting Scotland, 
England and Ireland under one Catholic French crown. Upon Henri's death, these 
kingdoms would officially fall into the imperial dominion of France. Thus, upon 
hearing the news of Mary Tudor's death, the French King: 
... caused to make pUblict proclamatione in Paris, publishing the Quenis 
majestie ofScotlande to be Quene of Inglande, Scotlande and Irelande 
and caused hir and the dolphin hir husbande tak the armes of Inglande, 
and j one with the armes of Scotland and France, and make all thair seales 
conforme thairto, and mark thair silver plait, brodir thair tapestries, hingers 
and all uther thyngs with the same. 1 
As early as 16 January 1558/9, Mary and Franyois had styled themselves 'Mary and 
Franyois, King and Queen Dauphins of Scotland, England and Ireland', while Henri was 
actively trying to persuade the pope to declare Elizabeth Tudor illegitimate and 
recognise Mary Stewart's right to the English throne.2 
On account of the international situation, however, Henri had to be careful not to 
push the claims of Mary and Franyois to the English succession too vigorously, as he 
was currently negotiating a peace with Philip. On the one hand, Mary Tudor's death 
had undermined the strength of Philip's demand that Henri relinquish Calais, but on the 
I Lesley, Histmy, pp. 268-9. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,235,346, pp. 91, 145; CSP Rome, 4, pp. 1-2; Papal Negotiations, pp. 10-2. It 
is of interest to note that Elizabeth styled herself the sovereign of Scotland and France, so her anger at 
Mary and Franyois was not without contradiction. See, for example, CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 173, p.59. 
Mary, Queen of Scots' use of the styles and arms of England intensified after the death of Henri II in July 
1559 and subsequent union of the French and Scottish crowns. This became a particular bone of 
contention for Elizabeth and her secretary, William Cecil, who saw this as a pretext for a French invasion 
of England which they thought was imminent given the influx of French troops into Scotland sent to deal 
with the outbreak of rebellion. As will be discussed in Chapter VIII, Mary and Franyois' use of the arms 
of England was also a motivating factor behind England's later decision to intervene financially and 
militarily on behalf of the Lords of the Congregation. CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 837, 840, 845, 868, pp. 
311-2,312-3,314,324-9; PRO, SP1216, f.74r; BL, Cotton MSS, Caligula B.x, fos. 1r-8r; S. Alford, The 
Early Elizabethan Polity: William Cecil and the British Succession Crisis, 1558-1569, (Cambridge, 
1998), pp. 43-70. 
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other, he did not want to infuriate Elizabeth too much for fear that she would then be 
unreasonable over Calais. I The French King also feared the prospect of another Anglo-
Imperial dynastic alliance. During the negotiations that culminated in the Peace of 
Cateau-Cambresis (2 April 1559), therefore, Henri worked hard to prevent a marriage 
between Philip and Elizabeth - a marriage that would inevitably be more fruitful than 
Philip's marriage to Elizabeth's aged and barren half-sister had been.2 The actual terms 
of the treaty contracted between France, Spain and England reflect Henri's desire to 
safeguard his position and dynastic interests within the British Isles.3 In lieu of the 
English Queen, Philip would instead marry Henri's daughter, Elisabeth, thereby keeping 
the Imperial threat out of the British Isles.4 More importantly, it also provided for the 
possibility that Elizabeth could still be excommunicated by the pope, and enable Henri 
to put Mary and Franc;ois on the prized throne of England. 
With international peace and the dynastic and imperial interests of 'les Guises et 
Valois' safeguarded in Scotland and in England, the spring of 1559 seemed like the 
beginning of a 'golden age' for Henri and Marie de Guise. In reality, nothing could 
have been further from the truth. The reform movements in both Scotland and France 
soon began to translate into civil unrest, whilst Henri's untimely death in July 1559 
instigated a series of events that would eventually see the collapse of Marie de Guise's 
I Baumgartner, Hemy II, p.224. 
2 See CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,321-2,324-6,335·7,338-9,340-1,373,390-4, 399, 405, 408, 419-20, 
421-2,439,445-6,447-8,456, pp. 122-3, 137-44, 163-72, 175-9, 184, 186-8, 190, for references to the 
negotiations, in addition to Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 244-6; Ruble, Le TraiN! de Cateau 
Cambresis (Paris, 1889); Baumgartner, Hemy II, pp. 221-5; Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of 
Empire, pp. 305-18. 
3 Foedera, XV, pp. 505-12; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,475,483, pp. 195, 196-8. 
4 Baumgartner, Henry II, pp. 227-9; Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire, pp. 319-23. 
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regime in Scotland. But as we shall now see, the eventual outbreak of the so-called 
'Reformation Rebellion' in May 1559 was not due to the 'altogether altered' mind of 
the Queen Regent towards her Protestant subjects upon fulfilling her dynastic 
objectives. l In fact, religion was a decidedly secondary concern for Marie de Guise 
until well after the marriage of her daughter and the bestowal of the crown matrimonial 
on the Dauphin. Seen in this light, the prevalent view that Guise had to conciliate the 
reformers of her realm in order to achieve her dynastic objectives becomes highly 
questionable. 
*** 
Throughout most of Marie de Guise's regency, religious issues had taken a back seat to 
more pressing and immediate concerns such as the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance, 
national security and the imposition of law and order.2 However, Guise's preoccupation 
with these concerns did not mean that she was oblivious to the fact that the established 
Church was in need of internal reform or, for that matter, that there existed a small but 
powerful group of Protestants in her kingdom. In 1555 and 1556, for example, Pope 
Paul IV received numerous reports and petitions in the name of Mary, Queen of Scots,3 
detailing the degenerate and profligate state of the Scottish Church and requesting a 
visitation for the 'management and reform of our clergy'.4 Church property had been 
alienated and neglected by prelates, rectors, prebends and holders of canomies and 
I Knox, Works, I, p.315 and History, I, p.l58. 
2 Papal Negotiations, p.xiii. 
3 Ibid, pp. 4-9, 522-30, xviii-xx. 
4 Ibid, p. 525. 
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benefices, while ecclesiastical discipline had relaxed to such an extent that nuns 
wandered freely through the houses of the laity, admitted 'worthless and wicked men' to 
their monasteries and daily indulged in carnal lusts. 1 This was also evidenced by the 
fact that: 
... divers abuses are introduced into the churches ... and very many 
crimes, iniquities, and scandalous enornlities (some of them savouring 
of heresy) are committed by various persons of either sex, by ecclesiastics 
of various orders, both secular and regular, iniquities which give offence 
to the Divine Majesty, bring shame on the Christian religion, and cause 
loss of souls, and scandal to Christ's faithful? 
It is significance that this is this is the only reference to heresy in all the applications for 
a 'visitor' to Scotland. Even in Guise's letter to the Cardinal de Lorraine of 13 January 
155617, in which she describes her problems in Scotland at great length, neither religion 
nor heresy is mentioned.3 But it was at the instigation of the Queen Regent that Paul IV 
granted factory to Cardinal Anthony Trivulzio, legate de latere to the Apostolic See and 
to the Most Christian King of France on 27 October 1557. Specifically, he was 
commissioned 'to visit, by means of some fit prelate, to be deputed by him, the churches 
monasteries, and persons of either sex, ecclesiastical and secular, and regulars of every 
order in the realm of Scotland, and of the reforming and correcting of what he shall 
think deserving of reformation and correction,.4 In 1556, Guise had already 
recommended the Scottish prelates who she thought were the most capable and suitable 
candidates to hold the office of 'visitor'. The names of James Beaton, archbishop of 
I Papal Negotiations, pp. 6-9, 528-9. 
2 Ibid, p.7. 
3 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 8-11; Papal Negotiations, pp. 423-30. 
4 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
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Glasgow, Patrick Hepburn, bishop of Moray, Andrew Durie, bishop of Galloway, 
William Chisholm, bishop of Dunblane and Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney were all 
submitted for consideration. 1 It is not known, however, who was appointed, if anyone. 
By 1557, the international situation was a more serious concern for the papacy 
than the internal reform of the Scottish Church. In December 1557, Trivulzio was sent 
on a special mission to France to pursue peace on the Continent. But Trivulzio also 
used his time in France to gather information on the 'state of Scottish affairs to which 
the queen's application to the Pope referred'.2 In this, he was to be assisted not only by 
Henri and the Cardinal de Lorraine, but also by the delegation of Scottish 
Commissioners negotiating Mary, Queen of Scots' marriage treaty. Expecting their 
arrival in two or three days time, Henri informed Trivulzio that these 'Scotsmen of 
importance ... would give full information as to the necessities of that kingdom'. 3 As 
proposed candidates to hold the office of visitor, Beaton and Reid, could be expected to 
provide Trivulzio with pertinent and constructive information for the internal reform of 
the Scottish church, but what the delegation's noted reformers, Cassillis, Erskine of Dun 
and Lord James, had to say on the matter is anyone's guess. Again, it is not known 
what information Trivulzio gathered from the Henri or the Scots, if anything at all. 
What his papal appointment does reveal, however, was Marie de Guise's desire to see 
the internal reform of the Church. 
I Papal Negotiations, pp. 530, xx. 
2 Ibid, p.9. 
3 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
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Marie de Guise was similarly mindful that there existed a small but powerful 
group of Protestants in her kingdom that might oppose the Franco-Scottish dynastic 
alliance on religious grounds. In order to assure her Protestant subjects that her dynastic 
policies were not incompatible with the reformed faith, Guise adopted an 
accommodating position. Committed and noted reformers such as Glencaim, Argyll, 
Cassillis, Erskine of Dun and Lord James were shown no political bias in Guise's 
administration on account of their faith. Rather, they continued to play prominent roles 
in her government and, more importantly, were extensively involved in every stage of 
the process that culminated in Mary, Queen of Scots' marriage to the Dauphin. As we 
have seen in Chapter III (Appendix A), reformers were recipients of French patronage 
alongside their Catholic peers and participated in Henri's triumphant entry into Rouen 
that celebrated, amongst other things, the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance and 
projected Henri's imperial ambitions in the British Isles. Seven years later, Protestants 
elected to proceed with the Valois-Stewart marriage and were directly involved in the 
negotiations of the marriage treaty itself. Finally, in November 1558, having consented 
to grant the crown matrimonial to their new king, two of Scotland's most prominent 
reformers, Argyll and Lord James, were appointed to transport the crown itself to 
France.' By embracing a tolerant position with respect to religion and implementing a 
policy of inclusion rather than persecution, Guise sent a clear message to her Protestant 
subjects that they would not be marginalised, excluded or made to suffer personally or 
I Knox, Works, I, p.294 and Hist01Y, I, p.141; Lesley, Hist01Y, p.268. Argyll was to be accompanied in 
this, by another Protestant sympathiser, Lord James Stewart, who not only negotiated the Valois-Stewart 
marriage, but also invited Knox to return to Scotland on 10 March 1556/7, along with Glencairn, Argyll 
and Erskine of Dun. Knox, Works, I, pp. 267-8 and Hist01Y, I, p.132. 
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politically on account of their faith. This may also explain their support of Guise's 
dynastic policies when most would see the union of the French and Scottish Catholic 
crowns as a direct threat to the reform movement in Scotland. J enny Wormald has 
argued that leading Protestants such as Lord James and Erskine of Dun gave 'positive' 
support to the union with Catholic France because 'they saw it as a way to keep the 
Catholic-educated Mary out of Scotland, while maintaining their formal loyalty to her, 
[and] thereby maximIzmg the opportunity to advance the Protestant cause while 
minimizing the need to clash directly with their sovereign'. 1 However, the relationship 
between Guise and her Protestant subjects appears to be far less cynical, and one based 
rather on a mutual understanding of religious toleration, than Wormald's argument 
allows. 
This can be evidenced in many ways. Unlike Mary Tudor, Marie de Guise did 
not implement a policy of persecution - the controversial burning of Walter Miln in 
April 1558 being the work of Archbishop Hamilton.2 John Knox, moreover, went 
unmolested during his preaching tour of Scotland in 1555-1556 and Guise did nothing 
to prevent him associating with Scots with Protestant sympathies such as Erskine of 
Dun, Argyll, Lord Lome and Lord James.3 Rather, Guise reinforced her assurances of 
inclusion and toleration with patronage. In November and December 1557, she entered 
into a bond a manrent with the Earl of Morton, while Donald Campbell, abbot of 
1 Wormald, Mary, Queen a/Scots, pp. 94-5 and Court, Kirk, and Community, p.114. 
2 Dawson, 'The Scottish Reformation and the Theatre of Martyrdom', in D. Wood (ed.), Martyrs and 
Martyrologies (Oxford, 1993), pp. 259-70, especially pp. 269-70. Even Knox accepted Guise's 
protestations of innocence in this matter. Knox, Works, I, pp. 308-9, Appendix XIII, pp. 550-5, and 
History, I, pp. 153-4. 
3 Donaldson, James V-James VII, pp. 85-6. 
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Coupar-Angus was nominated to the bishopric ofBrechin, a son of Glencaim received a 
pension of £900 from Kelso abbey, a nephew of Argyll was granted the temporalities 
from Brechin, and Adam Bothwell, son of the provost of Edinburgh, was nominated and 
provided with the bishopric of Orkney. 1 So, if Guise had adopted a tolerant position 
with respect to religion in a conscious effort to reassure her Protestant subjects that there 
would not be a backlash after the Valois-Stewart marriage, the 'First Band' of the 
Congregation cannot be seen as a sign of opposition to Guise's dynastic policies.2 But, 
as a politique who was ultimately concerned with her own dynastic interests and those 
of her daughter, Marie de Guise was not above altering her religious policy if 
circumstances deemed it necessary or advantageous to do so. There was the possibility 
that she could abandon her tolerant position towards the reform movement for one far 
less accommodating, and it is because of this possibility that the 'First Band' must be 
seen, primarily, as an insurance policy against an eventuality. 
Thus, on 3 December 1557, Argyll, his son and heir, Lord Lome, Glencaim, 
Morton and Erskine of Dun signed a covenant, pledging to: 
... continually apply our hole power, substance, and our verray lyves 
to manteane, sett fordward and establish the most blessed word of God 
and his Congregatioun; and shalliaubour at our possibilitie to have 
faythfull Ministeris purely and trewlie to minister Christis Evangell 
and Sacramentes to his people. We shall manteane thame, nuriss 
thame, and defend thame, the haill congregatioun of Christ, and everie 
membour thairof, at our haill poweris and waring of our lyves against 
Sathan, and all wicked power that does intend tyranny or truble against 
the foirsaid congregatioun.3 
I Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.86 and Reformed by Bishops, pp. 1-52; Mahoney, 'The Scottish 
Hierarchy', p.53; Dowden, Bishops, pp. 190-1, 374, 267; Papal Negotiations, pp. 28, 30, 40, 55, 172; 
Highland Papers, IV, p.211; ER, XIX, pA51, RSS, IV, 1800, p.292 and V, 589, pp. 122-3. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 273-4 and HistOlY, I, pp. 136-7; NLS, Ch.2593. 
3 Knox, Works, I, 273 and History, I, p.136. 
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Unlike the later proclamations of the Lords of the Congregation, the 'Common Band' 
was purely a religious manifesto in which the subscribers publicly declared their 
commitment to the reformed religion and its establishment in Scotland. Nothing 
contained within it suggests that the subscribers' motives were political or, more 
importantly, that they were opposing Marie de Guise or the Franco-Scottish dynastic 
alliance. Rather, the 'Common Band' was entirely consistent with John Knox's own 
position at the time (at least publicly) - 'lawful obedience' to the established authority.l 
The purpose of the 'Common Band', therefore, was purely defensive. In the event that 
Marie de Guise was not playing straight with them, this group of committed reformers 
took the precautionary step of setting up a private insurance policy against the 
possibility that once the marriage was accomplished, Guise would no longer need or, as 
it would happen, could no longer afford to be so accommodating.2 As we shall see in 
Chapter VIII, the fears of the Protestants ensured that this became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Needless to say, the subscribers' concerns about the possible ramifications of 
I Even though he advocated lawful obedience, Knox had started to develop his theory of armed resistance 
by October 1557. For in-depth analyses of John Knox's theory of armed rebellion, see: Mason, 'Knox 
on Rebellion', Kingship and the Commonweal (Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 139-64, 'Knox, Resistance and the 
Royal Supremacy' in Mason (ed.), John Knox and the British Reformations, pp. 154-75, 'Covenant and 
Commonweal: the Language of Politics in Reformation Scotland' in Macdougall (ed.), Church, Politics 
and Society (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 98-120, 'Knox, Resistance and the Moral Imperative', HistOlY of 
Political Thought, I (1980), pp. 411-36, in addition to his edited work, Knox: On Rebellion; lH. Bums, 
'Reformation and Resistance: John Knox' in The True Law of Kingship (Oxford, 1996), pp. 122-52, 
'John Knox and Revolution, 1558', History Today, viii (1958), pp. 565-73, and 'The Political Ideas of the 
Scottish Reformation', Aberdeen University Review, xxxvi (1956), pp. 251-68; J.R. Gray, 'The Political 
Theory of John Knox', Church Hist01Y, viii (1939), pp. 132-47; Greaves, 'Calvinism, Democracy, and 
Knox's Political Thought' in Greaves (ed.), Theology and Revolution in the Scottish Reformation, pp. 
169-83, and 'John Knox and the Covenant Tradition', Journal of Ecclesiastical History, xxiv (1973), pp. 
23-32; Dawson, 'Trumpeting Resistance: Christopher Goodman and John Knox' in Mason (ed.), John 
Knox and the British Reformations, pp. 131-53, 'The Two John Knoxes', pp. 555-76; and Q. Skinner, 
'The Origins of the Calvinist Theory of Revolution' in B.C. Malament (ed.), After the Reformation 
(Manchester, 1980), pp. 309-30. 
2 Mason, Kingship and the Commonweal, p.150 n.40. 
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the dynastic union of the French and Scottish Catholic crowns makes the Protestants' 
presence on the Commission to negotiate the terms of the marriage very intriguing. 
But, if the 'Common Band' signalled the emergence of Protestantism as an 
organised political force, did the reformers pose enough of a threat to force Guise to 
maintain her accommodating position in order to achieve her dynastic objectives? With 
only five subscribers one would hardly think so. It is Donaldson's contention that the 
'Common Band' 'failed to attract the support of the many others for whose signatures 
ample space was provided'. I While this is true, there is also the possibility that this 
document was the only surviving copy of several that were circulated throughout the 
kingdom. In his History of the Reformation in Scotland, Knox claims that there were 
'many otheris' who subscribed to the 'Common Band'.2 His failure to identify these 
'many others', however, leads one to presume that they were not of the same political 
stature as Glencaim, Argyll, Morton, Lord Lome or Erskine of Dun and, therefore, a 
negligible threat to the Queen Regent in the accomplishment of her dynastic objectives. 
Knox is similarly vague when referring to the Protestants who formulated and 
subscribed the petitions, letters and protestations that were presented to Marie de Guise 
and the Three Estates in November and December 1558.3 Apart from 'certain zealous 
men' who exhorted their 'brethren' in the privy-kirk, the only person of note who Knox 
cites specifically is Sir James Sandilands of Calder who presented the 'First Oration, 
I Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.89. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.274 and History, I, p.137. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 302-14 and History, I, pp. 149-58; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 15-6,45-6,66-7, pp. 
7-8, 14,21. 
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and Petition, of the Protestants of Scotland to the Queen Regent' in November 1558. 1 
Other than that, Knox predominantly uses the royal 'we' when referring to the 
Protestants as a whole. Being the name-dropper that he was, one would expect Knox to 
identify the more notable supporters of the reform movement; his failure to do so 
suggests that, in actuality, there were not that many. As we shall see in Chapter VIII, 
the majority of support for the Congregation came in 1560, when France failed to 
respond to England's military intervention following the treaty of Berwick. 
The year following the signing of the 'Common Band' witnessed the systematic 
development of the Lords of the Congregation's religious policy, which they presented 
to the Queen Regent in their petitions of November 1558. Again, Guise showed her 
proclivity for accommodation by promising to have them considered at a Provincial 
Council, which subsequently convened at Edinburgh on 1 March 1558/9.2 Passing 
several statutes upholding the ancient faith and its authority as the established Church in 
Scotland, the Protestants' requests for such things as the legal assembly of Protestants in 
private or public, the reading of Scripture in the vernacular, the administration of the 
sacraments of baptism and communion in the vernacular (the latter in both kinds) and 
the reform of the Estate Ecclesiastical according to the above precepts, were rejected 
outright - not by Guise, but by the Provincial Council. 3 These facts being as they are, 
considerable doubt is raised as to the accuracy of Knox's assertion that: 
I Knox, Works, I, p.301 and Hist01Y, I, p.148. In CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 15, p.7, the date of the 'First 
Oration' is cited as 20 November 1558, but this date has not been substantiated elsewhere. Knox, 
Hist01Y, I, p.152 n.1. 
2 Patrick, Statutes, liv, pp. 149-91. 
3 Ibid, liv, pp. 156-62. 
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. .. to gett the Matrimoniall Croune, the Quein Regent left no point of 
the compas unsailled ... Unto the Protestants she said, "I am nott 
unmyndfull how oft ye have suyted me for Reformatioun in religioun, 
and glaidly wald I consent thairunto; but ye see that the power and craft 
of the Bischop of Sanctandrois, togetther with the power of the Duck 
[Chatelherault], and of the Kirk-men, ever to be bent against me in all 
my proceadingis; So that I may do nothing, onless the full authoritie of 
this Realme be devolved to the King of France, which can nott be butt 
by donatioun of the Croune Matrimoniall; which thing yf ye will bring 
to passe, then devise ye what ye please in materis of religioun and thei 
shalbe granted".' 
This version of events is, of course, coloured by Knox's personal bias as well as 
hindsight. It gives the impression that Guise needed to conciliate the Protestants by 
granting empty promises because their sheer political weight could have some bearing 
on the outcome of whether the crown matrimonial was granted to the Dauphin or not. 
Given the presumably small number of openly committed reformers at the time, this 
scenario seems highly unlikely - especially as this decision was made in Parliament, 
where the majority vote ruled. Of greater significance, perhaps, is Knox's inference that 
pro-reforming sympathies were synonymous with opposition to Franco-Scottish 
dynastic union. There is no evidence to suggest that such a correlation even existed 
before patriotism became a central theme of the Lords of the Congregation's 
propaganda during the Reformation Rebellion. The only formal protest lodged against 
the granting of the crown matrimonial to the Dauphin came from Chatelherault, who 
was noticeably absent from this session of Parliament and principally concerned with 
safeguarding his own dynastic ambitions and rights to the succession.2 
I Knox, Works, pp. 293-4 and History, I, pp. 140-1. 
2 APS, II, pp. 507-8. 
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Future membership in the Lords of the Congregation is in no way indicative of 
opposition to Marie de Guise's dynastic policies in 1557 and 1558. If anything, this 
chapter has clearly shown that the Scottish political community actively pressed for the 
conclusion of their sovereign's marriage from as early as May 1556. It is important to 
remember that, if the Scots had any reservations about the effect Franco-Scottish 
dynastic union would have on their ancient laws or liberties, or their cultural or 
institutional independence, they could have refused to grant the crown matrimonial to 
the Dauphin. The fact that the Three Estates did grant it, moreover, does not 
automatically mean that they did so because Marie de Guise made a secret deal with her 
Protestant subjects over matters of religion. Rather, their consent was more than likely 
due to her dual policy of accommodation and inclusion, and the general assurances she 
gave to her Protestant subjects throughout her regency that her dynastic policies were 
not necessarily incompatible with the reform movement. Yet, despite these assurances, 
international and national events coinciding with the fulfilment of Guise's dynastic 
policies forced the Queen Regent to take a harder line in matters of religion and 
encouraged her Protestant subjects to take a far more assertive stance in their quest to 
advance and establish the reformed kirk in Scotland. Culminating in the outbreak of 
rebellion, the conflict that would dominate Marie de Guise's final years and lead to the 
collapse of her regime in Scotland is the subject to which we now tum. 
283 
CHAPTER VIII 
The Reformation Rebellion: the Collapse of Marie de Guise's Regime in 
Scotland? 
On 24 May 1559, a government force of 8,000 men assembled on the outskirts of Perth 
to confront a riotous 'congregation' of Protestants who had embarked on a violent 
campaign of iconoclasm. l On the surface, Marie de Guise's decision to respond to this 
Protestant revolt militarily seemed to confirm her 'altogether altered' mind towards the 
reform movement since the fulfilment of her dynastic policies? Already on 23 March 
1558/9, she had issued a religious proclamation in suppOli of the Third Provincial 
Council, upholding the authority and supremacy of the Scottish Church and ordering the 
return of all Scots to the ancient faith by Easter (26 March).3 Guise's determination to 
enforce this ordinance resulted in four Protestant preachers being summoned to account 
for their non-compliance. Their failure to appear, whether deliberate or unintentional, 
was regarded by the Queen Regent as an act of open defiance and led to their immediate 
denunciation as rebels.4 Incensed by this turn of events and, in particular, by Marie de 
Guise's ostensible volte-face, John Knox preached a rancorous sermon 'vehemente 
1 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,728, pp. 268-9; CSP Scot., I, 457, p.213. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.315 and HistOlY, I, p.159. 
3 Patrick, Statutes, pp. 149-91; D. Laing (ed.), 'Historie of the Estate of Scotland', Wodrow Misc., 1, p.56; 
W.L. Mathieson, Politics and Religion: A Study in Scottish History fi'om the Reformation to the 
Revolution (Glasgow, 1902), I, p.57; Lee, James Stewart, p.33. 
4 Pitcairn, Trials, I.i, ppA06-7; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,710, pp. 263-4; CSP Scot., I, 455, pp. 212-3; 
Knox, Works, I, pp. 315-9. The foUl' preachers were Paul Methven, John Christison, William Harlaw and 
John Willock. 
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against idolatrie'. I The iconoclasm that this sermon incited officially marked the 
beginning of the Reformation Rebellion in Scotland.2 
Both contemporaries and modern historians have used the timing of this change 
of religious policy to suggest that Marie de Guise adopted a 'conciliatory' position 
towards her Protestant subjects with the sole purpose of achieving her dynastic 
objectives.3 Thus it is argued that, having secured the Three Estates' ratification of 
Mary, Queen of Scots' marriage contract and consent to grant the crown matrimonial to 
the Dauphin, Guise no longer required the political support of her Protestant subjects 
and promptly abandoned her policy of conciliation for one less accommodating. This 
alteration in policy, however, was neither sudden nor extreme and did not represent the 
complete abandonment of Guise's accommodating position. Rather, a complex series of 
international and national events coinciding with the completion of her dynastic policies 
compelled Guise to take an increasingly harder line in matters of religion. As in so 
many other aspects of her regency, events in England dictated her actions at home, and 
the dynastic controversy that followed in the wake of Mary Tudor's death forced Guise 
to adopt a more assertive stance against the reform movement in Scotland. Marie de 
Guise's sudden preoccupation with religion in 1559, therefore, came not with the 
realisation of her dynastic ambitions, but rather as a direct result of the early Elizabethan 
successIOn CrISIS. 
I Knox, Works, I, p.321 and History, I, p.163. 
2 Knox's accounts of the iconoclasm in Pelih varied to suit his audience. A more realistic account can be 
found in his letters to Anna Locke in CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 743, 877, pp. 278, 331-5, while a 
decidedly more favourable version of events is contained in his Works, I, pp. 319-23 and Ristory, I, pp. 
162-3. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 294, 312, and Risto/y, I, pp. 140-1, 156; Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.91; Lee, 
James Stewart, pp. 20, 32-3; Mathieson, Politics and Religion, I, pp. 42-4, 52, 56. 
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*** 
Following the death of Mary Tudor in November 1558, the question of religion in 
Scotland became a matter of crucial importance - for only in Catholic eyes was Mary 
Stewart's claim to the English succession superior to that of Elizabeth Tudor. Yet 
despite her dubious legitimacy, Elizabeth succeeded her half-sister to become the Queen 
of England - a fact that physically prevented the immediate realisation of Hemi' s 
imperial vision of a Franco-British Empire. Undeterred, Hemi launched a campaign to 
advance his daughter-in-law's claim to the English succession on the grounds that she 
was 'laitlie mareit to the dolphine his eldest sone, [and] was just heritour of the realme 
of Inglande, as nerrest and lauchfull to the croun thairof, being onelie dochtir to King 
J ames the Fyft of Scotlande, quhois model' Quene Margaret was eldest sister to Henry 
the viij'. I Hemi' s dynastic argument rested foursquare on religion. Because the Pope 
had not sanctioned Hemy VIII's divorce from Catharine of Aragon, his subsequent 
marriage to Anne Boleyn was invalid, thus rendering Elizabeth illegitimate. 
Unlike her cousin, there was no question of Mary Stewart's legitimacy in canon 
law, and it was this line of argument that Hemi used to try to persuade Pope Paul IV to 
'declare Queen Elizabeth illegitimate, and, as it were, of incestuous birth and 
consequently incapable of succeeding to the throne'? The credibility of his argument, 
however, would be seriously undermined if the Queen of Scots' subjects were seen to 
favour Protestantism and, worse still, if the Scottish government was seen to 
1 Lesley, HistOl}J, pp. 268-9. 
2 [December 1558], CSP Rome, 2, p.l. 
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accommodate them in their heretical beliefs.! That Scotland should remain a kingdom 
favourable to Catholicism and a faithful adherent to the Holy See, therefore, was pivotal 
if Henri was to receive papal support for his daughter-in-Iaw's claim and, more 
importantly, realise his dynastic ambitions within the archipelago. Although Henri 
never received the papal suppOli he so desired, Marie de Guise's religious proclamation 
of 23 March 1558/9 can neveliheless be seen as part of Henri's international campaign 
to strengthen Mary Stewart's Catholic claim to the English succession? 
I After the outbreak of the Reformation Rebellion, Henri, Mary and Franc;:ois wrote to Pope Paul IV 
seeking financial assistance, papal intervention and, more importantly, to absolve themselves of any 
responsibility for their tolerance of heresy and growth of Protestantism in their respective kingdoms. In 
his letter of29 June 1559, Henri went so far as to blame the pope for the troubles in Scotland on account 
of the latter's failure to provide a remedy for the degenerative state of the Church. 'Having long foreseen 
the incredible disaster which has since befallen the realm of Scotland', he wrote, 'we have many and 
divers time heretofore written and made most instant request to you Holiness, that it might be your good 
pleasure to commit and delegate some good virtuous and notable personage among the prelates of that 
kingdom, such as our most dear and well-beloved good sister and cousin the queen dowager of this 
Scotland could well choose and select to introduce and establish some wholesome, holy and devout 
reform in the Church, correct, bridle and temper the corrupt customs, the depraved and dissolute lives of 
the said prelates and ecclesiastical ministers, who already begin to fall away very much and degenerate'. 
Papal Negotiations, pp. 17, xxviii-xxix, 13-20; NLS, Adv.MSS, 54.l.2(ii), fos. 6-7'; Ribier, Lettres et 
Memoires, II, p.808; P. Hume Brown, John Knox (London, 1895), II, Appendix B, pp. 300-2. 
2 Henri's appeals to the Court of Rome were no doubt enhanced by his own commitment to extirpate 
heresy in France. While this was cited as a premise for the peace of Cateau-Cambresis, Henri's declared 
intent to combat the Huguenot movement did not begin in earnest until the summer of 1559. In late May, 
ThrockmOlion reported that, 'The French King ... minds to make a journey to Poictou, Gascoigne, 
Guienne, and other places for the repressing of religion, and to use the extremist persecution he may 
against the Protestants in his countries and like in Scotland, and that with celerity'. It was only with the 
outbreak of the Reformation Rebellion in Scotland that Henri's declarations against heresy became more 
extremist in nature. On 3 July, Henri wrote to his ambassador in Rome that, ' ... I'espere bien, puisque 
Dieu m'a donne la paix, d'employer Ie temps, et ce qu i'auray de force en main a faire pun iI', chastiser et 
extirper tous ceux qui se trouveront imitateurs de ces nouvelles Doctrines, sens y epargner personne, de 
quelque qualite or dignite qu'ils soient'. Despite the projections of contemporary observers, such as 
Etienne Pasquier, that as soon as the Valois-Habsburg peace was contracted, ' ... Monsieur Ie cardinal de 
Lorraine declara en plein Parlement, que I'opinion du Roy avoit este de la faire a quelque prix et 
condition que ce fust pour de la en avant vacquer a son aise a l'extermination et banissment de I'heresie de 
Calvin' and, similarly, that 'Le Roy resolut, a quelque prix que ce rust, de fa ire la paix en deliberation de 
s' armer contre les Heretiques de son Royaume', Henri's threats of extremist persecution did not translate 
into effective action. CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,732,823,833, pp. 272, 301, 308-11; Ribier, Lettres et 
Memoires, II, p.806; E. Pasquier, Les Oeuvres d'Estienne Pasquier, cOllntenant ses recherches de la 
France (Amsterdam, 1723), II, pp. 77, 450; Dickinson (ed.), 'RepOli by de la Brosse and d'Oysel on 
conditions in Scotland, 1559-60', SHS Misc., IX, pp. 85-6. 
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Another cause for concern for Henri and Marie de Guise was the possibility that 
Elizabeth's own religious sympathies would result in a Protestant religious settlement in 
England. The prospect of yet another Protestant English monarch serving as the foci of 
support for discontented Scottish reformers eager to revive the arguments in favour of 
Anglo-Scottish Protestant union or for disaffected Scots opposed to the Franco-Scottish 
dynastic alliance, posed a significantly greater threat to French interests in Scotland than 
the Anglo-Imperial dynastic and Catholic alliance had done during the reign of Mary 
Tudor. For, as time would ultimately reveal, this threat would not only come from 
England, but also from within Scotland itself. I The Elizabethan religious settlement, 
therefore, was eagerly anticipated by Catholics and Protestants alike - its outcome not 
only had the potential to change the political map of the British Isles, but of Europe as a 
whole. 
Unsurprisingly, Elizabeth's first Parliament (assembled on 25 January 1558/9) 
was overwhelmingly concerned with the highly contentious matter of religion. Strong 
opposition from the Lords to the proposed restoration of the Acts of Supremacy and 
Uniformity, as they had been during the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI, delayed 
the final settlement until May 1559.2 The question throughout the spring of 1559, 
therefore, was not whether England would break from Rome, but the extent to which the 
I In their letter to Pope Paul IV, Mary and Franyois cited the Elizabethan religious settlement as one 
reason for the outbreak of the Reformation Rebellion in Scotland. They claimed they needed a papal 
subsidy for the 'soustenement et deffence de I'eglise Romaine contre les nouvelles sectes qui 
commancerent lors a seslever au dict Royaulme par Ie moyen de leurs voisins suivant I'eglise changee en 
Angleterre'. NLS, Adv.MSS, 54. 1.2 (ii), f.6 f ; Brown, John Knox, II, p.30 I. 
2 See, for example, Sir Simonds d'Ewes, The Journals of all the Parliaments during the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth, Both of the House of Lords and House of Commons (London, 1682), pp. 37-56; N.L. Jones, 
'Elizabeth's First Year: The Conception and Birth of the Elizabethan Political World' in C. Haigh (ed.), 
The Reign of Elizabeth I (London, 1989), pp. 36-9, 43-8. 
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Elizabethan Church would be a reformed church. All speculation ended when, on 8 
May, the Elizabethan Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy received Parliamentary 
sanction in both the Commons and the Lords. I With the restoration of the Edwardian 
Book of Common Prayer and the Administration of Sacraments, and 'to the Crown the 
ancient jurisdiction over the state ecclesiastical and spiritual', England once again 
became a Protestant kingdom and, in doing so, irrevocably changed the dynamics of 
Scottish politics? 
By May 1559, Scotland's Protestants had become decidedly more assertive in 
their demands for religious reform. Elizabeth's accession and religious settlement no 
doubt played a part in this new found confidence, but so too did the return of John Knox 
to Scotland on 2 May 1559. Ending his exile on the Continent at the behest of Argyll, 
Lord Lome, Glencairn, Morton and Erskine of Dun, Knox's return had an immediate 
impact on the progress of the reform movement in Scotland, even though he would have 
preferred to go to England? Just four days after his return, the Congregation sent a 
letter to Marie de Guise expressing their dissatisfaction at her sudden volte-face and, in 
particular, her religious proclamation of 23 March 1558/9: 
... now allace frustret of our howp to our greit hewines, we find the 
contrair, our lycht is changeit in myrknes, our myrth and joy in sorow 
and weping; ffor your letters proclamationis and the wordis dalie pronuncit 
of your awin mowthe, dois aItogidder mak for the downputting of Godis 
gloir, his wird, and trew wirschiping, and to menten and to authoreis the 
idolatrie and abhominatioun of the Roman Antichrist.4 
I 1559: I Eliz. I, c. I & 2, Statutes of the Realm, IV, pp. 350-5, 355-8. 
21552: 5 & 6 Ed. VI, c.l and 1559: 1 Eliz. I, c.l, ibid, IV, pp. 130-1,350-5. 
3 It was following his successful preaching tour in Scotland that Knox was invited to return in November 
1558. Knox, Works, I, p. 274 and HistoIJ', I, pp. 137, 161, 139 n.3. 
4 'Appendix to the Dun Papers', Spalding Misc., IV, p.88. 
289 
Chapter VIII: The Reformation Rebellion. 
Of greater significance was the Congregation's latent threat that if Guise 
persisted in making 'ordinance aganis the word of God ... we ofnecessitie man disobey 
your ordinance,.1 Whilst it is unknown whether Knox actually penned this letter 
himself, his influence on the Congregation's language and ideology is beyond question. 
Espousing Knox's covenanting ideology and theory of armed resistance, the 
Congregation's epistle clearly reflected their perceived duty as the elect bound in 
'league and covenant' to the divine will. As such, they were constrained to disobey 
Guise as the constituted temporal authority, if her laws contradicted those of God as 
revealed in Scripture? Written just days before Paul Methven, John Christison, William 
Harlaw and John Willock were scheduled to appear before the Queen Regent at Stirling 
on 10 May, the Congregation's letter not only justified the Protestant preachers' act of 
defiance in failing to observe Guise's religious proclamation, but was also a poignant 
foreshadowing of things to come. 
It was in support of the summoned preachers that a multitude of Protestants, 
including John Knox, assembled in Perth during the first week of May. According to 
Knox, this multitude, comprised of men from 'the toune of Dundy, [and] the gentilmen 
of Anguss and Mearnis', was ' ... without armour, as peciable men, mynding onlie to 
geve confessioun with thare preachearis,.3 But for the Queen Regent, this assembly was 
an alarming prospect - especially since it was their declared intention to accompany 
their preachers to Stirling. Showing her proclivity for accommodation rather than 
1 Spalding Misc., IV, p.90. 
2 Mason, 'Covenant and Commonweal', pp. 98-101. 
3 Knox, Works, I, p.317 and History, I, p.160. 
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persecution, Guise asked Erskine of Dun 'to wret to those that ... war assembled at 
Sanct Johnestoun, to stay, and nott to come fordwarte', which Knox claims was taken to 
include the summoned preachers. l In light of the Congregation's letter, however, this 
'misunderstanding' could just as easily be interpreted as an open and deliberate act of 
defiance. Whatever the intent, the subsequent non-appearance of the preachers 
prompted Guise, with justification, to give 'commandiment to putt thame to the horne, 
inhibiting all men under pane of thare rebellioun to assist, conforte, receave, or 
mayntenne thame in any sorte' .2 
This assembly at Perth was also a cause for concern for Guise because of the 
threat contained within the 'Beggars Warning,.3 Throughout January 1558/9, a 
summons appeared 'upon the gaittis and ports of all the Freiris places'. Written in the 
name of the 'Blynd, Cruked, Bedrelles, Wedowis, Ophelingis, and all uther Pure ... as 
may not worke', this proclamation sought to effect the 'Restitutioun of Wranges bypast, 
and Reformatioun in Tyme Cuming' - namely, by ordering the Friars to sunender their 
propeliy so that the poor, 'the onelie lawfull proprietaris thairof may enter thairto, and 
efterward injoye thai commodities of the Kyrk, quhilke ye have heirunto wranguslie 
hal den fra us,.4 The day of eviction, or 'flitting Friday', fell on 12 May 1559 and 
coincided, rather unfortunately for Guise, with the scheduled appearance of the four 
preachers and their subsequent denunciation as rebels on 10 May. 5 The existence of a 
I Knox, Works, I, p.318 and HistOl)" I, p.l60. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 318-9 and History, I, pp. 160-1; Pitcairn, Trials, I.i, pp. 406-7; CSP Foreign, 1558-
1559,710, pp. 263-4; CSP Scots., I, 455, pp. 212-3. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 320-1n.l and HistOl)" II, Appendix V, pp. 255-6. 
4 Knox, Works, I, p.321 and HistOl)J, II, p.256. 
5 Knox, Works, I, pp. 320-1 and HistOl)J, I, p.162; Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.92. 
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mob of extremist Protestants none too pleased with the Queen Regent added a new 
element of danger to the threat that, if the Friars did not meet their demands and 
surrender their properties, they would, 'at the said terme, [and] in haile number .... enter 
and tak possessioun of our said patrimony, and eject yow utterlie furthe of the same'. I 
True to their word, the Protestants assembled at Perth ran 'without deliberatioun to the 
Gray and Blak Freris' after having been suitably inspired by John Knox's sermon 
'vehement against idolatrie' on 11 May. In the iconoclasm that followed these religious 
houses were attacked, spoiled and utterly destroyed.2 
*** 
Upon hearing of the destruction in Perth, Marie de Guise immediately summoned the 
nobility and began making preparations to assert her authority and that of the Scottish 
Church through a visible display of force. 3 Her decision to respond to this tumult 
militarily, however, is not evidence of her proclivity for religious persecution. As we 
have seen, international and national events culminating in the month of May, forced 
Guise to take an increasingly harder line in matters of religion. Moreover, for Guise, the 
aims of the Congregation's revolt in Perth were not as they professed. Rather than a 
revolt of conscience in defence of the true faith, she perceived the Congregation's 
insurgent activity as 'nothing bot a rebellioun' directed against the established 
I Knox, Works, I, p.321 and RistOlY, II, p.256. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 322-3 and RistOlY, I, pp. 162-3. The White Friars were also victims. According to 
one commentator, the Protestants targeted the Abbey of the Chmter-House and 'pullit the hoill place 
downe, alsweill the Kirk thairof as uther housses, and all the coastlie bigginis quhilkis was maid be King 
James the First' in 1429. Lesley, RistOlY, p.272. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 324-5 and RistO!)!, I, p.163; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 728, 743, pp. 268-9, 278; 
CSP Scot., 1,457, p.213. 
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h . I aut onty. The dictum cuius regia, eius religia was fast becoming a commonplace 
idiom in Reformation Europe, and Guise, like Henri, believed that the religion of their 
subjects should be that of their sovereigns. Any challenge to the established Church was 
seen as a challenge to the temporal authority and, as such, political sedition. But, as a 
politique whose dynastic interests took precedence over her own religious convictions, 
Guise had shown a considerable degree of toleration towards the reform movement. 
The relationship she had established with her Protestant subjects - namely, one of 
mutual accommodation - moved her to perceive the Congregation's revolt exclusively 
in political terms. Throughout their rebellion, she consistently maintained that the 
Congregation 'intended not religioun, bot the subversioun of authoritie'? 
This questioning of motives ultimately gave the Queen Regent an edge over the 
Congregation in the war of words that continued between the two sides throughout 1559 
- especially when the Congregation's actions began to substantiate her contentions. As 
I Knox, Works, I, p.324 and History, I, p.163. 
2 D. Calderwood, The HistOlY of the Kirk of Scotland, T. Thomson (ed.), (Wodrow Society, 1842-9), I, 
p.433. See similar comments that the Congregation 'pretended no religion, but a plain revolt fi'om the 
Authority' in Knox, Works, I, pp. 324, 363-4, 397-9 and HistOlJ" I, pp. 163, 193-4,217-9. Only when 
seeking intervention from Pope Paul IV did Henri, Guise, Mary and Franr;ois speak of the Congregation's 
rebellion in religious terms. The nobles and the third estate were described as 'seditious and scandalously 
insolent against religion', having 'certain apostate preachers of the learning or doctrine of Geneva to 
exhort, and induce the people to follow their damnable errors and heresies, whence the greater part of the 
said people is entirely infected and as it were lost. They constrain everyone to follow their sect, wreck 
churches and monasteries, profane holy things, burn publicly the statues and pictures of the saints with 
their holy relics and bones. They have disinterred the bodies of the kings of Scotland, whom they have in 
like manner burnt and reduced to ashes; they have taken off and changed the habits of monks and nuns to 
make them become seculars and leave and abandon their orders and professions, boasting and bragging of 
attacking and bearing down the queen and all others who would oppose and refuse to join their new 
league, in such sort that cruel savages could not do worse'. With French military intervention, Henri 
hoped that the King and Queen Dauphin and the Queen Regent 'will overcome these heretics and 
schismatics, and force and power will be in their hands to chastise and punish their great temerity and 
arrogance, for the honour of the Creator, the exaltation of His Holy Name, and the increase of our holy 
faith and religion'. Papal Negotiations, pp. 17-8; NLS, Adv.MSS, 54.1.2(ii), fos. 6-7'; Ribier, Lettres et 
Memoires, II, p.808; Brown, John Knox, II, pp. 300-2. 
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Roger Mason points out, 'If credibility be ranked among the most treasured assets of any 
political movement, then it was the Congregation's singular misfOliune that from the 
very outset their motives were questioned and their professed aims scoffed at and 
derided'.! Perhaps because Guise did not see the Congregation's revolt in religious 
terms, she did not employ a policy of persecution nor abandon her policy of 
accommodation towards the reformers. Instead, she continued to use notable 
Protestants such as John Erskine of Dun, Lord James Stewart and Archibald, 5th earl of 
Argyll, in the hope of suppressing the Congregation's revolt. 
We have already seen how Marie de Guise tried to 'stay' the multitude in Perth 
through the intervention of Erskine of Dun, whom Knox described as 'a zealous, 
prudent, and godly man ... most addict to please hir in all thingis not repugnant to 
God'? During the initial stages of the rebellion, Guise also relied on the services of 
Lord James and Argyll to try to restore order through peaceful means. While 
Chatelherault and d'Oisel's troops were on standby in Auchterarder, Guise sent Argyll, 
Lord James and Lord Sempill (an ardent Catholic whom Knox described as 'a man sold 
under syne, enymye to God and to all godlynes'), to meet with representatives of the 
Congregation.3 Their first task was to inquire as to the nature of the Congregation's 
armed occupation of Perth. In the two weeks that had elapsed since the iconoclasm first 
began, the situation in Pelih had taken a more serious turn with the arrival of Glencairn 
1 Mason, 'Covenant and Commonweal', p.112. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 317-8 and History, I, p. 160. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 341,339 and HistOlY, I, pp. 175, 173. 
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and a small contingent of lesser nobles in suppOli of the Congregation. J The extent of 
Glencairn's reinforcements, however, was not substantial (numbering somewhere in the 
region of 2,500 meni and should not be taken as a sign that Marie de Guise faced a 
groundswell of opposition from the nobility or the Protestant community at large.3 
Rather, support for the Congregation at this point was minimal and localised in nature. 
Glencairn was the only magnate of significance willing to risk his lands, liberty and life 
for the' caus of religioun,.4 Most of the gentry and leading reformers were still firmly in 
the Queen Regent's camp. As Sir James Croft observed, because 'a great number of 
those that rise with the Queen being of that religion that the other faction is, being also 
of kindred and alliance', it was his opinion that 'the matter will fall to some other 
appointment without battle' .5 
I Glencairn was accompanied by the Lords Ochiltree and Boyd, Matthew Campbell of Loudon, John 
Wallace of Craigie, George Campbell of Cessnock, Hugh Wallace of Carnell, John Lockhart of Barr, 
James Chalmer of Gadgirth. Knox, Works, I, p.340 and HistOlJI, I, p.175; CSP Foreign, 1558-/559, 822, 
833, pp. 301,308-11; CSP Scot., 1,464, p.215. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.341 and HistOl)" I, p.175; Sanderson, Ayrshire and the Reformation, pp. 98-9. 
3 Upon hearing that Guise had summoned the nobility for the purpose of confronting them militarily, the 
Congregation hastily wrote a letter 'To the Nobilitie of Scotland', in which they earnestly required their 
'moderatioun, and that ye stay your selfis, and the furye ofutheris, from [the] persecuting of us'. Penned 
in the language of the covenant and espousing Knox's theory of armed resistance, the Congregation took 
great pains to stress the 'difference betuix the authoritie quhiche is Goddis ordinnance, and the personis of 
those whiche ar placit in the authoritie'. God's law was infallible, and if the nobility persecuted the 
Congregation for following God's will as revealed in Scripture, 'blynd zeale, nather yit the colour of 
authoritie' would excuse them in the eyes of God. Rather, it was the nobility's duty to 'defend innocentis, 
and to brydle the fury and raige of wicked men, wer it Princes or Emperouris'. And, as a foretaste of the 
patriotic stance they would later adopt, the Congregation played on the fact that, if the nobility carried out 
the will of the constituted temporal authority, namely, Marie de Guise, they would be doing so against 
their 'naturall cuntriemen'. Knox, Works, I, pp. 329-34 and Histol)" I, pp. 167-71; Mason, Knox: On 
Rebellion, pp. 152-6. 
4 As Knox himself admitted, support for the Congregation in Perth came only from the brethren of Fife, 
Angus [Dundee], Mearns, Cunningham and Kyle. Knox, Works, I, pp. 335-6, 327 and HistOl)" I, 171, 
165. 
5 CSP Scot., I, 457, p.213; CSP Foreign, /558-1559,728, pp. 268-9. 
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Yet the reality of the situation was that Perth was a town under siege, and the 
Congregation's assurances of 22 May 1559 did little to convince Guise that theirs was 
simply a revolt of conscience or that their promise of 'all humill obedience' was 
sincere.! Argyll, Lord James and Sempill's prime directive on 24 May was 'to inquire 
the caus of that convactioun of liegis' in Perth and, more importantly, if the 
Congregation 'myndit nocht to hold that town against the authoritie, and against the 
Quene Regent'? The response to this question did little to assure the Queen Regent. 
With Knox as their spokesperson, the Congregation reiterated their assurances of 
obedience, while simultaneously pledging to 'tak the sweard of just defence aganis all 
that should persew us for the mater of religioun,.3 Upon hearing Knox's reply, Guise 
immediately issued letters to her Lyon-King at Arms, Robert Forman, charging all men 
to avoid Perth on pain oftreason.4 No military force, however, was used to enforce this 
proclamation; Guise was still determined to reach some sort of agreement with the 
Congregation and restore the burgh to a state of obedience peacefully. 5 
With the law and the majority of leading reformers still behind the Queen 
Regent, Knox knew that for the Congregation to succeed more support was needed -
particularly from high-ranking members of the nobility such as Lord James and Argyll. 
The problem facing Knox was that these two nobles had bound themselves to the 
I Knox, Works, I, pp. 326-7 and HistOlY, I, pp. 164-5; Mason, Knox: On RebeWon, pp. 149-51. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.337 and RistO])I, I, p.173. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 339,326 and HistOl)" I, pp. 173, 164; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, pp. 149-50. 
4 Knox, Works, I, p.340 and RistOlY, I, p.175. 
5 In his HistOl)" Knox lets slip that an 'appointment' was what Guise 'required' at Perth - contradicting 
his inferences that the Regent's true intention was to persecute the Congregation and suppress them by 
force. Knox, Works, I, p.341 and HistOlY, I, p.175. 
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Regent, promising 'to laubour for concord, and to assist the Quene' against the 
Congregation if the latter refused to act reasonably and accept Guise's offer to negotiate 
a settlement. 1 Despite his attempts to goad Lord James and Argyll into breaking with 
the Regent by accusing them of 'infidelitie, in sa fer as thay had defrauded thair 
brethering of thair debtfull support and confOli in thair gretest necessitie', honour 
prevented them from doing SO.2 Honour, however, worked both ways and Knox claims 
that Lord James and Argyll promised to side openly with the Congregation if, having 
concluded some sort of appointment with the Regent, 'the Quene did break in ony joit 
thairof.3 Whatever the premise, the negotiations that ensued culminated in the Perth 
Agreement of 29 May 1559. It was agreed that both armies would disband and leave 
Perth open to the Queen Regent; that none of the inhabitants would be molested on 
account of the late alteration in religion; that no Frenchmen would enter or be left to 
ganison the town when Guise retired; and finally, that all other controversies would be 
refened to the next Parliament.4 Guise's success in reducing Perth to obedience through 
diplomacy without having to resort to force, however, was short-lived and ultimately 
lost her the crucial support of Argyll and Lord James. Upon entering Perth the next day, 
Guise immediately restored the Mass, replaced Lord Ruthven as Provost with a more 
faithful adherent to the crown, the Laird of Kinfauns, and upon leaving the burgh, 
maintained a garrison of four Scottish companies there in French pay.s Guise's 
I Knox, Works, I, p.343 and Histol}" I, p.I77. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.343 and HistOl)l, I, p.I77. 
3 Knox, Works, I, p.343 and HistOl}J, I, p.I77. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 784, p.289. 
5 Knox, Works, I, pp. 347-8 and HistOl}J, I, pp. 179-80; Donaldson, James V-James VII, p.93; Lee, James 
Stewart, p.39. 
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perceived contravention of the Pelih Agreement cost her dearly. The subsequent 
defection of Argyll and Lord J ames to assume the nominal leadership of the 
Congregation was a devastating blow to the Queen Regent and must have surely 
reinforced her perception of the rebellion as one against the established authority. 
Why these two notable reformers switched allegiances is open to speculation and 
slightly bemusing given that, just days before, Knox claims they were firmly on side 
with the Regent and convinced that the Congregation 'ment nothing bot rebellioun,.1 
Knox purports that they remained loyal to the Queen Regent because she desired peace, 
but Guise had not resorted to violence at any time during the revolt or in her actual 
violation of the Perth Agreement. 2 Equally perplexing is the fact that the Perth riots had 
secured very little support for the Congregation - especially from the nobility. The 
Second Band of the Congregation (31 May 1559) had only six subscribers, four of 
whom were new: Lord James, Matthew Campbell of Teringland, and the Lords Boyd 
and Ochiltree? If the opposite had been true, and the Congregation was perceived as the 
winning side, as it would start to after England entered the conflict in January-February 
1559/60, Lord James and Argyll's defection would be more understandable. 
A slightly more sinister analysis emerges, however, if Knox's version of events 
is accurate. Knowing that Guise was bent on peace and that Argyll and Lord James 
1 Knox, Works, I, p.341 and History, I, pp. 175-6. In their negotiations with the Congregation, Knox 
writes that Argyll and Lord James 'had promesed to laubour for concord, and to assist the Quene, in case 
we refuised ressonable offen'is, of conscience and honour, thay culd no na less than be faithfull in thair 
promeise maid'. But, as Maurice Lee points out, the terms of the Pelth Agreement were far too 
favourable to the Congregation for Guise to abide by them permanently. Knox, Works, I, p.343 and 
HistOlY, I, p.177; Lee, James Stewart, p.36. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 337-8 and HistOlY, I, pp. 175-6; Lee, James Stevllart, p.36. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 344-5 and HistOl)), I, pp. 178-9; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 799, p.296. Glencairn 
and Argyll were the only two subscribers to the 'First' and 'Second' Bands of the Congregation. 
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would break from the Regent if she violated any part of the agreement, it is possible that 
Knox entered into negotiations not with the intent of reaching a peaceful settlement, but 
rather to provide a pretext for Lord James and Argyll's defection. Although there is no 
evidence to substantiate such a theory, it is significant that it was only because of Lord 
James and Argyll's promise that Knox consented to negotiate with Guise in the first 
place. 1 Moreover, it was widely recognised that the terms of the Perth Agreement were 
decidedly favourable to the Congregation - too favourable for Guise to keep for any 
substantial length of time? Knox was fully aware of this and preached a sermon on the 
day of the agreement, in which he predicted with a great deal of confidence that, 'I am 
assured, that no pairt of this promeise maid shalbe longar keipit than the Quene and hir 
Frenchemen have the upper hand,.3 While Maurice Lee and Jane Dawson contend that 
Lord James and Argyll sided with the Congregation because Guise, as her violation of 
the Perth Agreement clearly demonstrated, never had any intention of honouring her 
declarations of peace, it might also be said that Knox's pugnacity and determination to 
secure the suppOli of Lord James and Argyll ensured that no settlement with the Queen 
Regent could be pennanent.4 With Guise's subsequent demands for their return 
dismissed,S Argyll and Lord James went on to become the de facto leaders of the 
1 Knox, Works, I, p. 343 and HistOlY, I, p.I77. 
2 Lee, James Stewart, p.3S. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 343-4 and HistOl)), I, p.I78. 
4 Lee, James Stewart, pp. 37,39; Dawson, 'Protestantism and the Anglo-Scottish Alliance, 155S-60' in 
her forthcoming monograph on Archibald Campbell, 5th earl of Argyll. See also Argyll and Lord James' 
letter to the Queen Regent dated 15 June 1559 in Knox, Works, I, pp. 356-7 and HistOlY, I, pp. IS7-S. 
5 Knox, Works, I, p.347 and HistOlY, I, p.1S0. 
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Congregation until Chatelherault and his son, Arran, assumed nominal control m 
September 1559.1 
*** 
As the Congregation's systematic campaign of iconoclasm continued throughout June 
and July, news of the Queen Regent's troubles soon reached the shores of France and 
became a topic of concern at the French COUli. On 7 June, Throckmorton informed 
Cecil that the Cardinal de Lorraine, the King and Queen Dauphin and the Duc de Guise, 
have had great consultation of Scotland, wherein, as yet, they have fallen to no 
determination. They are in doubt what to do and whom to send thither, being greatly 
perplexed with the news brought thence to the Court'.2 Although military intervention 
was high on the list of considerations, the general unceliainty as to what was actually 
going on and, in particular, as to the motives behind the Congregation's rebellion 
resulted in an initial reluctance to send reinforcements. Amidst this uncertainty, they 
advised the Queen Regent 'to tolerate them [the Congregation] for a time till they ... 
may overcome these great matters here and so to take order accordingly'. 3 In the 
interim, Sir James Melville of Halhill was to be sent on a fact-finding mission to 
Scotland. His instructions clearly reveal Henri's private reservations about sending 
troops to Scotland, despite his public declarations and assurances to the contrary.4 
I Knox, Works, I, pp. 413-4 and HistOl)i, I, pp. 229-30; Sadler Papers, I, pp. 455-7; Stevenson, 
Documents, pp. 73-5. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 826, pp. 304-6. 
3 Ibid, 826, pp. 304-6. 
4 The reliability of Melville as a witness should not be dismissed simply because he recounts the nature of 
his commission in his Memoirs. While the discussions he had with Henri and Montmorency may not be 
verbatim, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the professed aims of his mission to Scotland. 
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Melville had been assured that Hemi 'myndit to wair and [to] hazard his crown, 
and all that he has, rather or your Quen want hir rycht, now seing that sche is maried 
vpon his son; and purposis to raise and send ane armye in Scotland for that effect'. 1 
However, there were several factors preventing him from doing so. The most notable of 
these was 'that his Maieste hes hed wairres lang anough with his auld elmemys, and 
agreed with them for gud respectis, his is laith till enter again in a new vnnecessary wair 
with his auld frendis'.2 Apart from the obvious financial and diplomatic considerations, 
Hemi's reluctance to support Marie de Guise militarily was primarily because he was 
unsure as to whether such intervention was justified. What, exactly, was the nature of 
the civil umest in Scotland and why had it erupted? Was the Congregations' rebellion a 
revolt of conscience or was it politically motivated? Was Marie de Guise an innocent 
bystander or had she acted dishonourably towards her subjects, thereby inciting them to 
rebel? Many questions needed to be answered before Hemi was prepared to translate 
his words into decisive action. 
Melville's principal duty was to investigate the events surrounding Lord James' 
defection to the Congregation. As the bastard son of James V, Lord James' 
tergiversation sparked fears, particularly in the Guise camp of the French Court, that he 
intended 'vnder pretext of this new religion, [to] vsurp the crown of Scotland, and pluk 
it clean away from the Quen,.3 Simultaneous reports that the Queen Regent had broken 
her word and violated the Perth Agreement, however, added an altogether new 
I Melville, Memoirs, p.79. 
2 Ibid, p.79. 
3 Ibid, pp. 78, 80. 
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dimension to the situation in Scotland. I Melville was thus commissioned to determine 
whether Lord James had designs on the crown or 'gene he be mouit to tak armes only of 
conscience, for deffence of his religion, him self and his dependers and associatis', what 
promises to Lord James and the Congregation had been broken, by whom and at whose 
instance? Unlike Marie de Guise and d'Oisel, Hemi was willing to concede that the 
Congregation's revolt might be religiously motivated. 3 If that was indeed the case, he 
was powerless to do anything about it for, 'Gif it be only religion that moues them, we 
mon commit Scottismens saules vnto God; for we haue anough ado to reull the 
consciences of our awen contre men,.4 Rather, it was 'the obedience dew vnto ther 
lawfull Quen with ther bodyes' that the King desired, but again, Hemi's hands were tied 
if Guise refused to keep her promises. 5 In short, the uncertainty surrounding what lay 
behind the Congregation's rebellion prevented Hemi from intervening in support of 
Marie de Guise - especially in light of the reports that suggested she was not entirely 
blameless. Instead, Hemi chose to place his faith in the Scots and the 'auld alliance', 
not wanting 'to geue haisty credence, that Scotland, wha haue keped salang frendschip 
I Melville, Memoirs, p.79. 
2 Ibid, pp. 78, 80. 
3 See d'Oisel's letter of 14 June 1559 to Gilles de Noailles, the new French ambassador resident in 
England, in which he writes that Argyll, Lord James and the Congregation 'disent que c'est pour la 
Religion Et de faict ilz ant des predicantz avec Eulx Gens de Mauvaise & dangereuse doctrine. Mais je 
cuyde qu'ilz ont autre desseing en l'esprit & n'y a autre apparence .... Ilz disent bien qu'ilz veulent estre 
obeyssants a leurs Roy & Rayne, mais il ne s'en void sartiI' effect du monde qui n'y soit du contraire, 
prenans Les armes tous lesjours, pillant & destruissant les Abbayes 9a et la'. AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, 
XIII, f.257; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 310-11 and Relations, I, pp. 318-9. 
4 Melville, Memoirs, p.80. 
5 Ibid, p.80. 
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with France, will now sa leichtly brek the auld band, nor abandon deute to ther lawfull 
prince'. I 
This was a far cry from the offensive stance taken by the King in his supplication 
to Paul IV for a papal subsidy to finance his intended military campaign in Scotland.2 
Blaming the troubles on the internal degeneration of the Scottish Church and the 
heretical learning and doctrine of Geneva, Hemi characterised the Congregation's 
rebellion in exclusively religious terms, making only a passing reference to the 
'bragging of attacking and bearing down the queen and all others who would oppose 
and refuse to join their new league,.3 Hemi's position on the matter was clear, and 
conveyed none of the personal reservations he had as to the cause and nature of the 
rebellion nor, significantly, what France's response should be. Rather, he had resolved: 
... to send immediately to Scotland a large and sufficient force or posse 
of French soldiers, both infantry and cavalry, with the hope of sending 
more after them very shOlily, and of increasing and strengthening them 
with another large company or army, if need shall be; not intending to 
spare anything in sustaining and defending the cause of God, even 
though we have but just concluded a long war to enter on peace, after 
having borne and suffered an incredible expense as everyone knows. 
But our confidence is in God who in signally offended at this wretched 
pest of ruffians. He will so provide our most dear and well-beloved son 
and daughter, the king and queen dauphin, and the queen dowager their 
mother, with our aid and succour, will overcome these heretics and 
schismatics, and force and power will be in their hands to chastise and 
punish their great temerity and arrogance, for the honour of the Creator, 
the exaltation of His Holy Name, and the increase of our holy faith and 
1·· 4 re IglOn. 
I Melville, Memoirs, p.79. 
2 Papal Negotiations, pp. 13-20. 
3 Ibid, pp. 17-8. 
4 Ibid, p.18. See also contemporary English repOlis detailing France's planned military intervention, 
which were more than likely deliberate leaks out of the French COUli in order to fhghten the Congregation 
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In practice, however, Hemi had opted for a policy of temporisation - a policy that was 
also, but not exclusively, favoured by Franc;ois II during his short reign. 
Following the death of Hemi on 10 July 1559 from injuries sustained in a 
jousting tournament, France's new king, Franc;ois, despatched another diplomatic envoy 
to Scotland with new instructions for Marie de Guise. Echoing those of 7 June, Guise 
was to proceed 'doulcement' against the Congregation.! Unlike the former missive, 
which advised Guise simply 'to tolerate them for a time', B6thencourt's commission 
included a specific plan of action for temporising with the Congregation. The most 
notable feature was an extensive letter writing campaign, whereby leading members of 
the Congregation were targeted and promised absolution for past offences if they 
repented and returned to their due obedience to the crown? Lord James was one such 
member of the Congregation who received letters from both Mary and Franc;ois.3 Fair 
words and promises, however, failed to induce the Prior to repent, for in his words, 'my 
conscience perswaidis me in thir proceidingis to have done na thing aganeis God, nor 
into submission and to deter the English from joining the conflict. CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 902, 928, 
953,962, pp. 346-8,356,365,367-8; CSP Scot., I, 486, p.223. 
I Bethencourt's instructions (16 July 1559) are printed in L. Paris, Negotiations, Lettres et Pieces Diverses 
Relative au Relative au Regne au Fral1r,:ois 11 (Paris, 1841), p.12. See also Papal Negotiations, pp. 
xxxiii-iv, and CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1094, pp. 428-9. 
2 Bethencourt brought unaddressed letters from both Mary and Franyois with him to Scotland; Guise was 
left to determine which members of the Congregation were to receive these letters and fill in the blanks 
accordingly. Paris, Negotiations, p.16; Papal Negotiations, pp. xxxiii-iv; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1149, 
pA57. 
3 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 27-8; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1004, p.385; Knox, 
Works, I, pp. 384-6 and HistOlY, I, pp. 208-9; Papal Negotiations, pA32. Melville must have got to the 
bottom of Lord James' defection, at least to the French Court's satisfaction, as both Mary and Franyois' 
letters charge the Prior with being the self-proclaimed head, principal beginner and nourisher of the 
tumults. 
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the debtfull obedience torwartis your Hienes and the Queneis Grace my Soverane,.1 As 
in the 'rough wooing', the distribution of patronage was also hoped to secure support for 
the Queen Regent. Bethencourt brought with him 20,000 livres to induce members of 
the Congregation to abandon their cause, but it is not known how this money was 
dispensed or to whom? 
Marie de Guise, however, had already made efforts to appease her Protestant 
subjects before Bethencourt's arrival in August 1559. As per her instructions of 7 June 
and despite their sustained campaign of iconoclasm, Guise was constrained to tolerate 
the Congregation, or at least give the appearance that she was doing so by granting 
conciliatory promises. On 1 July 1559, for example, Guise issued a proclamation 
outlining the various concessions she had allegedly made to the Congregation over the 
recent controversy in religion.3 Written in the name of Mary and Franyois, this 
pronouncement claimed that the Queen Regent: 
... perceaving the seditious tumult rased by ane parte of the our liegis, 
naming thame selffis THE CONGREGATIOUN, who, under pretense 
of religioun, have putt thame salffis in armes; and .... for satisfeing of 
everie manis conscience, and pacifeing of the saidis trubles, had offerred 
unto thame to affix ane Parliament to be haldin in Januare nixt to cum, ... 
or sonnar, gyf that had pleased, for establissing of ane unversall ordour 
in matteris of religioun, be our advise and Estatis of our Realme; and in 
I Knox, Works, I, p.387 and History, I, p.209. For Lord James' reply dated 12 August 1559, see AE, 
Mel/1Oires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.30; Papal Negotiations, pp. 433-4; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 
1184, pp. 468-9 and Knox, Works, I, pp. 386-7 and HistOlY, I, p.21O. 
2 Paris, Negotiations, p.12; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1149, pA57. Rumours of Hemi's Scottish policy 
had reached England even before Bethencourt had arrived in France. On 8 July, Cecil informed Sir James 
Croft that 'the Protestants there [in Scotland] shall be essayed with all fair promises first, next with 
money, and last with arms'. In the end, Cecil was right - this was exactly how France's intervention in 
Scotland developed. Elizabeth responded accordingly by sending Sir Ralph Sadler nmih with £3000 to 
counter the French offers. Ibid, 953, 1125, 1131, 1140, 1157, 1161, 1162, pp. 365, 450, 449, 453-4, 459-
60, 460-1; CSP Scot., I, 486, 520, 521, pp. 223, 241-2; AE, Cor. Pol., AngIeterre, XIII, fos. 319v-20'; 
TeuIet, Papiers, I, pp. 344-5 and Relations, I, pp. 348-9. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 363-5 and History, I, pp. 193-4; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,905, pp. 348-9. 
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the meantyme, to suffer everie man to leaf at libertie of conscience, without 
truble, unto the tyme the said ordour war tackin be advise of our forsaid 
[Estates.] And at last, because it appeared mekle to stand upoun our burght 
of Edinburght, what maner of religioun thai wald sett up and use for the 
tyme; swa that na man mucht alledge that he was forsed to do against his 
conscience: Quhilk offer the Quenis Grace, ... was at all tymes , and yit 
is, ready to fulfill. l 
This proclamation also served as an effective piece of propaganda in which Guise was 
able to launch a scathing attack on the Congregation by exposing the true aims of their 
rebellion. As they themselves had declared 'by oppin dead', the Congregation's military 
occupation of Edinburgh,2 their suspected communication with England and, most 
damning of all, their seizure of the kingdom's coining irons at Holyrood on 21 July, 
were used by the Queen Regent to show how it was not 'religioun ... thai seak, bot 
onelie the subversioun of our authoritie'? In light of such blatant acts of sedition, Mary 
and Franyois charged all members of the Congregation to withdraw from Edinburgh 
under pain of treason, and for 'all and sindrie personis to leave thair cumpany, and 
adhear to our authoritie'. Those who failed to observe this royal proclamation were 
warned that they would be reputed and held as 'manifest traytouris to our Crowne,.4 
Clearly, the main function of this proclamation was to discredit the Congregation 
by exposing the true aims of their rebellion as secular rather than religious. Guise's 
I Knox, Works, I, pp. 363-4 and HistOlY, I, p.193. Knox strenuously denies that Guise made an offer to 
settle their religious differences before the Congregation demanded it. 
2 Following their voluntary withdrawal from Perth, and Guise's subsequent violation of the Pelih 
Agreement, the Congregation mustered their forces at St Andrews. From there, they returned to Pelih and 
re-took the burgh on 25 June 1559. The Congregation then made their way to Edinburgh by way of 
Stirling, entering there on 29 June. Knox, Works, I, pp. 347-62 and HistOlY, I, pp. 180-92; CSP Foreign, 
1558-1559, 861, 862, 877, 878, pp. 319-20, 320-2, 331-5, 335-6; CSP Scot., I, 469, 471, pp. 216-7; 
Donaldson, James V-James VII, pp. 93-4. 
3 Knox, Works, I, p.364 and Histol)), I, p. 193. 
4 Knox, Works, I, pp. 364-5 and Histol)), I, pp. 193-4. The Congregation issued a formal response to this 
proclamation on 2 July 1559. Knox, Works, I, pp. 365-6 and HistOlY, I, pp. 194-5; CSP Foreign, 1558-
1559, 925, p.355. 
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position was further strengthened by the concessions she had ostensibly granted to settle 
the religious controversy. While giving the impression that her conciliatory oveliures 
were genuine, in reality, she had not conceded a thing. Guise's proclamation, therefore, 
enabled her to grant promises that she did not necessarily have to keep. This system of 
granting what were essentially 'empty promises' became the cornerstone of Guise's 
policy of toleration. Not only did they cast her in a favourable light, but they also 
bought time for reinforcements to arrive from France. It was presumably in the hope 
that French military intervention would materialise that Guise re-entered negotiations 
with the Congregation later that month. 
These negotiations culminated in what would prove to be the highly contentious 
Leith Agreement of 23/4 July 1559.1 Central to the agreement was the offer previously 
made by Guise to have the religious controversy settled by the Three Estates in 
Parliament, which was scheduled to convene on 10 January 1559/60. This provision 
gave both the Regent and the Congregation just under six months to procure military 
suppOli from France and England respectively. For their part, the Congregation agreed 
to withdraw from Edinburgh and relinquish the commg irons they had seized at 
Holyrood. They also promised to render their due obedience to their sovereigns and 
refrain from further outbreaks of iconoclasm and assaults on the clergy until the meeting 
of the said Parliament. For her part, Guise promised that the inhabitants of Edinburgh 
I For details of the negotiations at Leith and the agreement itself, see Knox, Works, I, pp. 374-81 and 
HistOlY, I, pp. 202-6; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1052,1056,1058,1062,1063/4,1065, pp. 406-7, 408-9, 
410,411; CSP Scot., I, 500, 503, 505, pp. 231-2, 233, 233-4; AB, Cor. Pol., Angieterre, XIII, fos. 285, 
303 and XIV, f.241; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 327-8, 329-32 and Relations, I, pp. 334-5, 335-7. 
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would be free to choose their own religion, having liberty of conscience, and that no 
interference nor harm would befall members of the Congregation or their preachers. 
The effectiveness of Guise's attempts to stall the Congregation is not only 
evidenced by the tenor of Leith Agreement itself, but also, and more significantly, by the 
band concocted by the Congregation shOlily thereafter on 1 August. Foreseeing 'the 
slycht of our adversaries, tending all maner of way is to circumvene us' and in particular, 
the 'desait' of the Queen Regent, it was deemed necessary to prohibit individual 
members of the Congregation from communicating or meeting with Guise 'without 
consent of the rest, and commone consultatioun thairupoun ... swa that nathing saIl 
proceid heirin without commune consent of us all'. 1 Ultimately, this was a tribute to 
Marie de Guise's political acumen and charisma. By forbidding individual members 
from speaking with the Regent, presumably out of fear that she would then persuade 
them to defect, the Congregation was inadvertently acknowledging the potential threat 
Guise alone posed to their cause and, perhaps, the precarious loyalty of some members 
to the Congregation. However, in light of the controversy that ensued surrounding the 
terms of the Leith Agreement, it was not the deceit of the Queen Regent, but that of 
Knox that was ultimately responsible for its undoing. 
The terms of the Leith Agreement initially came into dispute with the arrival of 
French reinforcements in August and September 1559. Unbeknown to Guise, Franyois 
had decided to send military reinforcements as a token gesture of support in July.2 
1 Knox, Works, I, p.382 and HistOlY, I, pp. 206-7; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1108, p.435. 
2 Franyois to Noailles, 21 July 1559, AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XX, f.192. Bethencourt delivered this 
letter to Noailles on 30 July 1559 whilst en route to Scotland. Neither he nor Franyois were aware that the 
Leith Agreement had been contracted when the decision to send troops had been made. Brosse Missions, 
pp. 164-5. 
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Although it was widely believed that the situation in Scotland justified full-scale 
military intervention,l financial constraints and the delicate international situation, 
particularly with England, constrained the young King of France to send only the bare 
minimum.2 Temporising was still the preferred method at the French Court to combat 
the Congregation.3 In August, Nicolas de Pelleve, bishop of Amiens, and Jacques de la 
Brosse were sent as envoys from the Courts of Rome and France respectively to try to 
effect a peaceful conclusion and bring the Regent all the comfort, counsel and aid that 
lay within their power.4 In the meantime, d'Oisel was instructed to use the 'petites 
forces' that de la Brosse and, later, Octavien Brosso brought with them, to dispel the 
Scottish insurgents and defuse their designs until Franyois could deploy the 'plus 
grandes' reinforcements Guise was promised would come with her next supplication to 
the French Court.s No sooner had Brosso arrived with the 'quatres premieres enseignes 
qu'il a pleu au Roy y faire passer', than he was immediately despatched back to France 
to update Franyois on the continuing troubles in Scotland and to urge him 'faire haster Ie 
I See, for example, AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, f. 314v, XIV, f.239' and XX, f.195; Teulet, Papiers, I, 
pp. 325-7, 340-3 and Relations, I, pp. 332-4, 345-8. 
2 Franyois did not want to rock the boat with Elizabeth. Noailles was instructed to give Elizabeth and her 
Council ample warning of the French King's intentions to dispel any suspicion that these troops were 
intended for an attack against England. AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XX, f.192; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 
1118, 1143, 1151, 1187, 1190, 1255, 1270, pp. 444-5, 454-5, 458, 470-1, 476,502,507-8; CSP Scot., I, 
535, pp. 248-9. 
3 AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 316', 319'; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 342-3 and Relations, I, pp. 347-8. 
4 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 130'-53\ and Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 319, 
322v-3'; SRO, SP13/85; NLS, MSS, 3137, fos. 16-8; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 348-9, 349-50 and Relations, 
I, pp.352-3, 353-4; Labanoff, Lettres, I, pp. 70-2; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,1187,1190,1274, pp. 470-1, 
476,508-9; Paris, Negotiations, p.15; Tytler, HistOlY of Scotland, IV, p.163. For details and analyses of 
de la Brosse's mission to Scotland in 1559-60 see Brosse Missions, pp. 175-271; Dickinson, 'Report by 
de la Brosse and d'Oisel', pp. 85-125; and 1. de la Brosse, Jacques de la Brosse 1485(?)-1562: Ses 
Missions en Ecosse (Paris, 1929), pp. 150-171. 
5 AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 316', 319v; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 343, 344 and Relations, I, pp. 
347-8, 348-9; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1151, pA58; Paris, Negotiations, p.12. 
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reste de son secours,.1 As the Congregation's rebellion developed and the situation in 
Scotland deteriorated, Guise became increasingly alarmed at the trickle of military aid 
coming out of France. Her urgent and desperate appeals for reinforcements to the King 
and her brothers seemed to fall on deaf ears - a fact that ultimately contributed to the 
collapse of Guise's regime in 1560 following England's formal entry into the conflict? 
While the relatively small number of troops sent from France was far from 
adequate in the eyes of Guise and d'Oisel, the arrival of 1,000 men in August and 
another 800 in September was more than enough for the Congregation to accuse Guise 
of violating the Leith Agreement. 3 According to the Congregation, the entry of new 
French troops into the kingdom had been expressly forbidden in the truce, which 
stipulated that, 'with all diligent speed the Frenchmen here present shall be sent away, 
and none other shall come in this realm without the consent of the whole nobility [and 
Parliament].,4 Further condemnation followed when Guise decided to fortify and 
garrison Leith on 22 September 1559.5 Again, the Congregation claimed that this 
contravened the article stipulating that Edinburgh was to be kept free of both Scottish 
and French garrisons. 6 While these articles were contained in the copies of the 
I AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 319v-20, 322' and Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.39; 
Teulet, Papiers, I, p.344 and Relations, I, pp. 348-9; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1355, p. 562. 
2 See, for example, Guise's letters of 19 and 22 September 1559 in AB, Memoires et Documents, 
Angleterre, XV, fos. 37'-41 r. 
3 Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 342-3 and Relations, I, pp. 347-8; AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 315v-6r; 
CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,1190,1255,1270, pp. 476,502,507-8; Donaldson, James V-James VII, p. 95; 
Mathieson, Politics and Religion, I, p.63. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1056, pp. 408-9. 
5 AB, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 322v-4' and Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f.39; Teulet, 
Papiers, I, pp. 349-50 and Relations, I, pp. 353-4. 
6 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1056, pp. 408-9; CSP Scot., I, 505, pp. 233-4. 
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agreement sent to the English,l they were interestingly and conspicuously absent from 
Marie de Guise's, suggesting that the Congregation had altered the agreement to their 
favour. 2 Like the Perth Agreement, the Congregation's fabrication of these clauses 
seems to have been done with a view to gaining support. Having informed Sir James 
Croft of the terms of the agreement, William Kirkaldy of Grange added this personal 
note: 
They [the Congregation] believe that never a word will be kept of these 
promises on the Queen's side, and therefore have taken bonds of my Lord 
Duke [Chatelherault], the Earl of Huntly and the rest of the nobility on her 
side for the performance thereof. With this condition, that if she break any 
point thereof, they will renounce her obedience and join themselves with 
the party of the writer. 3 
Knowing that some form of French intervention was inevitable, the invention of certain 
clauses that the Queen Regent was bound to break would attract more support 
nationally. More importantly, it would also strengthen the Congregation's appeals for 
English military aid and justify their rebellion on an international scale by showing how 
Guise had broken her word yet again.4 
As Guise did not know that Franyois had determined to send troops until 
Bethencourt arrived with the news in August 1559, after the conclusion of the truce, it 
was imperative for her to counter the Congregation's charges and implement some form 
I See, for example, the report sent to Sir James Croft by William Kirkaldy of Grange in CSP Foreign, 
1558-1559,1056, pp. 408-9, and CSP Scot., I, 505, pp. 223-4. The same discrepancy also appeared in the 
two versions of the Congregation's proclamation of the appointment made on 25 July 1559. CSP 
Foreign, 1558-1559, 1062, 1063/4, p. 411; CSP Scot., I, 503, p.233; Knox, Works, I, pp. 380-1 and 
Histol)', I, pp. 205-6. 
2 ' AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 285, 303 and XIV, f.241; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 327-8 and 
Relations, I, pp. 334-5. 
3 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1056, pp. 408-9; CSP Scot., I, 505, pp. 233-4. 
4 Lee, James Stewart, p. 46; A. Lang, Knox and the Reformation, (London, 1905), pp. 142-8. 
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of damage control. On 28 August, she issued a general proclamation defending and 
justifying the arrival of the first wave of French reinforcements. 1 Addressed to the 
Lords, Barons, Gentlemen and, as Knox terms them, the 'vulgar pepill' of the realm, 
this proclamation stressed that no violation of the Leith Agreement had occurred and 
that the current controversy was the result of the Congregation's 'interprysing' against 
the 'authoratie, and tennour of the said Appointment,.2 Accusing them specifically of 
inventing and 'blawin abrod dyvers rumouris and evill brutis,' Guise asserted that there 
had been no stipulation in the compact that had 'communit or concludit to stope the 
sending in of Frensche men; as may cleirlie appeir be inspectioun of the said 
Appointmente', and denied unequivocally that the French were 'myndit to draw in greit 
forceis of men of weir fUlih of France, to suppress the libertie of this realme, oppres the 
inhabitantis thairof, and mak up straingaris with thai I' landis and goodis' .3 Rather Guise, 
together with Mary and Fran<;ois, had nothing but a 'guid mynd' towards their Scottish 
subjects who, it was hoped, would not be led from their 'dew obedience' for there was 
held a 'moderlie luif towartis all' who showed themselves to be 'obedient subjectis,.4 
Condescending words like these, however, served only to reinforce the Congregation's 
emerging contention that Scotland was not destined to be an equal partner in the Franco-
I Knox, Works, I, pp. 397-9 and History, I, pp. 217-9; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, pp. 157-9. The 
Queen Regent also embarked on an extensive letter writing campaign, sending letters to 'everie Lord, 
Barroun, and Gentilman' justifying, as in her proclamation, her actions and those of the French. Knox, 
Works, I, pp. 395-7 and History, I, p.215. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.397 and HistOlY, I, p.217; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.157. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 397-S and HistOl)), I, p.217; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.157. 
4 Knox, Works, I, pp. 39S-9 and Histol)), I, p.21S; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.15S. 
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Scottish dynastic union of the crowns and brought to the fore the potential implications 
of the Valois-Stewati marriage for Scotland's independence. 
Although the deaths of Marie de Guise and Franyois in 1560 prevent us from 
knowing what plans France actually had for Scotland, namely, whether it would be 
coalesced, conquered or become the 'exampill of Brytanny', the Congregation 
neveliheless used the arrival of French troops, various other aspects of Guise's regency 
and the establishment of French power in Scotland as a whole, to infer that conquest 
was, indeed, the Queen Regent's true objective. I Their proclamation to the 'Nobilitie, 
Burghis, and Communitie of this Realme of Scotland,2 was not simply another public 
apology for their rebellion - it signalled the emergence of the Congregation's as a 
'patriotic' party.3 By playing on the xenophobia of the Scots and instilling the fear of 
conquest by strangers, the Congregation became the self-proclaimed defenders of the 
true faith and the commonweal. Interestingly, it was Marie de Guise and not Franyois 
and Mary, who was cited as the principal agent for France's alleged conquest of 
Scotland, whose aim was to place the Scots 'under the perpetuall servitude of 
I As in Scotland, dynastic union was the pretext for Franco-Breton integration. As opposed to conquest, 
Anne of Brittany's successive marriages to Charles VIII and Louis XII of France resulted in the 
installation of a governor and the infiltration of Frenchmen into Breton institutions, such as the Court of 
Parliament and the Exchequer. Instead of imposing purely 'French' institutions, Brittany technically 
retained its cultural and institutional independence. Some Scots, such as the Earl of Argyll, feared that a 
similar fate was destined for Scotland in the Franco-Scottish dynastic union of the crowns. According to 
Archbishop Hamilton, Argyll was using France's military presence in Scotland and the occupation of 
certain of Scottish offices by Frenchmen to persuade the Scots that 'the France ar cumin in and sutin down 
in this realm to occupy it and to put furtht the inhabitant is tharoff, and siclik to occupy uther menis 
rowmes pece and pece, and to put avay the blud of the nobilitie'. Scottish Correspondence, cclxxxi, p.427 
and n. I; McNeill, 'Discours', p.87. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 400-8 and Risto!y, I, pp. 219-28; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, pp. 159-65. 
3 See Mason, 'Covenant and Commonweal', pp. 107-112, and Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community, pp. 
1 18-9, for the ideology behind the Congregation's patriotism and their use of the concept and language of 
the commonweal. 
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strangearis,.1 This was evidenced by the bringing in of French troops with their 'wyffis 
and bairneis' to occupy the Scots 'houssis and possessiouns' and 'ancient rowmeis and 
heritageis', the garrisoning of Scottish strongholds with French soldiers in times of 
peace, the most recent example being that of Leith, the Regent's exorbitant taxation and 
finally, her debasement of Scots coinage.2 Rather than demonstrating Guise's 
'motherlie cair ... [for] our communweath', these acts of the Regent revealed her true 
intention: to conquer Scotland and suppress its 'ancient lawis and liberteis,.3 The 
Congregation's rebellion was no longer a Protestant revolt against Catholicism. It was 
now a 'patriotic' response to Guise dynasticism and the establishment of French power 
in Scotland. 
The inherent problem with the Congregation's new platform, however, was that 
the establishment of French power had not come about as a result of Guise's regency, 
but rather as a result of the treaty of Haddington and the Franco-Scottish protectoral 
alliance. As we have seen in previous chapters, the establishment of French power, of 
which Guise's regency was but one aspect, occurred with the consent and/or at the 
behest of the Scottish political community. In effect, the Congregation was now 
rebelling against something the Scots' themselves had facilitated. More importantly, the 
Congregation was rebelling against the possibility and not the reality of conquest. Yet, 
despite these contradictions, the Congregation's association with patriotism was 
imperative if they had any chance of receiving the requested military aid from England 
1 Knox, Works, I, pA05 and HistOl)i, I, p.223; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.162. 
2 Knox, Works, I, pp. 407-8 and HistOlY, I, pp. 224-6; Mason, Knox On Rebellion, pp. 163-5. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pA02 and HistOlY, I, p.221; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, p.160. 
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and, in the short-term, justifying their suspension of Marie de Guise from the regency. 
Contrary to the Congregation's assertions, Guise's decision to fOliify Leith was not a 
motiveless act of aggression or evidence of her overall plan to conquer the realm.l 
Rather, it came as a direct response to the return of James, 3rd earl of Arran, to Scotland 
and Chatelherault's subsequent defection to the Congregation on 19 September 1559? 
The return of Chatelherault' s son and heir to Scotland to assume nominal control 
of the Congregation with his father, added a new, but not an entirely unexpected 
dimension to the Congregation's rebellion. Guise knew something was afoot when she 
learned that the Congregation had summoned a convention to meet at Stirling on 10 
May. Her immediate response was to write to Chatelherault and her nobility, warning 
them that the Congregation was 'interprysing ... sum heycht purpoise aganis us, [and] 
our authoratie,.3 She knew that Chatelherault's 'loyalty' was suspect at the best of 
times, and the very reason that his son and heir was in France to begin with was to act as 
surety for his suppOli for the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance. Arran's escape from 
France in June 1559, therefore, had serious ramifications - especially for the 
Congregation.4 Chatelherault would not break with the Regent until he could be sure 
1 See, for example, the Congregation's letter to the Regent dated 19 September 1559. Hearing that 
Guise's 'army of Frensche men' were about to fortifY Leith without the consent of the 'Nobilitie and 
Counsale of this realme', the Congregation claimed that this would not only be a breach of the Leith 
Agreement, but also 'verray prejudiciall to the commun-wealth, and playne contrail' to our ancient lawis 
and 1ibertieis'. Knox, Works, I, pp. 413-4; and HistOI)), I, pp. 229-30; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1342, 
1343, pp. 564-5. 
2 Knox, Works, I, p.413 and HistOl)), I, p.229; AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 322v-31'; Teulet, 
Papiers, I, pp. 349-50 and Relations, I, pp. 353-4. 
3 Knox, Works, I, p.395 and Histol)), I, p.216. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,848,868,888, pp. 316,327,340-1; CSP Scot., I, 465, p.215. 
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that his son had arrived safely in Scotland.! Until then, he could only promise the 
Congregation 'not to be ... [their] enemy,.2 Arran's return was equally crucial in the 
Congregation's hope of gaining the formal support of Elizabeth I for their rebellion. 
*** 
The Congregation's appeals for English military aid took on a new sense of urgency 
with the arrival of French reinforcements in the summer of 1559. F or William Cecil, 
Elizabeth's secretary, the deployment of these troops served only to substantiate his long 
held contention that France was planning an invasion of England to advance the claim 
of Mary Stewart to the English succession. This, coupled with his notion of a united, 
Protestant British Isles, rendered Cecil more inclined than his mistress to support the 
Congregation.3 In order to convince Elizabeth that intervention in Scotland was 
justified, Cecil not only stressed the immediate threat the establishment of French power 
in Scotland posed to Elizabeth's sovereignty and England's national security, but also 
used the 'sondry homagees done to this Crowne by the kinges of Scotland' to argue that 
'england is of duty and in honour bound to preservve the realme of Scotland from such 
absolute Dominion of the french,.4 On its own, Cecil's imperial and historical 
justification only managed to procure covert financial support for the Congregation's 
rebellion; full-scale military support would require the fulfilment of certain criteria on 
1 CSP Scot., 1,466,487,525, pp. 216,223,242-3; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,888,974,1186, pp. 340-1, 
372,469-70. 
2 CSP Scot., I, 525, p.243. 
3 For more on Cecil's notion of an Anglo-British Protestant Empire and his dealings with the 
Congregation, see Alford, The Early Elizabethan Polity, pp. 43-70; Dawson, 'William Cecil and the 
British Dimension of early Elizabethan foreign policy', Hist01JI, 74 (1989), pp. 205-7; W. MacCaffrey, 
'Elizabethan Politics: The First Decade, 1558-68', Past and Present, xxi (1963), pp. 26-7. 
4 BL Cotton MSS, Caligula B.x, f.86. 
316 
Chapter VIII: The Reformation Rebellion. 
the part of the Congregation.! One such 'suggestion' was for the Congregation to 
emerge and establish themselves as a 'great council'. As the 'ancient blood of the 
realm', the Congregation would be the true and natural defenders of Scotland's ancient 
laws and liberties.2 To legitimise this provisional government further, Cecil advised the 
Congregation to 'committ the Gouernance' of the realme to the 'nex heyres to the 
Croune ... the house of Hameltons,.3 Only in this way could the Congregation 
effectively and legitimately oppose the Queen Regent and the 'Tyrannouse affection of 
fraunce,.4 Chatelherault's position as second person in the realm coupled with his own 
dynasticism, provided the Congregation with a formidable defence against the potential 
usurpation of France and, more directly, against Marie de Guise and the Queen of Scots. 
If the French continued to act against the commonweal and threaten Scotland's ancient 
libeliies and privileges, Arran could then be put fOlih as a suitable candidate for either 
the Regency or the throne. 5 Arran's return, therefore, was not only crucial in gaining 
Chatelherault's suppOli for the Congregation, but also for the realisation of Cecil's 
notion of an Anglo-British and Protestant Empire.6 
1 Contained within 'A memoriall of certain pointes meete for restoring the Realme of Scotland to the 
Anncient Weal' in BL, Lansdowne MSS, 4, fos. 26'_7'; CSP Scot., I, 537, pp. 249-50; CSP Foreign, 
1558-1559,1297-99, pp. 518-9. See also, ibid, 1300, pp. 519-23, BL, Cotton MSS, Caligula B.x, f.78, 
and especially, Alford, The Early Elizabethan Polity, pp. 58-64, for a detailed discussion and analysis of 
this document. 
2 BL, Lansdowne MSS, 4, fos. 26v-27'; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1297, p.518. 
3 BL, Lansdowne MSS, 4, f.26'. 
4 Ibid, 4, f.27'. 
5 Ibid, 4, f.27'. 
6 See, for example, Cecil's letter to Chatel herault on 24 August 1559 in CSP Foreign, 1558-1559,1240, 
p.494. The Congregation also hoped to entice the English into supporting them by proposing Arran as a 
potential husband for Elizabeth. This proposal was not formally made, and rejected, until late 1560. Ibid, 
743,846,878, pp. 278, 316, 335-6; CSP Scot., I, 465, 466, 471, 926, 927, pp. 215-6, 216-7, 495-6; APS, 
II, pp. 605-6; Knox, Works, II, pp. 130-1, 137 and HistOlY, I, pp. 345-6, 350. 
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With the help of the English,l Arran arrived safely in Scotland on 12 September 
1559 in time to attend the Congregation's convention at Stirling.2 Chatelherault had 
already written to Cecil on 9 August thanking him for the' great kindness' he had shown 
in giving his son a 'veill' in order that he could return to Scotland undetected.3 Cecil 
duly responded by advising the Duke 'not to neglect the present opportunity of doing 
good to his country', as there was nothing more he would like than 'to see this isle well 
united,.4 Chatelherault was not about to pass up any opportunity that would enhance his 
position and the prestige of the House of Hamilton. After being reunited with his son, 
who had been in 'consultatioun' with the principal lords of the Congregation since his 
arrival, Chatelherault and Arran officially became the nominal leaders of the 
Congregation on 19 September 1559.5 The full implications of Arran's return and 
Chatelherault's defection were realised on 21 October 1559 when the Congregation, as 
the 'borne Counsallouris' of the realm and the 'sworne protectouris and defendaris' of 
the commonweal, formally assumed the governance of the realm and 'deposed' Marie 
de Guise as Regent in their 'Soverane Lord and Ladyeis name,.6 Perceiving 'the 
I For correspondence concerning Arran and the details of his escape from France to Scotland, see CSP 
Foreign, 1558-1559, 998, 999, 1009, 1022, 1039, 1043, 1075, 1111, 1114, 1151, 1290, 1291, 1321, 
1323,1337,1354, pp. 382-3, 383-4, 386-8, 391, 401, 402-3, 418, 436-7, 441, 451,516,542,542-4,551-
2,567; CSP Scot., I, 538, 542, pp. 250, 251-2. See also Hannay, 'The Earl of Arran', pp. 264-6. 
2 CSP Scot., I, 538, p.250; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1137, pp. 551-2. 
3 CSP Scot., I, 522, p.242; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1176, p.465. 
4 Ibid, 1240, p.494. 
5 Knox, Works, I, pp. 413-4 and History, I, pp. 229-30; CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1356, 1365, pp. 568, 
571-2. On 19 September, the Congregation sent letters to the Queen Regent and John, 6th lord Erskine 
subscribed by Chiitelherault and Arran. Ibid, 1342-4, pp. 564-5; Knox, Works, I, pp. 413-7 and HistOIJ', I, 
pp. 229-33. William Maitland of Lethington was then commissioned to begin formal negotiations with 
Elizabeth and her Council for English military SUppOlt. CSP Scot., I, 543, p.252. 
6 Knox, Works, I, pp. 444-9 and HistOlY, I, pp. 249-55; Mason, Knox: On Rebellion, pp. 171-4; BL, 
Cotton MSS, Caligula B.x, fos. 38, 42; NLS, Adv.MSS, 34.2.3, fos, 1-2. 
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interprysed destructioun of thair said commoun-weall, and ovelihrow of the libertie of 
thair native cuntree, be the meanes of the Quene Regent and celiane strangearis', the 
Congregation regarded it as their 'dewtie' to suspend Guise's commISSIOn 'and all 
administratioun of the policy ... [her] Grace may pretend thairby'. I 
For Marie de Guise, Chatelherault's defection and the Congregation's' Act of 
Suspension' was the ultimate confirmation that they 'intended not religioun, bot the 
subversioun of authoritie'. 2 As such, she simply ignored their 'act', carried on in her 
capacity as Queen Regent and publicly accused Ch:1telherault and Arran of attempting to 
usurp 'the Croune and Authoritie of this Realme,.3 For all her confidence, Guise was 
not entirely flippant about the Congregation's 'Act of Suspension'; their rebellion had 
taken a very serious turn against which she had to defend her position and the authority 
of her daughter. Foreseeing what Ch:1telherault's defection would lead to, Guise 
proceeded in earnest with the fortification of Leith which was now viewed as a political 
and military necessity.4 This was accompanied by renewed and urgent appeals to 
1 Knox, Works, I, pA49 and History, I, p.255. 
2 Calderwood, The HistOl)) a/the Kirk of Scotland, I, pA33. 
3 Knox, Works, I, p. 439 and His/OI)), I, p. 248. The perceived strength of Guise's position can be 
demonstrated by the fact that, in the words of Knox, 'because the rum our ceassed nott, that the Duke his 
Grace usurped the Authoritie, he was compelled, with the sound of trumpete, at the Mercat Croce of 
Edinburgh, to maik his purgatioun'. In this proclamation dated 19 October 1559, ChatelherauIt claimed 
he joined the Congregation because he was 'movit partlie by the violent persute of the religioun and trew 
professouris thairof, partlie by compassioun of the commoun-wealth and poore communitie of this realme, 
oppressed with strangearis'. Knox also admits that an extensive letter writing campaign was undertaken 
by the Lords immediately following the Duke's defection, highlighting the danger 'giffthe Frensche sould 
be sufferit to plant in this cuntrey at thair plesoure', their repeated pleas to Guise to 'send away to France 
hir Frensche men, quha war ane burding unproffitable and grevous to thair communwealth', and how the 
arrival of French troops with their wives and children was 'a declaratioun of ane plane conquiest'. On 6 
October, for instance, Arran wrote to Sempill asking for his military support, not because of his 
'conscience towmiis the religioun', but 'for the commoun wealth and libertie of this youre native cuntray'. 
Knox, Works, I, pp. 438-40, 417-8 and HistOl)1, I pp. 248-9, 232-3; Scottish Correspondence, cclxxxii, 
pp.428-9. 
4 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 37r, 39v and Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, f.322 v; 
Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 349-50 and Relations, I, pp. 353-4. 
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Fran90is for military and financial aid. l Detailing the nature of the Congregation's 
propaganda campaign following the Duke's defection, in which it was claimed that the 
King wanted to 'subuirtir toutes leurs lois et les reduir cy extreme seruitude', Guise 
begged her son-in-law to have pity on her and 'nous ayde de meilleure forces & dargens 
cy la plus grand dilligence,.2 Similar pleas came from Noailles in London with the 
emergence of the Congregation as a rival council to Guise's administration. On 30 
September 1559, the French ambassador wrote to the Cardinal of Lorraine that the 
Congregation 'veulent prendre toute authorite & ne recognoistre enfin aucun superieur', 
which was made worse by the now certain likelihood that Elizabeth, 'les pourra ayder 
soubz main de quelque friandise d'argent et armes et munitions pour les eschauffer 
davantage a leur faire continuer leurs coups'. 3 'Grand secours' were thus needed in the 
form of men, money and munitions, without which d'Oisel, the Queen Regent and 'tous 
les Francoys n' ayent cependant beaucoup a souffrir'. 4 
But neither these supplications nor Guise's warning that Chatelherault and his 
accomplices would do all they could as soon as possible, translated into effective action 
on the pati of France.5 As a result, Guise was left to continue her war of words with the 
I AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 37r_8v ; 39v_40r. Similar appeals were contained in the 
Regent's letter to her brothers, ibid, XV, fos. 40r-lr. See also CSP Foreign, 1558-1559, 1346, pp. 565-6; 
CSP Scot., I, 540, p.25 I . 
2 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fAOr. 
3 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, f.323r; Teulet, Papiers, I, p.354 and Relations, I, p. 358. A month later, 
NoaiIIes wrote again to the Cardinal de Lorraine with certain proof that the Congregation's forces were 
being maintained with English money. AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, f.335 r; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 360-
1 and Relations, I, pp. 363-4. 
4 Noialles to Constable Montmorency, 28 September 1559, AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, f.322 V • 
5 Ibid, Memoires et Docllments, Angleterre, XV, fAOr. 
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Congregation, and to fortify Leith with what resources she had. l Needless to say, the 
Congregation's attempted deposition of Guise sparked a flurry of new appeals to 
Franyois for aid. He was told that, 'il y faille faire passer si grand nombre de gens & de 
navires & qu'il y avoit beaucoup d'autres places a la devotion de lad[icte] Royne 
Regente plus que du Petit-Leyth, comme Dombarre, l'Isle aux Chevaulx & Ie Chasteau 
mesmes de lislebourg,.2 Even with this dramatic turn of events, military aid from 
France was still not forthcoming. 
While Marie de Guise obviously felt the need to implement some precautionary 
defensive measures to counter the effects of the Congregation's patriotic campaign, their 
'Act of Suspension' also served to strengthen her resolve to asseli her authority and that 
of Mary and Franyois in Scotland offensively. Not only was the Congregation's 
attempted deposition a blatant act of sedition, but the fact that it was done in the names 
of the very sovereigns who had granted the commission in the first place, was also an 
act of extreme arrogance.3 Marie de Guise took her case, once again, to the public. 
Denouncing the Congregation's actions, which seemed 'to come from a Prince to his 
subjects, rather than from subjects to one that bears authority' ,4 Guise declared that 
'None can have the authority here except the Queen's daughter and her husband'. The 
Congregation's 'Act of Suspension' clearly indicated that they 'acknowledge[d] no 
other superiority'. 5 The Regent justified her position further by declaring that she would 
I Knox, Works, I, pp. 417-21 and HistOJ)" I, pp. 232-5. 
2 AE, Cor. Pol., Angleterre, XIII, fos. 338v-91'. See also, ibid, fos. 3361'-7\ 3381'-421'; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 
364-7,367-76 and Relations, I, pp. 366-9, 369-78. 
3 Knox, Works, I, pp. 448, 449 and HistOJ)" I, pp. 254, 255; APS, II, p. 519; SRO, SP13/81. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1559-1560, 107, pA5. 
5 Ibid, 109, pA5. 
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'grant anything which may not resist the piety due to God, nor fight with their duty to 
their King and Queen', as she did 'not seek the overthrow of their laws and liberties, nor 
dream of conquering the kingdom by violence, for her daughter possesses it already'. 1 
Finally, Guise defended her fortification of Leith by shifting the onus of blame to the 
Congregation, for she 'had attempted nothing that way before' until they 'showed that 
they would shake off the lawful government, .. , and made league and covenant with her 
ancient enemies [the English]'. 2 
Words were not the only way Guise chose to asseli her authority. On 7 
November, she re-entered Edinburgh and proceeded to 'hath all things at her will,.3 Her 
'will' dictated that Mass be restored, St. Giles re-consecrated, and Leith continue to be 
fortified. 4 But it was the process of treason that was initiated against Chatelherault and 
Arran that is, perhaps, most revealing as to the French reaction to the Congregation's 
'Act of Suspension' and, more importantly, as to who Mary, Fran<;ois and Guise 
ultimately held responsible. 5 
Throughout November, d'Oisel and Jacques de la Brosse began to assemble a 
case against the Congregation and their Hamilton figureheads. 6 Instances of the 
Congregation's treasonous behaviour since the enlistment of Chatelherault and his son 
were cited in detail. This 'charge sheet' made specific reference to their convocation at 
I CSP Foreign, 1559-1560, 109, p.46. 
2 Ibid, 109, p.46. 
3 Ibid, 234, p.l00. 
4 AE, Cor. Po!., Angleterre, XIII, fos.336v-7f; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 364-7 and Relations, I, pp. 366-9. 
5 Mary and Franr;ois' commission was dated 10 November 1559. AE, Memoires et Documents, 
Angleterre, XV, f.13 Of. 
6 Ibid, XV, fos. 130 f -53v; Dickinson, 'Report by de la Brosse and d'Oisel', pp. 85-125. 
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Stirling on 19 September 1559, their taking up of arms and twenty day siege of 
Edinburgh in October, their suspension of Marie de Guise from the Regency (all the 
more treasonous since it was an office granted to her by Mary and Franyois), their letters 
and proclamations written in the name of their sovereigns demanding that obedience be 
rendered instead to Chatelherault and Arran, and their seizure of coining irons and 
counterfeiting of coins.' The Congregation's illicit activities were then corroborated in 
depositions given by a plethora of witnesses, including the Archbishop of Glasgow, the 
Bishop of Dunblane, the Earl of Bothwell, and Sir Alexander Erskine, son of John, 5th 
Lord Erskine who, as custodian of Edinburgh Castle, had managed to stay neutral 
throughout the conflict.2 
The evidence compiled by d'Oisel and de la Brosse was damning. Validating 
the crown's suspicion that Chatelherault and Arran were guilty of treason, their report 
concluded that they had indeed committed: 
.. , crimes de leze maieste .,. a lencontre de nous leurs princes souverains 
par les assemblees de gens en armes hostilitez et aultre actes de felonnye 
et Infidelite par eulx faictz Et quilz continuent encores chacun Jour pour 
de tout en tout opprimer audit royaulme notre auctorite et se lattribuer par 
la force des armes contre tout droict divin et humain'. 3 
On the strength of this evidence, Guise then commissioned James Makgill of Nether 
Rankeillor and John Bellenden of Auchnoul, Scotland's clerk register and justice 
register, to find historical and legal precedents for the various acts of treason committed 
I AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 131 '-39v; Dickinson, 'Report by de la Brosse and 
d'Oisel', pp. 90-8. Reference was also made to the iconoclasm and various skirmishes engaged in by the 
Congregation. 
2 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 140'-53v ; Dickinson, 'Report by de la Brosse and 
d'Oisel', pp. 98-125. 
3 AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, f. 130'. 
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by the Congregation as detailed in de la Brosse and d'Oisel's report. The result was the 
Discours Particulier d'Escosse. 1 
While the Discours covered a wide range of topics, a disproportionate amount of 
the report was devoted to treason and the legal process through which cases of lese 
majesty were executed and punished.2 Specifically, the Discours outlined what acts 
constituted treason and crimes of lese majesty as stipulated by the Three Estates in 
Parliament. Not surprisingly, these included initiating, partaking or assisting in a 
rebellion against the sovereign or his authority, taking up arms or maintaining a 
stronghold against the crown, the counterfeiting of coin, and convoking an assembly of 
rebels.3 Also contained in their report were case studies of those against whom the 
process of treason had been duly executed - the most notable of these were James, 9th 
earl of Douglas (1455), Alexander Stewart, duke of Albany (1483) and John 
MacDonald, lord of the Isles (1475).4 Of particular significance was the case of David 
Hume of Wedderburn, who was charged with treason for putting 'his people in order of 
battle against ... James, earl of Arran, and for having invaded him'. The fact that Arran 
'was then one of the regents of this kingdom', made Hume's invasion a direct attack 
against 'the person of our sovereign'. 5 In an ironic twist of fate, Chatelherault had 
become the perpetrator of a crime of which he had previously been a victim. 
1 Thomson (ed.), Discovrs Particvlier D 'Escosses escrit par coml11andement et ordonnance de la Royne 
Dovariere et Regent, par Messires Iacques Makgill clerc dv registere et lean Bellenden clerk de lajl/stice 
(Bannatyne Club, 1824), pp. 3-32; NLS, Adv.MSS, 35.1.2; McNeill, 'Discours', pp. 86-13l. 
2 Ibid, pp. 117-31. 
3 Ibid, pp. 123-5. 
4 Ibid, pp. 127-3l. 
5 Ibid, p.129. 
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Together, the Discours and 'Information' provided the crown a strong legal 
foundation with which to proceed against Chatelherault and Arran for treason and 
crimes of lese majesty. But by the time Makgill and Bellenden had completed and 
submitted their report on 11 January 1559/60, circumstances had changed and the tide 
was beginning to turn decidedly against the Queen Regent. Any legal, ideological or 
constitutional strength Guise could derive from Chatel herault and Arran's nominal 
leadership of the Congregation and their 'Act of Suspension' was undermined by the 
military intervention of England on the side of the Congregation in February 1559/60. 
While this was unquestionably a contributing factor to the collapse of Marie de Guise's 
political regime in Scotland, France's failure to respond to England's intervention 
adequately would prove to be the most devastating. 
*** 
England's military intervention in Scotland unofficially began in January 1559/60 when 
a naval fleet commanded by Admiral Winter 'accidentally' entered the Filih of Forth.! 
Officially, it was inaugurated on 27 February 1559/60 with the conclusion of the treaty 
of Berwick - an agreement written in the name of Mary, Queen of Scots, but contracted 
between James, Duke of Chatelherault, as second person in the realm, and Elizabeth 1.2 
The pretext of the treaty, and England's military support of the Congregation on the 
whole, was the defence of Scotland's 'ancient right and liberty'? In reality, it facilitated 
I Brosse Missions, pp. 56-61; CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,616,636,645, pp. 288-91, 311-2, 324. 
2 CSP Scot., I, 665, pp. 323-4; CSP Foreign, 1559-1560, pp. 413-5, 781; Foedera, XI, p.95 and X, pA7; 
BL, Cotton MSS, Caligula B.ix, f.34; Knox, Works, II, pp. 45-52,53-6 HistOlY, I, pp. 302-7, 308-10. For 
a discussion of the negotiations and the treaty as it pertained to Cecil's 'British strategy' and notion of an 
Anglo-British Protestant Empire, see Alford, The Early Elizabethan Polity, pp. 64-79, and Dawson, 
'William Cecil', pp. 207-10. 
3 CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,781, pAl3. 
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the interference of a foreign monarch in what was essentially a domestic crisis. Hedged 
in the language of the commonweal, Elizabeth's intervention was justified by the fact 
that: 
... the French intend to conquer the realm of Scotland, suppress the 
liberty thereof and unite it to France, and being required thereto by the 
said nobility in the name of the whole realm, shall accept this said realm, 
the apparent heir to the crown, the nobility and subjects thereof, for the 
protection of their old freedoms and liberties from conquest or oppression. l 
In effect, the treaty of Berwick was a renunciation of the Franco-Scottish protectoral 
alliance that was established in the treaty of Haddington and the Congregation's formal 
appointment of Elizabeth as the new 'protector' of Scotland. It was also the culmination 
of the Congregation's patriotic platform. By accusing Marie de Guise of attempting to 
conquer the realm, and associating themselves with freedom, libeliy and the defence of 
the commonweal, the Congregation, as Scotland's legitimate government, was able to 
secure the open and military support of England against the establishment of French 
power in Scotland. 
The inherent contradiction in the Congregation's position, of course, was the 
simultaneous justification of their rebellion and alliance with England in terms of 
patriotism. In doing so, the Congregation revealed their true objective: the defence of 
their interests and position in Scotland as the natural born councillors of the realm. 
Self-interest and not altruism, therefore, was the prime motivating factor behind the 
treaty of Berwick and the Congregation's use of patriotism as a whole. The treaty's 
additional stipulation that England and the Congregation 'shall never assent that the 
realm of Scotland shall be knit to the crown of France otherwise than it is already, only 
1 CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,781, pAl3. 
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by marriage of the Queen to the French King', reinforced the Congregation's position. l 
As long as the Franco-Scottish dynastic union was nominal, the Scottish nobility's 
interests and traditional role in government were safeguarded. Anything beyond that, ie 
coalescence, integration or conquest, posed a direct threat and was, therefore, 
unacceptable. But the fact that they accused Marie de Guise only with the intent of 
conquering the realm indicates how weak their justification really was. Ultimately, the 
treaty of Berwick was contracted against something that had not actually happened, and 
any sincerity that the Congregation hoped to convey in their professed recognition of 
Franyois and Mary's authority was undermined by the simple fact that they had forged a 
military and protectoral alliance with England against the constituted authority of 
Scotland. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that, as with the' Act of Suspension', Marie de 
Guise refused to recognise the terms of the treaty of Berwick. On 27 March 1560, she 
reported to her brothers that she 'never saw anything so shameful as the Articles, as well 
for the honour of God as the reputation of the King, and according to them there will 
rest no more but to render obedience to the Queen of England,.2 Despite her indignation 
that the Congregation and Elizabeth should come to such an agreement in the first place, 
the arrival of English troops in March 1560 brought the seriousness of the situation 
home. Elizabeth had fulfilled her promise that she would 'send into Scotland sufficient 
aid of men to join with the Scots ... not only to expel the present power of French, but 
also to stop all greater forces to enter therein, and shall continue the same until they are 
I CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,781, pAl3. 
2 Ibid, 906, pp. 480. 
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"aluterly" expelled therefrom'. 1 Owing to their own domestic troubles, however, the 
Cardinal de Lorraine and the Duc de Guise were unable to help their sister in her most 
desperate time of need. 
'Les Guises' had originally intended to send their brother, Rene, Marquis 
d'Elboeuf to Scotland with reinforcements in December 1559. They had also issued 
Rene with letters patent commissioning him to replace his sister as regent.2 This was in 
response to the news that Marie de Guise had fallen seriously ill and was not expected to 
survive. On 4 December, Rene had initially received a commission from Mary and 
Franyois to serve as their Lieutenant-General in Scotland, 'during the absence of the 
Queen Dowager about to return to France for recovery of her health,.3 Subsequent 
reports that the Queen Regent' is nothing amended of hir diseas' and 'still languishes in 
great siclmess, and her physicians have no hope of her recovery' must have forced 'les 
Guises' to reconsider their position and provide for a more permanent arrangement.4 
But when Rene's expedition was postponed indefinitely due to bad weather conditions, 
all the Queen Regent's family could do was send encouraging messages and sit and wait 
for news on the progress of her health. 5 In his desire to see her soon, Franyois intimated 
in a personal note that Guise would have 'no better "medicines" than her daughter and 
1 CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,781, p.4l3. England's military intervention in Scotland and the ensuing war 
between France and England in Scotland, which culminated in the siege of Leith, is a lengthy and complex 
topic in itself that cannot be fully explored here. See Brosse, Jacques de la Brosse, pp. 217-59 and 'The 
Journal of the siege of Leith, 1560' in Brosse Missions, pp. 51-179, for detailed accounts of the conflict, 
in addition to Marshall, Mal)J o/Guise, pp. 242-53 and Tytier, HistOl)J o/Scotland, IV, pp. 114-23. 
2 11 December 1559, BL, Cotton MSS, Caligula B.ix, fos. 46r_7V. 
3 Cal. Scot., I, 590, p.271. 
4 Ibid, I, 596(ii), 592, pp. 275, 272. 
5 Ibid, I, 609 (i-vi), pp. 283-4. 
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himself'. I By January, the growing civil unrest in France rendered it too dangerous for 
Rene to try again.2 Indeed, the political and religious opposition to 'les Guises' in 
France, culminating in the Conjuration of Amboise on 15 March 1559/60,3 prevented 
them 'from furnishing her with money as often as they would be glad to do. This they 
durst not adventure, nor the Marquis [d'Elboeuf] their brother, for the evident danger 
that might happen; but it cannot be long before they find some way open, when they will 
not lose one quarter of an hour,.4 Fortunately for them, their sister's health improved 
enough for her to carryon in her capacity as regent, and although the French troops in 
Scotland managed to withstand the English in their siege of Leith, the Guise brothers' 
failure to send additional reinforcements proved to be decisive in procuring widespread 
support for the Congregation. But if Rene had been successful in his mission, the 
question must not only be asked whether these reinforcements would have been enough 
to defeat the English army, but also whether his assumption of the regency would have 
kept French interests alive in Scotland? 
Realising that French reinforcements were not coming in aid of the Queen 
Regent, the Congregation was finally beginning to emerge as the winning side in the 
conflict. This can be evidenced by the number of subscribers to the Congregation's 
'Third Band', which was drawn up at Leith on 27 April 1560.5 Approximately 140 
1 23 December 1559, CSP Scot., I, 609(ii), pp. 283-4. 
2 CSP Foreign, 1559-1560, 508, 575, 746, pp. 358-7, 460-1; CSP Scot., I, p.135; AB, Memoires et 
Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 56, 58, 65 and COl'. Pol., XX, fos. 99, 100, 282, 291; Teulet, Relations, 
II, p.139; Brosse, Jacques de la Brosse, pp. 342, 344; Carroll, Noble Power during the French Wars of 
Religion, pp. 95-100. 
3 See, for example, Bouille, Histoire des Ducs de Guise, II, pp. 42-112. 
4 CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,879, pp. 460-1. 
5 Knox, Works, II, pp. 61-4; HistOlY, I, pp. 314-5. 
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Scots' signatures adorned the band and included such former stalwarts to the crown as 
Huntly.! Even more indicative that the tide had turned against Guise, was the fact that 
so many Scots (Catholic and Protestant) had subscribed to a band that was not an 
exclusively political manifesto. After a long absence, the religious aims of the 
Congregation's rebellion reappeared alongside their now familiar political objective to 
defend the commonweal against the oppression of the French. Unlike their religious 
bands of 1557 and 1559, which attracted minimal public support for the Congregation, 
the band of April 1560 reflects the Congregation's confidence in their position. While 
this confidence may be attributed to England's formal entry into the conflict, the timing 
of the band suggests that it was more to do with France's failure to respond to this 
intervention - something which could only be determined in the months following the 
arrival of the English reinforcements. 
For her part, Marie de Guise was still hoping that her brothers would 'find some 
way open' to send her aid and, in an attempt to buy time, she re-entered negotiations 
with the Congregation.2 Despite her obvious military disadvantage, the Queen Regent's 
stance was surprisingly adamantine in the series of talks that took place with the 
Congregation and their English representatives in the spring of 1560. She was 
particularly obstinate in her position when it came to the authority of Mary and Franyois 
in Scotland. When presented with the demand that, 'the whole number of French men 
I Donaldson, All the Queen's Men, pp. 33-4. 
2 In the spring of 1560, the French also sought to 'appease things in Scotland, and to find a means to win 
time' by sending two diplomatic envoys, the Bishop of Valence and M. de Randan. The French position 
was weakened considerably, however, with the news that Marie de Guise had passed away on 11 June 
1560. CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,879, pp. 460-1. 
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at war at present in this realm be removed with speed so that we [the Scots] may live in 
peace without fear of disturbances from them', de la Brosse reports that Guise 
responded by saying that this article 'was quite beyond reason and could not be 
discussed.! As she had told them the day before, the King and Queen would not receive 
orders from any prince in the world, much less from subjects, and that she, for her pati, 
would in no wise consent thereto'. 2 Moreover, Elizabeth's intervention on behalf of the 
Congregation was regarded by Guise as an act of blatant interference in Scottish affairs 
that not only undermined her position and authority as Queen Regent, but also that of 
Mary and Franyois. As a result, Guise was consistently unyielding in her demand that 
Scots uphold and respect the authority of their own sovereigns and not the Queen of 
England. 
Another point on which Marie de Guise was unyielding was her defence of the 
Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance. Just as the Congregation was persistent in their 
demands that the French must leave Scotland, so too was Guise in her demand that the 
Congregation revoke their league with England. The refusal of both sides to renounce 
their respective allegiances resulted in stalemate and a temporary suspension of the 
negotiations.3 On 12 May 1560, renewed attempts were made to reach a settlement and 
Lord James and William Maitland of Lethington presented Guise with a list of 
grievances about the establishment of French power in Scotland or, as they termed it, 
I CSP Foreign, J 559-J 560, 879, pp. 460- I; Brosse Missions, p. 101. 
2 Ibid, p. I 03. 
3 On 14 May, Maitland reported to Cecil that, 'In the end they found that nothing could be agreed upon'. 
CSP Foreign, 1559-1560,94, p.42. See Brosse Missions, pp. 151-7, for Guise's entire defence of the 
Franco-Scottish alliance and the establishment of French power in Scotland. 
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'the stay the French had made'. 1 As we have seen in their propaganda as a whole, the 
establishment of French military power was a particular sore point with the 
Congregation (or was it the English?). Reiterating their objections to Guise's 
importation of French troops in August and September 1559, the Congregation also took 
issue with the taxes raised for the French fortification of Inchkeith,2 the French officers 
who had been appointed to the most important offices in the realm (a specific reference 
to the Vice-Chancellor, du Rubay) and of Guise's desire to change their laws.3 To each 
of these grievances, Marie de Guise justified and defended her position and that of the 
French in Scotland by declaring, quite rightly, that each of these had been accepted in 
Parliament with the consent of the Scottish political community - all, that is, except 
their last complaint, which accused Guise of desiring, but not actually succeeding in 
changing their laws.4 
As with their 'Act of Suspension', Marie de Guise's reaction to the 
Congregation's patriotic stance against her dynastic policies and the establishment of 
French power in Scotland was to adopt an asseliive counter-position, which she did with 
great finesse during her negotiations with the Congregation in May and June 1560. 
Guise's position was enhanced, of course, by the fact that it was the Scottish political 
I Brosses Missions, p.15l. 
2 As we have already seen in Chapter IV, the Treasurers Accounts reveal that the fort at Langholm was the 
only stronghold, whose modernisation was financed out of crown revenues. Throughout 1558, Inchkeith 
was one of many strongholds, including Home Castle and Eyemouth, that was furnished with provisions 
for the war against England but paid for by the burghs of Leith and Edinburgh. If this is what the 
Congregation was referring to, why did they not mention these other strongplaces? TA, X, pp. 409, 421-
45. 
3 Brosse Missions, p.15l. 
4 Ibid, p.155. 
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elite who had provided for the establishment of French power in the treaty of 
Haddington and, in particular, by their request for continued French military 
intervention after the cessation of hostilities with England in 1550. Similarly, as we 
have seen in Chapter VII, the Scots wanted to see the conclusion of Mary Stewart's 
marriage to the Dauphin in 1556/7 just as much as Guise did, and their subsequent 
ratification of the marriage treaty and consent to grant the crown matrimonial to the 
Dauphin demonstrates the extent to which the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance was 
favoured by the majority of the Scottish political community. In 1559-60, therefore, the 
Scots were effectively rebelling against something that they themselves had facilitated. 
Success ultimately came for the Congregation, however, not as a result of their 
military might or ideological arguments, but with the death of Marie de Guise in the 
early hours of 11 June 1560. 1 Falling seriously ill again on 1 June, the Queen Regent's 
health deteriorated rapidly and several of the leading members of the Congregation 
came to pay their last respects, including CMtelherault, Arran, Argyll, Huntly and 
Glencairn.2 Although England's military intervention seriously weakened the 
foundations of her administration, the onus of failure for the collapse of her political 
1 Brosse Missions, p.I77. 
2 Ibid, pp. 175-7; AE, Memoires et Documents, Angleterre, XV, fos. 113-4; CSP Foreign, 1559-60,276-
89, pp. 116-21; Pitscottie, Historie, II, p.171; Diurnal of OCCl/rents, pp. 276-7; Lesley, HistOl)" pp. 439-
41. Despite this ostensible display of respect, the Congregation snubbed Marie de Guise even after death. 
Following her autopsy, the Congregation refused her burial at Holyrood and to comply with the wishes 
'les Guises' for her body to be shipped back to France. As a result, Marie de Guise's corpse remained in 
the Chapel of St. Margaret at Edinburgh Castle for several months. Negotiations did not begin for the 
Queen Regent's burial until August 1560. It was only after Franyois II passed away and Mary, Queen of 
Scots' had made the decision to return to Scotland, did she order that her mother's body be sent to France 
on 16 March 1560/1. Guise was finally laid to rest at the Convent of St. Peter at Rheims. A memorial 
service was then held in her honour at the Cathedral of Notre Dame, and was attended by her daughter and 
the entire French Court. TA, XI, p.24; CSP Foreign, 1560-1561,218, p.133; Teulet, Papiers, I, pp. 615-
6; Diurnal of Occur rents, p.64; Knox, Works, II, Appendix III, pp. 590-2; Tytler, Histol), of Scotland, IV, 
p.398; Marshall, Mal)' of Guise, pp. 261-2. 
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regime ultimately lay with her allies in France. The failure of her brothers to meet the 
English challenge enabled the Congregation to emerge, and be seen, as the victors of the 
conflict. Yet, despite being seriously let down by 'les Guises' in France, the Queen 
Regent never gave up her fight to protect her own dynastic interests or those of her 
daughter. She not only maintained her ideological position against the Congregation to 
the very end, but also her hope that her appeals for French intervention would 
materialise into effective action. l Only in death did Marie de Guise abandon her fight to 
defend the Franco-Scottish dynastic alliance and the authority of Mary and Franyois in 
Scotland, and only then, can one say that her political regime truly collapsed. Of greater 
importance, perhaps, was that the death of the Queen Regent also signalled the death of 
the French cause in Scotland. As the acceptable face of French power, the loss of Marie 
de Guise witnessed the almost immediate removal of all French influence in Scotland -
the death of Franyois II in December 1560 merely confirmed it. 
I AE, Memoires et Documents, AngJeterre, XV, [os. 86-105. 
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On 6 July 1560, a treaty was contracted between England, Scotland and France that 
called for the withdrawal of all French troops from Scotland - the last vestiges of 
French power that remained after the death of Marie de Guise the previous month. In 
real terms, the treaty of Edinburgh marked the end of an alliance that had been 
unprecedented in its intimacy and transformed it into one of a purely nominal nature, 
whereby an absent queen ruled over a kingdom with a self imposed system of 
government, and over subjects who had taken it upon themselves to define the duties of 
their sovereign. The 'divorce' was finalised when, six months later, Franyois II's death 
severed the dynastic ties that had bound Scotland and France together since 1548, and 
that had slackened considerably since Marie de Guise's exit from the political arena. 
Marie de Guise not only proved to be the acceptable face of French power in Scotland, 
but was in many ways the linchpin of the Franco-Scottish alliance as a whole. As a 
victim of circumstance and a slave to the ever-changing international situation, 
however, she was always destined to meet with limited success. 
Marie de Guise was raised, and later operated, in a world where dynasticism 
took precedence over personal and religious convictions. The dynastic interests of 'les 
Guises' became inextricably associated with those of Mary Stewart when she became 
the Queen of Scots at the tender age of six days old. But it was her Catholic claim to the 
English succession that made Mary Stewart a figure of extraordinary dynastic 
importance in sixteenth-century Europe - for it was possible that she alone could unite 
the kingdoms of Scotland, England and Ireland under one Catholic crown. As with any 
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queenship, the question of marriage assumed great significance. For Mary Stewart, it 
was a question that dominated the politics of her minority, most notably because her 
marriage carried with it notions of British Imperialism for her future husband and served 
as the pretext for war. 
It was to protect and advance these dynastic and imperial interests that Marie de 
Guise formally entered into the factional high politics of Scotland during the 1540s in 
opposition to the Anglo-Scottish dynastic alliance contracted in the treaties of 
Greenwich. Guise's allegiances naturally lay with her native France and, aided by an 
unlikely bedfellow in the person of Somerset, whose particularly aggressive Scottish 
policy procured tremendous support for the French cause, she played a key role in 
contracting a treaty of alliance with Henri II in July 1548. Marie de Guise's policies 
during the period 1548-1560, therefore, were dictated by European dynastic politics and, 
more directly, by the Franco-Scottish protectoral and dynastic alliance established by 
the treaty of Haddington in 1548. 
While Marie de Guise was instrumental in contracting the treaty of Haddington, 
her official political career in Scotland as Queen Regent was an inadvertent by-product 
of the treaty that facilitated the establishment of French power in Scotland. Henri's 
protection of Scotland and its queen enabled him to establish a permanent foothold in 
the kingdom that served as the backdoor to England, and assume control over Scottish 
diplomacy and foreign policy. As the 'protector' of Scotland, he was also able to 
determine when Mary, Queen of Scots reached her perfect age and, more importantly, 
who would govern her kingdom in her absence during her majority rule. Despite her 
role in forging this alliance, it should not be presumed that Marie de Guise had political 
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designs in Scotland once the treaty of Haddington had been contracted and her 
daughter's future seemed secure. Her return to France in 1550, and even more 
surprising return to Scotland in 1551 to assume the regency in 1554, has conventionally 
been interpreted to show that one of Guise's long-term objectives was to oust 
Chatelherault from power. But, as in the case of the Reformation Rebellion, this 
misconception is an example of the tendency of historians to read history backwards 
when assessing Marie de Guise's regime, in order to provide convenient explanations 
for events that often defy such simplistic analyses. The decision behind Guise's return 
seems not to have been her own, but that of the Scots who had accompanied her to 
France and, latterly, that of Henri. 
Marie de Guise's regency was dominated and, to a large extent, dictated by the 
international situation. The general aim of her policy was to restore stability to a realm 
that had endured a decade of plague, famine, war and the adverse affects of factionalism 
that accompanied any minority government. Like her late husband and his Stewart 
predecessors, she sought to achieve this by effecting a strong, yet personal monarchy 
and imposing royal authority by advancing the interests of the crown at the expense of 
local jurisdictions. But it is her quest for law and order and the pursuit of royal justice 
that best characterises her domestic policy - particularly as these were seen as necessary 
prerequisites for facing the Anglo-Imperial threat that emanated from England during 
the reign of Mary Tudor. But it was precisely because of this threat, and the Habsburg-
Valois conflict on the Continent in general, that Guise's quest for law and order was 
undermined. Mary Tudor's accession and marriage to Philip of Spain meant that, 
through the forging of dynastic alliances, the Habsburg-Valois powers now met tete a 
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tete on the Anglo-Scottish Border, and Guise was forced to focus her attention on the 
more pressing and immediate concerns of defence and national security. The 
international situation also brought to the fore the importance of, and need for, Mary, 
Queen of Scots' marriage to the Dauphin. For many of Scotland's ruling elite, the 
Franco-Scottish protectoral alliance had run its course and now needed to be established 
on a more permanent footing that only dynastic union could bring about. Roughly 
translated, this meant that before they committed any more resources to finance Guise's 
defensive policies or to fight Henri's war on the Continent, they needed to know who 
their master was and where their allegiances formally lay. It was within this European 
context of the Habsburg-Valois conflict, therefore, that Marie de Guise fulfilled her 
dynastic objectives, not only by securing the marriage of her daughter to the Dauphin, 
but also the consent of the Three Estates to grant the crown matrimonial to their new 
king. 
Although Marie de Guise made a deliberate effort to reassure her Protestant 
subjects that the union of the French and Scottish Catholic crowns was not incompatible 
with the reform movement, she was not above abandoning her accommodating position 
if changes in the international or national scene made it advantageous to do so. Indeed, 
it was more than likely because she was recognised as a politique that a group of 
Scotland's leading Protestants signed a covenant pledging to 'manteane, sett fordward 
and establish the blessed word of God' on the eve of the Parliament that moved to 
advance the Valois-Stewart marriage. 1 The Lords of the Congregation were wise to take 
I Knox, Works, I, p.273 and Hist01Y, I, p.136. 
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out such an insurance policy; changes in the international situation coinciding with the 
completion of her dynastic policies forced Guise to alter her religious policy and assume 
a less tolerant position towards the reform movement. The dubious legality of Elizabeth 
Tudor's accession saw the launch of a new campaign to advance the Catholic claims of 
Mary Stewart to the English throne by virtue of Elizabeth's illegitimacy in canon law. 
Once again, Guise's dynastic interests took precedence over religious considerations. 
Conventional historiography has placed undue emphasis on the religious 
dimension of Marie de Guise's administration. Religion was a decidedly secondary 
concern for Guise throughout her regency. Dynasticism, not Catholicism, was the prime 
motivational force behind her policy in Scotland and it is from a dynastic perspective 
that her regime must be examined. As a victim of circumstance, though, even Guise's 
dynastic policies met with limited success. While she showed herself to be an 
extremely shrewd and effective politician in fulfilling her dynastic objectives, the failure 
of her allies in France to respond accordingly to the changes in the international scene 
served to undermine all she had worked for during her political career in Scotland. In 
itself, the outbreak of the Congregation's rebellion did not pose a sufficient threat to her 
administration to cause its collapse. Guise's consistent belief that this was not a revolt 
of conscience, but a rebellion against duly constituted temporal authority, gained 
credence with every act of sedition the Congregation committed - none more so than 
their 'Act of Suspension'. Throughout 1559, Guise had the constitutional, legal, 
ideological and military edge over the Congregation. It was only when the rebellion 
adopted a British dimension with the . formal intervention of England that the 
foundations of Guise's administration began to crumble. 
339 
Conclusion 
As feared, Elizabeth's Protestant sympathies, and the religious settlement of 
May 1559, made her a source of support for Scotland's reformers and disaffected 
subjects in a way that her Catholic half-sister had never been, posing an arguably more 
dangerous threat than the Anglo-Imperial alliance had done during Mary Tudor's reign. 
Guise knew that, with the military might of England behind the Congregation, 
ideological arguments would not be enough to maintain her position. The inability, or 
unwillingness, of her allies in France to respond adequately to this intervention was the 
most damaging blow to her regime. The onus of failure for the collapse of French 
power in Scotland and the Franco-Scottish alliance, therefore, lay with those who had 
wanted it the most - 'les Guises'. The fact that it did meet with limited success is solely 
down to Marie de Guise, whose death not only deprived the French cause of a respected 
and effective figurehead, but also what would prove to be the only acceptable face of 
French power in Scotland. 
Much of the negative imagery surrounding Marie de Guise and her regime in 
Scotland derives from the propaganda of the Congregation. Its emphasis on conquest 
and French domination at the hands of Marie de Guise was designed to play on the 
xenophobia of the Scots and identify the Congregation as a party of patriots. This thesis 
has shown, however, that the Reformation Rebellion is not a reliable or accurate context 
within which to assess Marie de Guise. Her regime must be examined within the wider 
context of European dynastic politics and, specifically, within the Franco-Scottish 
protectoral alliance of 1548-1560. By changing the perspective and reading history 
forwards, Marie de Guise emerges as a pragmatic politique whose dynastic interests 
consistently took precedence over her religious convictions, while her assumption of the 
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regency was the final part of a larger process establishing French power in Scotland that 
was intended to be consolidated by the marriage of Mary Stewart to Franyois Valois. 
Despite the allegations of the Congregation to the contrary, the establishment of French 
power and the dynastic union of the French and Scottish crowns were both sanctioned 
and endorsed by the Scottish political elite. As a result, and ironically, the 
Congregation's rebellion was a revolt against something that they themselves had 
established. 
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 d
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 d
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 d
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r o
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; f
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r o
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 o
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r o
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 C
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 c
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at
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r o
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 c
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n
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ra
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 k
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 d
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 b
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re
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n
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ra
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re
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 c
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 b
at
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r d
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m
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f D
ol
la
r w
ho
 w
a
s 
bu
rn
ed
 fo
r h
er
es
y 
a
t 
Ed
in
bu
rg
h,
 2
8 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
53
8/
9;
 tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 F
ra
nc
e 
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 P
rio
r o
f S
t. 
A
nd
re
w
s' 
re
tin
ue
. 
A
pp
en
di
x 
A
: 
SC
O
TS
 IN
 F
R
A
N
C
E 
D
U
R
IN
G
 M
A
R
IE
 d
e 
G
U
IS
E'
S 
T
R
IP
 (1
55
0-1
55
1) 
R
E
FE
R
E
N
C
ES
 
K
no
x,
 W
or
ks
, I
, p
.2
41
 a
n
d 
H
is
to
ry
, I
, p
.1
16
; N
LS
, 
A
dv
.M
SS
, 2
9.
2.
5,
 f.
13
8.
 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
79
, p
.1
46
. 
N
A
M
E 
A
le
xa
nd
er
 G
or
do
n 
36
8 
B
on
d 
o
f m
an
re
n
t w
ith
 M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
 fo
r 
an
 a
n
n
u
al
 p
en
si
on
 o
f £
20
0 
Sc
ot
s (
15
47
/8)
; 
o
bl
ig
at
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re
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f C
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 b
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 m
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e 
ar
ch
bi
sh
op
ric
 o
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re
ce
iv
ed
 ti
tu
la
r a
rc
hb
ish
op
ric
 o
f 
A
th
en
s, 
a
n
d 
In
ch
af
fr
ay
 in
 c
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 o
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at
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 b
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at
io
n 
o
f t
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at
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at
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at
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; c
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pr
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os
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 d
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0 f
ra
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re
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 b
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 p
os
se
ss
io
n 
o
f 
th
e 
G
re
at
 S
ea
l a
n
d 
m
o
st
 o
f h
is
 p
ow
er
s 
as
 C
ha
nc
el
lo
r 
to
 d
u 
R
ub
ay
, v
ic
e-
C
ha
nc
el
lo
r (
15
54
); 
re
st
or
ed
 to
 
fa
vo
ur
 (1
55
5)
; h
el
pe
d 
pl
an
 th
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 d
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 o
f t
he
 P
rio
r o
f S
1. 
A
nd
re
w
s' 
re
tin
ue
; w
ro
te
 a
 
pl
ay
 fo
r M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
's 
ar
riv
al
 in
 E
di
nb
ur
gh
 to
 
as
su
m
e 
th
e 
re
ge
nc
y 
(1
55
4)
; c
o
m
m
is
si
on
ed
 to
 w
rit
e 
a 
pl
ay
 c
el
eb
ra
tin
g 
th
e 
m
ar
ria
ge
 o
f M
ar
y,
 Q
ue
en
 of
 
Sc
ot
s f
or
 w
hi
ch
 h
e 
w
as
 p
ai
d 
10
 li
vr
es
 (1
55
8)
; jo
ine
d 
th
e 
Lo
rd
s o
f t
he
 C
on
gr
eg
at
io
n 
(15
60
); 
ap
po
in
te
d 
by
 
Pe
rth
 p
re
sb
yt
ry
 to
 m
in
is
te
r a
t F
or
ga
nd
en
ny
, 
Fo
rte
vi
ot
 a
n
d 
M
uc
ka
rs
ie
 (1
56
3).
 
Tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 F
ra
nc
e 
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 P
rio
r o
f S
t. 
A
nd
re
w
s'r
et
in
ue
. 
A
pp
en
di
x 
A
: 
SC
O
TS
 IN
 F
R
A
N
C
E 
D
U
R
IN
G
 M
A
R
IE
 d
e 
G
U
IS
E'
S 
T
R
IP
 (1
55
0-
15
51
) 
R
E
FE
R
E
N
C
ES
 
K
no
x,
 W
or
ks
, I
, p
.2
41
 a
n
d 
H
is
to
ry
, I
, p
.1
16
; R
SS
, I
II,
 
25
79
, p
p.
 4
12
-3
 a
n
d 
IV
, 
68
2,
 p
.1
16
; N
LS
, 
M
SS
.2
99
1,
 f.
67
v 
a
n
d 
A
dv
.M
SS
, 2
9.
2.
5,
 fo
s. 
14
3,
 
14
6;
 F
ou
rq
ue
va
ux
 M
is
si
on
, 
p.
18
 n
.b
. 
CS
P 
Fo
re
ig
n,
 1
54
7-
15
53
, 
28
1,
 p
.6
8.
 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
79
, p
.1
46
. 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
79
, p
.1
46
. 
N
A
M
E 
R
ob
er
t, 
6th
 lo
rd
 M
ax
w
el
l 
Th
om
as
 M
en
zi
es
 o
f 
Pi
tfo
dd
el
ls*
 
Si
r A
ng
us
 M
ur
ra
y,
 c
ha
nt
or
 
o
f C
ai
th
ne
ss
 
Si
r W
ill
ia
m
 M
ur
ra
y 
o
f 
Tu
lli
ba
rd
in
e 
Ja
m
es
 O
gi
lv
y 
o
f D
es
kf
or
d 
a
n
d 
Fi
nd
la
te
r*
 
37
4 
G
ift
 o
f n
o
n
-e
n
tr
y 
(15
48
/9,
 1
55
0);
 gr
an
te
d 
a 
le
tte
r o
f p
ro
te
ct
io
n,
 re
sp
ec
t, 
sa
fe
gu
ar
d 
an
d 
ex
em
pt
io
n 
fo
r h
is 
tim
e 
in
 F
ra
nc
e 
(15
50
); 
pe
ns
io
n 
o
f2
,00
0f
ra
nc
s a
n
d 
m
ad
e 
a 
ge
nt
le
m
an
 o
f t
he
 F
re
nc
h 
K
in
g'
s 
B
ed
ch
am
be
r. 
G
ra
nt
ed
 a 
le
tte
r o
f p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
an
d 
sa
fe
gu
ar
d 
fo
r h
is 
tim
e 
in
 F
ra
nc
e 
(15
50
). 
G
ra
nt
ed
 a 
le
tte
r o
f p
ro
te
ct
io
n,
 s
af
eg
ua
rd
 
an
d 
ex
em
pt
io
n 
fo
r h
is 
tim
e 
in
 F
ra
nc
e 
(15
50
). 
40
 e
c
u
s 
fro
m
 M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
 (1
55
1).
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A
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C
O
M
M
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TS
 
A
n 
'a
ss
u
re
d 
Sc
ot
' w
ho
 s
u
pp
or
te
d 
th
e 
A
ng
us
lL
en
no
x 
fa
ct
io
n 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 o
f t
he
 E
ng
lis
h 
dy
na
sti
c 
al
lia
nc
e 
an
d 
re
fo
rm
ed
 re
lig
io
n 
(15
44
); 
la
te
r s
w
itc
he
d 
al
le
gi
an
ce
s 
an
d 
su
pp
or
te
d 
th
e 
Fr
en
ch
 d
yn
as
tic
 a
lli
an
ce
, 
be
co
m
in
g 
a 
lo
ya
l a
ge
nt
 o
f M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
 a
n
d 
th
e 
Fr
en
ch
 K
in
g 
[e.
g. 
hi
s m
is
si
on
 to
 S
co
tla
nd
 in
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
55
0/
1,
 to
 jo
in 
d'
O
is
el
 a
n
d 
Ch
at
el
he
ra
ul
t 
o
n
 th
e 
B
or
de
rs
]; 
W
ar
de
n 
o
f t
he
 W
es
t M
ar
ch
 fo
r 
Sc
ot
la
nd
 an
d 
an
 im
po
rta
nt
 fi
gu
re
 in
 A
ng
lo
-S
co
tti
sh
 
B
or
de
r a
ffa
irs
; d
ie
d 
(15
52
). 
Tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 F
ra
nc
e 
as
 p
ar
t o
f R
ob
er
t S
te
w
ar
t, 
bi
sh
op
 e
le
ct
 o
f C
ai
th
ne
ss
' r
et
in
ue
. 
A
fte
r A
rr
an
's 
'g
od
ly
 fi
t',
 s
u
pp
or
te
d 
th
e 
A
ng
us
lL
en
no
x 
fa
ct
io
n 
in
 fa
vo
ur
 th
e 
En
gl
ish
 
dy
na
sti
c 
al
lia
nc
e 
an
d 
re
fo
rm
ed
 fa
ith
 (1
54
4);
 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 re
fo
rm
er
 a
n
d 
m
em
be
r o
f t
he
 
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n;
 s
ig
ne
d 
in
str
uc
tio
ns
 to
 t
he
 n
eg
ot
ia
tin
g 
co
m
m
is
si
on
er
s f
or
 th
e 
tr
ea
ty
 o
f B
er
w
ic
k 
(15
59
/60
); 
co
m
pt
ro
lle
r (
15
65
-56
); 
fu
tu
re
 m
em
be
r o
f t
he
 K
in
g'
s 
Pa
rty
. 
Th
ird
 so
n
 o
f G
eo
rg
e 
G
or
do
n,
 e
ar
l o
f H
un
tly
, w
ho
 
as
su
m
ed
 th
e 
n
am
e 
O
gi
lv
y;
 m
ar
rie
d 
a 
sis
te
r o
f M
ar
y 
Li
vi
ng
sto
ne
, o
n
e 
o
f t
he
 fo
ur
 'M
ar
ie
s' 
an
d 
da
ug
ht
er
 
to
 L
or
d 
Li
vi
ng
sto
ne
, g
au
rd
ia
n 
o
f M
ar
y,
 Q
ue
en
 of
 
Sc
ot
s; 
su
pp
or
te
r o
f t
he
 M
ar
ia
n 
ca
u
se
. 
A
pp
en
di
x 
A
: 
SC
O
TS
 IN
 F
R
A
N
C
E 
D
U
R
IN
G
 M
A
R
IE
 d
e 
G
U
IS
E'
S 
T
R
IP
 (1
55
0-
15
51
) 
R
E
FE
R
E
N
C
ES
 
K
no
x,
 W
or
ks
, I
, p
.2
41
 a
n
d 
H
is
to
ry
, I
, p
.1
16
; R
SS
, I
V
, 
88
0,
 p
.1
47
; A
PC
, I
II,
 p
p.
 
20
5-
6;
 C
SP
 F
or
ei
gn
, 
15
47
-
15
53
,2
91
,2
95
,p
p.
 7
3,
 7
5;
 
Sc
ot
tis
h 
Co
rr
es
po
nd
en
ce
, 
cc
x
x
x
iv
, c
cx
x
x
v
iii
, p
p.
 3
34
-
5,
34
9-
51
. 
CS
P 
Fo
re
ig
n,
 1
54
7-
15
53
, 
22
8,
 p
.5
2.
 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
83
, p
.1
48
. 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
87
, p
.1
48
. 
N
LS
, A
dv
.M
SS
, 2
9.
2.
5,
 
f.1
50
. 
N
A
M
E 
D
av
id
O
nn
e 
D
av
id
 P
an
ite
r, 
bi
sh
op
 o
f 
R
os
s 
Jo
hn
 R
ou
ll,
 p
ri
or
 o
f 
Pi
tte
nw
ee
m
 a
n
d 
B
la
nt
yr
e 
(+
 
hi
s c
o
n
v
en
t a
t P
itt
en
w
ee
m
) 
Pa
tri
ck
, M
as
te
r o
f 
R
ut
hv
en
* 
Si
r J
am
es
 S
an
di
la
nd
s 
o
f 
Ca
ld
er
, l
or
d 
S1
. J
oh
n,
 
pr
ec
ep
to
r o
f T
or
ph
ic
he
n,
 
pl
us
 tw
o 
o
r 
th
re
e 
pa
ge
s ..
 
37
5 
G
ift
 o
f t
em
po
ra
lit
y 
o
f t
he
 a
bb
ey
 o
f 
Ca
m
bu
sk
en
ne
th
 (1
54
8/9
); 
gi
ft 
o
f w
a
rd
 
a
n
d 
n
o
n
-e
n
tr
y 
(1
55
0/1
); 
gi
ft 
o
f e
sc
he
at
 
(1
55
0/1
); 
gi
ve
n 
A
bb
ey
 o
fl
'A
by
se
 in
 
Po
ic
to
u 
(15
51
). 
G
ra
nt
ed
 a
 r
em
is
si
on
 (1
55
0);
 re
ce
iv
ed
 
1,
20
0 
liv
re
s 
to
ur
no
is
 fr
om
 M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
 
o
n
 b
eh
al
f o
f h
is
 fa
th
er
, W
ill
ia
m
, 3
rd
 lo
rd
 
R
ut
hv
en
 (1
55
0)
, a
n
d 
40
0 
cr
o
w
n
s 
fo
r 
hi
m
se
lf(
15
50
/1)
. 
G
ra
nt
ed
 a 
le
tte
r o
f p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
a
n
d 
sa
fe
gu
ar
d 
fo
r h
is 
tim
e 
in
 F
ra
nc
e 
(15
50
). 
G
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ER
A
L 
C
O
M
M
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TS
 
Tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 F
ra
nc
e 
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 P
rio
r o
f S
1. 
A
nd
re
w
s' 
re
tin
ue
. 
A
m
ba
ss
ad
or
 to
 F
ra
nc
e 
(1
54
4-
52
); 
pr
ov
id
ed
 to
 t
he
 
bi
sh
op
ric
 o
f R
os
s 
(15
47
); 
in
 F
ra
nc
e 
fo
r M
ar
y,
 Q
ue
en
 
o
f S
co
ts
' m
ar
ria
ge
 to
 th
e 
D
au
ph
in
 (1
55
8);
 di
ed
 
(15
58
). 
Tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 F
ra
nc
e 
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 P
rio
r o
f S
t. 
A
nd
re
w
s' 
re
tin
ue
. 
Qu
es
tio
na
ble
 lo
ya
lty
 in
 1
54
7 
w
he
n 
it 
w
as
 th
ou
gh
t h
e 
w
o
u
ld
 su
rr
en
de
r P
er
th
 to
 th
e 
En
gl
is
h 
fo
r a
 p
ric
e;
 
su
cc
ee
de
d 
hi
s f
at
he
r, 
W
ill
ia
m
, 2
n
d 
lo
rd
 R
ut
hv
en
 as
 
he
rit
ab
le
 s
he
rif
f a
n
d 
pr
ov
os
t o
f P
er
th
 (1
55
2)
; r
ef
us
ed
 
to
 s
u
pp
re
ss
 th
e 
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n 
at
 P
er
th
 (M
ay
 15
59
); 
ig
no
re
d 
a 
su
m
m
o
n
s 
by
 th
e 
Qu
ee
n R
eg
en
t t
o 
su
pp
or
t 
th
e 
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n 
m
ili
ta
ril
y 
at
 C
up
ar
 (J
un
e 1
55
9);
 
n
eg
ot
ia
to
r f
or
 th
e 
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
Qu
ee
n 
R
eg
en
t; 
o
n
e 
o
f t
he
 c
o
m
m
is
si
on
er
s w
ho
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
d 
a
n
d 
si
gn
ed
 th
e 
tr
ea
ty
 o
f B
er
w
ic
k 
(1
55
9/6
0)
; 
su
bs
cr
ib
er
 to
 th
e 
'T
hi
rd
 B
an
d'
 a
t L
ei
th
 (A
pr
il 
15
60
); 
pl
ay
ed
 a
 le
ad
in
g 
ro
le
 in
 th
e 
m
u
rd
er
 o
f R
ic
ci
o 
(15
66
). 
R
ef
on
ne
r a
n
d 
m
e
m
be
r o
f t
he
 L
or
ds
 o
f t
he
 
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n;
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 th
e 
C
on
gr
eg
at
io
n'
s p
et
iti
on
 
to
 M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
 (N
ov
em
be
r 1
55
8).
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e 
G
U
IS
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S 
T
R
IP
 (1
55
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15
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) 
R
E
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R
E
N
C
ES
 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
79
, p
.1
46
. 
RS
S,
 IV
, 1
36
, 1
04
9,
 1
13
9,
 
pp
.2
1,
 1
72
, 1
84
;N
LS
, 
A
dv
.M
SS
, 2
9.
2.
5,
 f.
15
0;
 
Ba
lc
ar
re
s P
ap
er
s,
 II
, c
cx
iii
, 
pp
. 2
45
-8
; H
BC
, p
.3
19
. 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
79
, p
.1
46
. 
RS
S,
 IV
, 7
60
, p
.1
29
; N
LS
, 
A
dv
.M
SS
, 2
9.
2.
5,
 f.
13
4;
 
Sc
ot
tis
h 
Co
rr
es
po
nd
en
ce
, 
cc
x
x
x
v
, 
pp
. 3
45
-7
. 
RS
S,
 IV
, p
.8
82
, p
p.
 1
47
-8
. 
N
A
M
E 
Jo
hn
 S
em
pi
ll 
o
fF
ow
lw
od
* 
H
en
ry
 S
in
cl
ai
r, 
de
an
 o
f 
G
la
sg
ow
 
37
6 
G
ra
nt
ed
 fu
ll 
lic
en
se
 a
n
d 
fre
e 
po
w
er
 a
n
d 
fa
cu
lty
 to
 p
as
s i
nt
o 
Fr
an
ce
'a
nd
 o
n
y 
u
th
ir 
pa
rti
s b
ey
on
d 
se
y 
to
 th
e 
sc
u
lis
 fo
r d
oi
ng
 
o
f h
is 
u
th
iri
s l
ef
ul
l b
es
yn
es
 a
n
d 
er
an
di
s' 
(15
50
). 
G
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A
L 
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O
M
M
EN
TS
 
Th
e 
Se
m
pi
lls
 w
er
e 
fa
ith
fu
l a
dh
er
en
ts 
to
 t
he
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 C
hu
rc
h 
an
d 
lo
ya
l s
u
pp
or
te
rs
 o
f M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
. 
Lo
rd
 o
f S
es
sio
n 
(15
37
); 
A
bb
ot
 o
f K
ilw
in
ni
ng
 
(15
41
); 
be
ca
m
e 
D
ea
n 
o
f G
la
sg
ow
 a
fte
r e
x
ch
an
gi
ng
 
K
ilw
in
ni
ng
 w
ith
 G
av
in
 H
am
ilt
on
 (1
55
0);
 di
d 
n
o
t 
re
tu
rn
 to
 S
co
tla
nd
 fr
om
 F
ra
nc
e 
u
n
til
 1
55
4;
 w
o
rk
ed
 
fo
r t
he
 in
te
rn
al
 re
fo
rm
 o
f a
bu
se
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
Ch
ur
ch
 
an
d 
w
as
 o
n
e 
o
f G
ui
se
's 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 fo
r p
ap
al
 
v
isi
to
r; 
n
eg
ot
ia
tin
g 
co
m
m
is
si
on
er
 fo
r t
he
 tr
ea
ty
 o
f 
Ca
rli
sle
 (1
55
6) 
an
d 
U
ps
et
tli
ng
to
n 
(15
59
); 
su
cc
ee
de
d 
R
ob
er
t R
ei
d 
as
 P
re
si
de
nt
 o
f t
he
 C
ol
le
ge
 o
f J
us
tic
e 
(15
58
); 
re
ce
iv
ed
 g
ift
 o
f t
em
po
ra
lit
ie
s 
fo
r t
he
 se
e 
o
f 
R
os
s u
po
n 
th
e 
de
at
h 
o
f D
av
id
 P
an
ite
r (
15
58
) a
n
d 
pr
ov
id
ed
 to
 th
e 
bi
sh
op
ric
 in
 1
56
1;
 d
ie
d 
at
 P
ar
is 
(15
65
). 
A
pp
en
di
x 
A
: 
SC
O
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 IN
 F
R
A
N
C
E 
D
U
R
IN
G
 M
A
R
IE
 d
e 
G
il
lS
E
'S
 T
R
IP
 (1
55
0-1
55
1) 
R
E
FE
R
E
N
C
ES
 
RS
S,
 IV
, 8
88
, p
.1
48
; N
LS
, 
A
dv
.M
SS
, 2
9.
2.
5,
 f.
13
4.
 
CS
P 
Fo
re
ig
n,
 1
54
7-
15
53
, 
22
8,
 p
.5
2;
 R
SS
, I
V
, 6
44
-6
, 
82
0,
 p
p.
 1
09
-1
10
; 1
37
-8
. 
N
A
M
E 
Ja
m
es
 S
om
er
vi
lle
 in
 
H
um
bi
e,
 6
th
 lo
rd
 S
om
er
vi
lle
 
M
as
te
r J
 01
m 
Sp
ot
tis
w
oo
de
, 
re
ct
or
/p
ar
so
n 
o
f C
al
de
r 
Lo
rd
 Ja
m
es
 S
te
w
ar
t, 
co
m
m
en
da
to
r o
f K
el
so
 a
n
d 
M
el
ro
se
* 
37
7 
G
ift
 o
f n
o
n
-e
n
tr
y 
(15
49
/50
). 
G
ra
nt
ed
 a 
le
tte
r o
f p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
a
n
d 
sa
fe
gu
ar
d 
fo
r h
is 
tim
e 
in
 F
ra
nc
e 
(15
50
). 
3,
00
0 
e
c
u
s 
fro
m
 M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
 (1
55
1).
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A
L 
C
O
M
M
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TS
 
U
nl
ik
e 
hi
s 
fa
th
er
, H
ig
h,
 5
th 
lo
rd
 S
om
er
vi
lle
, w
ho
 w
as
 
an
 '
a
ss
u
re
d 
Sc
ot
' a
n
d 
pe
ns
io
ne
r o
f H
en
ry
 V
II
I, 
Ja
m
es
 w
as
 a
 s
u
pp
or
te
r o
f t
he
 F
ra
nc
o-
Sc
ot
tis
h 
al
lia
nc
e 
a
n
d 
M
ar
ie
 d
e 
G
ui
se
; h
el
pe
d 
to
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
 
C
ha
te
lh
er
au
lt'
s r
es
ig
na
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 re
ge
nc
y 
(15
53
-4)
; 
tr
av
el
le
d 
to
 F
ra
nc
e 
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 P
rio
r o
f S
t. 
A
nd
re
w
s' 
re
tin
ue
 (1
55
0);
 ne
go
tia
te
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n 
o
n
 b
eh
al
f o
f t
he
 Q
ue
en
 R
eg
en
t (
Ju
ly 
15
59
); 
de
fe
ct
ed
 to
 th
e 
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n 
in
 1
56
0,
 
pr
es
um
ab
ly
 w
he
n 
it 
w
as
 c
le
ar
 th
at
 F
ra
nc
e 
w
as
 n
o
t 
go
in
g 
to
 r
es
po
nd
 to
 E
ng
la
nd
's 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n;
 s
ig
ne
d 
'T
hi
rd
 B
an
d'
 o
f t
he
 C
on
gr
eg
at
io
n 
a
t L
ei
th
 (A
pr
il 
15
60
) a
n
d 
th
e 
ra
tif
ic
at
io
n 
o
f t
he
 tr
ea
ty
 o
f B
er
w
ic
k 
(M
ay
 15
60
); 
v
o
te
d 
ag
ai
ns
t C
on
fes
sio
n o
f F
ai
th
 in
 
Pa
rli
am
en
t a
n
d 
re
fu
se
d 
to
 s
u
bs
cr
ib
e 
to
 th
e 
Bo
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